Granting the Lansing Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, and Dismissing Counts 1, 7 8 (Federal Claims) and Count 5 (IIED) as to Police Defendants as Untimely; Counts 2, 3 and 4 (False Arrest, False Imprisonment, A B) as to All Defendants as Untimely; Count 6 (Malicious Prosecution) as to All Defendants for Failure to State a Claim

Dismissing the Lansing Police Department;

Denying without prejudice the Sparrow Health Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment: Allowing Sparrow et al. to File Renewed Summary-Judgment Motion After Close of Discovery

Granting in Part, and Denying without Prejudice in Part, Greyhound's Motion to Dismiss: Denying Motion to Dismiss Count 1 ( 42 USC 1981) and Count 5 (IIED) as to Greyhound; Dismissing Count 3 (False Imprisonment) as to Greyhound because it is Untimely as to All Defendants; Dismissing Count 9 (International Law) as to All Defendants for Failure to State a Claim

OPINION AND ORDER

PAUL MALONEY, District JudgePage 3

This is a federal civil-rights action with pendent state-law tort claims. Plaintiff David Aslani ("Aslani") has asserted nine claims. Numerous defendants have filed motions to dismiss or motions for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, the court will dismiss the following parties from the case: the Lansing Police Department ("LPD"), because it is not a juridical entity; and the individual Lansing Police Officers, because all nine claims are meritless or untimely as to them.

The court will dismiss five counts as to all defendants. Counts 2, 3 and 4 (Michigan common-law claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and assault battery) are barred by the applicable Michigan two-year statute of limitations, and Aslani has not shown the propriety of equitable tolling. Count 6 (Michigan common-law claim for malicious prosecution) fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted, because the underlying criminal proceedings did not terminate favorably to Aslani. Count 9 (claims under the United Nations Convention Against Torture ("CAT") and the UN's Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR")).

Thus, only four claims remain, all of which appear to be governed a three-year statute of limitations under Michigan law: counts 1, 7 and 8 (federal civil-rights claims) and count 5 (intentional infliction of emotional distress, "IIED").

Aslani describes himself as a Muslim and "an Iranian-born naturalized citizen of the United States" who "is olive-skinned and outwardly appears to be of Middle Eastern descent." See Complaint filed March 31, 2008 ("Comp") ¶¶ 13 35; First Amended Complaint filed July 21, 2008 ("Am Comp") ¶¶ 15 17. Aslani had a valid Greyhound bus ticket for a round trip from Detroit to Lansing and back. On April 1, 2005, Aslani was attempting to use the return portion of that ticket, going from Lansing to Detroit. Aslani urgently needed to get home because his wife was waiting for him with his blood-pressure medication, which he had forgotten to take with him on the trip. Comp ¶¶ 1-2.

Aslani approached the Greyhound bus driver, showed him the valid ticket, and, it seems, explained that he needed to get on the next bus, not a later bus, in order to get his medication as soon as possible; Aslani indicated that he would stand in the aisle or "squeeze" himself on a seat with other passengers. Comp ¶ 3. Aslani does not mention whether there was a seat available within the customary, contemplated use of the seats, i.e., with enough room for each person to be reasonably comfortable and not unduly cramped or imposed upon. Nor does he relate the driver's response, if any, to his request.

While the driver was busy with luggage and talking to other passengers, Aslani boarded the bus and "easily" found a seat. Comp ¶ 4. A few minutes later, two City of Lansing police officers boarded the bus, approached Aslani, and "advised him with hostility, anger, and disrespect that he had to get off the bus immediately, otherwise he would be arrested for trespassing." Comp ¶ 6. Aslani explained to the police that he had a valid ticket, which he showed them, and that he needed to get back to Detroit urgently to get his blood-pressure medication that he had forgotten to take on the trip, Comp ¶ 7, but the police again ordered him to get off the bus or he would be arrested for trespassing, Comp ¶ 8. Aslani claims that he complied and got off the bus. Comp ¶ 9.

Aslani alleges that both Lansing Police Department ("LPD") and Capital Area Transportation Authority ("CATA") security officers directed racial slurs at him, such as "fuckin[g] Arab", while he was at the Greyhound bus terminal. Comp ¶ 11. Aslani alleges that he was then "subjected to monstrous mistreatments, in the form of brutal beating, terrorizing tasering and yes, terrifying torture, with . . . intense cruelty. . . ." Comp ¶ 12. Aslani asserts that he was subjected to disparate treatment due to his religion (Islam), as evinced by the fact that CATA or LPD officers told him "pray now" and called him a "fuckin[g] Moslem" while they were beating, throwing, and tasering him, and by the fact that they desecrated his Muslim holy book. Comp ¶ 13.

On April 25, 2005, Aslani was charged in the State Court of Ingham County, Michigan, with trespassing, two counts of resisting and obstructing a police officer, and one count of assault and battery, and assigned a court-appointed attorney over his objections. The prosecutor offered a bargain in which Aslani would plead guilty to a simple misdemeanor for trespassing and the State would drop the other charges. Comp ¶¶ 14-16. Aslani contends that he was wrongfully denied access to surveillance videos from the Greyhound bus terminal, the CATA station, and the Sparrow Hospital emergency room, where he was allegedly "subjected to various savage . . . treatments, including but not limited to, beating, tasering, cathe[te]rization and medical torture, and verbal and physical and psychological abuses." Comp ¶ 17.

At a September 2006 state-court hearing, the state prosecutor offered Aslani this plea agreement: plead nolo contendere (no contest) to misdemeanor trespassing and misdemeanor resisting and obstructing an officer, and pay a fine up to $200, and in return the prosecution would drop the other charges and vacate the order that had prohibited Aslani from carrying firearms. Comp ¶ 18. Feeling pressured, Aslani reluctantly accepted the plea bargain because his attorney led him to believe that a no-contest plea was not an admission that he was guilty of committing any offense. Comp ¶¶ 19-21. The Michigan Court of Appeals denied Aslani's application for leave to appeal in October 2007, see Comp ¶ 24 (not available on WestLaw), and the Michigan Supreme Court denied review in April 2008, see People v. Aslani, 747 N.W.2d 307 (Mich. 2008).

Aslani filed the original complaint in this court on March 31, 2008, one day less than three years after his allegedly false arrest and imprisonment and the other alleged torts of the defendants. The original complaint named four institutional defendants — the LPD, Greyhound, CATA, and Sparrow Health Systems — and no individual defendants.

Before the defendants filed any response to the original complaint, Aslani filed the first amended complaint in July 2008. Because none of the defendants had filed a responsive pleading by that time, Aslani was entitled to amend his complaint once "as of right", i.e., without leave of court or opposing counsel. Essroc Cement Corp. v. CPRIN, Inc., 2009 WL 129809, *1 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 20, 2009) (Maloney, C.J.) (citing Rogers v. AK Steel Corp., 1998 WL 1753590, *2 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 16, 1998) ("'A party may amend the party's pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served. . . .'") (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)); McCready v. Michigan State Bar Standing Comm., 926 F. Supp. 618, 620 (W.D. Mich. 1995) (McKeague, J.) ("Plaintiff was entitled to file his amended complaint as of right under FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a), because defendant had failed to file an answer to his original complaint."), aff'd o.g., 1996 WL 637484 (6^th Cir. Nov. 4, 1996). Accordingly, the court accepted Aslani's amended complaint for filing.

The amended complaint kept the four institutional defendants and added 16 individual defendants: seven alleged employees of Sparrow (doctors, nurses, and administrators), one alleged Greyhound employee (bus driver Ed Lewis), two alleged CATA employees (security officers Fowler and Becker), and six alleged City of Lansing employees (police officers). The amended complaint asserts three federal claims, five state-law claims, and one claim under international law: 42 U.S.C. § 1981Count 2, Am Comp ¶¶ 49-61 False Arrest Count 3, Am Comp ¶¶ 62-73 False Imprisonment Count 4, Am Comp ¶¶ 74-83 Assault and Battery / Excessive Force Count 6, Am Comp ¶¶ 90-106 Malicious Prosecution 42 U.S.C. § 1983 42 U.S.C. § 1985Count 9, Am Comp ¶¶ 123-125 UDHR and CAT

Aslani demands a jury trial. See Am Comp at 1.

The Lansing Police Defendants. On October 8, 2008, seven defendants filed both an answer to the first amended complaint, and a motion to dismiss ("MTD") the first amended complaint: the Lansing Police Department and Lansing Police Officers Paul Beasinger, Kevin Schlagel, Shannon Thielen, and Nathaniel Osborn; Lansing Police Captain Theresa Szymanski; and Lansing Police Chief Mark Alley (collectively "the Lansing Police Defendants"). In October 2008, this court denied the Lansing Police Defendants' dispositive motion without prejudice for failure to comply with W.D. MICH. LCIVR 7.1(d), which requires a movant to consult with opposing counsel in an attempt to obtain concurrence before filing a motion, and to affirmatively state in their motion the efforts that they made to obtain concurrence. See Aslani v. Sparrow Health Sys., 2008 WL 2642617 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 20, 2008) (Maloney, C.J.).

DISCUSSION: The Lansing Police Defendants' Renewed Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint

On November 4, 2008, the Lansing defendants filed a renewed motion to dismiss the amended complaint under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted ("Lansing Police MTD"). Aslani filed an opposition brief on December 2, 2008, and the Lansing defendants elected not to file a reply brief. The Lansing defendants first seek to dismiss the LPD on the ground that it is not an entity suable eo nomine, in its own name. See Lansing Police MTD at 2 ¶ 8. They acknowledge that official-capacity claims against Lansing police employees constitute claims against the City of Lansing, but they note that Aslani did not raise any official-capacity claims against the Lansing police employees (in fact, did not name them as defendants at all) until the amended complaint.

The amended complaint was not filed until July 21, 2008. That was more than the three years allowed on the federal civil-rights claims (counts 1, 7 and 8) by MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.5805(10) and the state-law IIED claim (count 5). A fortiori, it was more than the two years allowed on the state-law false arrest, false imprisonment, and assault battery claims (counts 2-4) by MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.5805(2).

The Lansing Police defendants also seek to dismiss the malicious prosecution claim (count 6). They argue that it is duplicative of the false-imprisonment claim and/or that it fails on its merits.

The Lansing Police defendants' motion does not address count 9, which asserts a claim for violation of the UDHR and the CAT. But that claim will be dismissed as to all defendants for failure to state a claim, for the reasons stated below in the discussion of Greyhound's motion to dismiss.

In his brief opposing the Lansing Police defendants' motion to dismiss, Aslani spends much time on matters that are irrelevant to the arguments for dismissal and/or legally or factually mistaken.

For example, Aslani complains that the Lansing defendants have not filed "responsive pleadings" to the first amended complaint and thus should be subject to entry of default judgment, id. at 1-2 and 3-4 and 15-16. Aslani is advised that defendants are required to file either an answer or a dispositive motion (motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment) within 20 days of being served with the complaint. See Phelps v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., 2008 WL 3978318, *3 (E.D. Mich Aug. 22, 2008) ("[A] defendant may properly defend as required by Rule 55(a) in ways other than filing an answer, such as by filing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.") (citing, inter alia, In re Sumitomo Copper Lit., 204 F.R.D. 58, 61-62 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)).

Moreover, the Lansing Police Defendants are not required to file an answer to the amended complaint until after the court rules on their pending motion to dismiss. Almost every court to consider this latter issue has concluded that "[p]ursuant to Rule 12(a)(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, once a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is filed a defendant need not file its answer until 10 days following the denial of the motion to dismiss." Woodruff v. McPhie, 593 F. Supp.2d 273, ___ n. 2 (D.D.C. 2009) ("Therefore, the defendant's answer cannot be considered untimely as the Court is now just ruling on the defendant's motion to dismiss.").

The court adopts this view and finds that the Lansing Police Defendants have complied with the Rules regarding the filing of answers and dispositive motions. There is no basis for entering default or for sanctioning the Lansing Police Defendants for "failing" to file an answer while their timely Rule 12 motion to dismiss is pending. See, e.g., FaceBook, Inc. v. ConnectU, LLC, 2007 WL 1725441, *2 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2007) ("Pacific Northwest and Williams need not file an answer until 20 days after the issuance of a written order denying their pending motion to dismiss, in the event the Court so rules."); Reeder v. Knapik, 2007 WL 1521100, *-2 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2007) ("Knapik timely filed a Rule 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss plaintiff[']s for insufficiency of service of process. * * * Accordingly, Knapik is not in default but is entirely within the procedures set forth in the Federal Rules. . . . Knapik need not file an answer unless and until the Court enters a ruling on his motion. . . ."); Combs v. Valdez, 2005 WL 2291626, *1 n. 3 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 13, 2005) ("[They] were served on June 16, 2005; they timely filed the instant motion to dismiss on July 6, 2005. Thus, pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(4), [they] need not file an answer or other responsive pleading until 10 days after the District Court determines the instant motion. . . .").

Nor can the court conclude that the Lansing Police Defendants conceded allegations in Aslani's complaint by "failing" to file an answer which denies them. Krajicek v. Justin, 1999 WL 195734, * 1 (6^th Cir. Mar. 23, 1999) (Boggs, Clay, 11^th Cir. J. Godbold) ("defendants filed a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer to the complaint. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(4). Thus, we will not construe their failure to deny the allegations in the complaint as an admission under Rule 8(d).").

Aslani also seems to assert that "the City of Lansing has been one of the Defendants in the case at hand", id. at 2, even though neither the original complaint nor the amended complaint names the City of Lansing as a defendant. Perhaps Aslani means to say that, once he amended the complaint to include official-capacity claims against the individual Lansing police defendants, those claims effectively were claims against the City of Lansing (which is correct). In any event, as discussed below, the court will dismiss the Lansing Police Department and substitute the City of Lansing as a party defendant in its place.

Next, Aslani complains that the Lansing Police Defendants failed to comply with W.D. MICH. LCIVR 7.1(d) when they filed their first motion to dismiss, id. at 2-3. But this court already agreed with Aslani on that point, and used it as the basis for denying without prejudice the Lansing Police Defendants' first motion to dismiss (as Aslani acknowledges at Aslani Lansing Opp at 5).

Aslani next complains that the Lansing Police defendants are being dishonest when they invoke FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) and contend that he fails to state a claim against them on which relief can be granted. Id. at 3. The court notes that this is not a question of honesty or good faith, but merely a disagreement between adversaries over whether certain counts state a claim on which relief can be granted under the prevailing case law. Aslani then charges that the Lansing defendants are lying when they state that he "'filed his complaint [on] July 21, 2008,' which they should have known is absolutely untrue." Aslani Lansing Opp at 3. Aslani seems to miss two points of law here. First, once the court accepts an amended complaint for filing, it automatically replaces the original complaint. Malik v. AT T Mobility LLC, 2008 WL 4104555, *3 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2008) (Maloney, C.J.) and ABB, Inc. v. Reed City Power Line Supply Co., 2007 WL 2713731, *1 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 18, 2007) (Maloney, J.) (both quoting FL Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 702 (1982) (White, J., concurring in part dissenting in part o.g., joined by 3 JJ.)). The filing of the amended complaint renders the original null and void. Essroc Cement Corp. v. CPRIN Recycling, Inc., 2009 WL 129809, *1 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 20, 2009) (Maloney, C.J.) (citing B H Med., LLC v. ABP Admin, Inc., 526 F.3d 257, 268 n. 8 (6^th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted)). Thus, for most purposes, the original complaint has no effect, as if it never existed.

Second, the date when a superseded complaint was filed may be relevant under the "relation back" doctrine. Under that doctrine, which is codified at FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c) and MICH. CT. R. 2.118(D), an amended complaint is sometimes deemed to be filed on the date of the original complaint. See generally Moore v. Tenn., 267 F. App'x 450, 454-56 (6^th Cir. 2008). In the limitations analysis below, the court will explain why Aslani's amended complaint does not "relate back" to the time when he filed the original complaint.

DISCUSSION Plaintiff's Request for Rule 11 Sanctions against the Lansing Police Defendants

Next, Aslani seeks Rule 11 sanctions against the Lansing Police Defendants. He writes:

Defendants, through their attorneys, by placing a simple telephone call to the office of the clerk of this Court could have readily ascertained the fact that, under the attendant circumstances in the case at bar, they had been served timely, and thereby there was no necessity for filing the concerned vexatious and misleading motion for dismissal under the attendance circumstances in the case at bar.

Therefore, in their failure to provide their responsive pleadings to the plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, the said Defendants have failed to exercise reasonable inquiry and thereby have failed to utilize due diligence and in such a failure they have violated the requirement under FED. R. CIV. P. 11, which mandates that every motion is well grounded in fact and it is warranted by existing law or a good-faith argument [for a change in the law] and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. When a motion is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the motion, including a reasonable attorney's fee. [citation omitted]

* * *

Defendants have asserted that they had "left a detailed message on the basis of Defendants' Motion to dismiss. . . ." (please see pages 1-2 of the said motion). The fact of the matter is that Mr. David Otis, the attorney for the said Defendants, left only a one-sentence message in which he had advised the plaintiff that he was "calling to seek concurrence in our motion for summary judgment based on statute of limitations." That sentence a detailed message does not make, as under the dictionary definition the term "detailed" has been "characterized by abundant use of detail or thoroughness of treatment" [citation omitted].

Aslani Lansing Op at 4-6.

Aslani's request for Rule 11 sanctions fails for two independent reasons. First, "the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure governing non-discovery sanctions provides that '[a] motion for sanctions under this rule shall be made separately from other motions or requests. . . .'" Griffin v. Reznick, ___ F. Supp.2d ___, ___, 2008 WL 5110528, * 11 n. 6 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 2, 2008) (Maloney, C.J.) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(1)(A)). "The drafters instruct that a separate motion is one that is 'not simply included as an additional prayer for relief contained in another motion.'" Griffin, 2008 WL 5110528 at * 11 n. 6 (quoting Ridder v. City of Springfield, 109 F.3d 288, 294 n. 7 (6^th Cir. 1997) (quoting Advisory Comm. Notes to 1993 Amendments of FED. R. CIV. P. 11)).

If Aslani wished to pursue Rule 11 sanctions against the Lansing Defendants, he would have to "follow a two-step process: first, serve the Rule 11 motion on the opposing party for a designated period (at least twenty-one days); and then file the motion with the court." Griffin, 2008 WL 5110528 at * 11 n. 6 (quoting Ridder, 109 F.3d at 294). A Rule 11 request that fails to comply with this "safe harbor" provision must be denied or disregarded. Griffin, 2008 WL 5110528 at * 11 n. 6 (citing Standard Ins. Co. v. Cooper-Pipkin, 2008 WL 5000044 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 24, 2008) and Ferris v. Rollins College, Inc., 2008 WL 4569872 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 9, 2008) ("Plaintiff also did not follow the procedural requirements to request sanctions, such as filing a separate motion with the Court. Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion for sanctions is denied.")).

The second reason why this court will not impose Rule 11 sanctions against the Lansing Defendants at this juncture is that

Aslani has not identified any conduct by the Lansing Police defendants that could possibly warrant Rule 11 sanctions. Specifically, there was nothing inappropriate or unethical about the Lansing police defendants electing to file a motion to dismiss instead of an answer, or in waiting until the resolution of their motion to dismiss before filing an answer. Nor was there anything sanctionable in the their representation that they left a "detailed" voicemail with Aslani to request his concurrence in the instant renewed motion to dismiss.

Because 42 U.S.C. sections 1981, 1983 and 1985(3) do not provide their own statutes of limitation, the court "borrows" the most closely analogous statute of limitations in the State where the events giving rise to the claims occurred. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276-80 (1985); Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 539 (1989) (court also must borrow the State's tolling provisions); Mulligan v. Schlachter, 389 F.2d 231 (6^th Cir. 1968).

Aslani does not contest the Lansing Police Defendants' contention that his three federal civil-rights claims (counts 1, 7 and 8, under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 and 1985(3), respectively) are governed by Michigan's three-year statute of limitations for personal-injury claims, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.5805(10), see Aslani Lansing Opp at 6. The court holds that Aslani's section 1981 claim and his section 1983 claim are governed by a three-year limitations period:

There is no dispute that the applicable statute of limitations based on violations of 42 USC 1981 and 42 USC 1983 is a state's statute of limitations governing personal injury, Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 676 . . . (1987) . . . which in this state is three years.

Aslani also does not contest the Lansing Police Defendants' contention that his state-law claims for assault battery and false imprisonment (counts 3 and 4) are governed by the two-year limitations period set forth in MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.5805(2), and the court so holds. See Salter v. Lanni, 1999 WL 33455064, *1 (Mich.App. Jan. 19, 1999) (p.c.) (P.J. Hoekstra, Doctoroff, O'Connell) (citing Lemmerman v. Fealk, 534 N.W.2d 695, 697 (Mich. 1995) ("Claims for assault and battery normally must be brought within two years after they accrue. . . .")); Christopoulos v. Socall, 2008 WL 2220589, *1 (Mich.App. May 29, 2008) (p.c.) (P.J. Servitto, Cavanagh, Kelly) ("The statute of limitations for assault and battery is two years.") (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.5805(2)), app. den., 759 N.W.2d 390 (Mich. 2009); Lyman v. Toundas Motor Sports Group, Inc., 2007 WL 705035, *3 (Mich.App. Mar. 8, 2007) (p.c.) (P.J. Hoekstra, Markey, Wilder) (same);

Likewise, the court holds that Aslani's false-arrest claim (count 2) is governed by the two-year limitations period set forth in MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.5805(2). See Wolfe v. Perry, 412 F.3d 707, 715 (6^th Cir. 2005) (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.5805(2)); see also Watford v. City of Cleveland, 1996 WL 733138, *1 (6^th Cir. Dec. 18, 1996) (p.c.) (Engel, Brown, Cole) (applying two-year limitations period to section 1983 claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, illegal search and seizure, and invasion of privacy); Kearney v. Ohio Dep't of Indus. Relations, 1996 WL 290265, *1 (6^th Cir. May 31, 1996) (p.c.) (Siler, Batchelder, D.J. Carr) ("His claims for false arrest and imprisonment . . . also are barred because he did not file suit within two years.") (citing, inter alia, Browning v. Pendleton, 869 F.2d 989, 992 (6^th Cir. 1989)); Hirmuz v. City of Madison Hts., 469 F. Supp.2d 466, 477 (E.D. Mich. 2007) (David Lawson, J.) ("Under state law false arrest claims themselves must be commenced within two years.") (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.5805(2)).

Aslani's IIED claim (count 5), however, is governed by Michigan's three -year statute of limitations for personal-injury claims, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.5805(10). See Bell v. Kostanko, 2004 WL 1505509, *1 n. 2 (Mich.App. July 6, 2004) (p.c.) (P.J. O'Connell, Jansen, Wilder) ("a three-year period of limitation applies to plaintiff's claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress") (citing Lemmerman v. Fealk, 534 N.W.2d 695, 697 (Mich. 1995) ("claims for negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress must be brought within three years after they accrue in order to avoid the limitation bar.")).

Aslani concedes that he did not amend the complaint to name the individual LPD defendants until more than three years after their alleged wrongs, and therefore, that counts 2, 3 and 4 will be time-barred as to the Lansing Police Defendants absent equitable tolling. Aslani contends, however, that this court should equitably toll those limitations periods to exclude the time during which he was "diligently and relentlessly" pursuing his state remedies, by which he means his direct appeal from his criminal conviction and sentence. See Aslani Lansing Opp at 6-7. Aslani describes his efforts in the state criminal courts as follows:

[S]ubsequent to the September 18, 2006, hearing, at the state trial court, the Plaintiff has made numerous and at times arduous attempts and efforts to obtain a copy of his trial court record on file, however, to no avail, and thereby he has been denied his right to a copy of the register of actions and the final order, which according to the clerk of the trial court constituted a "$200.00 sentence," among other orders that unlawfully had been entered against him from the bench by the state trial court. Incredibly, to deny the Plaintiff his right to perfect and prosecute his appeal, to date of this filing he has been denied his right to a copy of the final order, or any other order for that matter, that he had meant to make his appeal from. According to the Michigan Court of Appeals, the state trial court had not entered any order f[rom] which the Plaintiff could make an appeal. It is an established doctrine that a court speaks through its orders; in the underlying case, however, such a principle has been rendered anathema to the rules of law under American jurisprudence.

Moreover, it was after 293 days of intentional delay and after various complaints and communications relative to this matter that had been made by the Plaintiff with the personnel of the Michigan trial court, including the reporter, herself, and others, such as judges at the state trial court, who did not lift a finger to assist him, that the court reporter finally provided him with the transcript of the September 18, 2006, hearing, in the course of which the state trial court had entered its final order for the said $200.00 sentence and other unlawful orders such as denying him from the bench his right to res gestae witnesses.

The said transcript, however, not only was provided to the Plaintiff intentionally 293 days dilatorily, but also had failed to constitute a verbatim recording of the said hearing in violation of MCR 8.108(8), and thereby it has caused further denial of the Plaintiff's established rights, inter alia, under the due process of law and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment in perfecting and prosecuting his meritorious appeal in order to establish his innocence. Despite, his facing such obstruction of justice, and enduring considerable hardship, the Plaintiff has pursued his appeal and subsequent to exhausting his appeal in the state courts, he timely filed his Application for a Writ of Certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, whose disposition is still pending in that court.

Under the attendant circumstances in the Michigan state courts, the Plaintiff was misled into believing that the final order had been entered into the record, however, all of his diligent efforts heretofore to obtain a copy of the same ha[ve] been rendered naught; in fact, the Michigan Court of appeals denied the Plaintiff's right to appeal because it ruled that there had been no order, rendering his appeal defective for want of a final order, which has been due to the trickery practiced on him wantonly and flagrantly at the state trial court level, resulting in the denial of his federal constitutional rights. Nonetheless, because the Plaintiff . . . has been relentlessly exercising his rights to exhaust all of his state remedies in his assiduously perfecting and prosecuting his state appeals, and thereby the statute of limitations has been tolled in the case at bar. * * *

Aslani Lansing Opp at 7-9 (paragraph breaks added).

"Equitable tolling . . . has a legal basis arising out of our common law, and it may be invoked when traditional equitable reasons compel such a result." McDonald v. Farm Bur. Ins. Co., 747 N.W.2d 811, 819 (Mich. 2008) (Taylor, C.J.). Equitable tolling has been applied where the plaintiff actively pursued his judicial remedies by filing a defective pleading during the statutory period or the claimant has been induced or tricked by the defendant's misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to pass. Mazumder v. Univ. of Michigan Regents, 715 N.W.2d 96, 99 (Mich.App. 2006) (citing 51 AM. JUR.2d, LIMITATION OF ACTIONS § 174 at p. 563 ("The time requirements in lawsuits between private litigants are customarily subject to equitable tolling if such tolling is necessary to prevent unfairness to a diligent plaintiff.")), rev'd in part on other grounds, 743 N.W.2d 889 (Mich. 2008). But the equitable-tolling doctrine "must and should be rarely invoked", and then only when necessary "to ensure fundamental practicality and fairness and to prevent the unjust technical forfeiture of a cause of action." Mazumder, 715 N.W.2d at 99.

The doctrine does not always require wrongdoing by a defendant, but it "applies principally situations in which a defendant actively misleads a plaintiff about the cause of action or in which the plaintiff is prevented in some extraordinary way from asserting his rights. . . ." Mazumder, 715 N.W.2d at 107 (Mich.App. 2006) (citing Ward v. Rooney-Gandy, 696 N.W.2d 64, 67 (Mich.App. 2005)). "[T]he usual sort of conduct which may work an estoppel in the statute of limitations context" includes, for example, "an offer to compromise or settle plaintiff's claim, a representation that the limitations period was of much greater duration than it actually was, or part payment of plaintiff's claim." Lothian v. City of Detroit, 324 N.W.2d 9, 18 (Mich. 1982). Defendant conduct that may justify equitable tolling also includes "fraudulent concealment." Devillers v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n, 702 N.W.2d 539, 558-59 (Mich. 2005) (citing Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946)).

An absolute prerequisite of equitable tolling is the plaintiff's showing that he acted diligently. See Ward, 696 N.W.2d at 67 (citing 51 AM. JUR.2d, Limitation of Actions § 175 at p. 564). Aslani has not shown that he acted diligently with regard to the filing of the instant claims. Other than the malicious-prosecution claim, he has not shown that any of his claims' accrual or success depended on the progression or success of the direct appeal of his conviction. In other words, the progress and outcome of Aslani's criminal direct appeal had no bearing on his right to bring these claims in federal court or his ability to prevail on these claims. Therefore, any bad-faith delay of his prosecution of that appeal provides no excuse for his delay in bringing this action.

In any event, Aslani does not allege that any of these defendants misled him as to the accrual of these claims or the applicable limitations periods. This is significant, because the Michigan Supreme Court "has been reluctant to recognize an [equitable] estoppel [preventing a defendant from raising the limitations bar] absent intentional or negligent conduct" by a party defendant "designed to induce a plaintiff to refrain from bringing a timely action." Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Citizens Ins. Co., 562 N.W.2d 648, 655 (Mich. 1997) (p.c.) and Adams v. Detroit, 591 N.W.2d 67, 70 (Mich.App. 1998) (both citing Lothian v. City of Detroit, 324 N.W.2d 9, 12 (Mich. 1982)). Instead, Aslani alleges only obstruction and delay by the Michigan state courts. The caption of the amended complaint does not name any Michigan courts, judges or staff, as defendants in our case. See Wilson v. Plyler, 2007 WL 866233, *3 (Mich.App. Mar. 22, 2007) (p.c.) (P.J. Smolenski, Saad, Wilder) (Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5855 tolls a limitation period where "a person who is or may be liable for any claim fraudulently conceals the existence of the claim or the identity of any person who is liable for the claim from the knowledge of the person entitled to sue on the claim", but "plaintiff must plead in the complaint the acts or misrepresentations that comprised the fraudulent concealment") (quoting Doe v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of the Archdiocese of Detroit, 692 N.W.2d 398 (Mich.App. 2004) (citation omitted))).

Even putting aside the fact that none of the accused Michigan judges and court staff are defendants in this action, the court cannot find that it was their alleged delay of Aslani's criminal appeal which caused him — or reasonably could have caused him — to refrain from filing the instant action for so long after the April 1, 2005 incident. The court is skeptical that the Michigan courts' alleged obstruction actually caused Aslani to delay bringing this suit. Even if that was the cause, the court finds that it was not reasonable for Aslani to sit on these claims because of difficulties or delays in his state criminal appeal. Cf. Robertson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2007 WL 4553630, *4 (Mich.App. Dec. 27, 2007) (p.c.) (P.J. Saad, Owens, Kelly) ("We also reject plaintiff's assertion that equitable tolling is appropriate on the grounds that Allstate acted fraudulently. * * * [P]laintiff failed to create an issue of fact [as to whether] Allstate made any misrepresentation about her submission of a sworn proof of loss or that the alleged misrepresentation caused plaintiff to delay filing her complaints.") (footnote 6 omitted) (emphasis added).

Other than the state courts' allegedly improper obstacles to the prosecution of his criminal direct appeal, Aslani has not proffered any justification for waiting almost three years before filing the original complaint on March 31, 2008 (which asserted the instant claims against Sparrow Health, CATA, Greyhound, and the LPD). Less still has he shown any legal necessity, or other compelling justification, for waiting more than three years to assert these claims against the individual defendants (who were added only in the amended complaint, filed July 2008). If the record discloses any "inequity", it is "inadequate to sustain a claim for . . . tolling, because it is directly related to [Aslani]'s unassisted failure to comply with the . . . applicable time constraints, not on intervening, external circumstances." Sudut v. Botsford Gen. Hosp., 2007 WL 286539, *1 (Mich.App. Feb. 1, 2007) (p.c.) (P.J. Saad, Cavanagh, Schuette) (quoting Ward v. Siano, 730 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Mich.App. Nov. 24, 2006), judgment rev'd o.g., 741 N.W.2d 836 (Mich. 2006)).

In short, Aslani has not established his own diligence. He has not shown any misconduct by these defendants that could have misled him into thinking he had more time to bring these claims. Nor has he shown any misconduct by the defendants that could have misled him into thinking that he could not file this civil action until he had pushed his criminal appeal to a certain point. Absent such showings, this is not the rare case where limitations periods should be equitably tolled. See Sobh v. Farm Bur. Ins. Co. of Mich, 2007 WL 1206978, *2 (Mich.App. Apr. 24, 2007) (p.c.) (P.J. Cavanagh, Jansen, Borrello) and Downs v. Keebler, 2006 WL 3422546, *14 (Mich.App. Nov. 28, 2006) (p.c.) (P.J. Zahra, Cavanagh, Owens) ("Although courts undoubtedly possess equitable power [to toll a limitations period], such power has traditionally been reserved for 'unusual circumstances' such as fraud or mutual mistake.") (both quoting Devillers v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n, 702 N.W.2d 539, 556 (Mich. 2005) (internal alterations quote marks omitted, nn. 63 64 omitted)).

DISCUSSION: Count 6 (Malicious Prosecution) Fails to State a Claim Against Any Defendant

Under Michigan law, "a basic element of a cause of action for malicious prosecution is the termination of the criminal proceedings in favor of the accused." Cox v. Williams, 593 N.W.2d 173, 174 (Mich.App. 1999) (citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS 2D § 658 at pp. 416-17). Criminal proceedings are deemed to terminate in favor of the accused by (1) discharge by a magistrate at a preliminary hearing, (2) the grand jury's refusal to issue an indictment, (3) the prosecutor's formal abandonment of the proceedings, (4) the quashing of an indictment or information, (5) an acquittal, or (6) a final order in favor of the accused by a trial court or appellate court. Cox, 593 N.W.2d at 174-75 (citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS 2D § 659 at pp. 417).

It is undisputed that none of the first five events occurred, and it is no longer possible for them to occur. Thus, Aslani can state a claim for malicious prosecution only if he can show that the sixth event occurred, i.e., that he obtained a final order in his favor from a trial or appellate court.

There is no such order, nor will there be. Following Aslani's no-contest plea and conviction, the Michigan Court of Appeals denied his application for leave to appeal in October 2007, see Comp ¶ 24 (not available on WestLaw), and the Michigan Supreme Court denied review in April 2008, see People v. Aslani, 747 N.W.2d 307 (Mich. 2008).

Aslani petitioned for a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court, see 2008 WL 4441090 (U.S. Sept. 25, 2008) (No. 08-415), but that Court denied the petition on December 1, 2008, Aslani v. Michigan, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 639 (2008). United States Supreme Court Rules provide that "[a]ny petition for the rehearing of an order denying a petition for a writ of certiorari or extraordinary writ shall be filed within 25 days after the date of the order of denial. . . ." U.S. SUP. CT. R. 44 ¶ 2 (version eff. from Oct. 1, 2007 to the present). The 25-day period for Aslani to file a rehearing petition with the U.S. Supreme Court began on December 2, 2008 and expired on December 27, 2008, see FED. R. CIV. P. 6, and Aslani did not seek rehearing.

Because it is no longer possible for the criminal proceedings to terminate in Aslani's favor, he fails to state a claim for malicious prosecution against Lansing Police Defendants or anyone else.

DISCUSSION: The Lansing Police Department Must Be Dismissed, Because it is Not Suable In Eo Nomine

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party's capacity to sue or be sued is determined by the law of the State in which the district court sits or the law of the individual's domicile. O'Donnell v. Brown, 335 F. Supp.2d 787, 815 (W.D. Mich. 2004) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 17(b)). Because this court sits in Michigan and the record suggests Michigan is Aslani's domicile, Michigan law will determine whether the Lansing Police Department is suable in its own name.

In Michigan, "it is well established that police departments are merely arms of the city and are not juridical entities capable of suing or being sued." Robinson v. City of Grand Rapids, 2008 WL 4822218, *6 n. 1 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 4, 2008) (Scoville, M.J.) (citing, inter alia, Haverstick Enters., Inc. v. Financial Fed. Credit, Inc., 32 F.3d 989, 992 n. 1 (6^th Cir. 1994)); see also Alexander v. City of Pontiac, 2007 WL 4357738, *6 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2007) (Battani, J.) ("'Michigan's governmental immunity statute, M.C.L. 691.1401 et seq., immunizes municipal police departments from suit.'") (quoting O'Donnell v. Brown, 335 F. Supp.2d 787, 815 (W.D. Mich. 2004)). Even before the enactment of the governmental-immunity statute, the Michigan Supreme Court explained that "[i]t cannot be true that such an agency can be officially liable to suits for liabilities, where it has no legal means of raising funds for payment." O'Leary v. Bd. of Fire Water Comm'rs of Marquette, 44 N.W. 608, 610 (Mich. 1890).

Accordingly, the court is obligated to dismiss the Lansing Police Department pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction. See Brown v. Romulus PD, 2009 WL 22881, *2 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 5, 2009) (Edmunds, J.) (citing, inter alia, McPherson v. Fitzpatrick, 234 N.W.2d 566, 568 (Mich.App. 1975) ("[T[he police department is not liable in a tort action directed solely against such department. . . .")); O'Donnell v. Brown, 335 F. Supp.2d 787, 815 (W.D. Mich. 2004) (Quist, J.) (§ 1983 action) ("[p]laintiff's claims against the City of Lansing Police Department are claims against the City of Lansing, and the Police Department will be dismissed. . . ."). The court will automatically substitute the City of Lansing as a defendant in place of the Lansing Police Department. "'[I]ndividuals sued in their official capacities stand in the shoes of the entity they represent.'" Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 810 (6^th Cir. 2003) (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985)). See Lambert v. Hartman, 517 F.3d 433, 439-40 (6^th Cir. 2008) ("Lambert sued the Clerk in his official capacity, which is the equivalent of suing the Clerk's employer, the County."), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 905 (2009); Powers v. Lorain Cty. 259 F. App'x 818, 822 n. 2 (6^th Cir. 2008) ("The same analysis for determining Defendant Lorain County's liability applies to Defendant Stammitti's liability because 'a suit under section 1983 against a defendant in his official capacity is equivalent to a suit against the local government entity.'") (quoting Leach v. Shelby Cty. Sheriff, 891 F.3d 1241, 1245 (6^th Cir. 1989)). See, e.g., Lake v. Granholm, 2008 WL 724162, *2 n. 1 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 17, 2008) (Jonker, J.) ("Suits against police departments are deemed to be brought against the municipality itself. I will therefore address all plaintiff's claims against the police department as being brought against the City of Midland itself.") (internal citation omitted); Adams v. City of Marshall, 2005 WL 3556146, *2 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 29, 2005) (Miles, J.) ("Thus, when a municipal police department is sued, the real party in interest is the city.") (citing Moomey v. City of Holland, 490 F. Supp. 188, 190 (W.D. Mich. 1980) (Gibson, J.)).

DISCUSSION: Sparrow Health Defendants' Premature Motion for Summary Judgment

On December 29, 2008, all the served Sparrow defendants jointly filed a motion for summary judgment on the amended complaint [document #49]. Aslani filed an opposition brief on January 15, 2009 [document #54], emphasizing that discovery is not complete and contending that summary judgment is premature until he is afforded a full opportunity for discovery. The court agrees with Aslani up to a point. But the court will not allow his right to discovery to occasion open-ended delay in this court's consideration of motions which have the potential to dispose of the remaining four claims.

It is a "'well-established' principle that the plaintiff must receive 'a full opportunity to conduct discovery to be able to successfully defeat a motion for summary judgment." Farah v. Wellington, 295 F. App'x 743, 747 (6^th Cir. 2008) (quoting Ball v. Union Carbide Corp., 385 F.3d 713, 719 (6^th Cir. 2004)). "[I]mplicit in the 'opportunity to respond' is the requirement that sufficient time be afforded for discovery necessary to develop 'facts essential to justify opposition to the motion." Transition Healthcare Assocs., Inc. v. Tri-State Health Investors, LLC, ___ F. App'x ___, ___, 2009 WL 67869, *5 (6^th Cir. 2009) (citing Routman v. Automatic Data Processing, Inc., 873 F.2d 970, 971 (6^th Cir. 1989)). To determine whether curtailing discovery now is the fairer course of action, the court considers how much of an opportunity for focused discovery Aslani has realistically had.

Proceeding pro se, Aslani has had his hands full: he drafted a cogent and fairly detailed complaint, then amended the complaint to name more than a dozen individuals whom he had identified in the meantime as employees of the four institutional defendants named in the original complaint. When the Lansing Police Defendants first moved to dismiss, Aslani worked to prepare an opposition brief — only to see their motion dismissed because of their failure to comply with a local civil rule, and then renewed after they cured the defect. Also in the time since Aslani initiated this action, Aslani also had to research and write a brief, again without counsel, to support his petition to the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. Coming up to the present, Aslani still must locate and serve three defendants (alleged Sparrow Health physicians Cagle and Owens, and alleged Greyhound bus driver Ed Lewis), as well as defeat two other defendants' efforts to quash service (alleged CATA security officers Fowler and Becker). The court cannot say that Aslani has squandered the time available to him, or that any diligent layperson would have completed discovery relative to all nine claims by now. Aslani has done enough so far, and will be given a chance to finish discovery at a reasonable pace.

Accordingly, the court will deny the Sparrow Health defendants' motion for summary judgment without prejudice to ensure that Aslani has a full and adequate opportunity to conduct discovery with regard to the remaining claims. See, e.g., Glen Eden Hosp., Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., Inc., 740 F.2d 423, 427-28 (6^th Cir. 1984) (district court abused discretion by granting summary judgment before completion of discovery); Communities for Equity v. Michigan H.S. Athletic Ass'n, 26 F. Supp.2d 1001, 1008 (W.D. Mich. 1998) (Enslen, J.) (granting Rule 56(f) request). In fairness to the defendants, however, the court will set a date certain by which Aslani must conduct whatever discovery he needs to meaningfully oppose summary judgment.

The Greyhound Defendants . The first amended complaint names Greyhound Lines, Inc., and "Ed Lewis, individually and as bus driver of Greyhound Lines, Inc." On July 21, 2008, a summons was issued to Greyhound, which filed an answer to the amended complaint on October 9, 2008 [doc #16]. On October 10, 2008, the summons was returned unexecuted as to defendant Ed Lewis, the alleged Greyhound bus driver [doc #30]. The docket sheet contains no further filings or information regarding Aslani's attempt to serve defendant Ed Lewis with the amended complaint and summons. Greyhound moves to dismiss the four claims against it: counts 1, 3, 5 and 9. As for count 3 (False Imprisonment), the court has already held that this claim is untimely as to all defendants under the two-year limitations period of MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.5805(2). Therefore, the court will grant Greyhound's motion to dismiss count 3 without further discussion.

As for count 1 (title 42 U.S.C. § 1981) and count 5 (IIED), Greyhound contends that such intentional torts cannot be alleged against Greyhound itself: "In order to maintain claims for intentional torts, plaintiff needed to name and serve the bus driver involved in the incident, which Plaintiff did not do." Greyhound MTD at 5. Greyhound contends that it "cannot be held liable for the intentional torts of its employees and/or agents performed outside the scope of their employment." Id. at 10-11; see also id. at 12-13 (relying on standard for respondeat superior liability for intentional torts set forth in Zisgo v. Hurley Med. Ctr., 716 N.W.2d 220 (Mich. 2006)).

The court determines that under the circumstances, dismissing these claims at this stage of the case would be hasty and unduly harsh. So far as the record reflects, Aslani has shown reasonable effort, as a pro se plaintiff, in refining and expanding his pleading as he obtains additional information about the identity and whereabouts of those responsible for the alleged wrongs. He has not demonstrated bad faith or undue delay. Less than four months after Aslani filed the original complaint, and without the aid of counsel, Aslani amended the complaint to add Greyhound bus driver Ed Lewis as a defendant, as well as CATA security officers Fowler and Becker. The court will afford Aslani an additional reasonable period in which to conduct discovery needed to find Lewis and effect proper service on Lewis, Fowler and Becker. If Aslani does not verify valid service of process on Lewis by April 30, 2009, Greyhound will be free to file a renewed motion to dismiss the remaining claims against it (counts 1 section 1981 and count 5 IIED) on this basis. As for Count 9, Greyhound contends that claims under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") and the United Nations Convention Against Torture ("CAT") are not cognizable, because there is no authority that those treaties are self-executing and enforceable in United States federal courts. This court agrees and will dismiss count 9 on that basis.

It is true that treaties entered into by the United States become the law of the land. US v. Renkel, 456 F.3d 640, 642 (6^th Cir.) (McKeague, J.) (citing U.S. CONST. Art. VI, cl. 2), reh'g reh'g en banc denied (6^th Cir Dec. 6, 2006). Generally, "'treaties have the same legal effect as statutes.'" Renkel, 456 F.3d at 642-43 (citing US v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 389 (6^th Cir. 2001) (citing Whitney v. Robinson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) and US v. Page, 232 F.3d 536, 540 (6^th Cir. 2000)).

"Yet treaties, like some statutes, do not always directly create rights that a private citizen can enforce in court." Renkel, 456 F.3d at 643 (citing Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 808 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Robert Bork, J., concurring)). This is because

[a] treaty is primarily a compact between independent nations. It depends for the enforcement of its provisions on the interest and honor of the governments which are parties to it. If these fail, its infraction becomes the subject of international negotiations and reclamation, so far as the injured parties choose to seek redress, which may in the end be enforced by actual war. It is obvious that with all this the judicial courts have nothing to do and can give no redress.

the judiciary is not that department of the government, to which the assertion of its interests against foreign powers is confided; and its duty commonly is to decide upon individual rights, according to those principles which the political Departments of the nation have established.

As for Aslani's purported claim under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the court must begin by adhering to the presumption that the UDHR does not create rights enforceable by a private individual in U.S. courts. See Renkel, 456 F.3d at 643 ("'courts presume that the rights created by an international treaty belong to a state and that a private individual cannot enforce them.'") (quoting Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d at 389) (emphasis in original). The court has located no binding authority, and not even any Sixth Circuit persuasive authority, that would rebut this presumption and permit this court to adjudicate Aslani's UDHR claim.

On the contrary, "at the time of its adoption in 1948, it was the explicit position of the United States that the Declaration 'is not a treaty . . . [or] an international agreement' and that 'it is not and does not purport to be a statement of law or of legal obligation.'" Taylor v. Cleveland Clinic, 2008 WL 1752140, *2 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 14, 2008) (quoting 19 STATE DEP'T BULLETIN 751 (1948) (remarks of U.S. Representative to the U.N.)); accord Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 719 (9^th Cir. 1992) (referring to UDHR as "a non-binding resolution"); Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794, 816 n. 17 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (J. Bork for the Court, with J. Buckley concurring in pertinent part). Not surprisingly, then, a plaintiff's

reliance on the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights as legal footing for his civil rights claim . . . is misplaced. The Supreme Court . . . observed that "the Declaration of its own force impose obligations as a matter of international law", and by itself cannot support creation of a cause of action that a federal district court could hear under the applicable jurisdictional statutes.

Therefore, the UDHR claim must be dismissed as to all defendants. See Taylor, 2008 WL 1752140 at *2 (James Gwin, J.) ("Ms. Taylor cannot rely on the UDHR, which is a resolution of the United Nations, and is binding on neither the United States nor this court.") and Taylor v. Taylor, 2008 WL 906102, *2 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 2008) (Jack Zouhary, J.) ("It does not serve as a legal basis for a cause of action.") and Taylor v. Vivid Video, 2008 WL 744212, *2 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 19, 2008) (Sara Lioi, J.) (all citing Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 165 n. 36, 167-68 n. 38, 169 (2d Cir. 2003)). The CATA Defendants. The first amended complaint names the Capital Area Transportation Authority ("CATA") and two of its alleged Security Officers, Matthew Fowler and Joseph Becker. CATA filed an answer to the amended complaint on October 9, 2008 [doc #20]. Fowler and Becker have not filed an answer or dispositive motion with regard to the amended complaint; rather, they filed a motion to quash service of process, which will be decided by Magistrate Judge Carmody.

ORDER

The following seven defendants are dismissed from the case:

"Police Department of the City of Lansing"

Lansing Police Officer Paul Beasinger

Lansing Police Officer Kevin Schlagel

Lansing Police Officer Shannon Thielen

Lansing Police Officer Nathaniel Osborn

Lansing Police Captain Theresa Szymanski

Lansing Police Chief Mark Alley

The Sparrow Health defendants and all other defendants are free to file motions for summary judgment on the remaining 4 claims after completion of discovery, no earlier than May 15, 2009.

Defendant Greyhound Lines, Inc.'s motion to dismiss [document #66] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, as follows: 42 USC 1981

— Count 1, federal civil-rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981

— Count 5, Michigan common-law claim for IIED (time-barred)

— Count 7, federal civil-rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

— Count 8, federal civil-rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)

This is not a final and immediately appealable order. See Griffin v. Reznick, ___ F. Supp.2d ___, ___, 2008 WL 5110528, *10 (W.D. Mich. 2008) (Maloney, C.J.) ("'Absent certification of an interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) or Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b), an order disposing of fewer than all parties or claims is nonappealable.'") (quoting Bd. of Ed. of Avon Lake City Sch. Dist. v. Patrick M., 2000 WL 712500, *4 n. 5 (6^th Cir. May 24, 2000) (citing Wm. B. Tanner Co. v. US, 575 F.2d 101, 102 (6^th Cir. 1978))).

IT IS SO ORDERED