Nos. 05-06-01476-CR, 05-06-01477-CR, 05-06-01478-CR
Opinion issued March 19, 2008. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex. R. App. P. 47.
On Appeal from the 366th Judicial District Court, Collin County, Texas, Trial Court Cause Nos. 366-80115-04, 366-82270-03, 366-82269-03.
Before Justices WHITTINGTON, WRIGHT, and FITZGERALD.
Opinion By Justice WRIGHT.
Khashayar Ashorali appeals his convictions for aggravated assault, failure to stop and render aid, and manslaughter. After finding appellant guilty, the jury assessed punishment at ten years' confinement in both the manslaughter and aggravated assault cases, and five years' confinement in the failure to stop and render aid case. In ten issues, appellant challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions, and contends the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence and by limiting the length of the trial. We overrule appellant's issues and affirm the trial court's judgments.
Background
Kasra Chalabi-Hajkarim (Chalabi) testified that after being laid off from his job as an electrical engineer, he would often help his brother-in-law, Amir Ali Anvari, with catering jobs. After one such job, Chalabi and Anvari drove home in Chalabi's blue Subaru wagon at about 1:30 a.m. The back of the Subaru was loaded with several bottles of alcohol that Anvari had gotten from an uncle the previous day. Chalabi was driving south on Highway 75 going about 60 or 65 miles per hour. The next thing Chalabi remembers is standing outside the car and he was "boiling, my hands [were] boiling and the skin was falling off." People had begun to gather around and Chalabi told them Anvari was in the car. Someone responded there was nothing they could do to help Anvari. Chalibi was transported by Care Flight to Parkland Memorial Hospital where he remained hospitalized for two months for treatment of severe burn injuries to his hands, face, back, neck, arms, and chest. Dr. Gary Perdue, the director of the burn unit, testified that Chalibi was admitted to the burn unit with second and third degree burns over 50 percent of his body. The majority of the burns were third degree and required skin grafting. Dr. Perdue explained such burns are life-threatening because of fluid loss and the risk of infection. At the time Chalibi was admitted, he was "critically ill and tracheally intubated." Intubation was necessary to maintain Chalibi's airway because of the swelling associated with his burns. Dr. Perdue also explained that Chalibi's scarring was permanent and could not be repaired with plastic surgery. According to Dr. Perdue, Cahlibi's injuries involved a risk of death, permanent disfigurement, and loss and impairment of an organ. Joe Armstead testified he worked at the same event as Chalibi and Anvari. As he was driving home on Highway 75, a dark Range Rover passed him going "probably-I know it was doing over a hundred miles per hour." According to Armstead, not only did the Range Rover pass his car really fast, it also "nearly hit the mirror on his car." A short time later, it nearly "smashed into a white Ford Probe . . . but somehow . . . went around the Probe." Armstead did not notice anything else for a "mile or so" when a white Lexus passed him. The Lexus was not going excessively fast, rather, it "eased by." As Armstead continued driving southbound on 75, he came upon an accident. He stopped to help and told a police officer he thought the Range Rover that had passed him caused the accident. The officer told Armstead there was a dark Range Rover parked further down the road. According to Armstead, the Range Rover was the same one that had passed him a short time before. When Armstead looked into the Range Rover, he noticed the air bags had been deployed and the front windshield was "smashed." Bryan Baggett was driving northbound on Highway 75 when he saw a car "up in flames." Baggett stopped and went over the concrete barrier and helped a man who had been burned. Baggett noticed a dark SUV that was "a Range Rover style" because it was the "closest thing to [the burning] car." The SUV was "right next" to the burning car. He did not see the SUV drive away, but later, he noticed the SUV was no longer there. Peter Kaplan was driving northbound on Highway 75 when he "heard a loud impact." Kaplan immediately looked over to the southbound side of the highway and saw a "SUV type vehicle, a shower of sparks" and a car spinning. Kaplan did not see a third vehicle. Kaplan stopped and ran back to the scene. He saw a disoriented man and heard someone "screaming `the guy is in the car and the car is on fire.'" Kaplan attempted to break the window of the burning car with a tire iron, but was unable to help the man out of the car. Jack Carter testified he was currently serving a 20-year sentence for drug possession. The night of the accident, he was with his wife driving southbound on Highway 75 in his white Lexus. He noticed "headlights behind [him], and they were coming fast." Carter was going "at least 70, if not 80" miles per hour but changed lanes because he was concerned about being hit. After moving over, Carter saw the vehicle was a black Range Rover and it "just breezed on by." Carter remembered thinking "whoa, that guy is moving." Carter sped up and paced him, and they were going about 90 miles per hour. As Carter continued to follow the Range Rover, it "just sailed into the back" of a small car that was going much slower. Carter did not see any brake lights nor did he see the Range Rover attempt to avoid the collision. Almost immediately, Carter saw a "fire ball." Carter stopped and told his wife to call 911. Carter attempted to open the door to help the passenger out of the car, but was unable to do so. Officer Kris Tyler, a Plano police officer, was dispatched to the accident. As he approached the scene, he saw that the vehicle was on fire. When he arrived, he found Chalabi on the roadside. Chalabi was severely burned and a car facing northbound in the southbound lane was "fully engulfed in flames" with Anvari trapped inside. Because of the fire, Tyler was unable to help Anvari. After the firefighters arrived and after speaking with people at the scene, Tyler walked to a Range Rover parked on the shoulder about 50 yards from the burning car. The front end was "completely-the front end was pushed in." The air bags had deployed but there was no blood in the car. Other than a scrape, there was no damage to the rear end of the Range Rover. Although Tyler was at the accident scene for several hours, no one identified themselves as the driver of the Range Rover. During that time, officers stood near the car and the driver did not come forward. Anthony Cheshier was assigned to investigate the accident. As part of his investigation, he completed a State accident report. In that report, Cheshier concluded the accident occurred "because of the speed of the [Range] Rover." According to Cheshier, both the Range Rover and the Subaru were traveling in the same lane when the Range Rover struck the Subaru at a high speed, causing the vehicles to lock up and go toward the concrete barrier. When the vehicles hit the concrete barrier, they separated, causing the Subaru to spin and the Range Rover continued across the roadway until it was disabled a few hundred yards away. Kevin Sasso, a City of Plano police officer, also helped investigate the accident. Sasso explained that several pieces of physical evidence were obtained from the two cars. Included in that evidence were several pieces of plastic, glass, and paint chips from Chalibi's Subaru that were found on the bumper and behind the front grill of the Range Rover. The collected evidence also included the front license plate of the Range Rover that was found in the hatchback area of Chalibi's car and scrapings from "marks on the left rear bumper" of the Range Rover. Those scrapings were a "lighter color." Michael Villarreal, a forensic chemist, testified he analyzed the paint scrapings collected from the Subaru and the Range Rover. In his opinion, all but one of the blue paint chips collected from the Range Rover and its front license plate came from Chalibi's Subaru or another 1995 blue Subaru made at the same time and same place. One blue scraping collected from the front bumper of the Range Rover was not from the Subaru, but it did not appear to be automotive paint. Likewise, the lighter colored scraping collected from the left rear bumper of the Range Rover was not automotive paint. Rather, it was some sort of rubber or plastic material, it did not have "any paint on it." Villarreal explained that if a Lexus with a bumper that had a paint coating on the bumper had struck the Range Rover, he would expect to see paint transfer, not just the plastic material from the bumper. In Villarreal's opinion, the scraping was "probably going to be the substance consistent with that bumper . . . [the scraping was] more than likely . . . from the actual bumper itself." Plano Police Officer James Harbor was responsible for "reconstructing" the accident. Harbor testified that he responded to the scene of the accident and used electronic equipment similar to survey equipment to measure and "map" the scene. He then downloaded the data into a computer program and generated a scaled diagram to measure angles and distances for momentum calculations. After reviewing the data, Harbor determined that, without attempting to brake or avoid a collision, appellant's Range Rover hit Chalabi's Subaru from the rear. When the two vehicles collided, they locked together and began to rotate until they came into contact with the concrete barrier. The two vehicles remained locked together spinning until they hit the wall again, causing them to break apart. Chalabi's Subaru came to a stop facing north in the southbound lane while appellant's Range Rover continued traveling southbound. As the Range Rover passed the Subaru, fluid began leaking, the Range Rover hit the barrier for a third time and then came to a stop. The Range Rover was then driven to the shoulder. Harbor explained that to calculate the speed of the Range Rover at the time it hit the Subaru, it was necessary to know the speed the Subaru was traveling. He calculated the speed of the Range Rover with the Subaru's speed at 50, 55, 60, and 65 miles per hour. Respectively, he determined the Range Rover was traveling at 91.43, 87.28, 83.14, and 79 miles per hour. Harbor also calculated post-impact speeds based on tire marks, brake efficiency and the weight of the vehicles. He obtained the weight of the vehicles from the registration information at the Texas Department of Transportation. Harbor's calculations showed the Range Rover was traveling 79.85 miles per hour post impact and the Subaru was traveling at 64.7 miles per hour. Harbor also testified regarding the severity of the damage to the vehicles. According to Harbor, the scrape on the rear bumper of the Range Rover appeared to be the result of hitting the median wall. Finally, Harbor testified that in his opinion, both excessive speed and failure to keep a proper lookout were factors in the crash. Andre Smith, a traffic control officer in Plano, testified he was part of the team that investigated the accident. He arrived at the scene about 30 minutes after the accident. Shortly thereafter, he learned the Range Rover was registered to appellant. Smith asked the police dispatcher to contact appellant. When the dispatcher called appellant's home, they talked to appellant's wife. After contacting the City of McKinney Police Department, Smith went to appellant's house and waited nearby in his car. About 3:45 a.m., Smith saw a car park nearby. When appellant and Paul Perez got out of the car, Smith asked appellant if he was okay. Appellant said, "I hope they are okay; I had to leave; I was scared; I panicked." At that time, the McKinney police arrived. Smith then again asked appellant if he was okay and also if appellant would come with him to the Plano Police Department. Appellant kept saying "over and over, `just take me to jail; I need to be in jail, I don't deserve to be out.'" A few minutes later, Perez and appellant followed Smith back to the Plano Police Station. At the station, Smith interviewed appellant and asked Perez to fill out a witness statement. During appellant's interview, Smith noticed that appellant had been "drinking." In particular, he noticed appellant had bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and smelled of alcohol. In Smith's opinion, appellant was intoxicated. Appellant told Smith that the night of the accident, he had been to Dave Buster's to celebrate his birthday. According to appellant, while he was there he drank "at least five" beers and left around 10:00 p.m. Around 2:30 a.m., he drove his Range Rover to his mother's house. As he was driving south on Highway 75, a car "went by him real fast and it scared him" so he slowed down. As he proceeded into Plano, he suddenly lost control of his car. Appellant thought he may have had a "blow-out" on the right rear or that someone may have hit him from behind. However, Smith had seen the Range Rover at the scene and none of the tires were flat nor was there any damage to the rear of the Range Rover other than a scrape. There were no dents, dings, shattered glass, or broken lights on the rear of the Range Rover. After speaking with appellant, Smith believed that after the accident appellant walked to two or three gas stations looking for change so that he could call his wife. After his wife came and picked him up, he went home. As they were driving home he saw the accident scene. After he got home, appellant called Perez to take him back to the scene. Perez and appellant drove by the scene, again failing to stop, and then went home. Perez testified that his niece is married to appellant. The night of the accident, Perez attended appellant's birthday party at Dave Buster's. Perez gave appellant a ride home around midnight. About 3:00 a.m., appellant called Perez and told him that there had been an accident. Appellant asked Perez to take him to his vehicle. As they drove south on Highway 75, Perez saw that the highway was shut down and traffic had been diverted to the service road. The police and firefighters were still at the scene. As Perez drove further, he saw appellant's Range Rover. The two men then turned around and returned to appellant's home in McKinney. Perez did not remember discussing the accident with appellant. According to Perez, appellant was very quiet and "puzzled" as though he was trying to "figure out what had happened." David Michael Foster testified he is a contractor and knew appellant professionally through appellant's family's business, Ashore Lighting. The day after the accident, appellant came to Foster's house to check some light fixtures Foster had bought from Ashore Lighting. Foster's encounter with appellant was unusual because appellant did not call before he came, and because appellant looked at one of the fixtures and then began talking, not "incoherently, but just completely out of the whole context of the meeting." According to Foster, appellant was jumping from subject to subject and said he had been "in some kind of wreck and he start[ed] getting very emotional, started crying, . . . was just very confused and disoriented." Jack Murray, an expert in accident reconstruction testified that he could not form an opinion about the cause of the crash because "there was so much confusion between witnesses, there is so lacking of evidence that normally would be there, so much speculation that [he did not] want to draw any conclusions." After reviewing photographs of the Range Rover he agreed with defense counsel that it was a "possibility" the white mark on the bumper of appellant's Range Rover could have been caused by a white Lexus. Murray disagreed with Harbor that the collision was an "in-line" collision because the photographs did not show an even amount of impact from side to side, but rather showed damage from an angle. Murray likewise disagreed with Harbor regarding his estimate of the vehicles speed because Murray (1) did not believe there was sufficient information to calculate the speed, (2) disagreed with Harbor that the road where the crash occurred is flat, and (3) disagreed with the weight of the Range Rover that Habor used in his calculations. Murray obtained the weight of the vehicle from information for the National Crime Insurance Bureau and the Canadian Vehicle Specs Computer Program Data Base. Murray explained the discrepancy in weight as a clerical error on the part of the Texas Department of Transportation when the car was registered. Changing the weight of the Range Rover would have reduced the speed estimate of the Range Rover. In Murray's opinion, the accident investigation in this case was below standard. Specifically, Murray found fault with the police's failure to (1) keep the vehicles until the case was finished, (2) photograph the vehicles in the daylight, (3) obtain paint scrapings from the concrete barrier in the center median, and (4) further analyze the scraping from the Ranger Rover bumper. After hearing this and other evidence, the jury found appellant guilty of aggravated assault, failure to stop and render aid, and manslaughter. These appeals followed. Sufficiency of the Evidence
In his first through seventh issues, appellant challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions. When reviewing legal sufficiency complaints, we apply well-known standards: "we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether, based on that evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational juror could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Rollerson v. State, 227 S.W.3d 718, 724 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007); Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007). The jury, as the sole judge of the witnesses' credibility and the weight to be given their testimony, is free to accept or reject any or all of the evidence presented by either side. See Margraves v. State, 34 S.W.3d 912, 919 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). As the reviewing court, we must give deference to "the responsibility of the trier of fact to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts." Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13 (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979)). Evidence that rationally supports a guilty verdict beyond a reasonable doubt under the legal sufficiency standard can still be factually insufficient. Marshall v. State, 210 S.W.3d 618, 625 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006), cert. denied, 128 S.Ct. 87 (2007). Evidence is factually insufficient to support the verdict if it is clearly wrong or manifestly unjust or against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Id. The difference between the legal and factual sufficiency standards is that "the former requires the reviewing court to defer to the jury's credibility and weight determinations while the latter permits the reviewing court to substitute its judgment for the jury's on these questions `albeit to a very limited degree.'" Rollerson, 227 S.W.3d at 724. Nevertheless, a factual sufficiency review is "barely distinguishable" from a legal sufficiency review. Rollerson, 227 S.W.3d at 724. With these standards in mind, we turn to the merits of appellant's sufficiency complaints. In his first and second issues, appellant contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction for manslaughter. Appellant does not dispute that he crashed into Chalibi's car causing Anvari's death. Rather, appellant contends the State failed to prove he "recklessly" caused Anvari's death because the State did not show appellant was aware of, but consciously disregarded, a substantial and unjustifiable risk that death would occur as a result of his conduct. After reviewing the record, we cannot agree. . A person commits manslaughter if he recklessly causes the death of an individual. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.04(a) (Vernon 2003). Manslaughter is a "result of conduct" crime," one in which recklessness must go to the conduct causing the death. See Schroeder v. State, 123 S.W.3d 398, 400-01 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003); Gilbert v. State, 196 S.W.3d 163, 166 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. ref'd). A person is reckless with respect to the result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 6.03(c) (Vernon 2003). The jury's determination of a culpable mental state is usually grounded upon inferences drawn from the attendant circumstances and may be inferred from the acts, words, and conduct of the accused. See Robledo v. State, 126 S.W.3d 150, 155 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (citing Lane v. State, 763 S.W.2d 785, 787 (Tex.Crim.App. 1989)). As one alternative, the jury was authorized to convict appellant if the jury found appellant recklessly caused Anvari's death by operating his motor vehicle at an excessive speed. Viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment, the record shows Chalibi was driving about 60 or 65 miles per hour just before the accident. Armstead testified that the Range Rover involved in the accident passed him "doing over a hundred miles per hour." Carter testified that he was driving "70, if not 80 miles per hour" and had to change lanes because he was concerned a black Range Rover would rear end him. According to Carter, the Range Rover was going about 90 miles per hour when it "just sailed into the back" of a small car. After investigating the accident at the scene, Cheshier completed the required State Accident Report and in that report concluded that the accident occurred because of the speed of the Range Rover. Harbor "reconstructed" the accident and estimated appellant's speed at the time of impact to be between 79 and 91 miles per hour. Like Cheshier, Harbor concluded that appellant's excessive speed was a factor in the accident. Severe impact damage to both cars likewise showed excessive speed as a factor in the accident. And, although Chalabi's car immediately burst into flames, appellant left the scene because he was "scared" and he "panicked." Such conduct demonstrates consciousness of guilt and supports the jury's determination that appellant knew his conduct was reckless. See Bigby v. State, 892 S.W.2d 864, 883 (Tex.Crim.App. 1994) (evidence of flight is a circumstance from which jury can infer guilt); Rumbaugh v. State, 629 S.W.2d 747, 753 (Tex.Crim.App. 1982) (same). From this evidence, a rational jury could have determined appellant was driving at an excessive rate of speed and that he consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his conduct would result in Anvari's death. See Arellano v. State, 54 S.W.3d 391, 393-94 (Tex.App.-Waco 2001, pet. ref'd) (evidence legally sufficient to show Arellano was reckless when he was driving 20 to 30 miles over the speed limit when he collided with victim's car); Cooks v. State, 5 S.W.3d 292, 296 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (evidence legally sufficient to show recklessness where Cook was driving 50 miles per hour over the speed limit prior to accident). Thus, we conclude the evidence is legally sufficient to support appellant's conviction. We overrule appellant's first issue. With respect to appellant's factual sufficiency claim, although Murray testified that Harbor's calculations were incorrect and his reconstruction of the accident was below standard, Murray's opinion does not render the State's evidence insufficient to show appellant acted recklessly by operating his vehicle at an excessive speed. A reasonable jury could have disbelieved Murray's calculations and opinions, or believed their weight to be minimal, and believed Harbor's calculations and opinions. See Feagins v. State, 142 S.W. 3d 532, 540 (Tex.App.-Austin 2004, pet. ref'd) (jury free to believe complainant and disbelieve accident reconstructionist). After reviewing all the evidence, we cannot conclude the jury's verdict was clearly wrong or manifestly unjust or against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Thus, we conclude the evidence is factually sufficient to support appellant's conviction for manslaughter. We overrule appellant's second issue. In his third and fourth issues, appellant contends the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support his conviction for aggravated assault. Specifically, appellant contends the State failed to show he "intentionally or knowingly" caused serious bodily injury to Chalabi. After reviewing the record, we cannot agree. Bodily injury aggravated assault is a "result of conduct" offense that can be committed intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly. Dolkart v. State, 197 S.W.3d 887, 893 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2006, pet. ref'd). However, in light of the indictment and charge in this case, the jury was authorized to convict appellant only if he intentionally or knowingly caused serious bodily injury to Chalabi. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 6.03 (Vernon 2003). Knowledge may be inferred from the person's acts, words, and conduct. Hart v. State, 89 S.W.3d 61, 64 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002); Martinez v. State, 833 S.W.2d 188, 196 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1992, pet. ref'd). Circumstantial evidence of a defendant's mental state is not "required to meet the same rigorous criteria for sufficiency as circumstantial proof of other offensive elements." See Margraves, 34 S.W.3d at 919 (discussing circumstantial evidence of intent in legal sufficiency challenge). It is not necessary that this Court find to its own satisfaction the culpable mental state, it is enough for us to find that a rational jury could have so found. Id. As previously discussed, the eyewitness testimony, expert testimony, and the extent of damage to the cars are sufficient evidence to support the jury's determination that appellant was driving at an excessive speed. Additionally, Carter testified that appellant did not brake or attempt to swerve to avoid Chalabi's car and the police did not find any skid marks at the scene, supporting Carter's testimony that appellant did not brake. Finally, although appellant claimed the accident was the result of a blowout or another car hitting him from behind, the tires on appellant's Range Rover were fully inflated after the accident and the only damage to the rear of appellant's vehicle was a scrape. Villarreal testified the scraping from the bumper did not contain automotive paint, which he would expect to see if a car with a painted bumper had hit the car. Additionally, Harbor testified the scrape on the rear bumper appeared to be the result of hitting the concrete barrier. Thus, the jury could have reasonably determined that appellant's explanation for the accident was false and infer that appellant's conduct was knowing. See Alexander v. State, 229 S.W.3d 731, 740 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2007, pet. ref'd) (appellant's lie about injuries to child one circumstance from which jury could infer intent). Similarly, as previously discussed, the jury could infer from appellant's flight after the accident that appellant's conduct was knowing. See Bigby, 892 S.W.2d at 883; Rumbaugh, 629 S.W.2d at 752. After reviewing the evidence under the appropriate standards, we conclude a rational jury could have determined appellant was driving at an excessive speed and, after considering all of the circumstances, could have inferred from appellant's actions that he was aware that his conduct was reasonably certain to cause the result in this case. Thus, we conclude the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support appellant's conviction for aggravated assault. We overrule appellant's third and fourth issues. In his fifth and sixth issues, appellant claims the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support his manslaughter and aggravated assault convictions because his conduct did not cause Anvari's death or Chalabi's injuries. In particular, appellant claims the white Lexus that rear-ended his vehicle and the explosion of the alcohol in the back of Chalabi's car were concurrent causes of Anvari's death and Chalabi's injuries. Section 6.04 of the penal code provides that a person "is criminally responsible if the result would not have occurred but for his conduct, operating either alone or concurrently with another cause, unless the concurrent cause was clearly sufficient to produce the result and the conduct of the actor clearly insufficient." Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 6.04(a) (Vernon 2003). Under section 6.04(a) a "but for" causal connection must be established between the defendant's conduct and the resulting harm. Robbins v. State, 717 S.W.2d 348, 351 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986). Two possible combinations exist to satisfy the "but for" requirement: (1) the defendant's conduct may be sufficient by itself to have caused the harm, regardless of the existence of a concurrent cause; or (2) the defendant's conduct and the other cause together may be sufficient to have caused the harm. Id. However, section 6.04(a) further defines and limits the "but for" causality for concurrent causes by the last phrase, "unless the concurrent cause was clearly sufficient to produce the result and the conduct of the actor clearly insufficient." Id. If the additional cause, other than the defendant's conduct, is clearly sufficient, by itself, to produce the result and the defendant's conduct, by itself, is clearly insufficient, then the defendant cannot be convicted. Id. Here, the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to show that Anvari would not have died and Chalabi would not have been seriously injured but for appellant's actions. Nothing in the record shows that the explosion of the alcohol in Chalabi's car alone caused Anvari's death and Chalabi's injuries. Rather, the evidence shows that the alcohol caught fire and burned after appellant rear-ended Chalabi's Subaru. And, the record contains sufficient evidence for the jury to reject appellant's defensive theory that Carter caused the accident by rear ending appellant causing him, in turn, to rear end Chalabi. Finally, the evidence does not show that appellant's impact with Chalabi's car was clearly insufficient to cause Anvari's death and Chalabi's injuries. Consequently, appellant's argument that he is not criminally responsible for Anvari's death and Chalabi's injuries lacks merit. See Thompson v. State, 93 S.W.3d 16, 20-21 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001) (evidence legally and factually sufficient to show causation where medical malpractice contributed to death but complainant would have died without medical intervention); Ferrel v. State, 55 S.W.2d 586, 590-91 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001) (appellant not entitled to concurrent causation instruction where evidence showed complainant would not have died but for appellant's actions and did not show complainant's intoxication alone was clearly sufficient to cause him to fall backwards, hit his head on the floor, and die or that hitting complainant with full beer bottle was clearly insufficient to cause complainant's fatal fall). We overrule appellant's fifth and sixth issues. In his seventh issue, appellant contends the evidence is factually insufficient to support his conviction for failure to stop and render aid. According to appellant, we must reverse his conviction because the record shows he did not have "knowledge of the circumstances surrounding his conduct." Again, we disagree. A person commits the offense of failing to stop and render aid if he is involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death of a person and does not (1) immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident or as close to the scene as possible; (2) immediately return to the scene of the accident if the vehicle is not stopped at the scene of the accident; and (3) remain at the scene of the accident until the operator gives his name and address, registration number, or the name of his insurance company and provide reasonable assistance. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. §§ 550.021, 550.023 (Vernon 1999 Supp. 2007). The culpable mental state for the offense of failing to stop and render aid is "that the accused had knowledge of the circumstances surrounding his conduct, i.e., had knowledge that an accident had occurred." Gross v. State, 582 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979). Although appellant contends the State did not meet its burden because the trial testimony shows he had a head injury and had no recollection of the accident, the record contains sufficient evidence for the jury to reject appellant's claim. When appellant ran into Chalabi, eyewitnesses testified there was a "loud impact," a "shower of sparks," and, almost immediately, a "fire ball." Appellant left the scene and walked to a pay telephone to call his wife. His wife picked him up and they drove by the scene on the way home. After arriving at home, appellant called Perez, who, at appellant's request, came and drove appellant back to the scene of the accident. Perez testified that although they saw the emergency equipment at the scene, they turned around and drove back to appellant's home. When they arrived at appellant's house, appellant repeatedly told Smith he deserved to be in jail and that he "had to leave; I was scared; I panicked." After reviewing the record, we cannot conclude the jury's determination that appellant knowingly committed the offense of failure to stop and render aid was clearly wrong or manifestly unjust or against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. See Goar v. State, 68 S.W.3d 269, 270-71(Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd) (evidence legally and factually sufficient to show appellant knew accident occurred where appellant admitted he heard collision, knew he was involved in accident, and lied to the police). We overrule appellant's seventh issue. Hearsay
In his eighth issue, appellant contends we must reverse his conviction because the trial court admitted hearsay statements about findings made by appellant's trace evidence analyst. The State responds that because Murray considered the trace analysis in formulating his opinion about the accident, the trial court was within its discretion to admit the complained-of statements under rules 703 and 705(d). We need not determine whether the trial court erred by allowing testimony about the results of the defense testing, because the error, if any, was not harmful. Error in the admission of evidence warrants reversal only if the erroneous admission affected the defendant's substantial rights by exerting a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2; King v. State, 953 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997). Here, appellant complains about the trial court allowing Murray to be cross-examined about the results of the defense testing which showed that the white scrape from the Range Rover's bumper was not paint. The record also contains testimony by Villarreal, the State's expert, that he had tested the scraping and determined it was some sort of rubber or plastic material, and that it did not have "any paint on it." Villarreal explained that if a Lexus with a bumper that had a paint coating on the bumper had struck the Range Rover, he would expect to see paint transfer. Neither of the two eyewitnesses to the crash saw a third car involved. And, Carter, the driver of the white Lexus testified that he did not hit appellant's car and he saw the Range Rover "slam" into the back of Chalabi's car without braking or attempting to avoid the car. Thus, the complained-of statements were cumulative of other expert testimony and were supported by eyewitness testimony. Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude the complained-of statements had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. We overrule appellant's eighth issue. Autopsy Photographs
In his ninth issue, appellant complains about the admission of two autopsy photographs. The admissibility of photographs lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. Paredes v. State, 129 S.W.3d 530, 539 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004). As a general rule, photographs are admissible if verbal testimony regarding what is depicted in the photographs is also admissible and the probative value of the photograph is not substantially outweighed by any of the rule 403 counter-factors. Threadgill v. State, 146 S.W.3d 654, 671 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004). Rule 403 of the rules of evidence favors the admissibility of relevant evidence, and the presumption is that relevant evidence will be more probative than prejudicial. Long v. State, 823 S.W.2d 259, 271 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991). An abuse of discretion arises only when the probative value of the photographs is small and its inflammatory potential is great. Id. When determining whether the trial court erred by admitting the photographs, we consider: (1) the number of exhibits offered; (2) their gruesomeness, detail, and size; (3) whether they are black and white or color; (4) whether they are close-up; (5) whether the body is naked or clothed; (6) the availability of other means of proof; and (6) other circumstances unique to the individual case. Santellan v. State, 939 S.W.2d 155, 172 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997); Emery v. State, 881 S.W.2d 702, 710 (Tex.Crim.App. 1994). Autopsy or post-autopsy photographs can be used to illustrate injuries and to reveal cause of death. Drew v. State, 76 S.W.3d 436, 451 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd). As long as the autopsy photographs aid the jury in understanding the injury and do not emphasize mutilation caused by the autopsy, the photograph is admissible even though it depicts the autopsy. Id. Here, appellant complains that because the complained-of photographs showed Anvari's body "charred beyond recognition," the probative value of the photographs was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Because of the nature of Anvari's death, the autopsy photographs are gruesome. However, Dr. William Rohr, the medical examiner who performed the autopsy, used the photographs to explain Anvari's injuries to the jury. The photographs provided a visual component to, and understanding of, the medical examiner's testimony about the extent and nature of Anvari's injuries. Further, not all of the photographs offered by the State were admitted by the trial court. The first of the complained-of photographs shows the way in which the medical examiner received Anvari's body. The other photograph is a closer view showing foam at Anvari's mouth, which Rohr explained to the jury indicated that he was alive for some period of time while the car was burning. Neither of the photographs showed any mutilation caused by the autopsy. Under the circumstances of this case, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in determining the probative value of the photographs was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. We overrule appellant's ninth issue. Time Constraints
Finally, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by continuing the trial until after midnight on Friday night. To preserve a complaint for appellate review, a defendant must make a timely, specific objection to the trial court. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); Saldano v. State, 232 S.W.3d 77, 88 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007), cert. denied, 76 U.S.L.W. 3454 (Feb. 25, 2008). "All a party has to do to [preserve error] is to let the trial judge know what he wants, why he thinks himself entitled to it, and to do so clearly enough for the judge to understand him at a time when the trial court is in a proper position to do something about it." Saldano, 232 S.W.2d at 88 (citing Lankston v. State, 827 S.W.2d 907, 909 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992). The trial in this case began on Monday morning. Wednesday evening, defense counsel asked the trial judge to announce the schedule so that he would be ready for the following day. The trial court responded the trial might "go late" the following day and then asked the jurors about the possibility of working on Saturday or Monday if needed. Two jurors told the trial court they had nonrefundable tickets for Monday. The trial court then said "they would work late tomorrow night and even possibly Friday night . . . [and if they had to] finish up Saturday." Thursday evening, defense counsel again asked about the schedule because "we have been in court for over eight hours, approaching nine hours." The trial court responded they would continue until "the State rests or 10:00 p.m., whichever comes first." Defense counsel then asked the court to consider waiting until the next morning for the State's reconstructionist to testify as the jury might be fatigued and that particular testimony was critical to the case. He also "note[d his] concerns for the record." Defense counsel then said he "would rather be here on Saturday than to try to have to speed this thing up or have to kind of cut a corner or be so dang tired [he could not] remember what is going on, but [he would] be quiet and see how we go." On Friday, the defense rested at 11:45 a.m., and, after closing arguments, deliberation, and the punishment phase of the trial, the jury returned its verdict just after midnight. Defense counsel did not complain about the schedule again until the motion for new trial. Because defense counsel told the trial court he would "be quiet and see how we go" and did not raise a further objection to the trial schedule, we conclude appellant failed to preserve error for our review. We overrule appellant's tenth issue. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgments.