WORKMAN, Justice:

This is an appeal by Mark Foster and Kathy Giauque from a final order, pursuant to a jury verdict, in favor of the appellee, Debra Adkins, in the amount of $222,133. The appellants contend that the trial court committed various errors which justify reversal of that final order. We reverse and remand for a new trial on the issue of damages alone, with special emphasis on the establishment of future economic damages to a reasonable degree of certainty.

I.

On June 21, 1986, Debra Adkins was a passenger in an automobile driven by Joseph Hammonds. That automobile was struck by a vehicle driven by appellant Mark Foster and owned by appellant Kathy Giauque. As a result of that accident, the appellee suffered a cervical strain and an exacerbation of her preexisting depression. At trial, the appellee submitted medical bills in the amount of $2,768. With regard to evidence of other economic loss, the appellee had apparently planned to introduce the testimony of economist Daniel Selby. On the first day of trial, defense counsel moved to exclude the testimony of Mr. Selby since the witness had not been disclosed prior to the discovery deadline, and the circuit court granted the motion.

At the close of the plaintiff-appellee's evidence, defense counsel moved for a directed verdict on the lost wage claim, and the lower court granted that motion. The lower court denied defense counsel's motion for a directed verdict on the diminished earning capacity issue, however, and explained that defense counsel would be permitted to address the issue of the impairment of future ability to earn during trial.

The appellee's evidence at trial regarding diminished earning capacity consisted of statements presented by the appellee with regard to her hourly rate when she had been working and the number of hours worked per day. The appellee's counsel also addressed the diminished earning capacity issue in closing argument, explaining that considering the appellee's age, life expectancy, and normal rate of pay, she had suffered diminished earning capacity in the amount of $447,825. Counsel for the appellee also explained that the figure should be reduced to its present value by dividing it in half. The jury verdict returned on May 8, 1991, was in favor of the appellee for $222,133.

The appellants contend that the following errors were committed: 1) the trial court erred by giving an instruction on the issue of the appellee's diminished earning capacity when the appellee had failed to introduce evidence of diminished earning capacity; 2) the trial court erred by allowing the appellee's counsel to suggest during closing argument a method of determining the appellee's damages for diminished earning capacity; 3) the trial court erred by allowing the appellee's counsel to suggest the amount of damages that the jury should award to plaintiff; 4) the trial court erred by failing to grant the appellants' motion for a new trial based on the alleged excessive verdict; 5) the trial court erred by failing to grant the appellants' motion for remittitur based on the alleged excessive verdict.

II.

The primary issues to be determined by this Court are whether the trial court erred by permitting the appellee and her attorney to attempt to calculate an award of diminished earning capacity, based upon insufficient evidence, to attempt to calculate the present value of the loss in the absence of expert, or other formal, economic evidence, and to permit the jury to consider the issue of diminished earning capacity based upon the amount and nature of the economic evidence presented. The appellee and her attorney employed evidence of the appellee's age, life expectancy as determined by the appellee's physician, and normal rate of pay to arrive at a figure of diminished earning capacity. The attorney then suggested to the jury that the figure could be divided in half to calculate the present value of that amount. While more extensive expert economic testimony is typically presented, the question remains of whether it is error to premise an award of diminished earning capacity upon the economic evidence introduced through the more simplistic method employed in the present case.

With regard to the instruction presented to the jury on diminished earning capacity, the appellants contend that the lower court erred in instructing the jury on that element of damages when sufficient evidence was not presented to support such instruction. We have explained that impairment of earning capacity is a proper element of recovery when two elements have been proven: permanent injury and reasonable degree of certainty of the damages. Jordan v. Bero, 158 W. Va. 28, 52, 210 S.E.2d 618, 634 (1974). We held in syllabus point 9 of Jordan that "[t]he permanency or future effect of any injury must be proven with reasonable certainty in order to permit a jury to award an injured party future damages." Id., 158 W. Va. at 29, 210 S.E.2d at 623; accord Dowey v. Bonnell, 181 W. Va. 101, 380 S.E.2d 453 (1989). We also explained the following in syllabus point 2 of Flannery v. United States, 171 W. Va. 27, 297 S.E.2d 433 (1982),

`Future damages are those sums awarded to an injured party for, among other things: (1) Residuals or future effects of an injury which have reduced the capability of an individual to function as a whole man; (2) future pain and suffering; (3) loss or impairment of earning capacity; and (4) future medical expenses.' Syllabus Point 10, Jordan v. Bero, [158] W. Va. [28], 210 S.E.2d 618 (1974).

In Jordan, we dealt with an injury to a ten-year-old boy who had been hit by an automobile while riding his bicycle and had suffered a massive head wound. We did allow "reasonable inferences arising from the evidence in proof of future effects of permanent injury." Id., 158 W. Va. at 56, 210 S.E.2d at 636. We cautioned, however, that such approach "cannot be extended to unreasonable lengths in support of instant claims for impairment of earning capacity and future medical expenses. . . ." Id. We emphasized in Jordan that "impairment of earning capacity is an item of permanent damages which again must be proved to a reasonable degree of certainty; it cannot be left to sheer speculation or surmise." Id., 158 W. Va. at 57, 210 S.E.2d at 637. We recognized that while the father's testimony regarding his son's performance of chores was competent, it was "of slight inferential value as to be deficient when it is asserted in support of a permissive instruction allowing the jury to make an award for impairment of earning capacity. . . ." Id. We concluded that "where the permanent injury is proven, reasonable inferences based upon sufficient evidence are all that is necessary to carry the question to the jury for its consideration. Here, however, the evidence was de minimis and was not sufficient to raise a proper inference for the jury's consideration." Id., 158 W. Va. at 57, 210 S.E.2d at 637.

The appellee in the present case introduced neither vocational evidence regarding future work capacity nor expert economic evidence either as to diminished earning capacity or as to reduction to present value. Ideally, the claim of diminished earning capacity could have been supported by testimony of a vocational expert regarding what types of jobs the appellee would be capable of performing and an economist to calculate future losses. The "reasonable degree of certainty" requirement of Jordan would have been more closely followed through the introduction of such testimony. 158 W. Va. at 56, 210 S.E.2d at 637. The appellants in the present case emphasize, for instance, that the injuries resulting from the accident, a cervical strain and exacerbation of a preexisting depression, are obscure injuries which are not readily apparent to the casual onlooker, implying a greater necessity for expert evaluation of future effects. Dr. James Michael Herr, an orthopedist, testified that the appellee was permanently disabled. Dr. Francis Whalen, a psychiatrist, also testified that the appellee was permanently disabled and that her depression was a result of the auto accident.

The appellants further contend that neither the appellee nor her attorney was qualified to testify that the appellee was permanently disabled from all employment. Certainly, the appellee's counsel's closing argument that calculating future damages by multiplying figures of rate of pay and life expectancy and dividing that amount in half to represent present value must be examined with caution. We do recognize that the appellee presented some evidence of diminished earning capacity; however, we do not believe that the Jordan requirement of proof to a reasonable degree of certainty has been satisfied. We do not suggest that expert economic or vocational evidence is mandatory in every instance; yet, we do reiterate our requirement of proof of future economic loss to a reasonable degree of certainty.

Especially where no expert evidence regarding appropriate reduction of an award to present value is introduced, we believe that the trial court is obligated to direct the jury in adjusting the award to present value. An illuminating discussion of this issue was recently presented by the Supreme Court of South Dakota in Howard v. Sanborn, 483 N.W.2d 796 (S.D. 1992). In Howard, injured motorists brought an action against the driver of the other vehicle involved in an automobile accident. In addressing an issue regarding an instruction on calculation of the present value of an award, the South Dakota Supreme Court compared the instruction to the federal instruction suggested in 3 Edward Devitt, Charles Blackmar Michael Wolff, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions: Civil § 85.11 at 325-26 (4th ed. 1987). Howard, 483 N.W.2d at 799-800. The South Dakota Supreme Court concluded that although expert testimony on the issue of the reduction of future earnings to present value is not required in every case, where an expert testifies and reduces the damages to present value, an instruction "which includes present worth tables must be carefully crafted to prevent confusion." Id. at 801. The Court in Howard further held that where there is no expert testimony on present value, "the jury must have some direction to help it intelligently reduce the award to present value." Id. As recognized in Brodie v. Philadelphia Transportation Co., 415 Pa. 296, 302, 203 A.2d 657, 660 (1964), and cited with approval in Howard,

`The involved process of reducing future losses to their present worth has, undoubtedly, led to confusion and guesswork verdicts. Reason, logic and fairness would, therefore, dictate that enlightenment is necessary. Such can be provided, at least in part, by permitting the use of accepted tables or the testimony of a qualified expert, who can compose the proper computations.'

483 N.W.2d at 801-02 (quoting Watkins v. Ebach, 291 N.W.2d 765, 767 (S.D. 1980) quoting Brodie, 415 Pa. at 302, 203 A.2d at 660).

Although expert economic evidence may not be necessary in every case, an instruction regarding appropriate reduction of an award to present value should be presented to the jury both in cases where expert economic evidence is presented as well as in cases where no such evidence is presented. Furthermore, where permanent injury is alleged, as in the present case, the prudent plaintiff's counsel would seek to introduce vocational evidence in addition to medical evidence of permanent injury in order to assist the jury in ascertaining the extent and permanency of the plaintiff's alleged inability to engage in gainful employment. Similarly, prudent defense counsel would also present such evidence in order to assist the jury in determining whether the plaintiff would be capable of some other future employment which might mitigate the damages for loss of future earning capacity.

Due to the lack of proof of diminished earning capacity to a reasonable degree of certainty, the issue of diminished earning capacity should not have been submitted to the jury. Consequently, we must reverse this matter and remand it for a new trial on the issue of damages alone, with special emphasis on the establishment of future economic damages to a reasonable degree of certainty.

III.

The appellants also allege error in the trial court's failure to grant a new trial or a remittitur in light of the large verdict. We have consistently held that "`[c]ourts must not set aside jury verdicts as excessive unless they are monstrous, enormous, at first blush beyond all measure, unreasonable, outrageous, and manifestly show jury passion, partiality, prejudice or corruption.' Syl. Pt., Addair v. Majestic Petroleum Co., Inc., 160 W. Va. 105, 232 S.E.2d 821 (1977)." Syl. Pt. 5, Roberts, 176 W. Va. at 492, 345 S.E.2d at 793.

The appellee presented evidence of significant injury and disfigurement resulting from the accident. As recognized by the lower court in denying the appellants' motions for a new trial and to set aside the verdict,

It appears to me that the jury simply did not buy the argument that this woman was not injured and was not in great pain in the past and presently as she appeared before the jury. She was a pitiful figure there, and I — I don't think that was lost on the jury.

In light of the evidence presented, we do not believe that the jury verdict should be set aside as excessive or that a remittitur should be granted.

Due to the absence of special interrogatories to the jury, we are unable to speculate regarding the jury's specific calculation of its award. Failure to submit a special interrogatory to the jury can lead to various unexpected areas of uncertainty upon appellate review of a jury verdict. In attempting to resolve an issue of prejudgment interest and its application to special or liquidated damages, for instance, we explained in syllabus point 3 of Beard v. Lim, 185 W. Va. 749, 408 S.E.2d 772 (1991), that prudent defense counsel should seek a special interrogatory on the issue of special damages in order to secure appropriate application of prejudgment interest principles. Accord Syl. Pt. 3, Perdue v. Doolittle, 186 W. Va. 681, 414 S.E.2d 442 (1992).

Similarly, the present inability to distinguish among the various categories for which the jury compensated the appellee could have been avoided by the submission of a special interrogatory. Had the verdict form delineated the nature of damages awarded, we could strike the award for loss of future earning capacity, if any, as being inadequately supported by the evidence and without proper legal instruction. Because there was no such delineation, it is possible the verdict was for other items of damages. Consequently, in the absence of a specific verdict form submitted at trial, the plaintiff should be given the benefit of the doubt and have an opportunity for remand. If the award was based upon pain and suffering as adjudged by the jury, that was clearly in their province under the evidence presented and could not be deemed excessive as a matter of law. If, however, it was based upon the speculative testimony presented on the issue of future economic damages, it cannot stand.

Our conclusion that this matter should be remanded on the issue of future economic damages is based upon our belief that the appellee presented significant evidence of permanent injury but failed to present evidence of future economic ramifications of the injury to a reasonable degree of certainty. Upon remand, the permanency of the appellee's injury, as proven in the previous trial, should be presumed, and evidence of future economic loss should be presented to permit a reliable calculation of economic loss.

Reversed and remanded.