JOHNSON, Justice[fn*] [fn*] Pursuant to Rule IV, Part 2, § 3, Lemmon, J. was not on the panel which heard and decided this case.

We granted defendant's writ of certiorari to determine whether, under La.R.S. 40:1299.43 (C) of the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act, an employee's health care provider is entitled to reimbursement of future medical expenses through subrogation from the Louisiana Patient's Compensation Fund (PCF) where the employer, through its Health Care Administrators, paid the employee's medical expenses in the amount of $731,602.57 under the employer's health plan. The trial court found that the A. Copeland Enterprises, Inc. and its Employee Welfare Benefits Plan (collectively Copeland) obtained a right of subrogation in favor of Copeland from their employee insured, Donna Wallace, which allowed Copeland to assert the medical expenses claim of the deceased employee and her family. The court of appeal affirmed. It determined that subrogation results in no greater liability to the PCF than would have occurred had the patient asserted the claim herself. Therefore, according to the court of appeal, Copeland could be reimbursed directly from the PCF for medical expenses incurred on behalf of Mrs. Wallace. We disagree and for the reasons assigned, the judgment of the court of appeal is reversed. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 12, 1988, Donna Wallace underwent a mastectomy at Slidell Memorial Hospital in Slidell, Louisiana. Immediately following the surgery, Mrs. Wallace awakened in the recovery room and complained of pain. Julie Joyce, the nurse anesthetist, injected Mrs. Wallace with a narcotic analgesic for her pain. Shortly thereafter, Mrs. Wallace lapsed into a coma where she remained until her death on August 22, 1990.

On February 16, 1989, Ms. Wallace and her husband, individually and on behalf of their three minor children, filed a medical malpractice suit, naming Slidell Memorial Hospital, Dr. Luis Hernandez, the anesthesiologist, and Julie Joyce, the nurse anesthetist, among others, as defendants. Pursuant to La.R.S. 40:1299.47, the matter was submitted to a medical malpractice review panel. During the review panel proceedings, Copeland, Mrs. Wallace's employer, intervened seeking reimbursement of medical expenses paid on her behalf. Copeland, through its Health Care Administrators, Travelers Insurance Company and Provident Insurance Company, paid a total of $731,602.57 in medical expenses for Mrs. Wallace's alleged medical malpractice injuries under its employee benefit plan from July 12, 1988 until August 1990, the month of her death.

Sometime in August 1990, the Wallaces settled their medical malpractice claim against the named defendants and received payment from the PCF in the amount of $500,000.00, plus legal interest, along with other medical expenses incurred after the date of settlement. The receipt and release agreement specifically stated that the settlement "represents general damages only and does not include any amount as compensation for medical expenses incurred prior to the date of Judgment authorizing and approving this settlement." In addition, the receipt and release agreement provided that PCF

will indemnify, protect and hold harmless Charles Wallace . . . from all liability . . . , from any and all claims . . . which has been or may ever be asserted by A. Copeland Enterprises, Inc., . . . concerning the terms and conditions of any ERISA plan and/or subrogation rights, or reimbursements, . . . and all related issues raised thereby and/or by the "subrogation recovery agreement" dated July 19, 1988 . . . .

(emphasis in original).

The "subrogation recovery agreement" executed by Charles Wallace on behalf of his wife, Donna Wallace, on July 19, 1988, provided as follows:

SUBROGATION RECOVERY AGREEMENT

In order for our claims department to process any charges incurred in connection with your recent accident, we must have this statement signed by you, The Eligible Covered Employee.

This agreement will allow payment for benefits under the A. Copeland Entp., Inc. plan based on the understanding that any money collected from a Third Party for the same expenses will be returned to A. Copeland Enterprises, Inc.

If I, Donna G. Wallace recover money from a Third Party for negligently injuring me, I agree to reimburse A. Copeland Entp., Inc. any money it has paid for such injuries.

I also agree to supply any information or assistance asked by the claims department which it needs to enforce the Plan's recovery rights.

Copeland filed suit against Slidell Memorial Hospital and its insured, the Louisiana Hospital Association Trust Fund, Dr. Hernandez, Julie Joyce, C.R.N.A., and the PCF on April 9, 1991, seeking reimbursement of medical expenses paid under Copeland's employee benefit plan on behalf of Mrs. Wallace. The Louisiana Hospital Association Fund and Dr. Hernandez were later dismissed from this litigation. During the trial of this matter, the parties agreed to stipulate to the following pertinent uncontested facts:

1) the qualified health-care provider status of two defendants, Slidell Memorial Hospital and Julie Joyce;

2) the liability of Slidell Memorial Hospital and Julie Joyce;

3) the payment of Mrs. Wallace's medical expenses in the amount of $731,602.57 by Travelers Insurance Company and Provident Insurance Company from money funded by A. Copeland Enterprises, Inc.;

4) that coverage for medical expenses was provided to Mrs. Wallace under the A. Copeland Enterprises Employee Benefit Plan;

5) that Mr. Wallace executed a subrogation agreement in favor of Copeland in regard to the medical payments; and

6) the authenticity of certain depositions and documents.

The parties submitted their legal arguments on briefs for the trial court's determination.

The sole issue before the lower courts was whether Copeland, as subrogee of Mrs. Wallace, was entitled to reimbursement of medical expenses directly from the PCF.

The trial court, relying on Lamark v. NME Hospitals, Inc., 522 So.2d 634 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1988), found that Copeland had been subrogated to assert its claim against the PCF for the stipulated medical expenses paid by Copeland on behalf of Donna Wallace. Accordingly, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Copeland and against Slidell Memorial Hospital and Julie Joyce, C.R.N.A., as nominal defendants, and the PCF for $731,602.57, plus legal interest from August 22, 1990, as stipulated by the parties.

The court of appeal affirmed. 637 So.2d 1087 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1994). It held that the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act, La.R.S. 40:1299.43(C), which allows a patient who has settled a medical malpractice action to make a claim to the PCF for future medical care and related benefits, would also permit recovery by the patient's self-insured employer as the patient's subrogee.

We granted the PCF's application for certiorari, 94-C-2011, 644 So.2d 661 (La. 1994), to determine whether Copeland is entitled to reimbursement through subrogation directly from the Patient's Compensation Fund for medical expenses paid on behalf of the patient under its employee benefit plan. LAW AND DISCUSSION I. LEGAL SUBROGATION

The PCF argues that the "subrogation recovery agreement" between Mrs. Wallace and Copeland does not allow Copeland to recover money directly from the PCF. Relying on Martin v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company, 94-C-0069, 638 So.2d 1067 (La. 1994), the PCF argues that legal subrogation, pursuant to La.C.C. art. 1829, does not occur in favor of a health insurer simply because the insurer has paid the medical expenses of an insured.

Subrogation is the substitution of one person to the rights of another. La.C.C. art. 1825. When subrogation results from a person's performance of the obligation of another, that obligation subsists in favor of the person who performed it, who may avail himself of the action and security of the original obligee against the obligor, but is extinguished for the original obligee. An original obligee who has been paid only in part may exercise his rights for the balance of the debt in preference to the new obligee. La.C.C. art. 1826.

In other words, subrogation is the legal fiction established by law whereby an obligation, extinguished with regard to the original creditor by payment which he has received from a third person, or from the original debtor but with funds that a third person has provided, is regarded as substituting in favor of this third person who in essence steps into the shoes of the original debtor and is entitled to assert, in the measure of what he has paid, the rights and actions of the former creditor. 4 C. Aubry C. Rau, Droit Civil Francais § 321 (6th ed. Bartin) in A. Yiannopoulos, 1 Civil Law Translations 187 (1965). See also 2 M. Planiol, Civil Law Treatise pt. 1, nos. 474, 475 at 271 (11th ed. La.St.L.Inst. trans. 1959); Comment, The Role of Subrogation by Operation of Law and Related Problems in the Insurance Field, 22 La.L.Rev. 225 (1961); Comment, Fundamental Principles and Effects of Subrogation in French and Louisiana Law, 25 Tul.L.Rev. 358 (1951). Subrogation thus gives an advantage to the third person by assuring him of reimbursement in a way considerably more effective than the personal action that arises from just his act of performing. Litvinoff, The Law of Obligations 5, § 11.2 (1992); See 7 Planoil et Ripert, Traite pratique de droit civil francais 626 (2d ed. 1954).

Subrogation, as a manner of effecting a transfer of an obligation at the time a creditor received payment from a person other than his principal or original obligor, originated from two Roman law institutions. See Buckland, A Text Book of Roman Law From Augustus to Justinian 449 and 565 (2d ed. 1950). Article 2161 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, is virtually identical to the corresponding article of the French Civil Code. Titles III and IV of Book III of the Civil Code of 1870, which formerly contained C.C. arts. 1756 to 2291, all relative to Obligations, were amended and reenacted by Acts 1984, No. 331, to contain C.C. arts. 1756 to 2057, effective January 1, 1985. Although not absolutely binding, this Court has given great persuasive weight to comments of French authors interpreting articles adopted from the French Civil Code. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd. v. Pittman Construction Co., 261 La. 665, 260 So.2d 661 (1972); Rials v. Davis, 212 La. 161, 31 So.2d 726 (La. 1947).

In essence, subrogation is a contract between the creditor and the person who renders performance. It is subject to the general rules that govern the proof of obligations. See 2 Planiol Ripert Traite Elementaire de Droit Civil, p. 1. no. 480, at 274 (11th ed. La. St. L. Inst. trans. 1959). Subrogation may be either conventional or legal. La.C.C. art. 1825. It may result from either the agreement of the obligor or the obligee or both with a third person, or directly from the operation of law. Thus, the intention of subrogation is to protect such persons who perform certain acts. Litvinoff, The Law of Obligations, § 11.8 (1992).

In Martin, supra, this Court addressed the issue of whether a health and accident insurer, which pays its insured's medical expenses after an automobile accident, is entitled to legal subrogation against a tortfeasor. We concluded that a health and accident insurer is not "bound with . . . or for" a tortfeasor whose actions give rise to medical expenses. Therefore, the insurer does not become legally subrogated to its insured's cause of action simply by making the medical payments called for in its insurance contract. In reaching this decision, we examined La.C.C. art. 1829 which provides:

Subrogation takes place by operation of law:

* * * * *

(3) In favor of an obligor who pays a debt he owes with others or for others and who has recourse against those others as a result of the payment.

We determined that under article 1829 (3), the initial inquiry is whether the obligor is bound "with . . . or for others," and in order for an obligor to be bound, the obligation must be solidary and indivisible. An obligation is solidary among debtors when they are obliged to do the same thing, so that either may be compelled to perform the whole obligation, and payment by one exonerates the other. La.C.C. art. 1794; Hoefly v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 418 So.2d 575 (La. 1982).

Solidary liability is never presumed and arises only from a clear expression of the parties' intent or from law. La.C.C. art. 1796. Consequently, an insurer bound to repair the damage caused by a tortfeasor is solidarily liable with the tortfeasor because both are obligated to the same thing, repair of the tort damage. Fertitta v. Allstate Ins. Co., 462 So.2d 159 (La. 1985). See La.R.S. 22:1406 (D)(1)(a); La.R.S. 22:655 (B)(1).

On the other hand, medical insurers are not obligated to repair tort damages. A medical insurer contracts to pay stipulated medical expenses, regardless of whether there is a tortfeasor and tort liability. The medical insurer thus pays its own debt, not that of the tortfeasor, and the two are not obligated to "the same thing." See Fertitta, 462 So.2d at 164, n. 7; 2 Planiol Ripert, Traite Elementaire de Droit Civil, p. 1. no. 491 n. 27, at 278 (La.St.L.Inst. trans. 11th ed. 1959). We also recognized that Article 1829 (3) is an exception to the general rule that subrogation does not take place when a third person pays the debt of another. La.C.C. art. 1855 states the general rule that "performance rendered by a third person effects subrogation only when so provided by law or agreement."

Hence, based on this court's analysis in Martin, Copeland, who is neither "bound with . . . or for" the tortfeasors' actions does not become legally subrogated to the rights of Mrs. Wallace simply by making medical payments on her behalf.

II. CONVENTIONAL SUBROGATION

Copeland argues that the instant case is distinguishable from Martin, supra, in that there is a distinct "subrogation recovery agreement" between it and the Wallaces. Copeland maintains that by agreement the Wallaces conventionally subrogated their rights to Copeland. Copeland further argues that the express language in the receipt and release agreement clearly indicates that the Wallaces did not receive any compensation from the tortfeasors representing medical expenses and the right to recover such expenses was reserved to it. In sum, Copeland contends that because it was conventionally subrogated to the rights of the Wallaces, it is entitled to reimbursement for all medical expenses incurred on behalf of Mrs. Wallace.

Conventional subrogation occurs when an obligee, who receives performance from a third person, subrogates that person to his rights, even without the obligor's consent. La.C.C. art. 1827. In conventional subrogation, an obligee who receives performance from a third person may subrogate that person to the rights of the obligee, even without the obligor's consent. La.C.C. art. 1827. The third person or conventional subrogee is now substituted to all the rights of the original obligee. The third person, or subrogee, is entitled to recover the full amount of the debt from the obligor regardless of the amount he paid to the obligee. See comment (d) of La.C.C. art 1827.

The obligee, by subrogating his rights to a third person from whom he receives performance, may obtain the advantage of receiving that performance at a moment when the original obligor might have difficulty rendering it. Moreover, unless the obligation is strictly personal, the obligor suffers no damage to his interest by the original obligee substituting his rights to a third party. Litvinoff, The Law of Obligations 5, § 11.21 (1992).

Although the obligor's consent is not required for subrogation by the obligee, the obligee's intention to subrogate must be clearly indicated. Pursuant to article 1827, the agreement for subrogation need not be in writing. The agreement may be oral or an express written agreement between the obligee and the third person. That being the case, prior decisions holding that conventional subrogation by the obligee must be in writing and before the time of payment have been expressly overruled. See Succession of Virgin, 18 La.Ann. 42 (1866); Bank of Bienville v. Fidelity Deposit Co. of Maryland, 172 La. 687, 135 So. 26 (1931); Cooper v. Jennings Refining Co., 118 La. 181, 42 So. 766 (1907); Cox v. W.H. Heroman Co., Inc., 298 So.2d 848 (La. 1974).

Nonetheless, if subrogation is disputed, the obligee's intention must be shown by clear proof of acts of the obligee that unquestionably implies it. Litvinoff, The Law of Subrogation 5, § 11.22 (1992). Louisiana jurisprudence has held that an agreement of subrogation by the obligee may be proved by parol evidence. See Litvinoff, The Law of Subrogation 5, § 11.23 n. 3. However, an act under private signature is regarded prima facie as the true and genuine act of a party executing it when his signature has been acknowledged, and the act shall be admitted into evidence without further proof. La.C.C. art. 1836. Therefore, absent such circumstances as a vice of consent, a simulation, or proof that a written act was modified by a subsequent and valid oral agreement, testimonial or other evidence may not be admitted to negate or vary the contents of an act under private signature. La.C.C. art. 1848.

In urging that there is no conventional subrogation, the PCF argues that the "subrogation recovery agreement" when considered alone and in the context of other agreements clearly constitutes a reimbursement agreement, not a "true subrogation agreement."

To determine whether the agreement entitled "subrogation recovery agreement" between Copeland and Mr. Wallace actually denotes a true conventional subrogation, we must first examine the wording of the agreement. The clear wording of the "subrogation recovery agreement" mirrors that of a reimbursement agreement. In other words, the agreement permits Copeland to be reimbursed directly from the Wallaces any money it has paid on behalf of Mrs. Wallace only if the Wallaces recover money from a negligent third party for the same injuries.

While subrogation and reimbursement are similar in effect, they are different principles. With subrogation, the insurer stands in the shoes of the insured, whereas with reimbursement, the insurer has a direct right of repayment against the insured. Thus, the agreement, although entitled "subrogation recovery agreement" does not conventionally subrogate Copeland to the Wallaces' rights against the tortfeasor, it only affords Copeland the right of repayment from the insured. That is, the language of the agreement never permits Copeland to recover money directly from the third party. For these reasons, we conclude that based on the clear language of the "subrogation recovery agreement", Copeland is not conventionally subrogated to the Wallaces' rights against the negligent third party.

Further, in regard to the indemnity agreement contained in the release and receipt agreement, we conclude the agreement merely attempts to protect the Wallaces from any and all liability in connection with any claims which may be asserted against them by Copeland regarding reimbursement of medical expenses incurred on behalf of Mrs. Wallace. The mere acknowledgment of the "subrogation recovery agreement" in the indemnity clause does not, in and of itself, grant Copeland a right of subrogation.

III. LEGISLATIVE INTENT

Next, PCF asserts that the clear and unambiguous language of La.R.S. 40:1299.43 (C) grants the right to recover future medical care and related benefits from the PCF only to the "patient". It argues that § 1299.41 (A)(3) specifically defines "patient" as " a natural person who receives or should have received health care from a licensed health care provider, under a contract, express or implied." (emphasis added). PCF thus contends that the clear reading of the statute precludes Copeland, who is neither the patient nor a natural person, from recovering through subrogation the $731,602.57 in medical expenses paid on behalf of Ms. Wallace. In addition, PCF, citing Ramirez v. The Fairgrounds, 575 So.2d 813 (La. 1991), argues that because the law is clear and unambiguous, it should be applied as written and no further interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the Legislature.

The purpose of the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act, La.R.S. 40:1299.41 et seq., is to provide compensation to medical malpractice victims who have been injured by qualified health care providers. Stuka v. Fleming, 561 So.2d 1371 (La. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 982, 111 S.Ct. 513, 112 L.Ed.2d 525 (1990). The Act creates a Patient's Compensation Fund which pays general damages to medical malpractice victims in excess of the $100,000.00 limitation, but not more than $500.000.00, plus interest and costs. In addition to any judgment in favor of medical malpractice victims, under Section 1299:43 (C) of the Act, the PCF also provides coverage for all reasonable future medical care and related benefits for the medical malpractice victims.

La.R.S. 40:1299.43 (C) provides:

Once a judgment is entered in favor of a patient who is found to be in need of future medical care and related benefits or a settlement is reached between a patient and the patient's compensation fund in which the provision of medical care and related benefits is agreed upon and continuing as long as medical or surgical attention is reasonably necessary, the patient may make a claim to the patient's compensation fund through the board for all future medical care and related benefits directly or indirectly made necessary by the health care provider's malpractice unless the patient refuses to allow them to be furnished.

Although proper interpretation and application of this statute would compel this Court to examine the Legislative intent, we pretermit resolving whether a non-patient, through subrogation, may assert a claim directly against the PCF for future medical expenses because, for the following reasons, this Court concludes that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction is these proceedings.

IV. ERISA

The PCF contends that because a provision in Copeland's Benefit Plan specifically provides that the plan is not a contract between Copeland and its employees, under state law, the subrogation provision cannot be construed to create an enforceable conventional subrogation in favor of Copeland.

The subrogation provision in Copeland's benefit plan contained the following clause:

SUBROGATION

If a Covered Employee . . . recovers money from a third party for negligently injuring the Covered Employee . . ., and if the Plan has paid any money for such injuries, then the Employee agrees to reimburse the Plan from any money he recovers from such third party. The Plan also has the right, in the Employee's place, to sue such third party to recover any money it has paid for such injuries.

(emphasis added.)

The provision in Copeland's benefit plan entitled "General Provisions" upon which the PCF relies provided that "[t]he Plan shall not be deemed to constitute a contract between the Company and any employee or to a consideration for, or an inducement or condition of, the employment of any employee."

Copeland maintains that the subrogation provision alone conventionally subrogates it to the Wallaces' rights. In addition, Copeland argues that the plan is not a contract, but a self-insured ERISA plan governed by federal law. Copeland contends that pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seq., federal law supersedes any and all state laws that relate to ERISA plans. Copeland thus argues that despite the general provision in the plan, the subrogation provision creates a true subrogation between it and the Wallaces. It further argues that despite state laws to the contrary, federal courts have consistently upheld such provisions in ERISA plans as valid and enforceable.

The federal Employee Retirement Benefit Income Security Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 829, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (ERISA), inclusively regulates employee pension and welfare plans. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (1), an employee welfare benefit plan is defined as

"any plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or maintained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that such a plan, fund, or program was established or is maintained for the purposes of providing for its participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment . . ."

"Plans may self-insure or they may purchase insurance for their participants. Plans that purchase insurance — so called 'insured plans' — are directly affected by state laws that regulate the insurance industry." Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 722 [ 471 U.S. 724], 732, 105 S.Ct. 2380, 2385 (1985). The statute imposes participation, funding and vesting requirements on pension plans and sets uniform standards, including rules concerning reporting, disclosure and fiduciary responsibilities, for both pension and welfare plans. Thus, "the purpose of ERISA was 'to promote the interest of employees and their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans,' Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90, 103 S.Ct. 2890, 2896, 77 L.Ed.2d 490 (1983), and 'to protect contractually defined benefits,' Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. at 148, 105 S.Ct. at 3093." Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Brunch, 489 U.S. at 113, 109 S.Ct. at 956 (1989).

The provisions of ERISA relating to pre-emption include the pre-emption clause in § 1144 (a), the saving clause in § 1144(b)(2)(A), and the deemer clause in § 1144 (b)(2)(B). In essence, state laws which relate to employee benefit plans are preempted by ERISA except for those state laws that regulate insurance. Moreover, a state law that purports to regulate insurance cannot deem an employee benefit plan to be an insurance company. See Soniat v. Travelers Ins. Co., 538 So.2d 210 (La. 1989). "While the purpose of ERISA pre-emption is to provide uniform application to benefits claims under ERISA-regulated plans, Congress apparently intended by enacting the saving clause to leave regulation of the insurance industry to the states." Soniat, supra, at 213.

Nevertheless, under ERISA, Congress explicitly set forth provisions granting federal district courts exclusive jurisdiction in civil actions brought by fiduciaries attempting to enforce the terms of a benefit plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (a)(3)(B)(ii). The standing provisions of ERISA must be construed narrowly, limiting civil actions under the Act to those parties and actions specifically enumerated in the Act by Congress. See Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Arnold, 809 F.2d 1520 (11th Cir. 1987); Lifetime Medical Nursing Services, Inc. v. New England Health Care Employees Welfare Fund, 730 F. Supp. 1192 (D. R.I. 1990).

Section § 1132 entitled " [c]ivil enforcement" provides in pertinent part:

(a) Persons empowered to bring a civil action

A civil action may be brought —

(1) by a participant or beneficiary — * * * * *

(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan;

(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or ( ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan; (emphasis added.)

(7) by a State to enforce compliance with a qualified medical child support order (as defined in section 1169 (a)(2)(A) of this title);

(1) Except for actions under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section, the district courts of the United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions under this subchapter brought by the Secretary or by a participant, beneficiary, fiduciary . . . State courts of competent jurisdiction and district courts of the United States shall have concurrent jurisdiction of actions under paragraphs (1)(B) and (7) of subsection (a). (emphasis added)

Congress specifically bestowed upon state courts concurrent jurisdiction in matters arising under 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (a)(1)(B) and (7). That being the case, we, construing § 1132 narrowly, interpret this section to mean that a participant or a beneficiary may bring an action in either state or federal court to 1) recover benefits due to him; 2) enforce his rights; and 3) clarify his rights to future benefits, under the terms of the plan. Also under paragraph seven (7) of subsection (a) of this section, a State may seek relief in state court to enforce compliance with a qualified medical child support order. (emphasis added). Here, Copeland is neither the proper party (a participant, beneficiary or State) to bring an action in this Court under ERISA, nor is this action one that falls within the scope of this Court's concurrent jurisdiction. Copeland is the fiduciary seeking to enforce a subrogation right under the terms of its employee benefit plan. It is apparent that this action is not within the realm of this Court's concurrent jurisdiction, as enumerated by the Act. Thus, based upon the clear wording of section 1132, the federal district court would have exclusive subject matter jurisdiction to determine whether Copeland is entitled to reimbursement pursuant to a subrogation agreement. CONCLUSION

Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132 this Court is without jurisdiction to determine the merits of the issues herein. Accordingly, the prior court judgments purporting to adjudicate the challenged claims are invalid and for the above assigned reasons, we reverse the judgments of both the court of appeal and district court.

REVERSED