Colo. R. Evid. 404

As amended through Rule Change 2024(18), effective October 2, 2024
Rule 404 - Character Evidence; Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts
(a)Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(1)Character of accused. In a criminal case, evidence of a pertinent trait of his character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same or if evidence of the alleged victim's character for aggressiveness or violence is offered by an accused and admitted under Rule 404(a)(2), evidence of the same trait of character of the accused offered by the prosecution;
(2)Character of alleged victim. In a criminal case, evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the alleged victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the alleged victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the alleged victim was the first aggressor;
(3)Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness as provided in Rules 607, 608, and 13-90-101 .
(b)Other crimes, wrongs, or acts.
(1)Prohibited Uses. Evidence of any other crime, wrong, or act is not admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in conformity with the character.
(2)Permitted Uses. This evidence may, be admissible for another purposes,such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident,
(3)Notice in a Criminal Case. In a criminal case, the prosecutor must:
(A) provide reasonable notice of any such evidence that theprosecutor intends to offer at trial, so that the defendant has a fair opportunity to meet it;
(B) articulate in the notice the permitted purpose for which the prosecutor intends to offerthe evidence and the reasoning that supports the purpose; and
(C) do so in writing before trial-or in any form during trial if the court, for good cause, excuses lack of pretrial notice.

CRE 404

Source: (a) amended and adopted June 20, 2002, effective 7/1/2002; (a)(1), (a)(2), and (b) amended and effective 9/27/2007; amended and Adopted March 29, 2021, effective 7/1/2021.

Committee Comment

See also § 16-10-301 , C.R.S. (Volume 8, 1978 Repl. Vol.), adopted by 1975 Legislature, setting for statute on standards and methods of proof relating to evidence of similar transactions in cases involving charges of unlawful sexual behavior.

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Annotation I. General Consideration. Law reviews. For article, "Hearsay in Criminal Cases Under the Colorado Rules of Evidence: An Overview", see 50 U. Colo. L. Rev. 277 (1979). For article, "The Use of Character to Prove Conduct: Rationality and Catharsis in the Law of Evidence", see 58 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1 (1986-87). For article, "How Should We Treat Character Evidence Offered to Prove Conduct?", see 58 U. Colo. L. Rev. 279 (1987). For casenote, "People v. Spoto: Teasing the Defense on Prior Bad Acts Evidence", see 63 U. Colo. L. Rev. 783 (1992). For article, "The Use of Rule 404(a) Character Evidence In Civil Cases", see 23 Colo. Law. 1801 (1994). For article, "Other Bad Act Evidence: How to Avoid the Slings and Arrows", see 26 Colo. Law. 43 (April 1997). For comment, "Reverse 404(b) Evidence: Exploring Standards When Defendants Want to Introduce Other Bad Acts of Third Parties", see 79 U. Colo. L. Rev. 587 (2008). For article, "The Expanding Use of the Res Gestae Doctrine", see 38 Colo. Law. 35 (June 2009). Rule applies in administrative proceedings as well as in criminal and civil cases. Knowles v. Bd. of Educ., 857 P.2d 553 (Colo. App. 1993). Rule gives an accused the right to introduce character evidence without prior character attack; accordingly, administrative hearing officer erred in not permitting defendant to present character evidence on grounds of irrelevancy. Knowles v. Bd. of Educ., 857 P.2d 553 (Colo. App. 1993). Documents excluded as irrelevant. People v. Walker, 666 P.2d 113 (Colo. 1983). Applied in People v. Alward, 654 P.2d 327 (Colo. App. 1982), cert. dismissed, 677 P.2d 948 (Colo. 1984); People v. Jones, 675 P.2d 9 (Colo. 1984); People v. Lucero, 677 P.2d 370 (Colo. App. 1983), cert. dismissed, 706 P.2d 1283 (Colo. 1985); People v. Marin, 686 P.2d 1351 (Colo. App. 1983). II. Character Evidenc. Prior acts of violence are not generally admissible to establish self-defense, unless the defendant had knowledge of the prior acts of violence at the time of the incident. People v. Jones, 635 P.2d 904 (Colo. App. 1981); People v. Lucero, 714 P.2d 498 (Colo. App. 1985). In the absence of a claim of self-defense, district court's exclusion of evidence of alleged violent and abusive acts by the murder victim was proper. People v. Smith, 848 P.2d 365 (Colo. 1993). Evidence may show character trait of aggression of victim. When the purpose of the evidence is to show a pertinent character trait of the victim from which it may be inferred that he was the initial aggressor, that trait may be shown by specific instances of past conduct. People v. Jones, 635 P.2d 904 (Colo. App. 1981). Weight to be accorded evidence of good character in criminal proceeding. People v. White, 632 P.2d 609 (Colo. App. 1981). Evidence of a person's character or a trait of his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith. People v. Hansen, 708 P.2d 468 (Colo. App. 1985). Specific instances of conduct introduced to counter evidence of good reputation or character must be relevant instances of conduct, that is, conduct related to the character trait put in issue. People v. Pratt, 759 P.2d 676 (Colo. 1988); People v. Kreiter, 782 P.2d 803 (Colo. 1989). When prosecution seeks to admit any evidence that suggests defendant is a person of bad character, it must explain why the logical relevance of that evidence does not depend on the inference that defendant acted in conformity with his or her bad character. Court properly admitted defendant's journal entries since they were relevant to establish defendant's mental state and rebut defendant's claims that he or she acted accidently or in self-defense. Although the evidence had the potential of unfair prejudice, there was no abuse of discretion by the court. People v. Griffin, 224 P.3d 292 (Colo. App. 2009). No plain error for failing to provide a limiting instruction when instruction was not required to be given either by statute or by timely request. People v. Griffin, 224 P.3d 292 (Colo. App. 2009). Erroneous rulings regarding introduction of character evidence sufficient to reverse conviction where defendant refrained from presenting defense based on such rulings. People v. Kreiter, 782 P.2d 803 (Colo. 1989). When impeachment is based upon rumor, the impeaching party has the burden of showing that acts forming the basis of rumor actually occurred. People v. Pratt, 759 P.2d 676 (Colo. 1988). Evidence in the form of reputation or opinion concerning a witness' character for truthfulness may be introduced to support the credibility of the person when the witness' character for truthfulness has been attacked; however, such testimony must be based on opinion held generally in a broad community. People v. Ayala, 919 P.2d 830 (Colo. App. 1995). "Were they lying?" type questions are categorically improper. Witnesses are prohibited from commenting on the veracity of another witness, because such opinions are prejudicial, argumentative, and ultimately invade the province of the fact-finder. Such concerns outweigh any potential or supposed probative value elicited by the question. Liggett v. People, 135 P.3d 725 (Colo. 2006). Reputation is distinguished from rumor in that it must be established over a period of time. People v. Ayala, 919 P.2d 830 (Colo. App. 1995). Reputation and rumor distinguished. People v. Erickson, 883 P.2d 511 (Colo. App. 1994). Court's failure to require a showing of the basis and relevance of specific instances of misconduct was error where the risk of prejudice of jury was great. Where prosecutor cross-examined character witness concerning alleged tying of nursing home patients to chairs, there was risk of prejudice sufficient to require advance determination by the court that such incidents likely had occurred and were in fact improper. People v. Pratt, 759 P.2d 676 (Colo. 1988). Admission of evidence that victim was an excellent worker and top employee, when defendant did not present any evidence going to the victim's trait of character, was reversible error. People v. Jones, 743 P.2d 44 (Colo. App. 1987). Testimony that a person is a "cautious driver" is character evidence under this rule and not habit evidence under C.R.E. 406. People v. T.R., 860 P.2d 559 (Colo. App. 1993). Trial court erred in ruling that evidence was inadmissible pursuant to C.R.E. 608 when it was admissible pursuant to subsection (a)(1) of this rule. People v. Miller, 862 P.2d 1010 (Colo. App. 1993). Testimony regarding victim's character may be relevant where self-defense is raised as a defense. People v. Erickson, 883 P.2d 511 (Colo. App. 1994). But where theory of defense was that homicide was committed in self-defense against a homosexual assault and the victim's alleged homosexuality itself would not prove an element of self-defense, evidence of the victim's homosexuality could only be introduced via reputation or opinion evidence, not via a specific instance of conduct. People v. Miller, 981 P.2d 654 (Colo. App. 1998). Opinion or reputation testimony was clearly relevant to establish a person's reputation in the community for peacefulness, and the trial court correctly permitted a witness to testify about such reputation. People v. Ibarra, 849 P.2d 33 (Colo. 1993). The trial court did not commit plain error in allowing the prosecution to elicit testimony during its case-in-chief showing the victim's character for peacefulness. Defense counsel raised self-defense as an affirmative defense during opening statements, and elicited testimony to support the affirmative defense during cross examination of a prosecution witness. People v. Baca, 852 P.2d 1302 (Colo. App. 1992). Trial court appropriately admitted prosecution testimony of episode of anger on part of defendant to rebut character trait of peacefulness set forth by defendant. People v. Garcia, 964 P.2d 619 (Colo. App. 1998), rev'd on other grounds, 997 P.2d 1 (Colo. 2000). Statement of defendant that her multiple personality disorder had been cured by the time of the murder was properly admitted even if defendant had not raised issue of diminished mental capacity. Statement was relevant to prosecution's theory that defendant had given a number of false and inconsistent statements to law enforcement officials after the murder and her purpose in mentioning the personality disorder was to explain why her statements had been inconsistent. People v. Hall, 60 P.3d 728 (Colo. App. 2002). Trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding character witness testimony because defendant admitted to using a false social security number he knew was not his own, and any evidence pertaining to his character for truthfulness was irrelevant in that respect. People v. Montes-Rodriguez, 219 P.3d 340 (Colo. App. 2009), rev'd on other grounds, 241 P.3d 924 (Colo. 2010). Similarly, trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence regarding whether or not defendant knew whose social security number he used. Because defendant admitted to using a social security number that was not his own, the evidence was irrelevant. People v. Montes-Rodriguez, 219 P.3d 340 (Colo. App. 2009), rev'd on other grounds, 241 P.3d 924 (Colo. 2010). A criminal defendant who testifies in his own defense at trial does not automatically have the right to present evidence of his character for truthfulness under this rule. The rule is intended to permit admissibility of pertinent traits and truthfulness is a pertinent trait only if it is involved in the offense charged. People v. Miller, 890 P.2d 84 (Colo. 1995). Administrative hearing officer's error in not allowing certain opinion testimony at teacher's disciplinary hearing did not affect any substantial right of petitioner where record reflects that, despite ruling, petitioner was permitted to present a substantial amount of character evidence and hearing officer concluded that petitioner was a person of good character. Knowles v. Bd. of Educ., 857 P.2d 553 (Colo. App. 1993). Although the defendant "opened the door" to questioning about why he or she was in Kansas, the prosecution could have elicited testimony that defendant gave a reason other than "family" as he or she testified to in court. The defendant's statement that he or she came to Kansas about drugs was not relevant to the case and injected defendant's bad character into the case and should have been inadmissable. People v. Rincon, 140 P.3d 976 (Colo. App. 2005). III. Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Law reviews. For article, "Rule 404(b): Evidence of Other Crimes, Wrongs or Acts", see 23 Colo. Law. 355 (1994). For article, "Admissibility of 'Other Acts' Evidence Under C.R.E. 404(b) ", see 32 Colo. Law. 87 (July 2003). Rule accords trial courts great discretion in admitting evidence of other acts, and that discretion is abused only if a ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. People v. Cousins, 181 P.3d 365 (Colo. App. 2007). Evidence of prior criminality casts damning innuendo likely to beget prejudice in the minds of juries. People v. Peterson, 633 P.2d 1088 (Colo. App. 1981). Therefore, prior criminal record generally inadmissible. As a general rule, subject to some exceptions, a prior criminal record of a defendant is inadmissible, and the introduction of such a record is reversible error. Serratore v. People, 178 Colo. 341, 497 P.2d 1018 (1972). Evidence of other crimes tending to prove res gestae of offense charged admissible. Where evidence of other crimes tends to prove the res gestae, these "other crimes" are not wholly independent of the offense charged, and it is not error to admit such evidence without giving a jury instruction in reference to the limited purpose for which the evidence of other crimes can be used. White v. People, 177 Colo. 386, 494 P.2d 585 (1972); People v. Czemerynski, 786 P.2d 1100 (Colo. 1990); People v. Fears, 962 P.2d 272 (Colo. App. 1997); People v. Lucas, 992 P.2d 619 (Colo. App. 1999); Litwinsky v. Zavaras, 132 F. Supp. 2d 1316 (D. Colo. 2001); People v. Merklin, 80 P.3d 921 (Colo. App. 2003). Although prior robbery and the murder with which defendant was charged were somewhat remote in time, they were inextricably intertwined because the victim of the murder had been a witness to the robbery, and evidence of the robbery gave context to the murder. People v. Fears, 962 P.2d 272 (Colo. App. 1997). Evidence of illegal drug paraphernalia was relevant to the question of defendant's knowledge of the nature of the drugs recovered from his apartment and their illegality without a prescription. Such evidence also gave the jury a more complete picture of the circumstances under which the drugs were found. People v. Valdez, 56 P.3d 1148 (Colo. App. 2002). Evidence of federal drug violation could properly be considered "part and parcel of the criminal episode" that became the basis for defendant's state prosecution. The prior drug transaction was closely interwoven with the facts of defendant's arrest and served to provide a context in which the jury could both understand the circumstances of the arrest and the validity of the charges. People v. Skufca, 141 P.3d 876 (Colo. App. 2005), rev'd on other grounds, 176 P.3d 83 (Colo. 2008). Evidence of other crimes is admissible to prove res gestae when such evidence is inextricably intertwined with the crime charged. People v. Workman, 885 P.2d 298 (Colo. App. 1994); People v. Thomeczek, __ P.3d __ (Colo. App. 2011). Such as where other activity part and parcel of entire criminal transaction. Where evidence that the defendant smoked marijuana cigarettes was elicited to show knowledge on the part of the defendant with regard to the possession of marijuana and was not adduced to show "another crime", nor to show that the defendant was evil and capable of committing crimes, and the activity was part and parcel of the entire criminal transaction entered into by the defendant, a limiting instruction was not necessary and the testimony was properly admitted. Dickerson v. People, 179 Colo. 146, 499 P.2d 1196 (1972). Evidence of argument between defendant and his girlfriend on night before fatal shooting was part and parcel of entire event and, therefore, properly admitted as res gestae of offense charged. People v. Agado, 964 P.2d 565 (Colo. App. 1998). Evidence presented at trial established that conduct was so closely connected to the main criminal transaction that evidence of it was necessary to complete the story of the crime. Without that evidence, the murder might not be properly understood as the jury would have no basis upon which it could determine the reasons behind defendant's conduct. People v. Gladney, 250 P.3d 762 (Colo. App. 2010). Res gestae evidence need not meet the procedural requirements of evidence introduced pursuant to section (b). Before admitting res gestae evidence, however, the trial court must find that its probative value is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. People v. Agado, 964 P.2d 565 (Colo. App. 1998); People v. Thomeczek, __ P.3d __ (Colo. App. 2011). Evidence of wholly independent offense to prove accused guilty of offense charged inadmissible. Evidence is not admissible which shows, or tends to show, that an accused has committed a crime wholly independent of the offense for which he is on trial, for no person shall be convicted of an offense by proving that he is guilty of another. Kostal v. People, 144 Colo. 505, 357 P.2d 70 (1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 804, 81 S. Ct. 471, 5 L. Ed. 462 (1961); Edmisten v. People, 176 Colo. 262, 490 P.2d 58 (1971); White v. People, 177 Colo. 386, 494 P.2d 585 (1972); People v. Ihme, 187 Colo. 48, 528 P.2d 380 (1974); People v. Geller, 189 Colo. 338, 540 P.2d 334 (1975). In a criminal trial to a jury, evidence of a defendant's criminal activity, which is unrelated to the offense charged, is inadmissible, and when reference is made in the presence of the jury to such criminal activity, a mistrial is normally required. People v. Goldsberry, 181 Colo. 406, 509 P.2d 801 (1973). The general rule is that evidence is not admissible which shows or tends to show that the accused has committed a crime wholly independent of the offense for which he is on trial. People v. Peterson, 633 P.2d 1088 (Colo. App. 1981). As a general rule, evidence of other criminal acts is inadmissible because of its prejudicial effect. People v. Mason, 643 P.2d 745 (Colo. 1982). Evidence that is not contemporaneous with the crime charged and does not illustrate its character is not part of the res gestae, and evidence that the defendant urged his wife not to testify with respect to the murder that defendant had allegedly committed two years earlier that implicated him in the separate crime of witness tampering was therefore not admissible as res gestae. However, such evidence was admissible to show the defendant's consciousness of guilt. People v. Medina, 51 P.3d 1006 (Colo. App. 2001), aff'd on other grounds, 71 P.3d 973 (Colo. 2003). Because guilt of one crime cannot be presumed by commission of another crime. It is not proper to raise a presumption of guilt on the ground that having committed one crime the depravity it exhibits makes it likely the defendant would commit another. Kurtz v. People, 177 Colo. 306, 494 P.2d 97 (1972); White v. People, 177 Colo. 386, 494 P.2d 585 (1972). To be admissible, similar transaction evidence must meet three tests: (1) Is there a valid purpose for which the evidence is offered? (2) Is the evidence relevant to a material issue in the case? (3) Does the probative value of the evidence of the prior act, considering the other evidence which is relevant to the issue, outweigh the prejudice to the defendant which would result from its admission? People v. Casper, 631 P.2d 1134 (Colo. App. 1981); People v. Crespin, 631 P.2d 1144 (Colo. App. 1981); People v. Quintana, 682 P.2d 1226 (Colo. App. 1984); People v. Rivers, 727 P.2d 394 (Colo. App. 1986). Test for admissibility is applied in Coll. v. Scanlan, 695 P.2d 314 (Colo. App. 1985); People v. Hansen, 708 P.2d 468 (Colo. App. 1985); Jacobs v. Com. Highland Theatres, Inc., 738 P.2d 6 (Colo. App. 1986); People v. Adrian, 744 P.2d 768 (Colo. App. 1987), aff'd, 770 P.2d 1243 (Colo. 1989); People v. Duncan, 754 P.2d 796 (Colo. App. 1988); People v. Czemerynski, 786 P.2d 1100 (Colo. 1990). To be admissible, the prior act evidence must relate to a material fact, be logically relevant, and be independent of the intermediate inference of bad character and its probative value must outweigh the danger of unfair prejudice. People v. Wallen, 996 P.2d 182 (Colo. App. 1999); People v. Masters, 33 P.3d 1191 (Colo. App. 2001), aff'd, 59 P.3d 979 (Colo. 2002). Prerequisites and factors to be considered by the trial court in determining whether to admit evidence of similar transactions under statute relating to sexual assault on a child are listed in State v. Janes, 942 P.2d 1331 (Colo. App. 1997). Trial court committed reversible error in admitting evidence of a prior criminal incident where the incident was too remote in time to constitute res gestae evidence, knowledge of the prior incident was not necessary to enable the jury to understand testimony concerning the incident at issue, and the probative value of the references to the prior incident was significantly outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. People v. Frost, 5 P.3d 317 (Colo. App. 1999). Trial court erred in admitting evidence of a prior act because it failed to meet the second and third prong of the People v. Spoto analysis. The prior act evidence did not show a tendency that can be separated from the prohibited inference that defendant acted a certain way in the past and therefore acted that way in this case and offered little probative value that was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Yusem v. People, 210 P.3d 458 (Colo. 2009). Evidence of other crimes is admissible to show guilt of crime charged. If evidence which is competent, material, and relevant to the issue of defendant's guilt of the crime for which he is on trial is not admitted for the purpose of showing the defendant's guilt of other crimes, but rather because it is relevant to show the defendant's guilt of the crime for which he is being tried, then it is not error to admit such evidence. Tanksley v. People, 171 Colo. 77, 464 P.2d 862 (1970). Evidence of defendant's gang affiliation admissible as res gestae. In murder trial, it would not be possible to tell the story of the events without referring to the relationship among the actors who were all gang members. People v. Martinez, 24 P.3d 629 (Colo. App. 2000). Evidence that defendant's body showed signs of drug use, that defendant possessed police scanners commonly associated with drug distribution, and that defendant possessed a notebook that was the same type used by drug dealers to document sales admissible as res gestae. People v. Griffiths, 251 P.3d 462 (Colo. App. 2010). Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is inadmissible if the logical relevance of the proffered evidence depends upon an inference that a person who has engaged in such misconduct has a bad character and the further inference that the defendant therefore engaged in the wrongful conduct at issue. People v. Spoto, 795 P.2d 1314 (Colo. 1990). Drawings and writings that were nothing more than evidence of defendant's violent nature simply authorized the inference that defendant had a bad character and killed the victim because of his bad character and thus were erroneously admitted as opposed to defendant's admissible drawings that paired sex with violence, represented rehearsal fantasy, evinced a hatred of women, or reflected specific aspects of the crime and thus revealed defendant's motive, preparation, plan, opportunity, or guilty knowledge; however, based on the totality of the circumstances, the jury was not substantially influenced by the inadmissible drawings and writings. Masters v. People, 59 P.3d 979 (Colo. 2002). Existence of bench warrant was not relevant and admissible as "history of arrest evidence", because the purpose of history of arrest evidence is to show the existence or absence of consciousness of guilt, and, without evidence that defendant knew that the prior warrant existed, mere evidence that a prior warrant existed would not have been relevant to that issue. People v. Perry, 68 P.3d 472 (Colo. App. 2002). Evidence of similar offenses admissible to show intent, motive, plan, scheme, or design. Evidence of similar offenses is admissible for certain purposes only, such as for the purpose of showing plan, scheme, design, intent, guilty knowledge, motive, or identity. Kostal v. People, 144 Colo. 505, 357 P.2d 70 (1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 804, 81 S. Ct. 471, 5 L. Ed. 462 (1961); Edmisten v. People, 176 Colo. 262, 490 P.2d 58 (1971); Howe v. People, 178 Colo. 248, 496 P.2d 1040 (1972); People v. Dago, 179 Colo. 1, 497 P.2d 1261 (1972); People v. Lamirato, 180 Colo. 250, 504 P.2d 661 (1972); People v. Ihme, 187 Colo. 48, 528 P.2d 380 (1974); People v. Czemerynski, 786 P.2d 1100 (Colo. 1990); People v. Bolton, 859 P.2d 311 (Colo. App. 1993); People v. Copeland, 976 P.2d 334 (Colo. App. 1998), aff'd on other grounds, 2 P.3d 1283 (Colo. 2000); People v. Fry, 74 P.3d 360 (Colo. App. 2002), aff'd on other grounds, 92 P.3d 970 (Colo. 2004). The exceptions to the rule that the evidence of a defendant's criminal activity, unrelated to the offense charged, is inadmissible are limited to well defined and special situations where proof of other similar offenses will show the defendant's intent, motive, plan, scheme, or design with respect to the crime charged. People v. Goldsberry, 181 Colo. 406, 509 P.2d 801 (1973). The exception to the rule, that evidence tending to prove the defendant guilty of a crime other than of the offense charged is not admissible, is applicable when the evidence is of a similar transaction and goes to the proof of intent, motive, plan, scheme, or design, and especially is this true where the other transactions are so connected in point of time with the offense under trial and so similar in character that a plan or scheme can be imputed as to all of them. People v. Moen, 186 Colo. 196, 526 P.2d 654 (1974). Court was justified in admitting evidence of a single prior incident since it was logically relevant under the doctrine of chances. Based on the relative similarity of the Pennsylvania sexual assault and the relative infrequency of two women separated by great geographical distance describing similar incidents was sufficient to admit the evidence. People v. Everett, 250 P.3d 649 (Colo. App. 2010). Admission of prior act evidence when defendant had been acquitted of the prior act does not violate due process or double jeopardy. Kinney v. People, 187 P.3d 548 (Colo. 2008). Informing jury of defendant's acquittal of a prior act is up to the discretion of the trial court on a case-by-case basis as long as the information's probative value substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. Kinney v. People, 187 P.3d 548 (Colo. 2008). An acquittal instruction is appropriate when the testimony or evidence presented at trial about the prior act indicates that the jury has likely learned or concluded that the defendant was tried for the prior act and may be speculating as to the defendant's guilt or innocence in that prior trial. Kinney v. People, 187 P.3d 548 (Colo. 2008). Appellate court will review trial court's decision for an abuse of discretion. Kinney v. People, 187 P.3d 548 (Colo. 2008). Trial court did not err by admitting evidence of other transactions when such evidence was determined to be relevant to prove intent, identity, motive, preparation or plan, and modus operandi and jury was instructed that evidence was to be used solely for those purposes. People v. Cook, 22 P.3d 947 (Colo. App. 2000). Trial court did not abuse discretion in admitting evidence of prior incident of sexual assault on a child where incident had occurred eight years earlier, the evidence was introduced only to prove identity, and the jury was instructed that identity was the only purpose for which the evidence could be considered. People v. Apodaca, 58 P.3d 1126 (Colo. App. 2002). Generally, evidence of prior acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith. People v. Gardner, 919 P.2d 850 (Colo. App. 1995). However, such evidence may be admissible for proof of, among other things, motive and intent. People v. Gardner, 919 P.2d 850 (Colo. App. 1995). Evidence is subject to exclusion under paragraph (b) only if it is offered to prove the defendant acted in conformity with a character trait. Prosecution clearly did not offer the evidence for that purpose. People v. Harland, 251 P.3d 515 (Colo. App. 2010). Evidence with reference to another transaction than that charged is admissible only as bearing upon the question of whether or not the defendant had a plan or design to produce a result of which the act charged was a part, and the jury can consider such evidence for no other purpose, for the defendant cannot be tried for or convicted of any offense not charged. Mays v. People, 177 Colo. 92, 493 P.2d 4 (1972). Criteria used to determine admissibility of evidence of prior conduct to prove intent are (1) whether the defendant's intent is a material issue in dispute; (2) whether the prior conduct involved the same intent as in the charged offense; and (3) whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect. People v. Spoto, 772 P.2d 631 (Colo. App. 1988); Munson v. Boettcher & Co., 832 P.2d 967 (Colo. App. 1991); People v. Close, 867 P.2d 82 (Colo. App. 1993); People v. Underwood, 53 P.3d 765 (Colo. App. 2002). Court properly admitted evidence of similar transactions in murder prosecution involving defendant's previous conduct of firing a handgun where such evidence was offered for the limited purpose of proving intent. People v. Willner, 879 P.2d 19 (Colo. 1994). Proof of motive which is relevant and material not excluded. While evidence of offenses other than the one for which the defendant is on trial is not admissible, proof of motive will not be excluded merely because it may be prejudicial to the defendant, as long as it is relevant and material. Candelaria v. People, 177 Colo. 136, 493 P.2d 355 (1972). Defendant's drawings and narratives of acts of violence that were similar to the manner in which the victim was killed were sufficiently similar so as to be logically relevant to defendant's motive, intent, and plan to commit the crime, and it was not error to introduce such evidence because intent was a material element required to be proven by the prosecution. People v. Masters, 33 P.3d 1191 (Colo. App. 2001), aff'd, 59 P.3d 979 (Colo. 2002). Evidence of prior threats and acts of violence toward women admissible to establish motive for alleged attack on a woman. Evidence showed defendant's anger toward and hatred of women and could provide a basis for a jury finding that defendant used violence and threats of violence against women when they frustrated his desires in order to force them to comply with his wishes. People v. Cousins, 181 P.3d 365 (Colo. App. 2007). Evidence admissible to show ill will. Ill will between the victim and the defendant is one purpose for which evidence of other crimes may be admissible. People v. Botham, 629 P.2d 589 (Colo. 1981); People v. Hulsing, 825 P.2d 1027 (Colo. App. 1991). A prior attack by the defendant on the victim is admissible as evidence of intent, in that it is probative of malice and ill will toward the victim. People v. Curtis, 657 P.2d 990 (Colo. App. 1982). Testimony related to activity allegedly occurring shortly before the time of the alleged crime, which was probative of ill will between the victim and defendant and relevant to the status of their relationship, is admissible. People v. St. John, 668 P.2d 988 (Colo. App. 1983). Evidence of argument with passenger in defendant's own vehicle just prior to altercation with the victim, a driver of another vehicle, admissible. The evidence was used to show that defendant's angry state of mind persisted up to and included the time of the shooting and was permissible for jury to hear. People v. Rudnick, 878 P.2d 16 (Colo. App. 1993). Evidence that the night before the defendant shot the victim, he struck her and pulled her hair, was relevant to disproving defendant's claim that the shooting was an accident by showing the defendant's indifference to the victim's welfare and trial court's limiting instruction was sufficient to restrict the jury's consideration of evidence to that purpose. People v. Covington, 988 P.2d 657 (Colo. App. 1999), rev'd on other grounds, 19 P.3d 15 (Colo. 2001). To resolve an issue of admissibility of prior acts, a court must determine whether the proffered evidence relates to a fact that is of consequence to determination of the action, whether evidence makes existence of a consequential fact more probable or less probable than it would be without such evidence, whether the logical relevance is independent of the prohibited intermediate inference that the defendant has bad character and probably acted in conformity with such bad character, and whether probative value of evidence is substantially outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice. People v. Spoto, 795 P.2d 1314 (Colo. 1990); People v. Garner, 806 P.2d 366 (Colo. 1991); People v. Ellsworth, 15 P.3d 1111 (Colo. App. 2000); People v. Martinez, 32 P.3d 520 (Colo. App. 2001); People v. Masters, 33 P.3d 1191 (Colo. App. 2001), aff'd, 59 P.3d 979 (Colo. 2002); People v. Cousins, 181 P.3d 365 (Colo. App. 2007). Test applied in Hock v. New York Life Ins. Co., 876 P.2d 1242 (Colo. 1994); People v. Harris, 892 P.2d 378 (Colo. App. 1994); Winkler v. Rocky Mountain Conference, 923 P.2d 152 (Colo. App. 1995); People v. Marquantte, 923 P.2d 180 (Colo. App. 1995); People v. Shepard, 989 P.2d 183 (Colo. App. 1999); People v. Martinez, 32 P.3d 520 (Colo. App. 2001); People v. Masters, 33 P.3d 1191 (Colo. App. 2001), aff'd, 59 P.3d 979 (Colo. 2002); People v. Rath, 44 P.3d 1033 (Colo. 2002); People v. Harrison, 53 P.3d 1103 (Colo. App. 2002); People v. Taylor, 131 P.3d 1158 (Colo. App. 2005); People v. Baker, 178 P.3d 1225 (Colo. App. 2007); Yusem v. People, 210 P.3d 458 (Colo. 2009); People v. Glasser, __ P.3d __ (Colo. App. 2011). This test must be applied to issues of admissibility of prior acts, notwithstanding the language of § 16-10-301 . The statute is permissive and contains no language that erodes the test. Thus, even when evidence of prior similar transactions is introduced in prosecutions specifically mentioned in the statute, an analysis under section (b) of this rule is still necessary. People v. Martinez, 36 P.3d 154 (Colo. App. 2001). Spoto does not demand absence of an inference that a defendant has bad character and acts in conformity with such behavior; it only requires proof that evidence of bad character is logically relevant independent of such inference. People v. Masters, 33 P.3d 1191 (Colo. App. 2001), aff'd on other grounds, 59 P.3d 979 (Colo. 2002). Evidence of defendant's possession and ownership of several knives was probative independent of an intermediate inference regarding the defendant's character. In trial where defendant allegedly stabbed victim, defendant's possession and ownership of the knives made it more probable that defendant had a knife when victim was stabbed and that defendant inflicted the wounds. Therefore, an inference about the defendant's character was not the only possible relevance of the knives, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting them as evidence. People v. Cordova, __ P.3d __ (Colo. App. 2011). Reversible error to admit defendant's statement about prior accusations of misconduct absent compliance with the requirements of Spoto and Garner. Defendant's statement alone is not sufficient to justify admission of the evidence. People v. Novitskiy, 81 P.3d 1070 (Colo. App. 2003). A defendant is on notice of the permissible purposes for which evidence of the defendant's prior bad acts is being offered under subsection (b) of this rule when the prosecutor states, at the hearing on the prosecution's motion to introduce similar transaction evidence, that the evidence was being offered to establish identity, guilty knowledge, intent, design, and motive. The defendant may not later claim that the prosecutor failed to articulate a "precise evidential hypothesis by which a material fact can be permissibly inferred from the prior misconduct independent of the inference prohibited by this rule ". People v. Harding, 983 P.2d 29 (Colo. App. 1998), 17 P.3d 183 (Colo. App. 2000). Testimony about prior incidents of other, similar alleged misconduct by church counselor with other counselees was not manifestly erroneous and thus was not improperly admitted in a civil action. DeBose v. Bear Valley Church of Christ, 890 P.2d 214 (Colo. App. 1994). The rule is not limited in application only to evidence of other crimes but permits evidence of other wrongs or acts, provided the evidence is offered for the proof of a material issue and substantive and procedural prerequisites are met. People v. Campbell, 706 P.2d 431 (Colo. App. 1985); People v. Jackson, 748 P.2d 1326 (Colo. App. 1987); Douglas v. People, 969 P.2d 1201 (Colo. 1998). The rule is not limited in application only to prior uncharged acts of the accused; the use of the word "person" in section (b) of this rule includes individuals other than the accused. People v. Harris, 892 P.2d 378 (Colo. App. 1994). Evidence does not become inadmissible under this rule or under the "rape shield" statute, § 18-3-407 , simply because it might indirectly cause the finder of fact to make an inference concerning the victim's prior sexual conduct. Where evidence of a person's prior acts is probative for reasons other than its tendency to show the person's propensity to perform similar acts at another time, the evidence is generally admissible. People v. Cobb, 962 P.2d 944 (Colo. 1998). Evidence of prior similar transactions is admissible in cases of sexual assault on a child if such evidence is offered to show a common plan, scheme, design, identity, modus operendi, motive, guilty knowledge, or intent. People v. Adrian, 744 P.2d 768 (Colo. App. 1987), aff'd, 770 P.2d 1243 (Colo. 1989); People v. Bolton, 859 P.2d 311 (Colo. App. 1993); People v. Leonard, 872 P.2d 1325 (Colo. App. 1993); People v. Snyder, 874 P.2d 1076 (Colo. 1994); People v. Williams, 899 P.2d 306 (Colo. App. 1995); People v. Underwood, 53 P.3d 765 (Colo. App. 2002). A prior act does not need to be similar in every respect to be admissible. People v. Masters, 33 P.3d 1191 (Colo. App. 2001), aff'd on other grounds, 59 P.3d 979 (Colo. 2002). To refute the defense of recent fabrication, evidence of prior similar transactions is admissible in cases of sexual assault on a child. People v. Duncan, 33 P.3d 1180 (Colo. App. 2001). Evidence of similar transactions in an incest case are admissible where there is sufficient and substantial similarity between the transactions and offense charged even though there were differences in the type of sexual activity. The evidence is also admissible on the issue of motive, and the trial court was not required to define motive for the jury. People v. Leonard, 872 P.2d 1325 (Colo. App. 1993). When such prior similar transaction evidence is admitted, the court must require the prosecution to elect a specific act on which the jury is asked to convict or, in the alternative, provide the jury with a unanimity instruction. Woertman v. People, 804 P.2d 188 (Colo. 1991). Evidence of prior criminal transactions is inadmissible where defendant was acquitted of similar act. The doctrine of collateral estoppel prevents the introduction of evidence of similar transactions for which a defendant has been acquitted. People v. Arrington, 682 P.2d 490 (Colo. App. 1983). Evidence of other offenses is admissible where offenses are part of single transaction and an integral part of the total picture surrounding the offense with which the defendant is charged. People v. Manier, 184 Colo. 44, 518 P.2d 811 (1974); People v. Wells, 691 P.2d 361 (Colo. App. 1984); Litwinsky v. Zavaras, 132 F. Supp.2d 1316 (D. Colo. 2001). Or to establish chain of circumstances. Where evidence is not introduced to show a transaction as independent criminal activity, but is used as one circumstance in a chain of circumstances to establish the defendants' complicity, it is admissible. Kurtz v. People, 177 Colo. 306, 494 P.2d 97 (1972). Evidence of prior acts may be admissible to rebut self-defense and defense of property defenses. Douglas v. People, 969 P.2d 1201 (Colo. 1998). Evidence of separate motor vehicle theft was relevant when thefts were similar, and when following a crash of the separate motor vehicle, defendant possessed identification stolen at the time of first theft and falsely identified himself to police as the person whose identification he had stolen. People v. Shepard, 989 P.2d 183 (Colo. App. 1999). Defendant's prior act was admissible to prove absence of accident. Where the prior act at issue was a violent one committed against the same child one week before the incident of physical abuse for which the defendant was on trial and where the basis for the evidence was to disprove defendant's defense of accident, the trial court did not err in admitting prior acts of the defendant as similar transaction evidence. People v. Fulton, 754 P.2d 398 (Colo. App. 1987). In an action based on allegations of trespass and deceptive trade practices, trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the following evidence of prior similar acts to demonstrate absence of mistake or accident: (1) Testimony regarding a dispute over access to a subdivision owned by defendants; (2) a letter to defendants concerning another access dispute; and (3) testimony regarding prior real estate litigation in which defendants were accused of selling property without proper title. Walter v. Hall, 940 P.2d 991 (Colo. App. 1996), aff'd on other grounds, 969 P.2d 224 (Colo. 1998). Exception recognized to show continuing scheme. A limited and well-defined exception is recognized where a similar act tends to establish the defendant's criminal culpability for the crime charged by showing that it was part of a continuing scheme and, hence, not the result of a mistake. People v. Mason, 643 P.2d 745 (Colo. 1982). Failure to instruct jury on limited purpose for which evidence of similar transactions was admitted was not plain error. People v. Tidwell, 706 P.2d 438 (Colo. App. 1985); People v. Lucero, 724 P.2d 1374 (Colo. App. 1986). While it is the better practice to issue a limiting instruction to the jury contemporaneously with the introduction of similar transactions evidence, when such an instruction is not requested, the failure to give one is not reversible error so long as the trial court properly applied the balancing test required to resolve the issue of admissibility. People v. Pineda, 40 P.3d 60 (Colo. App. 2001). Judge should repeat limited-purpose instruction in written instructions in order to safeguard against potential misuse of other-crime evidence by the jury. People v. Garner, 806 P.2d 366 (Colo. 1991). Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts applies in civil cases if evidence relevant. While section (b) is more frequently applied in criminal prosecutions, it also applies in civil cases if the evidence is relevant to the issues. Coll. v. Scanlan, 695 P.2d 314 (Colo. App. 1985). Evidence of a failure by a company to comply with a safety code or regulation at one point in time to support an allegation that the company failed to comply with safety regulations at another time does not satisfy any of the exceptions enumerated for admission of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Bennett v. Greeley Gas Co., 969 P.2d 754 (Colo. App. 1998). Evidence implicating defendant in another criminal case is admissible for purposes of identification. Hollis v. People, 630 P.2d 68 (Colo. 1981); People v. White, 680 P.2d 1318 (Colo. App. 1984). Modus operandi. Where a witness testifies as to a second crime by the defendant, a crime for which the defendant is not being tried, the testimony is not prejudicial where it aids in the identification of the defendant, shows the same modus operandi, and where the judge gives a proper limiting instruction as to its use. People v. Dago, 179 Colo. 1, 497 P.2d 1261 (1972). There is no error in the admission of evidence of another incident which, in addition to being closely proximate in time, involves features markedly similar to the offense charged. This evidence establishes a modus operandi that is highly probative of the issue of identity. People v. Madonna, 651 P.2d 378 (Colo. 1982). To establish modus operandi as exception for the admission of another transaction, there must be a dissimilarity from the methods generally used in such offenses, and there must be a distinctive factor in the methods used. People v. Crespin, 631 P.2d 1144 (Colo. App. 1981). Evidence of other crimes committed by the defendant is admissible where it is of similar crimes committed within the same geographical area within a few days, where similar methods were used, where the defendant himself introduced testimony pertaining to the transactions, and where the court followed proper procedures for the admission of such evidence. Stanmore v. People, 146 Colo. 445, 362 P.2d 1042 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 993, 82 S. Ct. 611, 7 L. Ed. 2d 529 (1962). It is error to admit evidence of numerous crimes which are wholly dissimilar in character and committed hundreds of miles away from the scene of the crime charged and where it is admitted over the defendant's objections. Kostal v. People, 144 Colo. 505, 357 P.2d 70 (1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 804, 81 S. Ct. 471, 5 L. Ed. 462 (1961). Evidence inadmissible even if elicited from defendant. Prejudicial evidence concerning other unrelated crimes elicited from the defendant on cross-examination does not make it admissible. Edmisten v. People, 176 Colo. 262, 490 P.2d 58 (1971). Evidence of prior crime must be clear and convincing. The commission of the prior crime and the defendant's identity as the perpetrator of the crime must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. People v. Botham, 629 P.2d 589 (Colo. 1981). Criteria used to determine admissibility of evidence of similar transactions in claims alleging fraud and violations of the Colorado Securities Act are: (1) Whether the proffered evidence relates to a material fact; (2) whether the evidence is logically relevant; (3) whether the logical relevance is independent of the intermediate inference that the defendants have bad character; and (4) whether the probative value is substantially outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice. Munson v. Boettcher & Co., Inc., 832 P.2d 967 (Colo. App. 1991); Abdelsamed v. New York Life Ins. Co., 857 P.2d 421 (Colo. App. 1992); People v. Rivera, 56 P.3d 1155 (Colo. App. 2002). However, the trial court may properly admit similar transaction evidence under another evidentiary theory without complying with the procedural safeguards required by section (b). Thus, in a securities fraud case, evidence of a prior fraud conviction was admissible to show defendant's knowledge of prior misconduct that should have been disclosed to the victim. People v. Campbell, 58 P.3d 1148 (Colo. App. 2002). Trial judge allowed substantial discretion when deciding admissibility of prior criminal activity. Because the trial judge must weigh the degree to which the charged criminal activity and an alleged prior criminal activity are similar, the bearing of the other transaction on the issues presented at the trial of the offense charged, and the degree to which the jury would be prejudiced by the other transaction, the trial judge is allowed substantial discretion when he decides regarding the admissibility of such evidence. People v. Ihme, 187 Colo. 48, 528 P.2d 380 (1974); People v. Hogan, 703 P.2d 634 (Colo. App. 1985). Substantial discretion is accorded trial court to determine whether evidence of a similar transaction is relevant to a material issue and whether its relevance outweighs its prejudice. People v. Crespin, 631 P.2d 1144 (Colo. App. 1981); Douglas v. People, 969 P.2d 1201 (Colo. 1998); People v. Rath, 44 P.3d 1033 (Colo. 2002). Trial court's admission of evidence of other acts will be disturbed only when it is demonstrated that the trial court abused its discretion. Douglas v. People, 969 P.2d 1201 (Colo. 1998); People v. Harrison, 58 P.3d 1103 (Colo. App. 2002). Trial court properly may base its preponderance of evidence determination solely on the parties' offers of proof. People v. Moore, 117 P.3d 1 (Colo. App. 2004). Court need not conduct hearing where sufficient foundation established. A court's refusal to conduct an in camera hearing is proper where a sufficient foundation is established prior to the admission of evidence of other crimes. Mays v. People, 177 Colo. 92, 493 P.2d 4 (1972). Although conditions should first be met. Where the trial court allows admission of evidence of other conduct of the defendant, there are four rather stringent conditions which should be met: (1) The prosecutor should advise the trial court of the purpose for which he offers the evidence; (2) if the court admits such evidence, it should then instruct the jury as to the limited purpose for which the evidence is being received and for which the jury may consider it; (3) the general charge should contain a renewal of the instruction on the limited purpose of such evidence; (4) the offer of the prosecutor and the instructions of the court should be in carefully couched terms-they should refer to "other transactions", "other acts", or "other conduct", and should eschew such designations as "similar offenses", "other offenses", "similar crimes", and so forth. Stull v. People, 140 Colo. 278, 344 P.2d 455 (1960); Kurtz v. People, 177 Colo. 306, 494 P.2d 97 (1972). Including requiring prosecution to announce intention to offer evidence, and limiting instruction. Recognizing that evidence of past crimes has inhering in it damning innuendo likely to beget prejudice in the minds of the jurors, the best method requires that the prosecution announce its intention to offer evidence of other crimes for a limited purpose before it is introduced, and moreover, the trial court should issue a limiting instruction to the jury contemporaneously with the offering of such evidence, even though the defendant may not formally request such an instruction. People v. Scheidt, 182 Colo. 374, 513 P.2d 446 (1973). Section (b) of this rule does not require pretrial notice as a prerequisite for admitting other bad act evidence. Even so, there may be circumstances in which such notice, even though not required by section (b), might be necessary to avoid prejudicial surprise to a defendant. People v. Warren, 55 P.3d 809 (Colo. App. 2002). Trial court must give cautionary instructions limiting the purpose of evidence of similar offenses. People v. Goldsberry, 181 Colo. 406, 509 P.2d 801 (1973). Where evidence of other criminal activity tends to show scheme, plan, intent, or design, the evidence will be admitted for that limited purpose, and in such cases, the trial judge is required to instruct the jury on the limited purpose for which the evidence of other criminal acts is admitted. People v. Geller, 189 Colo. 338, 540 P.2d 334 (1975). Where evidence of other crimes is admitted under one of the exceptions listed in section (b) of this rule, the trial court is required to give cautionary instructions limiting the purpose of the evidence. People v. Beasley, 43 Colo. App. 488, 608 P.2d 835 (1979); People v. Rivers, 727 P.2d 394 (Colo. App. 1986); People v. Leonard, 872 P.2d 1325 (Colo. App. 1993). The court must instruct the jury as to the limited purpose for which evidence of prior similar transactions is admitted and for which the jury may consider it. People v. Adrian, 744 P.2d 768 (Colo. App. 1987), aff'd, 770 P.2d 1243 (Colo. 1989). Court's failure to give limiting instruction when admitting evidence of defendant's other bad acts was not error, where defense did not request the instruction during defendant's cross-examination. People v. Marion, 941 P.2d 287 (Colo. App. 1996). Court's omission from the initial limiting instruction of the explicit purpose for which the bad act evidence was admitted was not error. Court rectified any potential prejudice to defendant by later informing the jury of the purpose. In addition, the court's written instruction reminded the jury that certain evidence had been admitted for a limited purpose. People v. Warren, 55 P.3d 809 (Colo. App. 2002). Evidence of similar wrongs or acts are admissible to prove intent and motive. Evidence of insurance company's ongoing pattern of purposeful delays in paying benefits and economic motives in causing delay in the case at hand was properly admitted. Southerland v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 794 P.2d 1102 (Colo. App. 1990). Testimony by the personnel director of her personal knowledge of defendant's outbursts of temper, including one directed toward the corporate victim's president which resulted in defendant's firing, were admissible as tending to establish a motive for defendant to retaliate against the corporation with bomb threats which were the basis of the charge against defendant. People v. Reaud, 821 P.2d 870 (Colo. App. 1991). Testimony of undercover officer relating to alleged similar meetings between the officer and defendant accused of distribution and sale and possession of a controlled substance, without any indication of criminal activity, does not create an inference of other criminal acts and, therefore, was admissible to show the officer's ability to identify the defendant. People v. Tyler, 854 P.2d 1366 (Colo. App. 1993). Reference to a "court appointed counselor" and a "court appointed therapist" by prosecution witnesses in sexual assault trial is not "other crime" evidence subject to the requirements of section (b). Trial court allowed the prosecution and other witnesses to refer to defendant's probation officer as a "court appointed counselor" and his offense-specific treatment provider as a "court appointed therapist". Because evidence of defendant's divorce was presented at trial, the court properly concluded that the jury could infer that defendant was in court-ordered counseling and therapy as part of the divorce proceedings and not as a condition of probation for a prior sexual assault conviction. People v. Mintz, 165 P.3d 829 (Colo. App. 2007). Similar transaction evidence of whether the defendants engaged in a pattern or practice and a plan, scheme, or design in regard to the alleged fraud and violation of the Colorado Securities Act related to a material fact and the trial court erred in not allowing the plaintiffs to present such evidence where the probative value thereof was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Munson v. Boettcher & Co., Inc., 832 P.2d 967 (Colo. App. 1991). Application of the doctrine of chances is inappropriate where a previous incident was not similar enough to the current case to make the objective statistical inference, since similarity is crucial when the theory of logical relevance is the doctrine of chances, and where there was only one prior incident. People v. Spoto, 795 P.2d 1314 (Colo. 1990). In order for the court to admit evidence of prior sexual assaults under the doctrine of chances theory, the court must determine that (1) the evidence of the other acts is similar to the charged crime; (2) the number of unusual occurrences exceeds the frequency of the general population; and (3) there is a genuine dispute over whether the act occurred. The facts that the victims were blond females and assaulted in the early morning hours after drinking are facts common to many sexual assaults. Therefore, the two previous assaults were not similar enough to be admitted to show common plan, scheme, or design, or to rebut the defense of consent. People v. Jones, __ P.3d __ (Colo. App. 2011). Evidence of similar incidents of forging and impersonating victim relevant to establish context in which the fraudulent forgeries and impersonations occurred. People v. Tyer, 796 P.2d 15 (Colo. App. 1990). Evidence of prior escape attempts and willingness to use force against law enforcement officers was admissible in trial for murder of deputy during escape attempt. People v. Vialpando, 954 P.2d 617 (Colo. App. 1997). However, trial court's failure to give limiting instruction held not plain error. Although the better practice is for trial court to issue a contemporaneous limiting instruction sua sponte, the failure to do so held not to be plain error. People v. Taylor, 804 P.2d 196 (Colo. App. 1990). No reversible error where cautionary instructions given. When evidence relating to other prior incidents of a similar nature between the defendant and the prosecuting witness is admitted and the court gives an oral cautionary instruction to the jury on the limited relevance of similar act testimony at the conclusion of the prosecuting witness's testimony and a similar written instruction when the case is submitted to the jury, there is no reversible error. People v. Elliston, 181 Colo. 118, 508 P.2d 379 (1973). Witness's inadvertent reference to earlier trial on same charges, promptly followed by corrective instructions from the court, held not prejudicial. People v. Fears, 962 P.2d 272 (Colo. App. 1997). Failure to give instruction on petty offense harmless error. Where evidence of a petty offense by a defendant is introduced during a trial for a felony, the trial judge should instruct the jury as to its limited purpose, but his failure to do so is harmless error, considering the nature of the petty offense as compared with the gravity of the felony charge against the defendant. Kurtz v. People, 177 Colo. 306, 494 P.2d 97 (1972). No plain error for admission of prior criminal history. The testimony in this case referred to a criminal matter remote in time and to a criminal case without confirmation that the case resulted in a conviction, therefore, there was no plain error. People v. McKinney, 80 P.3d 823 (Colo. App. 2003), rev'd on other grounds, 99 P.3d 1038 (Colo. 2004). Minor variations from standards for admission of evidence of other crimes not prejudicial. Stanmore v. People, 146 Colo. 445, 362 P.2d 1042 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 993, 82 S. Ct. 611, 7 L. Ed. 2d 529 (1962). Evidence of plaintiff's prior acts of negligence was admissible to support defendant's theory that negligence of plaintiff and others was the sole cause of the accident. Armentrout v. FMC Corp., 819 P.2d 522 (Colo. App. 1991). Trial court did not err when it allowed the prosecution to introduce evidence of defendant's prior felony convictions as character evidence where the record supports the trial court's finding that the defendant opened the door for the prosecution to pose questions of the defendant's character by eliciting testimony that the defendant's aggression was directed only at a car until the victim provoked him, that aggressive behavior against the car was unusual, that defendant's girl friend had never witnessed that type of aggressive behavior, and that defendant was an "easy-going person" and had never harmed the witness. People v. Pennese, 830 P.2d 1085 (Colo. App. 1991). Because defense initially adduced evidence concerning prior misconduct, trial court was not required to comply with the procedural requirements under section (b). People v. Deroulet, 22 P.3d 939 (Colo. App. 2000), rev'd on other grounds, 48 P.3d 520 (Colo. 2002). Evidence of defendant's prior domestic violence conviction was properly admitted. The conviction was relevant for impeachment purposes and was not prejudicial since it was a single, isolated, brief statement that was not a significant part of the prosecution's cross-examination or closing argument. People v. Sommers, 200 P.3d 1089 (Colo. App. 2008). While section (b) is more frequently applied in criminal prosecutions, it also applies in civil cases if the proffered evidence is relevant to the issues. Munson v. Boettcher & Co., Inc., 832 P.2d 967 (Colo. App. 1991). Evidence of previous drug transactions between defendant and witness admissible to refute witness's testimony that their relationship was casual and pertained only to radio-controlled car racing, where trial court weighed probative value and potential prejudicial effect of evidence before ruling on admissibility. People v. Miller, 890 P.2d 84 (Colo. 1995). Evidence that defendant had supplied witness with methamphetamine was relevant and admissible to refute defendant's claim that she did not knowingly possess controlled substance. People v. Warren, 55 P.3d 809 (Colo. App. 2002). Court properly admitted evidence of defendant's drug dealing. The evidence related to material facts of identity, intent, and motive. The evidence in relation to other evidence at trial tended to show that defendant was the killer. People v. Sandoval-Candelaria, __ P.3d __ (Colo. App. 2011). Evidence of victim's letter to the court, over defendant's objection, was not admitted as proof of other acts but was properly admitted solely for impeachment purposes. People v. Covington, 988 P.2d 657 (Colo. App. 1999), rev'd on other grounds, 19 P.3d 15 (Colo. 2001). Where defense is based on defendant's claim that he acted under duress, the jurors' perceptions regarding his credibility and weight to be given to his testimony substantially affect the outcome of the trial. Under these circumstances, refusal to admit evidence of the defendant's character for truthfulness is grounds for reversal. People v. Meinerz, 890 P.2d 130 (Colo. App. 1994). Court erred in admission of other act evidence. The court wrongfully admitted evidence regarding: (1) Defendant's ownership of other weapons and knives that were unlike the murder knife; (2) defendant's training in martial arts and self-defense; (3) defendant's possession of reading material on martial arts and the use of knives; (4) defendant's drawing from several days after the murder; and (5) defendant's previous two dissimilar bar fights. Kaufman v. People, 202 P.3d 542 (Colo. 2009). Court properly admitted other act evidence regarding defendant's knife and bayonet training and his religious beliefs. Kaufman v. People, 202 P.3d 542 (Colo. 2009). Any error in admitting evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where such evidence consisted of exhibits denoting a charge originally filed against defendant prior to his entry into a plea agreement on the conviction that formed the basis for his adjudication as a habitual criminal and records from Ohio showing the charges for which defendant was convicted. People v. Moore, 841 P.2d 320 (Colo. App. 1992). Similar transaction evidence held admissible. People v. Herrera, 633 P.2d 1091 (1981); People v. Mason, 643 P.2d 745 (Colo. 1982); People v. Adams, 678 P.2d 572 (Colo. App. 1984); People v. Montoya, 703 P.2d 606 (Colo. App. 1985); People v. Mathes, 703 P.2d 608 (Colo. App. 1985); People v. Hogan, 703 P.2d 634 (Colo. App. 1985); O'Neal v. Reliance Mortg. Corp., 721 P.2d 1230 (Colo. App. 1986); People v. Conley, 804 P.2d 240 (Colo. App. 1990); People v. Leonard, 872 P.2d 1325 (Colo. App. 1993). Evidence of prior criminal, wrongful, or bad acts perpetrated against others was inadmissible where the defendant failed to testify that he had knowledge of these acts and acted on the basis of that knowledge, and the trial court's rejection of such evidence was not an abuse of discretion. People v. Ibarra, 849 P.2d 33 (Colo. 1993). No abuse of discretion found in admitting testimony regarding previous explosions not involving defendant when such testimony was briefly elicited during cross-examination of a witness to impeach witness's testimony about the safeness of natural gas and so limited in scope and use. Bennett v. Greeley Gas Co., 969 P.2d 754 (Colo. App. 1998). It was not impermissible profiling where a psychological theory and analysis, founded on research and study, was used to provide a framework for the crime at hand and to examine and to give context to defendant's previous acts that were independently admissible; evidence was properly admitted since it was neither logically irrelevant nor unduly prejudicial, confusing, misleading, time-consuming, or cumulative. People v. Masters, 33 P.3d 1191 (Colo. App. 2001), aff'd on other grounds, 59 P.3d 979 (Colo. 2002). Evidence showing that defendant had never been convicted of a crime was not evidence of a "pertinent trait". Further, nonoccurrence evidence is improper under C.R.E. 405 because it is not in the form of an opinion and it does not describe a specific instance of conduct. People v. Goldfuss, 98 P.3d 935 (Colo. App. 2004). Applied in People v. Roybal, 775 P.2d 67 (Colo. App. 1989), cert. denied, 785 P.2d 917 (Colo 1989); People v. Blehm, 791 P.2d 1177 (Colo. App. 1989), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 817 P.2d 988 (Colo. 1991); People v. Adams, 867 P.2d 54 (Colo. App. 1993); People v. Collie, 995 P.2d 765 (Colo. App. 1999); People v. Cooper, 104 P.3d 307 (Colo. App. 2004).