Opinion
C22-0048JLR
03-28-2022
ALBERT B. ZUNIGA, Petitioner, v. KING COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, Respondent.
ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
JAMES L. ROBART, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Before the court is United States Magistrate Judge Michelle L. Peterson's report and recommendation (“R&R”) (R&R (Dkt. # 12)) and Petitioner Albert B. Zuniga's objections thereto (Obj. (Dkt. # 14)). Having carefully reviewed the foregoing, all other relevant documents, and the applicable law, the court ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation (Dkt. # 12) and DISMISSES Mr. Zuniga's petition for a writ of habeas corpus against Respondent King County Sheriff's Office (“KSCO”) without prejudice and without leave to amend. 1
A district court has jurisdiction to review a Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation on dispositive matters. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). “The district judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge's disposition that has been properly objected to.” Id. “A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The court reviews de novo those portions of the report and recommendation to which a party makes a specific written objection. United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). “The statute makes it clear that the district judge must review the magistrate judge's findings and recommendations de novo if objection is made, but not otherwise.” Id.
Magistrate Judge Peterson recommends denying the habeas petition and dismissing the action because Mr. Zuniga attempts to raise constitutional claims that “are more properly raised in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, ” such as the one he has pending in this district, which covers similar ground. (See R&R at 2 (citing Proposed Compl., Zuniga v. Schenck, et al., C22-0047TL-SKV (Dkt. # 9-1).) Other claims Mr. Zuniga attempts to raise pertain to his ongoing state court criminal proceedings. (See id.) Magistrate Judge Peterson recommends denying Mr. Zuniga's petition and dismissing this matter as to those claims because deciding them would require the court to interfere in the state court criminal proceedings, which federal courts decline to do “absent extraordinary circumstances.” (See Id. (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).) Magistrate Judge Peterson did not find that Mr. Zuniga alleged such extraordinary circumstances. (Id.) 2
The court has reviewed Mr. Zuniga's petition for writ of habeas corpus (Pet. (Dkt. # 11)), the Report and Recommendation, Mr. Zuniga's objections, and his “motion for further consideration and clarification of Defendants' alleged misconduct, ” which the court construes as supplemental memorandum in support of his objections (see Suppl. Mem. (Dkt. # 17)). Mr. Zuniga's submissions are difficult to parse but he appears to raise only one objection to dismissal that was not addressed by the reasoning contained in Magistrate Judge Peterson's Report and Recommendation. Specifically, Mr. Zuniga contends that Magistrate Judge Peterson “misconstrue[ed] his [constitutional] claims” as relating only to the First, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments when he intended to allege violations of each and every Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. (See Obj. at 6.) Thus, the court reviews de novo Mr. Zuniga's constitutional claims and his objection that they were misconstrued by Magistrate Judge Peterson. (Obj. at 6); see Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d at 1121.
Contrary to Mr. Zuniga's summation, Magistrate Judge Peterson construed his habeas petition as raising only “First and Eighth Amendment claims.” (See R&R at 2.) Liberally construed, however, Mr. Zuniga may have also meant to allege violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. (See Pet. 3-4 (alleging a “fraudulent arrest, staged set-up, ” “illegal incarceration, ” and “prosecutorial misconduct, vindictive prosecution, and malicious prosecution”).) To the extent Mr. Zuniga intended to allege violations of other constitutional provisions, he failed to do so in his petition (see id.) and he may not assert those claims now because “[i]ssues raised for the first time in objections to the magistrate judge's recommendation are deemed waived.” 3 Williams v. Ryan, No. CV-18-00349-TUC-RM, 2019 WL 4750235, at *5 (D. Ariz. Sept. 30, 2019) (quoting Marshall v. Chater, 75 F.3d 1421, 1426 (10th Cir. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Regardless of which constitutional provisions Mr. Zuniga intended to seek relief under, however, any such claim fails for the reason articulated by Magistrate Judge Peterson with respect to his First and Eighth Amendment claims: they are more properly raised in the separately filed civil rights action he has pending in this district. (See R&R at 2; see also Proposed Compl. (alleging constitutional violations by KSCO and other defendants).) Mr. Zuniga's constitutional claims also fail for the independent reason that he alleges no supporting facts in his petition that raise his “right to relief above the speculative level.” See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Indeed, the few allegations Mr. Zuniga does include are the sort of “unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s]” that do not suffice to state a claim for relief. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Further, Mr. Zuniga does not raise specific objection to Magistrate Judge Peterson's recommendation for dismissal based on the overlap between his petition and his ongoing criminal proceedings in state court. (See generally Obj.; see also R&R at 2.) Thus, the court need not review Magistrate Judge Peterson's recommendation for dismissal on that basis de novo. See Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d at 1121. After examining the record, the court finds Magistrate Judge Peterson's reasoning persuasive on that point. (See R&R at 2). Mr. Zuniga will not be able to cure this deficiency, or the other grounds for dismissal identified by Magistrate Judge Peterson and adopted by the court, by alleging additional facts. Thus, the court finds that amendment would be futile and that 4 Mr. Zuniga's petition should be DISMISSED without prejudice but without leave to amend. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting leave to amend need not be granted when “‘the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts'” (quoting Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995))); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) (requiring that leave to amend be “freely give[n]” only “when justice so requires”).
For the foregoing reasons, the court ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation (Dkt. # 12) in its entirety. Mr. Zuniga's habeas petition (Dkt. # 11) is DENIED, and this action is DISMISSED without prejudice but without leave to amend. Because the court dismisses this action, all of Mr. Zuniga's pending motions-including his motions for extradition to Russia (Dkt. # 13); to seal his habeas petition (Dkt. # 15); regarding transfer to a Washington State hospital (Dkt. # 16); and to incorporate by reference the records from specified cases in the Fifth Circuit (Dkt. # 19)-are DENIED as moot. The Clerk is DIRECTED not to accept further filings from Mr. Zuniga other than a notice of appeal. 5