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In Zuendel, the court held that a probate court did not have jurisdiction to render a declaratory judgment regarding the validity of a contract between the beneficiaries of an estate that provided for a division of a testator's estate in a manner contrary to the division established by the testator's will.
Summary of this case from Zahn v. NelsonOpinion
No. 91-732
Submitted March 19, 1992 —
Decided May 27, 1992.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Summit County, No. 14773.
Ralph E. Zuendel died testate and his will was admitted to probate in the Probate Court of Summit County on March 3, 1989. Beneficiaries of the will were the testator's children — appellants, Stephen, Mary, Jackie and Chris Zuendel, and appellees, Mark, David and Michael Zuendel. In addition to being a beneficiary, Stephen Zuendel was a trustee and was appointed executor of the estate.
Item I of the will provided for the payment of the testator's debts and funeral expenses. Item II provided in relevant part that:
"* * * All the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both real and personal, of every kind and description and wheresoever situate, which I may own or have the right to dispose of at the time of my decease, I give, bequeath and devise as follows:
"(A) Ten percent (10%) to my son, MARK ZUENDEL;
"(B) Ten percent (10%) to my son, DAVID ZUENDEL;
"(C) Sixty percent (60%) to all of my children, per stirpes; provided, however, that share that passes to my daughter, MARY ZUENDEL, shall pass into the Trust hereafter set forth. * * *" (Emphasis added.)
Apparently there was concern among the beneficiaries as to whether their father intended to include Mark and David within the meaning of "all of my children" as used in Item II(C). In March 1989, Stephen, Mark and David Zuendel signed an agreement which stated in relevant part:
"it is mutually agreed by and between the parties hereto that upon closing of the Estate of Ralph E. Zuendel, the said Executor shall pay to the undersigned MARK ZUENDEL and DAVID ZUENDEL an amount equal to ten percent (10%) each of the net distributable estate. Such amount shall be the final and distributive share of the undersigned from his father's estate."
Appellants claim that it was the understanding of all the children that the March 1989 agreement was entered into in lieu of a will-contest action. However, on November 20, 1989, Mark Zuendel filed a motion with the probate court to compel the executor (Stephen Zuendel) to distribute the assets of the estate in accordance with the terms of the will. This motion was filed after the statutory time period in which a will-contest action could be brought. See former R.C. 2107.76.
On March 21, 1990, Stephen Zuendel, individually and in his capacity as executor of the will, along with Mary, Michael, Jackie and Chris Zuendel, filed a complaint for declaratory judgment in the probate court seeking a determination that the March 1989 agreement was valid and enforceable, and that Mark and David Zuendel each receive an amount equal to ten percent of the net distributable estate; and, in the alternative, that the March 1989 agreement is a disclaimer of Mark's and David's interests in any share exceeding ten percent of the estate. In response, Mark and David filed a motion to dismiss and attached a copy of Mark's November 20, 1989 motion requesting that the executor distribute the assets of the estate according to the terms of the will. Thereafter, appellants filed an amended complaint realigning Michael Zuendel as a party defendant.
On August 15, 1990, the probate court granted Mark's and David's motion to dismiss. This also determined the matter as to Michael Zuendel. The probate court determined that "[t]he contractual basis of the dispute between the parties prohibits this [c]ourt from asserting jurisdiction over the matter." The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.
Joel R. Aberth, for appellants.
Nehrer Nehrer Co., L.P.A., and John A. Nehrer, for appellees.
The issue before us is whether the probate court had jurisdiction to address the appellants' complaint for declaratory judgment. For the reasons that follow, we find that the probate court did not have jurisdiction to render a declaratory judgment regarding the validity and enforceability of the March 1989 agreement.
The probate court is a court of limited jurisdiction. The court has only that jurisdiction which is granted by statute and by Constitution. Corron v. Corron (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 75, 531 N.E.2d 708; Schucker v. Metcalf (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 33, 22 OBR 27, 488 N.E.2d 210.
In enacting R.C. 2101.24, the General Assembly has specifically set forth what matters can be properly placed before the probate court. Appellants contend that the probate court has exclusive jurisdiction in this case by virtue of R.C. 2101.24(A)(1)(c), (k), (1) and (C), which provide:
"(A)(1) Except as otherwise provided by law, the probate court has exclusive jurisdiction:
"* * *
"(c) To direct and control the conduct and settle the accounts of executors and administrators and order the distribution of estates;
"* * *
"(k) To render declaratory judgments, including, but not limited to, those rendered pursuant to section 2107.084 of the Revised Code;
"(1) To direct and control the conduct of fiduciaries and settle their accounts;
"* * *
"(C) The probate court has plenary power at law and in equity to dispose fully of any matter that is properly before the court, unless the power is expressly otherwise limited or denied by a section of the Revised Code."
The issue in this case also requires that we consider relevant statutory provisions authorizing declaratory judgments. Corron, supra, 40 Ohio St.3d at 77-78, 531 N.E.2d at 710-711. R.C. 2721.03 provides, in part, that:
"Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract, or other writing constituting a contract, or whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a constitutional provision, statute, rule as defined in section 119.01 of the Revised Code * * * may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under such instrument, constitutional provision, statute, rule, ordinance, resolution, contract, or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder. * * *" (Emphasis added.)
Further, R.C. 2721.05 provides in relevant part that:
"Any person interested as or through an executor, administrator, trustee, guardian, or other fiduciary, creditor, devisee, legatee, heir, next of kin, or cestui que trust, in the administration of a trust, or of the estate of a decedent, an infant, lunatic, or insolvent, may have a declaration of rights or legal relations in respect thereto in any of the following cases:
"* * *
"(C) To determine any question arising in the administration of the estate or trust, including questions of construction of wills and other writings." (Emphasis added.)
R.C. 2721.03 and 2721.05, taken together, allow one responsible for the administration of an estate or personally interested in the administration of an estate to bring a declaratory judgment action in the probate court if a controversy exists with respect to the construction (meaning) or effect of a will's contents. Further, these statutes provide the probate court with jurisdiction when a justiciable dispute arises with respect to duties related to the administration of the estate. Thus, in determining whether appellants' declaratory judgment action regarding the validity and enforceability of the March 1989 agreement between Stephen and Mark and David Zuendel was properly before the probate court, the primary question is whether the agreement is related to the administration of the testator's estate. See Corron, supra, at 79, 531 N.E.2d at 712.
In addressing this question, the court of appeals relied on In re Estate of Martin (1962), 115 Ohio App. 515, 21 O.O.2d 166, 185 N.E.2d 785, wherein the Court of Appeals for Fayette County held that the probate court had no authority to determine the validity of a contract among the heirs of an estate. We believe Martin properly sets forth the applicable law with respect to the issue here.
In Martin, Myrtle D. Martin died testate devising and bequeathing certain real estate and its contents to Clara Snider. The residue of the estate was to be distributed to Snider, Gertie Whiteside and W.P. Noble. Noble was appointed executor of the will. Following the death of the testator, Snider, Whiteside and Noble entered into a contract and agreed, inter alia, not to contest the will, to effect a certain division of the assets of the estate, and to pay inheritance taxes in a certain manner. Thereafter, Snider refused to comply with the contract and Noble, as executor, brought an action for declaratory judgment in the probate court.
In Martin, the court, when presented with similar arguments to those posed by appellants herein, aptly observed and found that:
"Assuming, for the purposes of analysis, the validity of the purported contract now before us, upon which the petition for declaratory judgment is based, it raises no question for the determination either of the executor or of the Probate Court in connection with the further administration of the estate. The executor has been appointed; the time for contesting the will has passed; and the remaining provisions impose no duty upon the executor and contain no specifications as to what constitute the assets of the estate.
"* * *
"The purported contract having no bearing upon the * * * duties of the executor * * *, it is our opinion that a declaratory judgment with respect to the validity of the contract was not within the jurisdiction of the Probate Court." Id. at 521-522, 21 O.O.2d at 169, 185 N.E.2d at 789.
Appellants contend that Martin is distinguishable from the present situation because in Martin, Noble did not sign the agreement as executor but, rather, as an heir and beneficiary. In this case, urge appellants, Stephen Zuendel signed the March 1989 agreement solely in his capacity as executor of his father's estate and not as an heir.
The fact that Stephen may have signed the agreement in his capacity as executor of the estate is not dispositive. Assuming the validity of the agreement, for sake of analysis, the agreement between Stephen and Mark and David Zuendel is not directly related to the administration of the testator's estate. The March 1989 agreement has no bearing upon the duties of the executor. The agreement was merely an attempt by Stephen, Mark and David to contractually provide for a division of the estate different from that provided in the will. Absent a successful will-contest action, the executor's duties are to administer the estate and distribute the assets in accordance with the terms of the will. The General Assembly has specifically provided what matters are within the realm of the probate court's jurisdiction. Clearly, the March 1989 agreement is not one of those matters.
Accordingly, we find that a probate court does not have jurisdiction to render a declaratory judgment as to the validity or enforceability of a contract providing for a division of the testator's estate different from that provided in the will. Such contracts are not directly related to the administration of the testator's estate. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the cause to the probate court with an order directing the executor to disregard the March 1989 agreement and proceed with the administration of the estate in accordance with the terms of the will. The proper forum to test the validity and enforceability of the agreement is in the general division of the common pleas court.
Judgment affirmed.
MOYER, C.J., SWEENEY, H. BROWN and RESNICK, JJ., concur.
CHRISTLEY and WRIGHT, JJ., concur in judgment only.
JUDITH A. CHRISTLEY, J., of the Ninth Appellate District, sitting for HOLMES, J.
Although I concur with the result the majority reaches under the facts of this case, I am not prepared to accept the unduly broad rule of law announced in the syllabus paragraph.
Though I acknowledge that a probate court's jurisdiction is limited by statute, I do not accept that such courts are, in every instance, without jurisdiction to declare estate distribution contracts binding and enforceable. Indeed, if a will contest or will construction action is before the probate court, the court certainly would have jurisdiction to approve a settlement agreement among the parties to the action. Unfortunately, the majority now effectively precludes a probate court from exercising what I view as its inherent jurisdiction to approve settlements of conflicts before it. Such a result cannot be what the General Assembly intended and certainly does not lead to efficient and expeditious resolution of conflicts before the probate courts.
Accordingly, if I had written the syllabus, it would have read as follows:
"A probate court does not have jurisdiction to render a declaratory judgment as to the validity or enforceability of a contract providing for a division of a testator's estate different from that provided in his or her will, unless the parties to that contract are also before that probate court as parties to a pending will contest or will construction action on testator's will. ( In re Estate of Martin, 115 Ohio App. 515, 21 O.O.2d 166, 185 N.E.2d 785, modified and approved.)"
Without that qualification in the syllabus, I find that the law announced by the majority places limits on the jurisdiction of probate courts which go beyond those set forth in the Revised Code. Additionally, such a sharp restriction on the powers of our probate courts is unnecessary to resolve the case at bar. Here there was no pending action before the court, and the parties have indicated no interest in pursuing either a will contest or a will construction action.
Accordingly, I join in the judgment but not the opinion of the court.
CHRISTLEY, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.