Zoeller v. Baptist Healthcare Sys., Inc.

Full title: RUTH ZOELLER APPELLANT v. BAPTIST HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, INC. APPELLEE

Court: Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals

Date published: Apr 3, 2015

NO. 2013-CA-001922-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Apr. 3, 2015)

Opinion

NO. 2013-CA-001922-MR

04-03-2015

RUTH ZOELLER APPELLANT v. BAPTIST HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, INC. APPELLEE

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Robert C. Bishop Elizabethtown, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Susan M. Jones Stephen S. Johnson Louisville, Kentucky

LAMBERT, D., JUDGE

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KELLY MARK EASTON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 10-CI-02609
OPINION
AFFIRMING
BEFORE: CLAYTON, JONES, AND D. LAMBERT, JUDGES. LAMBERT, D., JUDGE: Ruth Zoeller ("Ms. Zoeller") challenges the Hardin Circuit Court's award of summary judgment in favor of Baptist Healthcare System, Inc. ("Baptist Healthcare"). After review, we affirm.

Ms. Zoeller received medical treatment at Baptist Hospital East ("Hospital"), an unincorporated division of Baptist Healthcare, from September 4- 8, 2009. In exchange for the services its facility provided, Baptist Healthcare sought payment from Ms. Zoeller. Baptist Healthcare sent Ms. Zoeller multiple copies of bills stating the services performed and the amount owed. Ms. Zoeller did not remit any payment for these services.

In 2010, Baptist Healthcare sought the assistance of a debt collection agency to attempt to collect from Ms. Zoeller. The collection agency was unsuccessful and recommended that the Hospital bring legal action to enforce the debt. Baptist Healthcare followed that recommendation and hired counsel to file suit under the theory of implied contract against Ms. Zoeller.

Following the filing of the complaint, Ms. Zoeller filed a number of motions and discovery requests in response. Baptist Healthcare cooperated throughout this discovery stage and on October 8, 2013, filed a motion for summary judgment seeking to recover on the debt.

At the summary judgment hearing, Ms. Zoeller acted pro se. The court questioned her regarding the medical services she received and who provided them. Ms. Zoeller acknowledged she had received medical services from the Hospital and that she owed money for these services. However, Ms. Zoeller maintained that the Hospital treated her and not Baptist Healthcare. After consideration, the Hardin Circuit awarded summary judgment in favor of Baptist Healthcare. This appeal followed.

After entry of summary judgment, the standard of review on appeal is whether the trial court correctly found that there were no genuine issues as to any material fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779 (Ky. App. 1996). "The record must be viewed in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment and all doubts are to be resolved in his favor." Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 467, 480 (Ky. 1991). And, there is no requirement that the appellate court defer to the trial court since factual findings are not at issue. Goldsmith v. Allied Building Components, Inc., 833 S.W.2d 378, 381 (Ky. 1992).

Moreover, when evaluating a motion for summary judgment, a trial court must consider all admissions. See CR 56.03; Godman v. City of Fort Wright, 234 S.W.3d 362 (Ky. App. 2007). The law in Kentucky on admissions has been long recognized by the following passage:

Admissions are divided into 2 classes which are designated in Wigmore in his work on evidence as (1) quasi admissions and (2) judicial admissions. A quasi admission is an act or utterance, usually extra-judicial, which creates an inconsistency with, and discredits to a greater or lesser degree, the present claim, or other evidence, of the person creating the inconsistency; and the person who enacted or uttered it may nevertheless disprove its correctness by the introduction of other evidence. But a judicial admission is conclusive, in that it removes the proposition in question from the field of disputed issue, and may be defined to be a formal act done in the course of judicial proceedings which waives or dispenses with the necessity of producing evidence by the opponent and bars the party himself from disputing it; and, as a natural consequence, allows the judge to direct the jury to accept the admission as conclusive of the disputed fact.

Sutherland v. Davis, 151 S.W.2d 1021, 1024 (Ky. 1941) (citing Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd Edition, Vol. 4, sections 1058, 1059, pages 20 and 21; Vol. 9, sections 2588-2590, inclusive, pages 586, 587). However, it is also well recognized that the court should use caution when classifying a statement as a judicial admission because of the possibility of an honest mistake. See Bell v. Harmon, 284 S.W.2d 812 (Ky. 1955).

Here, there is no question Ms. Zoeller received medical services from the Hospital and owes for these services. She admitted these facts in court while acting pro se at the summary judgment hearing. Specifically, the following exchange took place:

Court: If there were to be a judgment in this case...you say you owe money to [Hospital]?
Ms. Zoeller: Right
Court: You owe it.
Ms. Zoeller: And may I pay it to [Hospital]?

Under these circumstances, there is no indication these unequivocal statements were the product of a mistake. As such, they constituted judicial admissions and were conclusive: Ms. Zoeller owes for the services the Hospital performed.

Although Ms. Zoeller concedes she owes for her medical care, she disputes the party entitled to receive her payment. She contends the Hospital treated her and not Baptist Healthcare, so according to her, the Hospital should get her payment. As the record shows, Baptist Healthcare is the corporate entity that operates the Hospital and therefore is entitled to collect for the services the Hospital provides.

The only remaining factual dispute Ms. Zoeller argues in her brief is whether Baptist Healthcare is the original obligee of her debt. Ms. Zoeller maintains Baptist Healthcare assigned its interest to a third party and has attempted to collect from her improperly. A review of the record reveals Baptist Healthcare never assigned its interest in the debt, even though it employed a collection agency and retained legal counsel in an effort to collect. As such, Baptist Hospital remained the original obligee.

Viewing the record in a light most favorable to Ms. Zoeller, we agree that there are no genuine issues as to any material fact. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the Hardin Circuit Court.

ALL CONCUR. BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Robert C. Bishop
Elizabethtown, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Susan M. Jones
Stephen S. Johnson
Louisville, Kentucky