Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from orders of the Los Angeles Superior Court, No. BC377905, Michael C. Solner, Judge.
Tony Tiscareno, in pro. per., for Movant and Appellant.
No appearance for Defendant.
Eric Norwitz for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
CHANEY, J.
Appellant Tony Tiscareno, acting in propria persona, appeals from orders imposing sanctions of $3,200 and $4,500 against him under Code of Civil Procedure sections 128.7 and 1008. We affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The complaint in intervention
In December 2008, Tiscareno filed a complaint in intervention against certain plaintiffs and nonparties in ongoing litigation in the Los Angeles Superior Court, entitled Jon Zimmerman et al. v. David G. Riggs et al., case No. BC377905. (Certain of the parties named in Tiscareno’s suit are the respondents in this appeal, whom we refer to collectively as the “Zimmerman parties.”) On September 30, 2009, Tiscareno filed a first amended complaint in intervention in that action.
The original complaint in intervention apparently was not served.
Order striking the pleading
On September 29, 2009, the Zimmerman parties moved to strike Tiscareno’s complaint in intervention, and on October 1, 2009 they moved to strike his first amended complaint in intervention, on the ground that Tiscareno had failed to obtain court approval for his intervention as Code of Civil Procedure section 387, subdivision (a), requires. On November 19, 2009, the court heard and orally granted the motions to strike. In response to Tiscareno’s request, the court told him that “I will grant you leave” to move for permission to intervene.
Further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise specified.
Order denying leave to intervene
On November 20, 2009 Tiscareno filed a motion for leave to file a complaint in intervention, which the Zimmerman parties opposed and the court denied on January 5, 2010. “The motion for leave to file a complaint in intervention is denied with prejudice. There is a remedy available, should [Tiscareno] choose to do it. The remedy may well be in federal court.” Notice of the court’s denial of leave to intervene was filed on January 8, 2010.
In arguing for leave to intervene, Tiscareno told the court “I now know that I didn’t file [the original complaint in intervention] correctly, ” and that he was not asking the court to reverse its order striking the previous complaints in intervention (“I am not pressing for remittance to this case”). He explained that he had not dismissed the pleading despite the Zimmerman parties’ request, because the forms they had provided him were for dismissal with prejudice, which he was not willing to do.
Order granting sanctions under section 128.7
On January 12, 2010, the Zimmerman parties filed a motion for sanctions against Tiscareno under section 128.7, based on his filing of the first amended complaint in intervention without having obtained the court’s permission pursuant to section 387, subdivision (a), and because the pleading lacked evidentiary support and asserted claims that are not warranted by existing law, or was brought for an improper purpose. In support of the motion the Zimmerman parties offered evidence that they had served the proposed motion for sanctions on Tiscareno by mail on October 19, 2009, and that Tiscareno had not withdrawn or dismissed the improper pleading by November 16, the safe harbor period specified in subdivision (c)(1) of section 128.7.
The court heard the motion for sanctions on February 19, 2010. It orally found that the imposition of sanctions was “appropriate” because Tiscareno’s failure to dismiss the first amended complaint in intervention had required the Zimmerman parties to move to strike the pleading, and that Tiscareno had “ample opportunity” under the safe harbor provision of section 128.7, subdivision (c)(1), “to do what was not done here.” For that, the court imposed sanctions of $3,200, payable to the Zimmerman parties within 30 days of the order.
Although the court expressly noted that it had considered Tiscareno’s late-filed opposition despite the Zimmerman parties’ objection to it, Tiscareno contended in the trial court (but does not repeat on appeal) that the trial court did not sufficiently consider the opposition before hearing argument on the sanctions motion.
Order denying reconsideration and imposing additional sanctions
On March 10, 2010, Tiscareno moved for reconsideration of the February 19, 2010 order awarding sanctions against him. The Zimmerman parties’ opposition argued that Tiscareno’s motion failed to state the legal grounds for the motion, that the motion was not based on any new or different law or facts as required by section 1008, and that the reconsideration motion was clearly intended to delay the sanction obligation and to cause the Zimmerman parties additional attorney fees. Their opposition argued that “additional attorney fees should be imposed against Tiscareno” for having brought the reconsideration motion without conforming with the requirements of section 1008, and its title—“Opposition... To Motion By Tiscareno For Reconsideration of 02/19/10 Sanction Order; Request For Monetary Sanction Against Tiscareno; Memorandum Of Points & Authorities; Declaration of Norwitz, ” gave specific notice of that request.
Tiscareno originally set the motion for hearing on September 1, 2010, about six months later. However the hearing was later advanced to June 7, 2010.
At the June 7, 2010 reconsideration hearing, Tiscareno told the court that he had assumed that the court’s order allowing him leave to seek to intervene “negated everything up to then.” He argued that he had a right to intervene under the terms of section 382, and that he had corrected his mistake (in failing to seek leave to file the pleading) promptly upon being advised of it. The trial court orally denied the motion for reconsideration, sustaining the Zimmerman parties’ objections to Tiscareno’s declaration, and holding that the Zimmerman parties were entitled to additional sanctions of $4,500 for their attorney’s opposition to the reconsideration motion.
On June 8, 2010 the court signed and filed its order imposing sanctions against Tiscareno of $3,200, payable within 30 days, for filing his first amended complaint in intervention without leave of court and for “the improper purpose of harassing the moving parties and needlessly increasing their litigation expenses.” On the same date the court signed and filed its order denying reconsideration and granting additional monetary sanctions against Tiscareno of $4,500, payable within 30 days, finding that the motion for reconsideration was filed for the same improper purpose.
Notice of appeal
On June 8, 2010—the same date as entry of the orders imposing sanctions—Tiscareno filed a notice of appeal, using Judicial Council Form APP-002. The form calls for the appellant to insert the date of the judgment or order from which the appeal is taken, listing nine possible appealable orders, any one of which the appellant may designate by check box, with a tenth check box providing an option to designate an “[o]ther” appealable order.
In filling out the notice of appeal form, Tiscareno left blank the space that calls for the date of the order from which he intended to appeal. Purporting to identify the order from which he intended to appeal, he checked the box indicating that his appeal was taken from “[j]udgment after an order granting a summary judgment motion.” However there was no order granting a summary judgment motion.
Issues raised by Tiscareno’s appeal
Tiscareno’s opening brief contains no statement of the points upon which he appeals, notwithstanding rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) of the California Rules of Court, which requires that each brief must “[s]tate each point under a separate heading or subheading summarizing the point....” However his opening brief identifies as the basis for his appeal section 904.1, subdivision (b), which makes orders for sanctions of $5,000 or less appealable and his opening brief refers repeatedly to the sanctions orders as the subject of his appeal.
Tiscareno’s opening brief argues that the orders awarding sanctions were error, that the sanctions award abused court’s discretion, that in awarding sanctions trial court did not consider the requirements of § 128.7, that the motion for sanctions was not timely, and that “[a]ppellant respectfully asks that this Court reverse the decision of Judge Solner and vacate the Sanctions awarded to [the Zimmerman parties’ counsel], as they are unmerited.”
Motion to dismiss the appeal
The Zimmerman parties contend that the notice of appeal fails to identify any appealable order from which the appeal is taken. They therefore urge us to find that this court lacks jurisdiction to review any of the orders in this case, and to dismiss the appeal.
On June 9, 2011, Tiscareno filed a document entitled Appellant’s Opposition To Motion To Dismiss Appeal, which (as the Zimmerman parties correctly point out), neither controverts nor even discusses the merits of the motion to dismiss. For that reason, as well as because Tiscareno’s purported opposition rests on unsupported and inappropriate personal attacks on opposing counsel, we disregard it.
DISCUSSION
1. The motion to dismiss the appeal is denied.
A valid appeal is initiated by a notice of appeal filed in the superior court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.100(a)(1).) Tiscareno filed such a notice; but that is not the only requirement for validity of a notice of appeal. The rules also specify that “[t]he notice is sufficient if it identifies the particular judgment or order being appealed.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.100(a)(1)& (a)(2).)
This rule requires “that the notice affirmatively state, in some form, a present intention to appeal from a designated judgment or order.” (Estate of Roberson (1952) 114 Cal.App.2d 267, 269 [construing former rule 1(a)].) It is consistent with the oft-stated proposition that notices of appeal must be liberally construed so as to protect the right of appeal “‘if it is reasonably clear what appellant was trying to appeal from.’” (Geffcken v. D’Andrea (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1298, 1307; Luz v. Lopes (1960) 55 Cal.2d 54, 59 [notice of appeal designating appeal from order of particular date and from “all orders and rulings... which are adverse to them” validly includes appeal from underlying judgment]; Yolo County Dept. of Child Support Services v. Lowery (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1243, 1246; D’Avola v. Anderson (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 358, 361-362.)
But liberal construction cannot supply what is not there. Unless the notice of appeal can be construed to identify an appealable judgment or order that is being challenged, the court of appeal lacks jurisdiction to review unspecified orders. (Estate of Roberson, supra, 114 Cal.App.2d at p. 270 [rule’s clear meaning is that notice of appeal must state party’s intention to appeal “from some specified thing”]; People v. Delaney (1955) 132 Cal.App.2d 838, 839 [appeal dismissed where notice of appeal failed to “specify any judgment or particular part thereof” from which appeal is taken].) The questions here therefore are whether Tiscareno’s notice of appeal identified any appealable order sufficient to confer jurisdiction on this court, and if so, which order or orders are within the scope of that jurisdiction.
Tiscareno’s notice of appeal could not confer jurisdiction to review the January 5, 2010 order denying Tiscareno leave to file a complaint in intervention, even if it had clearly identified that order, for that order was independently appealable. (Bowles v. Superior Court (1955) 44 Cal.2d 574, 582; Socialist Workers 1974 etc. Committee v. Brown (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 879.) It was final as to Tiscareno, justifying an appeal, as of the date of its entry (Thorp v. North Moneta etc. Water Co. (1909) 12 Cal.App. 186, 187), and because notice of its entry was served on Tiscareno on January 6, 2010, a timely appeal from it would have had to have been filed no later than March 8, 2010. (Rule 8.104(a)(2) [first court day after 60 days from notice of entry].) Tiscareno’s June 8, 2010 notice of appeal therefore would not have been timely to challenge the order denying leave to intervene, and could not possibly encompass a challenge to that order.
The only orders that Tiscareno could validly have intended to be reached by his notice of appeal therefore are the orders formally entered on June 8, 2010, based on the trial court’s oral rulings of February 19, 2010, granting sanctions of $3,200 under section 128.7, and of June 7, 2010, denying reconsideration of the sanction order and awarding additional sanctions of $4,500. To the extent those orders award sanctions they are both appealable orders. (§ 904.1, subd. (b); Eichenbaum v. Alon (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 967, 974 [award of sanctions of less than $5,000 is appealable, under § 904.1, subd. (b), after case is concluded as to appealing party].) But the denial of reconsideration is not. (Alioto Fish Co. v. Alioto (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1669, 1679 [order denying reconsideration of order granting sanctions is not appealable].)
Nothing in the record indicates that notice of the February 19, 2010 ruling was given before June 8, 2010.
We have found no case that has dismissed an appeal for failure of the notice of appeal to identify an appealable order on facts such as these. People v. Delaney, supra, 132 Cal.App.2d at p. 839, perhaps comes closest. There, after his trial court motions were denied the appellant filed a document that expressed his intention “to file an appeal for a new trial, rehearing or modification....” The reviewing court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the notice was not a notice of appeal because it not only failed to “specify any judgment or particular part thereof from which he appeals, ” but also because it did not actually state “that defendant appeals, ” rather than merely seeking a new trial, rehearing, or modification of the judgment. (Ibid.)
Tiscareno’s notice of appeal is distinguishable from that in People v. Delaney. While Tiscareno’s notice of appeal does not explicitly identify what order or orders it intends to challenge in the appeal, unlike in People v. Delaney the notice of appeal clearly demonstrates an intention to initiate an appeal, rather than merely further superior court challenges; and it expresses an intention to appeal immediately, rather than merely a future intention to do so. (People v. Delaney, supra, 132 Cal.App.2d at p. 839.) Unlike the notice in People v. Delaney, Tiscareno’s notice of appeal plainly was intended to constitute his notice of appeal from something.
The only possible targets of his appeal—the only orders he could have validly intended to be within his notice of appeal—are the two sanctions orders that were entered the same day he filed his notice of appeal. His intention to appeal from the sanctions orders thus is evidenced by the timing of his notice of appeal and by the absence of any other orders from which he could have intended to appeal. Moreover, it is bolstered by his opening brief, which refers repeatedly to the sanctions orders as the subject of his appeal.
On this record we decline to construe the notice of appeal so rigidly as to look only to its failure to identify any order by date or name, when the record as a whole leaves no real doubt as to Tiscareno’s intention to challenge the sanctions awards. (Yolo County Dept. of Child Support Services v. Lowery (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1243, 1246 [does not matter that notice of appeal misdesignates date of the order, where it is clear from the record what is being appealed]; D’Avola v. Anderson, supra, 47 Cal.App.4th at pp. 361-362 [even where case or court are misidentified, notice of appeal is valid as long as it is “reasonably clear” what is being appealed from].) The court should accord the right to appeal in doubtful cases when it can be accomplished without doing violence to the applicable rules. (Alan v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 894, 901.) Because the intended subject of Tiscareno’s appeal is reasonably clear from the record—and because we can see no way in which respondents could have been prejudiced by the ambiguity in his notice of appeal—we deny the motion to dismiss the appeal.
2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by sanctioning Tiscareno for filing the first amended complaint in intervention without court permission.
Section 387 provides the circumstances under which an interested person may intervene as a party to an ongoing lawsuit, and the procedures for doing so. Specifically, it provides for intervention “[u]pon timely application” by a person who claims an interest in the matter being litigated. (§ 387, subds. (a) & (b).)
The right to intervene is not absolute; leave of court is expressly required. (Lohnes v. Ashtron Computer Products (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 1150, 1153 [“Whether intervention is permissive or mandatory, a petition to seek leave is required; without permission from the court, a party lacks any standing to the action”]; Beshara v. Goldberg (1963) 221 Cal.App.2d 392, 395 [intervention is not permissible without leave of court].) Despite the express statutory requirement of obtaining leave to intervene, however, Tiscareno filed his first amended complaint in intervention without obtaining, or even seeking, the trial court’s permission.
Section 128.7, subdivision (c), permits a trial court to impose an appropriate sanction upon a party who asserts claims that are not “warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law, ” or who has filed a pleading for “an improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.” (§ 128.7, subd. (b)(1), (b)(2).) It requires that when imposing such sanctions, the court “shall describe the conduct determined to constitute a violation of [that] section and explain the basis for the sanction imposed.” (§ 128.7, subd. (e).)
Section 128.7 also provides a “safe harbor” procedure, however, which is designed to strike a balance between the need to control improper litigation tactics and the competing desire to avoid chilling vigorous advocacy by encouraging prompt action to correct violations of its provisions. (Levy v. Blum (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 625, 637-638.) By withdrawing or dismissing the improperly filed pleading within 21 days after being served with a proposed motion seeking sanctions for the violation, an offending party may avoid being sanctioned for filings that violate section 128.7 sanctions. (§ 128.7, subd. (c)(1).) Only if that warning is ignored, and the improper pleading is not withdrawn or dismissed within that safe harbor period, may the court act to deter future violations by awarding the prevailing party the reasonable expenses and attorney fees it has incurred. (§ 128.7, subds. (c)(1), (d).)
The trial court awarded $3,200 in sanctions against Tiscareno under section 128.7, based on Tiscareno’s improper filing of his first amended complaint in intervention without having obtained the trial court’s permission, and for having filed it for the improper purpose of harassing the Zimmerman parties and needlessly increasing their litigation expenses. It found that the Zimmerman parties’ proposed motion for sanctions, served on Tiscareno by mail on October 19, 2009, had alerted Tiscareno to the impropriety of his filing—the failure to obtain the court’s permission to intervene pursuant to section 387—but that Tiscareno nevertheless had failed to withdraw or dismiss the improper pleading within the 21-day safe harbor period of section 128.7, subdivision (c)(1). On that basis the court found it appropriate to award sanctions of $3,200, to compensate the Zimmerman parties for the attorney fees they had incurred in prosecuting the motion to dismiss the improperly filed pleading.
Tiscareno’s opening brief offers no excuse for his failure to seek or obtain the required leave of court to intervene. Moreover, the justification Tiscareno offers for his failure to withdraw his improper pleading, after having been alerted to its impropriety and the possibility of sanctions, affirmatively confirms the trial court’s determination that sanctions should be imposed. Ignoring the patent impropriety of his pleading, Tiscareno explains that he refused to withdraw the improper pleading in the face of the proposed motion for sanctions because to do so would have required him to accede to the Zimmerman parties’ demand that he comply with section 387. He is correct that the proposed sanctions motion sought to pressure him to withdraw his first amended complaint in intervention; what he failed—and still fails—to recognize is that its aim was legally appropriate, and indeed, was exactly what section 128.7 was designed to accomplish: withdrawal of the improper pleading. (Banks v. Hathaway, Perrett, Webster, Powers & Chrisman (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 949, 955.)
Tiscareno characterizes the proposed motion for sanctions with which he had been served as “just another malice-laden scare tactic meant to pressure Appellant to drop his case, ” intended “to harass and amp up the pressure and scare tactics on Appellant, so that he would drop his case.”
Tiscareno decries the possibility that a pro. per. litigant “with a proper cause of action” will be afraid to bring his case to court, intimidated by the fear of sanctions. The safe harbor provision of section 128.7, however, is carefully designed to meet this precise threat. By providing litigants with a clear warning, in the form of a proposed motion for sanctions, showing the exact manner in which it will be argued that their pleadings are not “a proper cause of action, ” section 128.7 affords litigants an opportunity to withdraw defective pleadings without sanction. Only litigants who do not have “a proper cause of action”—and who refuse to heed the warning that their conduct is sanctionable—face the threat of sanctions.
Contrary to Tiscareno’s argument, the trial court’s statement that it felt “compelled” to award some form of sanctions does not reveal a disregard of the statutory provision that a court “may” award sanctions under these circumstances. (§ 128.7, subd. (c)(1).) Rather, it reveals only that the court’s exercise of discretion led it to conclude that the circumstances were such that sanctions were appropriate: Under these circumstances, it felt “compelled” to award sanctions; under other circumstances, it might not feel so compelled.
In addition to arguing that the threat of sanctions should not have been used to force him to withdraw his improper pleading, Tiscareno challenges the sanction award on the ground that the Zimmerman parties did not act with “due diligence” in seeking sanctions, as he contends section 128.7, subdivision (c) requires. Subdivision (c) of section 128.7 provides that “[i]n determining what sanctions, if any, should be ordered, the court shall consider whether a party seeking sanctions has exercised due diligence.” Tiscareno’s contention seems to be that the trial court abused its discretion by granting sanctions although the motion for sanctions was not filed until after it had already stricken the first amended complaint in intervention. We find no error, and no abuse of discretion, in the trial court’s grant of sanctions.
Tiscareno correctly identifies abuse of discretion as the applicable standard of review with respect to his appeal from the sanctions orders. (Day v. Collingwood (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1116, 1130 [award of sanctions under section 128.7 is reviewed for abuse of discretion].)
The Zimmerman parties served their proposed motion for sanctions on Tiscareno on October 19, 2009, seeking to induce Tiscareno to withdraw or dismiss his improperly filed pleading. (Banks v. Hathaway, Perrett, Webster, Powers & Chrisman, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 955 [purpose of section 128.7 is to give offending party opportunity to withdraw improper pleading before sanctions are incurred].) They filed the motion in the trial court almost three months later, on January 12, 2010, 54 days after the trial court’s November 19, 2009 order striking the first amended complaint in intervention, and 57 days after the November 16, 2009 expiration of the “safe harbor” period within which Tiscareno could have avoided being sanctioned by withdrawing or dismissing the pleading.
Tiscareno argues that that timing “cannot never be considered ‘due diligence’ by any definition in CCP Section 128.7, and any court must take heed of that, if proper discretion is to be used.” But he does not explain how he reached that conclusion. He does not identify how promptly a diligent party must bring its sanctions motion in order to comply with section 128.7’s due diligence requirement, and he does not claim that he was prejudiced in any way by the timing of the sanctions motion in this case.
Tiscareno argues that “Judge Solner could have directed him on November 19, 2009 to Federal Court, in Sua Sponte, instead of continuing his struggle to Intervene in the Superior Court action. This would have saved much time and expense for all... ”—thus suggesting that the court should then have barred him from seeking permission to intervene in the state court proceedings. His argument, though misplaced, reaffirms the obvious: His delay in filing in federal court, the sanctions imposed on him by the trial court in this case, and the delay and expense resulting from this appeal, all stem from his own failure to obtain and to follow competent legal advice—a failure that cannot be blamed on the trial court.
Although the Zimmerman parties did not file their sanctions motion until 57 days after the earliest date on which the law would have permitted them to do so, that delay plainly did not prejudice Tiscareno. By the time the motion was filed, Tiscareno had long had notice of its contents, yet he had refused to act on that notice either before or after the safe harbor period lapsed. The service of the sanctions motion was intended to induce Tiscareno to act to withdraw his improper pleading and thus to avoid becoming liable for sanctions. (Banks v. Hathaway, Perrett, Webster, Powers & Chrisman, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 955.) Once that purpose had failed, the trial court had discretion to redress that violation and to deter future violations by imposing sanctions, as section 128.7 permits.
Tiscareno’s contention in the trial court (but not repeated in his opening brief in this appeal) that the trial court’s order striking the offending pleading and granting him leave to seek permission to intervene somehow “eliminat[ed]” his sanctionable conduct, is unsupported by logic or authority. We disregard his apparent attempt to raise this as an issue for the first time in his reply brief. (Campos v. Anderson (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 784, 794, fn. 3.)
Without some explanation why he believes the trial court lacked discretion to conclude—as it apparently did—that the Zimmerman parties acted with acceptable diligence in seeking sanctions for his uncorrected violation of section 128.7, Tiscareno has failed to demonstrate any abuse of discretion.
3. Tiscareno’s opening brief fails to challenge the sanctions awarded against Tiscareno for his filing of the motion for reconsideration.
Section 1008 allows a trial court to reconsider its prior order when the moving party shows the existence of a different state of facts or a change in the law. (§ 1008, subd. (a).) “[T]he party seeking reconsideration must provide not only new evidence but also a satisfactory explanation for the failure to produce that evidence at an earlier time.” (Blue Mountain Development Co. v. Carville (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 1005, 1013; Mink v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1338, 1342.) “An order denying a motion for reconsideration is interpreted as a determination that the application does not meet the requirements of section 1008. If the requirements have been met to the satisfaction of the court but the court is not persuaded the earlier ruling was erroneous, the proper course is to grant reconsideration and to reaffirm the earlier ruling.” (Corns v. Miller (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 195, 202.)
Tiscareno’s motion for reconsideration contended that the trial court had not considered his opposition to the sanctions motion, that the court had unfairly held him to the same standards as it would an attorney, that the Zimmerman parties were not diligent in moving for sanctions, that Tiscareno was not properly served because he was not a party to the case, and that the trial court’s order granting him the option to seek leave to intervene precluded the imposition of sanctions for having filed his earlier pleading in intervention without court permission. In arguing for reconsideration, Tiscareno contended only that he should not have been sanctioned for having been ignorant of the requirement that he obtain court permission before filing the complaint in intervention.
As noted above, the Zimmerman parties’ opposition sought additional attorney fees for the reconsideration motion’s failure to conform to the requirements of section 1008. The attached declaration identified additional fees of $9,880 incurred to oppose the reconsideration motion.
The trial court denied reconsideration, finding the reconsideration motion “was brought without a legal basis for it.” It found that Tiscareno had failed to show any new facts, circumstances, or law, and that the motion for reconsideration was filed for the improper purpose of harassing respondents and needlessly increasing their litigation expenses.
Section 1008 specifically provides that a reconsideration motion that violates the statutory requirements “may be punished as a contempt and with sanctions as allowed by Section 128.7.” (§ 1008, subd. (d).) Consistent with that provision, the trial court awarded additional sanctions of $4,500 for Tiscareno’s improper use of the reconsideration motion.
Notwithstanding the indications in Tiscareno’s opening brief that he intended to challenge the award of sanctions for having sought reconsideration of the earlier sanctions award, his opening brief articulates no such challenge. We therefore affirm the award of attorney fees of $4,500 for the improper motion for reconsideration.
Because the ruling on the reconsideration motion is unchallenged by Tiscareno and therefore is beyond the scope of this appeal, we do not consider whether the trial court was justified in awarding fees based on the Zimmerman parties’ request made as a part of their opposition to the reconsideration motion without a separate motion for sanctions.
Disposition
The motion to dismiss the appeal is denied. The orders of the superior court requiring Tiscareno to pay sanctions of $3,200 and $4,500 to the Zimmerman parties are affirmed. Respondents are awarded their costs on appeal.
We concur: MALLANO, P. J., ROTHSCHILD, J.