Opinion
Case Number 02-10078-BC
November 25, 2002.
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND DENYING MOTION FOR SECURITY FOR COSTS
On March 22, 2002, the plaintiffs filed a 56-page, 326-paragraph complaint against several Michigan state court judges and county officials, two private citizens and an attorney attacking state judicial proceedings decided adversely to the plaintiffs which determined ownership to real property which the plaintiffs owned at one time, but which they lost due to unpaid taxes. The plaintiffs attempt to set forth various federal claims based on violations of their constitutional rights which purportedly occurred in the state proceedings determining ownership and right to possession of the land in question. The defendants have each filed motions to dismiss on a variety of grounds, and defendant Dwan has filed a motion for security for costs. The plaintiffs have filed responses in opposition to the motions. The Court has reviewed the submissions of the parties and finds that the relevant law and facts have been set forth in the motion papers and that oral argument will not aid in the disposition of the motions. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the motions be decided on the papers submitted. See E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(e)(2).
Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain most of the plaintiffs' claims, and those which arguably survive that challenge are barred by the statute of limitations, and judicial and Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Court therefore will grant the motions to dismiss and deny defendant Dwan's motion for security for costs as moot.
I.
The plaintiffs, Walter and Elgie Zerod, owned property at 2101 So. Jefferson in Bay City. They allege in their complaint that they were unable to pay their 1991 property taxes on the South Jefferson property and that the property was sold at a 1994 tax sale to defendants Bennett and Judith Shulman. The plaintiffs contend that they did not receive certain statutory notices of the delinquency and certain redemption periods, or any communication from the department of social services as required by state law. They allege that Bay County Treasurer Jeanette Neitzel was responsible for issuing the notices and Sheriff Deputies Joel Luethjohan and L. R. Nielsen were responsible for serving them.
The Shulmans filed a quiet title action in Michigan's 18th Circuit Court (Bay County) on July 19, 1996. They were represented in that case by defendant H. Michael Dwan, a Michigan attorney. The case was assigned to Bay County, Michigan Circuit Judge William J. Caprathe, who decided the quiet title action in the Shulmans' favor. The plaintiffs timely appealed that decision to the Michigan Court of Appeals on July 1, 1999. The plaintiffs complain that the Shulmans' appeal pleadings refer to the plaintiffs as "tax protesters," and that during the appeal the circuit court did not cause the proper transcripts to be filed. The appeal ultimately was decided against the plaintiffs by a panel of three court of appeals judges: David H. Sawyer, William B. Murphy, E. Thomas Fitzgerald. The plaintiffs then filed a timely appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court on April 11, 2001. The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal.
During the appeal process, the Shulmans filed a suit for possession of the South Jefferson property in the 74th District Court in Bay City, Michigan on January 31, 2000. District Court Judge Scott J. Newcombe granted possession to the Shulmans and the plaintiffs appealed that decision to the 18th Circuit Court on March 30, 2000. The case was again assigned to Judge Caprathe, who denied the plaintiffs' appeal. The plaintiffs applied for leave to appeal on April 18, 2001, and the Michigan Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal. Leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court was similarly denied.
During the appeal of the possession action in the 18th Circuit Court, the plaintiffs filed a complaint for an order of superintending control on September 7, 2000 to command specific performance of Judge Caprathe. All of the Bay County circuit judges recused themselves from that case, and it was then assigned to Iosco County Circuit Judge J. Richard Ernst. Although the complaint in this case does not indicate when and how the superintending control case was resolved, the Court presumes the decision was adverse to the plaintiffs since their complaint in this Court alleges that the decision "was arbitrary and capricious." Compl. ¶ 280.
Although the complaint in the present case contains thirty-eight counts, the allegations can be grouped into five distinct claims against the various defendants, all based on violations of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 1985 and 1986:
1. Deprivation of property without due process of law against all defendants. The plaintiffs allege that the state judges either failed to hold hearings or denied the plaintiffs' procedural requests to present affidavits. 2. Denial of equal protection under the law against all defendants. The plaintiffs allege they were unjustly labeled as "tax protesters." 3. Deprivation of federal rights under color of law against all defendants. The plaintiffs allege that the state government defendants used their respective positions with "deliberate and callous indifference . . . such as would shock the conscience." 4. Conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 against defendants Caprathe, Sawyer, Murphy, Fitzgerald, Newcombe, the Shulmans, Dwan, Roe, and Doe. The plaintiffs allege these defendants conspired to deprive the plaintiffs of their property and right to due process. 5. Failure to prevent conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1986 against defendants Caprathe, Sawyer, Murphy, Fitzgerald, Newcombe, Corrigan, Ernst, Roe, and Doe. The plaintiffs allege that these judicial defendants knew that the other defendants were conspiring to deprive the plaintiffs of their property and right to due process, and that by their judicial decisions they failed to prevent the conspiracy and actually joined it.
On March 25, 2002, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and motion for preliminary injunction, alleging that the purchasers of the property were going to evict the plaintiffs the next day and that Judge Caprathe refused to stop the eviction. On March 25, 2002, the Honorable Gerald E. Rosen, acting for this Court, entered an order denying the motion for a temporary restraining order and scheduled a hearing on the motion for a preliminary injunction on April 9, 2002. This Court held the hearing, and on April 10, 2002 entered an order denying the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction.
Thereafter, the defendants have each filed a motion to dismiss. The Michigan Attorney General's Office filed a motion on behalf of defendants Corrigan, Sawyer, Murphy, Fitzgerald, and Ernst. Counsel for Bay County filed on behalf of defendants Caprathe, Newcombe, Luethjohan, Nielsen, Neitzel, Roe, and Doe. Private counsel appeared for and moved to dismiss the case against the Shulmans. Defendant Dwan filed a pro se motion to dismiss and a motion for security for costs.
In their motions, the defendants contend that the factual and legal decisions required to address the plaintiffs' claims in this case are inextricably intertwined with the state judicial determinations, and therefore this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. In addition, the judicial defendants all assert that they were acting in their capacities as state officials, and therefore they are immune from suit under the doctrine of judicial immunity and the Eleventh Amendment. The county officials who were allegedly responsible for the statutory notices point out that their alleged failures to act occurred in 1995 at the latest, and therefore the suit against them is barred by the statute of limitations. Finally, the Shulmans and their attorney contend that they are private parties not acting under color of law, and thus the plaintiffs have not stated a cognizable claim against them.
The plaintiffs respond that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply because they are not asking this Court to review a state court's judgment, but rather how their due process rights were violated by the judicial procedures employed by the defendants. The plaintiffs argue that the actions of the judges were taken without jurisdiction and therefore judicial immunity does not protect them from suit. The suit is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment, argue the plaintiffs, because they have sued the state defendants in their individual capacities. The plaintiffs allege that the statute of limitations for their civil rights action in this Court should be tolled from the time the quiet title action was filed in 1996 until a final decision was rendered in that matter on March 4, 2002. Lastly, the plaintiffs argue that they may join the Schulmans and Dwan as defendants because a private party can be liable under Section 1983 if that party was jointly engaged with state officials in an act prohibited under Section 1983. See Adickes v. S. H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970).
II.
Motions to dismiss are governed by Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; Rule 12(b)(1) allows dismissal for "lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter," and Rule 12(b)(6) permits dismissal for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be asserted at any time, either in a pleading or in a motion. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1); In re DeLorean Motor Co., 991 F.2d 1236, 1240 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain "either direct or indirect allegations respecting all material elements to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory"). "Where subject matter jurisdiction is challenged pursuant to 12(b)(1), the plaintiff has the burden of proving jurisdiction in order to survive the motion." Michigan S. R.R. Co. v. Branch St. Joseph Counties Rail Users Ass'n, Inc., 287 F.3d 568, 573 (6th Cir 2002) (citing Moir v. Greater Cleveland Reg'l Transit Auth., 895 F.2d 266, 269 (6th Cir. 1990)). It is the plaintiff's obligation to show that the complaint "alleges a claim under federal law, and that the claim is `substantial.'" Michigan S.R.R. Co., 287 F.3d at 573 (quoting Masson Theatrical, Inc. v. Federal Express Corp., 89 F.3d 1244, 1248 (6th Cir. 1996).
"The purpose of Rule 12(b)(6) is to allow a defendant to test whether, as a matter of law, the plaintiff is entitled to legal relief even in everything alleged in the complaint is true." Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 638 (6th Cir. 1993). When deciding a motion under that Rule, "[t]he court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept all factual allegations as true, and determine whether the plaintiff undoubtedly can prove no set of facts in support of his claims that would entitle him to relief." Cline v. Rogers, 87 F.3d 176, 179 (6th Cir. 1996). "A judge may not grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion based on a disbelief of a complaint's factual allegations." Columbia Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995). "However, while liberal, this standard of review does require more than the bare assertion of legal conclusions." Ibid. "In practice, `a . . . complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory.'" In re DeLorean, 991 F.2d at 1240 (emphasis in original) (quoting Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir. 1988)). See also Morgan v. Church's Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12 (6th Cir. 1987) (liberal Rule 12(b)(6) review is not afforded legal conclusions and unwarranted factual inferences); Ana Leon T. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 823 F.2d 928, 930 (6th Cir.) (per curiam) (mere conclusions are not afforded liberal Rule 12(b)(6) review), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 945 (1987).
It appears that the plaintiffs in this case are invoking this Court's federal question jurisdiction. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1331 provides that the "the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." In determining whether an action "arises under" federal law, this Court follows the well-pleaded complaint rule. Michigan S.R. R., 287 F.3d at 573. A claim falls within this Court's original jurisdiction under Section 1331 "only [in] those cases in which a well-pleaded Complaint establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiffs right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law." Thornton v. Southwest Detroit Hosp., 895 F.2d 1131, 1133 (6th Cir. 1990) (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1983). Under the "well-pleaded complaint" rule, federal jurisdiction is determined by the allegations on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint. Long v. Bando Mfg. of America, Inc., 201 F.3d 754, 758 (6th Cir. 2000). See also Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987); Louisville Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1983) ("[O]nly those cases in which a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law.").
A pro se litigant's complaint is to be construed liberally, Middleton v. McGinnis, 860 F. Supp. 391, 392 (E.D.Mich. 1994) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); that is, it is held to a "less stringent standard" than those drafted by attorneys. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). Such complaints, however, must plead facts sufficient to show a cognizable legal wrong has been committed from which plaintiff may be granted relief. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b). Cf. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n. 46 (1975) ("The right of self-representation is not a license to abuse the dignity of the courtroom. Neither is it a license not to comply with the relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.")
A.
The gravamen of the plaintiffs' complaint is that the procedures used by the state judges to decide the quiet title action, the complaint for possession, the complaint for superintending control, and the appeals from those decisions, were improper under state law. As a result, the plaintiffs contend, they were denied due process and, because they were labeled and treated as "tax protesters," the decisions of the state courts denied them equal protection of the laws. The plaintiffs ascribe nefarious motives to the state actors, alleging that they were in league with the Shulmans and conspired to deprive the plaintiffs of their due process rights. But the essence of the plaintiffs' claims is that the failure of the state judges to accept the plaintiffs' argument that notice of the tax delinquency and their redemption rights was legally defective contravened their rights under the Due Process Clause. The plaintiffs ask this Court to review and overturn the state procedures, grant them possession and clear title to the South Jefferson Property, and award damages. However, as explained by the Supreme Court in District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), federal district courts do not have jurisdiction to take such action.
The Sixth Circuit recently reviewed the foundation of this rule which has come to be known as the Rooker-Feldman doctrine:
In District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983), the Supreme Court held that federal court review of state court proceedings is jurisdictionally limited to the Supreme Court of the United States by 28 U.S.C. § 1257. See also Patmon v. Michigan Sup.Ct., 224 F.3d 504, 506 (6th Cir. 2000). We refer to this doctrine as the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See also Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923). The Feldman Court stated that "United States District Courts . . . do not have jurisdiction . . . over challenges to state court decisions in particular cases arising out of judicial proceedings even if those challenges allege that the state court's action was unconstitutional. Review of those decisions may only be had in this Court." Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486, 103 S.Ct. 1303.Tropf v. Fidelity Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 289 F.3d 929, 936 (6th Cir. 2002).
Thus, the doctrine stands for the "simple . . . proposition that lower federal courts do not have jurisdiction to review a case litigated and decided in state court; only the United States Supreme Court has jurisdiction to correct state court judgments." Anderson v. Charter Township of Ypsilanti, 266 F.3d 487, 492 (6th Cir. 2001). The doctrine applies in two situations: (1) a direct attack of the substance of a state court decision and (2) a challenge to the procedures used by the state court to arrive at its decision. Id. at 493. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine includes cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because of the "full faith and credit" given to state judicial proceedings. Gottfried v. Med. Planning Servs., Inc., 142 F.3d 326, 330 (6th Cir. 1998).
The plaintiffs' complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because the plaintiffs' are asking this Court to review a case litigated and decided in state court proceedings. Such a review is prohibited under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The plaintiffs also argue that there was a conspiracy against them but, as the defendants point out, any review of the conspiracy claims would also require this Court to review the substance of and the procedures utilized in the state court proceedings out of which the alleged conspiracy grows.
The plaintiffs cite Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923), in support of their argument that when the state courts fail to correct a wrong, the federal district court has "the responsibility of securing the constitutional rights and a duty of examining the facts." Moore does not support a claim to jurisdiction of a federal trial court to pass on the merits of state judicial determinations in civil cases. Rather, Moore discusses a district court's obligation to review a state court criminal proceeding when a petition for a writ of habeas corpus has been filed.
The relief which the plaintiffs request is beyond the authority of this Court to grant. Because the Court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the complaint, it must be dismissed. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1).
B.
There are several other reasons that the complaint should be dismissed as well. First, "judges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity from suits for money damages for all actions taken in the judge's judicial capacity, unless these actions are taken in the complete absence of any jurisdiction." Bush v. Rauch, 38 F.3d 842, 847 (6th Cir. 1994). A judge is entitled to immunity from actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivation of civil rights. Stern v. Mascio, 262 F.3d 600, 606 (6th Cir. 2001).
It appears that all of the actions which constitute the bases for the plaintiffs' complaint against the defendant judges took place in the discharge of the judges' official duties. The plaintiffs allege that they were denied the submission of affidavits, a hearing on the validity of a tax deed, and a hearing on the validity of a return of service. A judge's determination of the admissibility of evidence and the decision to allow a hearing are actions taken by a judge while the judge is acting in his official capacity.
The plaintiffs' argument that the defendant judges did not have jurisdiction and thus cannot claim judicial immunity is somewhat incongruous. It was the plaintiffs who invoked the jurisdiction of the state judges in the first place when they filed a complaint for superintending control and pursued their appeals. Furthermore, the plaintiffs have pleaded no facts suggesting that the judicial actions were ultra vires or otherwise extended beyond the power of the respective state courts to adjudicate the disputes before them. The plaintiffs' complaint, when "fairly read," does not assert that the defendant judges acted "in an arbitrary manner, grossly abusing the lawful powers of office." See Kurz v. State of Michigan, 548 F.2d 172, 175 (6th Cir. 1977) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 235 (1974)). Because the plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against the judicial defendants upon which relief can be granted, the complaint against the defendant judges will be dismissed.
Second, to the extend that the complaint seeks monetary relief, the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against the state and its officials for damages. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). However, a suit against a state defendant in his individual capacity is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991).
There is no question that the plaintiffs have clearly stated their intent to plead against the judicial (state) defendants in their individual capacities, as the plaintiffs are required to do. See Moore v. City of Harriman, 272 F.3d 769 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc). However, the plaintiffs have failed to plead any actions against the defendant judges that they could have taken in their individual capacities. As discussed above, the plaintiffs' complaint alleges conduct by the judges as "officials" for the state. However, these conclusory allegations of individual capacity are not supported by any well-pleaded facts, which the plaintiffs are obliged to furnish. Ana Leon T., 823 F.2d at 930. Rather, the plaintiffs allege that the judges failed to hold hearings and that they denied the plaintiffs' request to present affidavits. These are allegations against the judges acting in an official capacity, not individually; the judges could only take these actions in an official capacity, unless they acted beyond their jurisdiction. Thus, the bounds of Eleventh Amendment immunity are conterminous with those of judicial immunity; the Eleventh Amendment likewise bars suit against the judicial defendants
Third, the complaint against the county officials is time-barred. Dismissal of a claim under Rule 12 for failure to comply with the applicable statute of limitations is proper when there is no set of facts that could demonstrate a timely claim upon which relief can be granted. Gibson v. Am. Bankers Ins. Co., 289 F.3d 943, 946 (6th Cir. 2002) (emphasis omitted). The court liberally construes the complaint in determining whether the action is time-barred, and will dismiss only when the allegations of the complaint itself demonstrate that the cause is filed out of time. Rauch v. Day Night Mfg. Corp., 576 F.2d 697, 702 (6th Cir. 1978). Section 1983 claims are characterized as personal injury actions for statute of limitations purposes, which, under Michigan law, must be filed within three years of when the claim accrues. Carroll v. Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44, 44 (6th Cir. 1986). The complaint in this case was filed on March 22, 2002, more than seven years after the defendants Nietzel, Luethjohan and Neilson allegedly failed to provide the plaintiffs with a delinquency notice and notice of tax sale. Thus, the complaint itself demonstrates that the cause is time-barred. The plaintiffs ask this Court to find that the statute was tolled by the state quiet title actions, but they provide no authority in support of that proposition. The statute of limitations bars the plaintiffs' claims against defendants Luethjohan, Neitzel and Neilson.
Finally, no claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 can lie against defendants Dwan or the Shullmans, private citizens all. The essential elements of a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are that the conduct complained of (1) was committed by a person acting under color of law, and (2) deprived the plaintiff of rights, privileges, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Berger v. City of Mayfield Heights, 265 F.3d 399, 405 (6th Cir. 2001). "Absent either element, a section 1983 claim will not lie." Christy v. Randlett, 932 F.2d 502, 504 (6th Cir. 1991). "[A] section 1983 claim can only be brought for actions done under color of state law." Ortman v. Thomas, 894 F. Supp. 1104, 1110 (E.D.Mich. 1995). "Merely instituting a routine civil suit does not transform a litigant's actions into those taken under state law." Tunstall v. Office of Judicial Support, 820 F.2d 631, 634 (3rd Cir. 1987).
The plaintiffs' argument that the Schulmans were acting together with state officials and therefore were acting under color of law is unfounded as the plaintiffs provide no basis to support the allegation other than mere speculation that the all the defendants were somehow in a conspiracy together to take the plaintiffs' property. However, when deciding a motion to dismiss the Court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, accept all factual allegations as true, and determine whether the plaintiffs undoubtedly can prove no set of facts in support of their claims that would entitle them to relief. Cline, 87 F.3d at 179. Because the plaintiffs could conceivably establish some fact that may show a conspiracy between Dwan, the Schulmans and the state officials, the complaint against the Schulmans and their attorney will not be dismissed against them on the basis that they were not acting under "color of state law."
However, the complaint will be dismissed against them under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because any determination of the complaint against Dwan and the Schulmans would require review of the state court proceedings. Furthermore, private citizens cannot be held liable for conspiring with state officials to violate a plaintiff's civil rights under color of state law if all of the state officials are immune from suit, as the Court has determined, above. Kurz, 548 F.2d at 175. The Court concludes, therefore, that no valid claim against Dwan and the Schulmans is stated in the complaint.
III.
Although the complaint is replete with conclusory allegations of conspiratorial actions by Michigan judges and an attorney and his clients, what the plaintiffs essentially seek from this Court is an "appellate" review of state court proceedings that were decided against them. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars that relief. In addition, the claims are barred by judicial and Eleventh Amendment immunity and the statute of limitations, as noted above.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the motion to dismiss by defendants Corrigan, Sawyer, Murphy, Fitzgerald, and Ernst [dkt #9] is GRANTED.
It is further ORDERED that the motion to dismiss by defendants Caprathe, Newcombe, Luethjohan, Nielsen, Neitzel, Roe, and Doe [dkt #21] is GRANTED.
It is further ORDERED that the motion to dismiss by defendants Shulmans [dkt #14] is GRANTED.
It is further ORDERED that the motion to dismiss by defendant Dwan [dkt #23] is GRANTED.
It is further ORDERED that the motion to for security for costs by defendant Dwan [dkt #22] is DENIED as moot.