Opinion
No. 339746
05-15-2018
PAULA K. ZELENKO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BURTON CITY COUNCIL, Defendant-Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 17-109371-AW Before: O'CONNELL, P.J., and HOEKSTRA and K. F. KELLY, JJ. PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff, Paula K. Zelenko, Mayor of the city of Burton, submitted a budget to defendant, Burton City Council, for fiscal year 2017 to 2018. The City Council amended the budget before adopting it. Mayor Zelenko subsequently filed an emergency complaint for a writ of mandamus in the trial court, alleging that the City Council only had the authority to accept or reject the Mayor's proposed budget but did not have the authority to amend it before approving it. The trial court ruled that the City Council did not run afoul of the city's charter and state law when it adopted an amended budget. Zelenko appeals the trial court's order as of right. We affirm.
We review for an abuse of discretion a "trial court's decision whether to issue a writ of mandamus . . . [,]" but we review de novo underlying legal questions of statutory interpretation. PT Today, Inc v Comm'r of the Office of Fin & Ins Servs, 270 Mich App 110, 133; 715 NW2d 398 (2006). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision "is outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes." Barrow v Detroit Election Comm, 305 Mich App 649, 662; 854 NW2d 489 (2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted). A plaintiff seeking mandamus must prove that "(1) the plaintiff has a clear, legal right to performance of the specific duty sought, (2) the defendant has a clear legal duty to perform, (3) the act is ministerial, and (4) no other adequate legal or equitable remedy exists that might achieve the same result." Berry v Garrett, 316 Mich App 37, 41; 890 NW2d 882 (2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
The principles of construction concerning statutory interpretation apply with equal force to the interpretation of city charters. Detroit v Walker, 445 Mich 682, 691; 520 NW2d 135 (1994). This Court's primary goal in matters of statutory interpretation is to determine and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Bonner v Brighton, 495 Mich 209, 222; 848 NW2d 380 (2014). "When the words used in a statute or an ordinance are clear and unambiguous, they express the intent of the legislative body and must be enforced as written." Sau-Tuk Indus, Inc v Allegan Co, 316 Mich App 122, 137; 892 NW2d 33 (2016). This Court "must assign every word or phrase its plain and ordinary meaning unless the Legislature has provided specific definitions or has used technical terms that have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law." Mayor of Cadillac v Blackburn, 306 Mich App 512, 516; 857 NW2d 529 (2014). "Each word of a statute is presumed to be used for a purpose, and, as far as possible, effect must be given to every clause and sentence." Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439, 459; 613 NW2d 307 (2000).
We begin with the Burton city charter's budget process provisions. First, the department heads submit statements of financial need and anticipated revenues to the mayor by February 1, and the mayor assembles the statements and prepares a budget proposal. The mayor submits "the annual budget proposal of the city" to the city council at the council's first regular meeting in April. The city council "shall, by resolution, adopt a budget for the ensuing fiscal year" at a regular meeting held no later than the second Monday in June.
Zelenko correctly observes that the city charter is silent on the issue of whether the city council has the authority to amend the mayor's proposed budget before adopting it, but it does not follow that the drafter's intention cannot be gleaned from the plain language of the charter. Our Supreme Court has disapproved of the legislative acquiescence theory and declines to "intuit legislative intent" from legislative silence. McCahan v Brennan, 492 Mich 730, 749-750; 822 NW2d 747 (2012). Accordingly, we will not give the absence of express provisions regarding the city council's authority to amend an annual budget proposal undue weight.
Instead, we focus on the plain language of the charter, which directs the city council to "adopt a budget . . . ." "All words and phrases shall be construed and understood according to the common and approved usage of the language[.]" MCL 8.3a. The definite article "the" has a " 'specifying or particularizing effect, as opposed to the indefinite or generalizing force of the indefinite article a or an . . . .' " Robinson, 462 Mich at 461-462, quoting Random House Webster's College Dictionary, p 1382. We apply this distinction between the articles "a" and "the" to the Burton city charter's budget provision. See id. The use of an indefinite article in referring to the city council's authority to "adopt a budget" suggests that the council is not limited to adopting the budget proposal submitted by the mayor. By the same token, if the city council is authorized to adopt a budget but is not restricted to consideration of the mayor's budget proposal, we can infer that the city council may alter or amend the mayor's budget proposal as long as the approved budget otherwise complies with local and state law.
Zelenko argues that the instant matter is analogous to Detroit City Council v Stecher, 430 Mich 74; 421 NW2d 544 (1988). In Stecher, 430 Mich at 85-88, the Supreme Court determined that the Detroit City Council was not authorized to alter the budget amendment proposal produced by the mayor, emphasizing its interpretation of § 17 of the Uniform Budgeting and Accounting Act (UBAA), MCL 141.421 et seq., which deals with midyear amendments required to ensure a balanced budget. Although the facts of this case are similar to the dispute in Stecher, the Supreme Court considered whether the Detroit City Council had the authority to unilaterally amend a previously adopted budget in the middle of the fiscal year, rather than a budget proposal that had not yet been passed. See id. at 78-79. This distinction is significant. Because the issue in this matter involves adoption of Burton's initial annual budget, the rationale in Stecher is inapplicable.
Zelenko's reliance on the UBAA is also misplaced. Section 16 of the UBAA sets forth the manner in which a local legislative unit shall pass a general appropriations act, MCL 141.436(1), which is defined as "the budget as adopted by the legislative body or as otherwise given legal effect pursuant to a charter provision in effect on the effective date of this section[,]" MCL 141.422c(2). However, § 16 does not apply if a "charter provision in effect on April 1, 1980," provides another method for adopting a budget. MCL 141.436(1). Furthermore, limiting language in the UBAA shows that "it is not intended to proscribe or interfere with the local unit's scheme for dealing with its fiscal affairs." Stecher, 430 Mich at 89 n 6. Because Burton's charter went into effect on July 1, 1972, its provisions concerning the method for adopting an annual budget are controlling.
Moreover, even if we were to look to the UBAA for guidance in this instance, our interpretation of the charter is not contradicted by the terms of the UBAA. Like Burton's charter, § 14 of the UBAA directs the chief administrative officer to "prepare the recommended annual budget for the ensuing fiscal year . . . [,]" MCL 141.434(2), which "shall be considered by the legislative body[,]" MCL 141.434(4). Section 16 authorizes the legislative body to "pass a general appropriations act . . . ." MCL 141.436(1) (emphasis added). Also like Burton's charter, the UBAA does not explicitly address the legislative body's authority to amend the proposed annual budget before adopting it. Accordingly, there is no conflict between our interpretation of Burton's charter and the UBAA.
In sum, the plain language of Burton's charter shows that the City Council was free to modify the budget proposal submitted by the Mayor before adopting a final budget for the fiscal year. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to issue a writ of mandamus directing the City Council to vote on the budget proposal as originally submitted by Mayor Zelenko. Because the City Council was only obligated to adopt "a budget" and did not have a clear legal duty to vote on the unaltered budget proposal submitted by Zelenko, she did not satisfy her burden of demonstrating entitlement to a writ of mandamus.
Zelenko also raises a cursory argument regarding the propriety of the annual budget "resolution" passed by the City Council for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2018. However, we need not address that issue for two reasons. First, a "party may not merely announce a position and leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for the claim." Southfield Ed Ass'n v Bd of Ed of the Southfield Pub Sch, 320 Mich App 353, 379; ___ NW2d ___ (2017) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Zelenko's perfunctory argument merely presents her dissatisfaction with the form of the budget submitted to her without grounding her position in any recognizable legal theory. Therefore, Zelenko has abandoned this issue.
Furthermore, this issue is moot. An issue is moot "when a judgment, if entered, cannot for any reason have a practical legal effect on the existing controversy." Barrow, 305 Mich App at 659 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Although the document identified as the final budget approved by the City Council is admittedly informal, Burton has been operating under its terms since the trial court determined on August 2, 2017, that the budget was properly passed. Now that the bulk of Burton's fiscal year has passed, this Court can no longer grant relief that will have a practical effect on the annual budget for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2018.
We affirm.
/s/ Peter D. O'Connell
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly