Opinion
22 Civ. 7112 (KPF)
04-17-2024
ROSA ZAYAS, as Parent and Natural Guardian of R.Z.; ROSA ZAYAS, individually; EDWIN ZAYAS, as Parent and Natural Guardian of R.Z.; and EDWIN ZAYAS, individually, Plaintiffs, v. DAVID C. BANKS, in his official capacity as Chancellor of New York City Department of Education, and NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
KATHERINE POLK FAILLA, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiffs Rosa and Edwin Zayas (“Plaintiffs”), individually and as parents and natural guardians of their son, R.Z., bring this motion for reconsideration under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60(b) and Local Rule 6.3. Plaintiffs ask this Court to reevaluate its January 19, 2024 Opinion and Order (Dkt. #39 (the “MSJ Order”)) denying Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and granting the cross-motion of Defendants David C. Banks (in his official capacity as Chancellor of the New York City Department of Education) and the New York City Department of Education (together, “DOE” or “Defendants”). Contrary to the MSJ Order's findings, Plaintiffs urge the Court to conclude that (i) DOE failed to offer R.Z. a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”) for the 2021-2022 school year, as mandated by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485; (ii) Plaintiffs' unilateral placement of R.Z. at the International Institute of the Brain (“iBRAIN”) for the 2021-2022 school year was appropriate; and (iii) equitable considerations warrant reimbursement of Plaintiffs for the total cost of R.Z.'s attendance at iBRAIN. For the reasons discussed herein, the Court denies Plaintiffs' motion.
The facts set forth in this Opinion are drawn from the parties' submissions in connection with the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. The Court primarily sources facts from Plaintiffs' Local Rule 56.1 Statement (“Pl. 56.1” (Dkt. #18)) and Defendants' Local Rule 56.1 Statement (“Def. 56.1” (Dkt. #30)), as well as the Complaint (“Compl.” (Dkt. #1)). The Court refers to the decisions of the Impartial Hearing Officer (“IHO”) and the State Review Officer (“SRO”) in the underlying administrative proceedings as “IHO Decision” (Dkt. #1-1) and “SRO Decision” (Dkt. #1-2), respectively.
The Court assumes familiarity with the factual and procedural histories of this litigation and incorporates by reference the facts set forth in the MSJ Order. The Court summarizes below only the facts essential to the adjudication of the instant motion.
A. Factual Background
R.Z., the son of Plaintiffs Rosa and Edwin Zayas, suffers from cerebral palsy, seizure disorder, hydrocephalus, dystonia, and global developmental delay, in addition to being legally blind, non-ambulatory, nonverbal, and having a shunt and a gastronomy tube. (Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 1, 3-4). Pursuant to IDEA, DOE is required to provide R.Z. with a FAPE, including by developing an appropriate “individualized education program” (“IEP”) for him. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a)(3)-(4); see also N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 200.1(y) (defining “IEP” as “a written statement ... which includes the [programs and services] to be provided [by the state] to meet the unique educational needs of a student with a disability”); id. § 200.4(d)(2) (describing the components of an IEP). The instant dispute surrounds the IEP formulated for R.Z. for the 2021-2022 school year (the “2021-2022 IEP”), which, among other things, called for R.Z.'s enrollment in a 12-month program in a 6:1:1 class at a District 75 (“D75”) school. (Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 10-16). Consistent with the 2021-2022 IEP, for the 2021-2022 school year, DOE placed R.Z. in the Horan School, a D75 school wherein R.Z. could be assigned to a 6:1:1 classroom. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 7).
Plaintiffs disagreed with the 2021-2022 IEP's recommended placement of R.Z. at a D75 school, in part due to the findings of Dr. Isabel Rodriguez, who conducted an Independent Educational Evaluation of R.Z. in May and June 2021. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 12; Compl. ¶¶ 68, 76). According to Dr. Rodriguez, “D75 programs often include children with autism spectrum disorder diagnoses, a clinical presentation that requires different academic and supportive needs than those needed of a child [like R.Z.] with an acquired brain injury”; for this reason, a D75 program “cannot meet [R.Z.'s] needs.” (IHO Decision 5-7). Crediting Dr. Rodriguez's assessment of the impropriety of R.Z.'s placement in a D75 school, Plaintiffs elected to unilaterally enroll R.Z. at iBRAIN for the 2021-2022 school year. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 10).
On the basis that DOE had denied R.Z. a FAPE for the 2021-2022 school year, Plaintiffs subsequently initiated state administrative proceedings seeking reimbursement for the cost of R.Z.'s iBRAIN tuition and related expenses. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 25-28). Following a due process hearing conducted in November and December 2021, Impartial Hearing Officer (“IHO”) Diane Ciccone issued a decision on February 9, 2022, concluding that DOE had failed to offer R.Z. a FAPE for the 2021-2022 school year and granting Plaintiffs' request for reimbursement (the “IHO Decision”). (IHO Decision 15-16; Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 37-42). On appeal, State Review Officer (“SRO”) Justyn Bates reversed the decision of IHO Ciccone in a decision issued on April 20, 2022 (the “SRO Decision”). (Id. ¶¶ 43-45).
B. Procedural Background
Plaintiffs commenced the instant action, seeking this Court's reversal of the SRO Decision, on August 19, 2022. (See generally Compl.). On February 2, 2023, the parties requested leave to file cross-motions for summary judgment in lieu of proceeding to discovery (Dkt. #16), which request the Court granted (Dkt. #17). “Because the allegations in the Complaint concern[ed] an underlying administrative hearing,” the parties indicated that the issues in this action could be resolved on the basis of the certified administrative record alone. (Dkt. #16 at 1-2).
On April 3, 2023, Plaintiffs filed their motion for summary judgment and accompanying Local Rule 56.1 statement of material facts. (Dkt. #18-20). On June 2, 2023, Defendants filed their cross-motion for summary judgment and opposition to Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment; Local Rule 56.1 statement of material facts; and responses to Plaintiffs' Local Rule 56.1 statement of material facts. (Dkt. #29-32). On July 3, 2023, Plaintiffs filed their opposition to Defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment, reply in further support of their motion for summary judgment, and responses to Defendants' Local Rule 56.1 statement of material facts. (Dkt. #33-34). Finally, on August 7, 2023, Defendants filed their reply in further support of their cross-motion for summary judgment. (Dkt. #38).
On January 19, 2024, the Court issued the MSJ Order, denying Plaintiffs' motion and granting Defendants' motion, both in full. (See generally MSJ Order). Specifically, applying the Burlington/Carter test - which governs claims seeking tuition reimbursement under IDEA, see C.F. ex rel. R.F. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 746 F.3d 68, 76 (2d Cir. 2014) - the Court concluded that DOE's placement of R.Z. at the Horan School did not violate IDEA. (See MSJ Order 14-31 (citing Sch. Comm. of Town of Burlington, Mass. v. Dep't of Educ. of Mass., 471 U.S. 359 (1985); Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter By & Through Carter, 510 U.S. 7 (1993))). Further, the Court found that because DOE's proposed placement did not violate IDEA (the first prong of the Burlington/Carter test), it was not necessary for the Court to evaluate whether Plaintiffs' private placement of R.Z. at iBRAIN was appropriate or whether equitable considerations favored Plaintiffs' reimbursement (the second and third prongs, respectively). (Id. at 15). Accordingly, the Court affirmed the SRO Decision and denied Plaintiffs' request for reimbursement of the costs of R.Z.'s private placement at iBRAIN. (Id. at 30-31).
On February 16, 2024, Plaintiffs filed the instant motion for reconsideration of the MSJ Order pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60(b) and Local Rule 6.3. (Dkt. #41-42). Defendants filed an opposition to Plaintiffs' motion on April 1, 2024 (Dkt. #45), and Plaintiffs filed a reply in further support of their motion on April 8, 2024 (Dkt. #47).
DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Law
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60(b) and Local Civil Rule 6.3 govern motions for reconsideration, depending on the type of order at issue and specific relief sought. See Cadet v. All. Nursing Staffing of N.Y., Inc., No. 21 Civ. 3994 (KPF), 2023 WL 3872574, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2023), reconsideration denied, 2023 WL 3872558 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2023); Silverberg v. DryShips Inc., No. 17 Civ. 4547 (SJF), 2018 WL 10669653, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2018); United States v. Real Prop. & Premises Located at 249-20 Cambria Ave., Little Neck, N.Y. 11362, 21 F.Supp.3d 254, 259 (E.D.N.Y. 2014); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) (motion to alter or amend judgment), 60(b) (motion for relief from judgment or order); Local Civ. R. 6.3 (motion for reconsideration). All reconsideration motions are subject to a “strict” standard, Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995), and will be granted “only when the movant identifies ‘an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice,'” Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Gottlieb, No. 98 Civ. 2636 (LAP), 2021 WL 5450360, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2021) (quoting Kolel Beth Yechiel Mechil of Tartikov, Inc. v. YLL Irrevocable Tr., 729 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 2013)).
Importantly, a reconsideration motion is not a vehicle (i) to “introduce additional facts not in the record on the original motion”; (ii) to “advance[] new arguments or issues that could have been raised on the original motion”; or (iii) to “relitigate an issue already decided.” Silverberg, 2018 WL 10669653, at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted) (collecting cases); accord Analytical Survs., Inc. v. Tonga Partners, L.P., 684 F.3d 36, 52 (2d Cir. 2012), as amended (July 13, 2012). Instead, reconsideration may be warranted where the movant “can point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked - matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court.” Schrader, 70 F.3d at 257; see also Lichtenberg v. Besicorp Grp. Inc., 28 Fed.Appx. 73, 75 (2d Cir. 2002) (summary order).
Ultimately, “the decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration rests within the sound discretion of the district court.” Vincent v. Money Store, No. 03 Civ. 2876 (JGK), 2011 WL 5977812, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
B. Analysis
In the preliminary statement of their memorandum of law in support of their motion for reconsideration, Plaintiffs identify two issues with the Court's MSJ Order that they believe constitute grounds for reconsideration. (See Dkt. #42 at 1-3). In particular, they argue that:
• “[T]he Court seems to have overlooked that [IDEA] ... gives courts broad authority to grant ‘appropriate' relief, including reimbursement for the cost of private special education ... [and] the Court has discretion to consider equitable factors relating to the reasonableness of the Plaintiffs' actions when fashioning relief.” (Id. at 2).
• “The Court erred in granting the unfounded SRO Decision more deference than it rightfully deserved. Considering equities is a duty that Congress has tasked
this Court to perform without unwarranted deference to the decisions of the SRO.” (Id. at 2-3).
Both assertions are plainly incorrect. As to the first - whether the Court overlooked its “discretion to consider equitable factors” when fashioning relief under IDEA - the Court's conclusion that R.Z. was not denied a FAPE for the 2021-2022 school year negated the Court's need to fashion relief for Plaintiffs altogether, and thus any concurrent need to “consider equitable factors” in doing so. As to the second, the amount of deference offered to the SRO Decision, the Court finds no error in its decision to accord the SRO Decision substantial deference. In explaining this decision, the Court discussed in the MSJ Order (i) the cursory nature of the IHO Decision; (ii) the relative length and thoroughness of the SRO Decision; (iii) the extensive citations to primary source material throughout the SRO Decision; and (iv) the Court's own review of such primary source material and assessment of the accuracy of the SRO's characterizations thereof. (MSJ Order 15-17, 26-28, 30; see id. at 17 n.3). What is more, beyond asserting that the Court erred in its decision concerning deference to the SRO Decision, Plaintiffs offer no law or fact demonstrating what such error was; Plaintiffs do not identify any new or previously overlooked matter that impacts (let alone merits alteration of) the Court's original analysis.
Far more troubling than the vague and conclusory nature of Plaintiffs' proffered grounds for reconsideration is the fact that Plaintiffs' submissions in support of their motion for reconsideration are copied, word-for-word, almost in full, from their submissions in connection with the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. Exhibit 1 to this Opinion provides a comparison of Plaintiffs' memorandum of law in support of their motion for reconsideration (Dkt. #42), filed February 16, 2024, with excerpts of Plaintiffs' memorandum of law in support of their motion for summary judgment (Dkt. #20), filed April 3, 2023, and memorandum of law in opposition to Defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment and reply in further support of their motion for summary judgment (Dkt. #33), filed July 3, 2023. Exhibit 2 provides a comparison of Plaintiffs' reply memorandum of law in further support of their motion for reconsideration (Dkt. #47), filed April 8, 2024, with excerpts of Plaintiffs' memorandum of law in support of their motion for reconsideration (Dkt. #42), filed February 16, 2024. As the Exhibits demonstrate, with the exception of the preliminary statements and a handful of paragraphs in Plaintiffs' reply memorandum, Plaintiffs' submissions on the instant motion are entirely repurposed from other briefs. (See generally Ex. 1-2).
The Court notes that the software used to produce the comparisons in Exhibits 1 and 2 is imperfect and, at times, identifies certain text in a document as unique when, in reality, it is copied from the file against which that document is being compared (i.e., the software operates in Plaintiffs' favor in that it is over-inclusive as to its identification of unique text).
The two exhibits bring into sharp relief the futility of Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration. Because Plaintiffs simply regurgitate the arguments made in support of their motion for summary judgment in their submissions on the instant motion, this Court's consideration of such arguments is by definition “relitigat[ion] [of] issue[s] already decided.” Silverberg, 2018 WL 10669653, at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Crowley Ambassador, No. 01 Civ. 3605 (PKL), 2003 WL 21313972, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 6, 2003) (“A motion for reconsideration is not an opportunity to press more strenuously the same arguments made in the original motion.”); Associated Press v. U.S. Dep't of Def., 395 F.Supp.2d 17, 19 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“It is settled law in this District that a motion for reconsideration is n[ot] an occasion for repeating old arguments[.]”). Not only is this recapitulation an inappropriate use of the reconsideration vehicle, but it is also a waste of both Defendants' and this Court's time.
The Court appreciates Defendants' thoughtful engagement with Plaintiffs' submissions notwithstanding the fact that Defendants, too, had already meaningfully addressed the arguments set forth therein in the course of summary judgment briefing.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration. The Court warns Plaintiffs and their counsel that, while the Court will refrain from issuing sanctions at this time, Plaintiffs' submissions in connection with the instant motion get close to the line of sanctionable conduct under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b).
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate the pending motion at docket entry 41.
SO ORDERED.