Opinion
No. 2:12-cv-00826-GEB-CMK
2013-10-17
MARIO ALBERTO ZARCO, Plaintiff, v. VECOPLAN, LLC, and TOTER, INC., Defendants.
DISMISSAL ORDER
On September 24, 2012, the parties filed a "NOTICE OF STIPULATION . . . OF DISMISSAL," in which they state this action is settled and shall "be and is dismissed with prejudice." (Notice of Stipulation of Dismissal ("Dismissal Notice") 1:24-2:2, ECF No. 32.) The parties also essentially request, in this filing, that the Court "retain jurisdiction over this litigated matter . . . notwithstanding dismissal of the Action for purposes of enforcing the terms and provisions of the settlement." (Id. at 2:7-16.)
The parties mistakenly presume the Court will retain jurisdiction over this action to enforce the terms of their private settlement agreement, which the Court has not seen. The parties have not shown why the Court should retain jurisdiction, and "the mere fact that the parties agree that the court [shall] exercise continuing jurisdiction is not binding on the court." Arata v. Nu Skin Int'l, Inc., 96 F.3d 1265, 1269 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Jessup v. Luther, 277 F.3d 926, 929 (7th Cir. 2002) (observing that settlement of a federal lawsuit "is just another contract to be enforced in the usual way, that is, by fresh suit") (citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 378-82 (1994)) (additional citations omitted).
Further, in light of the parties' "complete and total" settlement of this action and agreement to dismiss this action with prejudice, (Dismissal Notice 1:25-2:2), this action is dismissed with prejudice. See Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1472-73 (9th Cir. 1986) (explaining that "[t]he court reasonably concluded that the parties had the requisite mutual intent to dismiss the action with prejudice" when the court "f[ound] that the parties' . . . representations to the court agreeing to a dismissal with prejudice constituted a voluntary stipulated dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1)(ii)").
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GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.
Senior United States District Judge