Opinion
For ZACHARY D. HARRISON, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND THOSE SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiff: THOMAS P. DONNELLY, LEAD ATTORNEY, ANTHEIL MASLOW & MACMINN LLP, DOYLESTOWN, PA.
For DELGUERICO'S WRECKING & SALVAGE, INC., TONY DELGUERICO, INDIVIDUALLY, Defendants: ARI RISSON KARPF, LEAD ATTORNEY, RICHARD ALBANESE, KARPF, KARPF & CERUTTI PC, BENSALEM, PA.
MEMORANDUM
ROBERT F. KELLY, SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Presently before this Court is Plaintiff, Zachary Harrison's (" Plaintiff" ), " Motion to Certify Class," Defendants, DelGuerico's Wrecking & Salvage, Inc. and Tony DelGuerico's (collectively, " Defendants" ), Memorandum of Law in Opposition, and Plaintiff's Reply thereto. For the reasons set forth below, this Motion is granted.
I. BACKGROUND
On September 13, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Complaint alleging claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act (" FLSA" ), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. See Compl. ¶ 4. Specifically, Plaintiff filed this action on behalf of himself and other similarly situated current and former employees of DelGuerico's Wrecking and Salvage, Inc. (" Defendant" ) pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Id. ¶ 11. Plaintiff asserts that he and his co-workers consist of refuse truck drivers and office employees who worked for Defendant from September 2010 through the present. (Pl.'s Mot. at 2.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to pay him and these similarly situated former and current employees overtime wages for a number of years, either claiming them as exempt employees under 29 U.S.C. 213(b)(1) or misidentifying employees as independent contractors. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that, although he and these other employees often worked overtime hours, Defendants only compensated them with their " regular rate of pay" as defined by Section 207 of the FLSA. (Id.)
The instant Motion follows more than a year of discovery efforts on the part of Plaintiff attempting to ascertain the names and contact information of potential putative class members. The docket indicates that Plaintiff filed a Motion to Compel Responses to Plaintiff's Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents on March 4, 2014. (Doc. No. 8.) This Motion was granted by this Court on March 26, 2014, and Defendants were ordered to comply within 45 days. (Doc. No. 12.) Because Defendants failed to comply with this Order, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Sanctions on May 23, 2014. (Doc. No. 13.) The Motion was granted on June 19, 2014, and on July 22, 2014, Defendants were ordered to pay Plaintiff's counsel the amount of $3,000. (Doc. Nos. 16, 19.) Defendants' counsel, David Macfarlin, Esq., filed a Motion to Withdraw on October 22, 2014, which was granted on November 14, 2014. (Doc. Nos. 20, 22.) New counsel for Defendants, Ari Risson Karpf, Esq., entered his appearance on December 12, 2014. (Doc. No. 25.)
On December 22, 2014, we ordered Defendants to produce to Plaintiff " an itemized list stating all employees who worked as W-2 employees, as well as, individuals who were paid outside of the payroll as independent contractors, within the last three years on or before January 15, 2015." (Doc. No. 28.) We also ordered Plaintiff to file a Motion for Conditional Class Certification on or before January 22, 2015. (Id.) Plaintiff filed the instant Motion to Certify Class on January 22, 2015. (Doc. No. 31.) Defendants filed a Memorandum of Law in Opposition on February 9, 2015, and Plaintiff, subsequently, filed a Reply. (Doc. Nos. 32-33.)
In the instant Motion, Plaintiff requests that this Court conditionally certify a FLSA collective action and order notice sent to members of a class defined as follows:
i) all non-exempt employees (including those improperly categorized as independent contractors) employed by DelGuerico's Wrecking & Salvage, Inc. after September 13, 2010, ii) who worked overtime hours but were not paid overtime wages of at least one and one half times the applicable regular wage rate for each hour worked beyond forty (40) hours in a given work week at any time during their employment and iii) opt in to this collection action.
(Pl.'s Mot. at 2.)
Plaintiff asserts that on January 13, 2015, Defendants finally supplied a listing of their employees and contractors. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff, however, contends that " Defendant does not provide material information such as 'job title', 'dates of employment', classification or 'last known address for several employees.'" (Id. at 2-3.) Plaintiff further claims that " no records of 1099's reflecting payments to independent contractors have been produced," and that he is aware of at least three individuals who were not listed. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff, thus, argues that, in addition to conditionally certifying a FLSA collective action, Defendants should also be ordered to supplement their discovery responses and the list of employees and provide last known addresses for every potential putative class member so that the notice required by the FLSA can be effectuated. (Id.)
II. DISCUSSION
Collective actions brought under the FLSA are governed by § 216(b), which provides for an opt-in procedure for plaintiffs desiring to be included in the litigation. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). There are two requirements for potential plaintiffs to be included in the collective action: plaintiffs must (1) be " similarly situated" and (2) give written consent. Id. (stating that " [a]n action to recover the liability . . . may be maintained . . . by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated" and plaintiffs must " give[ ] [their] consent in writing to become such a party and such consent is filed in the court in which such action is brought" ). However, the " similarly situated" standard for employees to proceed collectively under the FLSA is not defined by the statute. Symczyk v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 656 F.3d 189, 192 (3d Cir. 2011). The FLSA also does not provide specific procedures by which potential plaintiffs may opt in, but the Supreme Court has held that " district courts have discretion, in appropriate cases, to implement [ § 216(b) ] . . . by facilitating notice to potential plaintiffs." Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 169, 110 S.Ct. 482, 107 L.Ed.2d 480 (1989). The Court further stated that " once a[ ] [FLSA] action is filed, the court has a managerial responsibility to oversee the joinder of additional parties to assure that the task is accomplished in an efficient and proper way." Id. at 171.
" In deciding whether a suit brought under § 216(b) may move forward as a collective action, courts typically employ a two-tiered analysis." Symczyk, 656 F.3d at 192. During the initial phase, which is conducted early in the litigation process when the court has minimal evidence, " the court makes a preliminary determination whether the employees enumerated in the complaint can be provisionally categorized as similarly situated to the named plaintiff." Id. " [I]f the plaintiff carries [his] burden at this threshold stage, the court will 'conditionally certify' the collective action for the purposes of notice and pretrial discovery." Id. " After discovery, and with the benefit of a much thicker record than it had at the notice stage, a court following this approach then makes a conclusive determination as to whether each plaintiff who has opted in to the collective action is in fact similarly situated to the named plaintiff." Id. at 193. If the plaintiff carries his heavier burden during the second phase " the case may proceed to trial as a collective action." Id.
At the first step of the inquiry, " the plaintiff . . . [must] make a modest factual showing that the proposed recipients of opt-in notices are similarly situated." Id. Under this standard, " a plaintiff must produce some evidence, beyond pure speculation, of a factual nexus between the manner in which the employer's alleged policy affected [him] and the manner in which it affected other employees." Id. However, this remains a lenient burden. Smith v. Sovereign Bancorp Inc., No. 03-2420, 2003 WL 22701017, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2003); see also Resch v. Krapf's Coaches, Inc., No. 11-6893, 2012 WL 2500623, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 29, 2012). Further, the merits of plaintiff's claims need not be evaluated in order for notice to be approved and disseminated. Resch, 2012 WL 2500623, at *3; see also Chabrier v. Wilmington Fin., Inc., No. 06-4176, 2006 WL 3742774 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 13, 2006).
A. Conditional Certification
In accordance with the above, we address only the first part of the two-tier analysis-whether Plaintiff can make a " modest factual showing that the proposed recipients of opt-in notices are similarly situated." See Symczyk, 656 F.3d at 193. Here, at this stage of the litigation, some discovery has been completed. Although Plaintiff contends that such discovery is incomplete, he asserts that he has met this " modest factual showing," through the submission of his affidavit and payroll records from the Defendant.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's " allegations supporting this lawsuit are threadbare at best and only come from two locations, Plaintiff's Complaint and a subsequent affidavit." (Defs.' Resp. at 2.) Defendants further maintain that Plaintiff has not " submitted any evidence that suggests a common decision, policy, or plan," nor has he " submitted any affidavits from similarly situated employees." (Defs.' Resp. at 6.) Defendants also assert that " Plaintiff does not identify anything similar about the putative class aside from their hours and that they received their regular rate of pay." (Id. at 7.) We, however, disagree and find that Plaintiff has made the required " modest factual showing that the proposed recipients of opt-in notices are similarly situated." See Symczyk, 656 F.3d at 193.
In his affidavit, Plaintiff states that he is aware of a company policy against the payment of overtime which applies to all non-management employees, and of other Defendant employees who regularly worked more than forty hours, but did not receive overtime rates. (Harrison Aff. ¶ ¶ 7-9.) In addition, he asserts that he is aware of other individuals, like himself, who were employed for periods of time as independent contractors who did not receive overtime or the benefit of employer withholding taxes. (Id. ¶ 10.)
Plaintiff also offers payroll records from Defendants' payroll provider which he asserts reflect that their employees routinely worked in excess of forty hours per week. (Pl.'s Mot. at 10.) As examples, Plaintiff gives the names of several employees whose payroll records reflect that they regularly worked more than forty hours per week. Plaintiff further submits that Defendants' " responses to interrogatories and request for production of documents reflect that not a single employee received overtime wages, and that Defendants maintain no records or policies reflecting how or why they classify their employees as exempt." (Id. at 11.)
Based on these submissions, we find under the " lenient" first step of conditional certification that Plaintiff has made a " modest factual showing" that there are " similarly situated" persons who may desire to opt into the litigation. See Smith, 2003 WL 22701017, at *3; Resch, 2012 WL 2500623, at *3. If Defendants have evidence or obtain evidence that Plaintiff or any other Plaintiff that opts in is not " similarly situated," such evidence is more appropriately reviewed pursuant to a decertification motion or a motion for summary judgment after more discovery has been completed. See Bosley v. Chubb Corp., No. 04-4598, 2005 WL 1334565, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 3, 2005) (finding that evidence that proposed class members did not perform the same duties as named plaintiffs is appropriately considered at step two); see also Resch, 2012 WL 2500623, at *3. However, at this preliminary stage of the case, Plaintiff has met his burden of a " modest factual showing." See Scott v. Bimbo Bakeries, Inc., No. 10-3154, 2012 WL 645905, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 29, 2012); see also Resch, 2012 WL 2500623, at *3. Accordingly, this Court will conditionally certify a collective action consisting of all of the individuals who were employed by Defendant who worked more than forty hours during any workweek since September 13, 2010.
We address the issue of the appropriateness of this opt-in date in the section that follows.
B. Form of Notice and Opt-In Consent
Once a court conditionally certifies a collective action, it possesses the discretion to provide court-facilitated notice. Hoffmann-La Roche, 493 U.S. at 170. Such notice: (1) ensures that the employees receive " accurate and timely notice concerning the pendency of the collective action, so that they can make informed decisions about whether to participate," and (2) " serves the legitimate goal of avoiding a multiplicity of duplicative suits and setting cut off dates to expedite the disposition of the action." Id. at 172. District courts have wide discretion in the implementation of notice to proposed plaintiffs. See Engers v. AT& T, No. 98-3660, 2007 WL 1557163, at *1 (D.N.J. May 24, 2007) (citing Hoffmann-La Roche, 493 U.S. at 169) (" Decisions as to whether to facilitate notice to potential plaintiffs, and how to facilitate it, are matters entrusted to the district court's discretion." ).
Plaintiff has submitted a proposed " Notice of Opportunity to Join a Lawsuit to Recover Back Overtime Wages" (" Notice" ) and a consent form, and requested that this Notice be posted within all of Defendants' work sites in the same areas in which it is required to post FLSA notices. See 29 C.F.R. § 516.4 (requiring posting of FLSA requirements " in conspicuous places in every establishment where such employees are employed so as to permit then to observe easily a copy." ). Plaintiff asserts that this " Notice informs class members in neutral language of the nature of the action, of their right to participate in it by filing a consent to sue form with the Court, and the consequences of joining or not joining the action." (Pl.'s Mot. at 12.)
Defendants have made no objections to the form of this Notice other than arguing that, if this Court did grant Plaintiff's Motion, the Notice would have to be modified to go back three years from the date of this decision. Defendants assert that Plaintiff's " attempt to include class members dating back to 2010 is incorrect as such claims are barred by the statute of limitations." (Defs.' Resp. at 8.) The FLSA requires that actions be filed within two years of a violation, or three years if plaintiffs allege a willful violation of the statute. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). In the case of a collective action: " For a named plaintiff, the action commences on the date the complaint is filed. 29 U.S.C. § 256(a). For an opt-in plaintiff, however, the action commences only upon the filing of a written consent." Symczyk, 656 F.3d at 200 (citing § 256(b). Defendants argue that " if this Court were to grant Plaintiff's Motion on the date of [their] Response, February 9, 2015, that means that any potential claim of any putative Plaintiff that stopped working for Defendants before February 9, 2013 would be time-barred - or in the case of a willful violation: February 9, 2012." (Defs.' Resp. at 8.)
Plaintiff does not address this issue in his Motion or in his Reply Brief. In addition, Plaintiff does not request that this Court apply the doctrine of equitable tolling. The equitable tolling doctrine is applicable to every federal statute of limitation, including the FLSA. See Miller v. Beneficial Mgmt. Corp., 977 F.2d 834, 845 (3d Cir. 1992). The doctrine " can rescue a claim otherwise barred as untimely by a statute of limitations when a plaintiff has been prevented from filing in a timely manner due to sufficiently inequitable circumstances." Santos ex rel. Beato v. United States, 559 F.3d 189, 197 (3d Cir. 2009) The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (" Third Circuit" ) has identified " three principal situations in which equitable tolling is appropriate." Podobnik v. U.S. Postal Serv., 409 F.3d 584, 591 (3d Cir. 2005). Those situations are: (1) " where the defendant has actively misled the plaintiff respecting the plaintiff's cause of action, and that deception causes non-compliance with an applicable limitations provision" ; (2) " where the plaintiff in some extraordinary way has been prevented from asserting his rights" ; or (3) " where the plaintiff has timely asserted his or her rights mistakenly in the wrong forum." Id. The Third Circuit, however, has yet to address the issue of whether equitable tolling is appropriate where a defendant fails to disclose the names of potential collective action members. See Adami v. Cardo Windows, Inc., 299 F.R.D. 68, 82-83 (D.N.J. 2014).
We note that the Court in Adami ruled that " Defendants' failure to provide potential plaintiffs' names and contact information prior to conditional certification [did] not itself justify tolling the statute of limitations period." 299 F.R.D. at 82-83. However, we further note that Third Circuit case law also provides for equitable tolling of the statute of limitations when it " is demanded by sound legal principles as well as the interests of justice." Jones v. Morton, 195 F.3d 153, 159 (3d Cir. 1999).
Here, as discussed earlier, Defendants have been less than forthcoming during the past year with regard to Plaintiff's discovery requests as to the names and contact information of potential Plaintiffs, which has necessitated this Court's intervention, including the issuing of sanctions. Because of Defendants' conduct during this discovery period, we will, at this time, defer a ruling on the issue of whether equitable tolling is appropriate in this case. Such action would allow inclusion in the conditional class potential Plaintiffs who worked for Defendants dating back to September 13, 2010. We, thus, approve the Notice as to this date, but defer a ruling on the size and scope of any class until discovery is complete and the issue of final certification is before the Court. At that time, we will also entertain argument from the parties on the applicability of the doctrine of equitable tolling if the statute of limitation remains an issue regarding any Plaintiff who opts into the class.
This Notice is attached to this Memorandum Opinion.
III. CONCLUSION
We find that Plaintiff has met the " lenient" first step of conditional certification by making a " modest factual showing" that there are similarly situated persons who may desire to opt into this litigation. See Smith, 2003 WL 22701017, at *3. We also approve the Notice proposed by Plaintiff. Furthermore, we defer a ruling on the issue of the statute of limitations and equitable tolling until a further period of discovery has been completed as to identify potential Plaintiffs and final certification of the class.
An appropriate Order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 18th day of March, 2015, after consideration of Plaintiff, Zachary Harrison's (" Plaintiff" ), " Motion to Certify Class" (Doc. No. 31), Defendants, DelGuerico's Wrecking & Salvage, Inc. and Tony DelGuerico's (collectively, " Defendants" ), Memorandum of Law in Opposition, and Plaintiff's Reply thereto, it is hereby ORDERED that the Motion is GRANTED. It is further ORDERED that:
1. The conditionally certified class is defined as: all current and former non-exempt employees (including those improperly categorized as independent contractors) employed by Defendants after September 13, 2010, who worked overtime hours, but were not paid overtime wages of at least one and one half times the applicable regular wage rate for each hour worked beyond forty (40) hours in a given work week at any time during their employment;
2. Defendants shall be under a continuing duty to provide Plaintiff with information relating to Defendants' employees and contractors who provided any service to Defendants after September 13, 2010, including each individual's name, job title, last known address, telephone number, email address (if available), dates of employment, and date of birth;
3. Plaintiff's proposed " Notice of Collective Action and Opportunity to Join a Lawsuit" (" Notice" ) is approved. Within seven (7) days after the entry of this Order, Plaintiff's counsel shall mail to all current and former employees and contractors of Defendants who provided service to Defendants after September 13, 2010, copies of the attached Notice and Opt-In Consent Form and a postage-paid return envelope bearing Plaintiff's counsel's address (collectively, the " Notice Package" ). The Notice Packages shall be mailed in envelopes bearing Plaintiff's counsel's return address. Plaintiff's counsel shall pay all postage and printing costs associated with the preparation and mailing of the Notice Packages. If any Notice Package is returned as undeliverable, Plaintiff's counsel shall make all reasonable efforts to update the address information and re-send the Notice Package;
4. This Notice shall be posted within all of Defendants' work sites in the same areas in which they are required to post Fair Labor Standards Act (" FLSA" ) notices;
5. In order to participate in this action as an opt-in party under FLSA § 216(b), a class member must complete his/her Opt-In Consent Form and return it in an envelope postmarked on or before the deadline indicated in the Notice Package, which shall be set at ninety-seven (97) days after the entry of this Order;
6. Within one hundred and four (104) days of the entry of this Order, Plaintiff's counsel shall file with the Court all completed and timely Opt-In Consent Forms, and, prior to filing, the parties shall confer in good faith to amicably resolve any disputes concerning the completeness or timeliness of any Opt-In Consent Forms; and
7. The parties shall, within one hundred and eleven (111) days of the entry of this Order, jointly submit to the Court a proposed schedule for the completion of this litigation.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ZACHARY D. HARRISON, on behalf of himself and all those similarly situated vs. DelGuerico's WRECKING & SALVAGE, INC. and TONY DELGUERICO, Individually
No. 13-05353
NOTICE OF OPPORTUNITY TO JOIN A LAWSUIT TO RECOVER BACK OVERTIME WAGES
To: All current and former non-exempt employees (including those improperly categorized as independent contractors) employed by DelGuerico's Wrecking & Salvage, Inc. at any time after September 13, 2010 who worked overtime hours but were not paid overtime wages of at least one and one half times the applicable regular wage rate for each hour worked beyond forty (40) hours in a given work week.
Re: Collective action lawsuit against DelGuerico's Wrecking & Salvage, Inc. and Tony DelGuerico, Individually, under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act.
The purpose of this Notice is to inform you of the existence of a collective action lawsuit in which you may be " similarly situated" to the named Plaintiff, Zachary D. Harrison (" Harrison" ), to advise you of how your rights may be affected by this lawsuit, and to instruct you on the procedure for participating in this lawsuit.
1. WHAT THE LAWSUIT IS ABOUT :
Harrison filed this lawsuit against DelGuerico's Wrecking & Salvage, Inc. (" DelGuerico's" ) on September 13, 2013. Harrison is a former employee of DelGuerico's and was not paid overtime wages during the term of his employment. Harrison filed the lawsuit individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated persons. He claims that DelGuerico's violated his rights under the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act (" FLSA" ). Harrison claims that at all times after 2010, DelGuerico's did not pay non-exempt employees overtime wages even though they worked overtime hours and DelGuerico's misclassified employees as independent contractors and failed to pay overtime as a result of such classification. The lawsuit seeks back overtime pay plus liquidated damages equal to the amount of the back pay owed. The lawsuit also asks that DelGuerico's be required to pay Plaintiffs' costs and attorneys' fees. DelGuerico's denies Harrison's allegations, and denies that they are liable for any back pay or liquidated damages.
2. WHO CAN PARTICIPATE IN THE LAWSUIT
You can join the case if you worked for DelGuerico's after September 13, 2010 as a non-exempt employee such as a driver, helper, yard worker or other staff and worked overtime but were not paid for it. You can join the case if you are still employed by DelGuerico's.
3. HOW TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS LAWSUIT
If you wish to join this case, you may do so by completing the attached " Consent to Become Party Plaintiff form and mailing it in the enclosed pre-paid envelope or sending it to the Plaintiffs' counsel by fax to 215-230-7796 or by e-mail to calff@ammlaw.com. The form must be sent to the Plaintiff' counsel by [date 90 days from mailing]. You must return the Consent to Become Party Plaintiff by that date to participate in this lawsuit. It is entirely your own decision whether or not to join this lawsuit. This notice does not mean that you have a valid claim or that you are entitled to any monetary recovery. Any such determination must still be made by the Court.
4. EFFECT OF JOINING THIS CASE
If you choose to join in this case you will become a plaintiff class member and you will be bound by any judgment, whether it is favorable or unfavorable.
If you sign and return the Consent to Become a Party Plaintiff form attached to this Notice and are joined in the case, you are agreeing to designate Plaintiff as your agent to make decisions on your behalf concerning the litigation, the method and manner of conducting this litigation, the entering of an agreement with Plaintiffs attorneys concerning attorneys' fees and costs, and all other matters pertaining to this lawsuit. These decisions made and entered into by the representative Plaintiffs will be binding on you if you join this lawsuit.
The attorneys for the plaintiffs are being paid on a contingency fee basis as set forth in the " Consent to Become Party Plaintiff form which is attached. Under the terms of the contingency agreement, you are not responsible for paying attorneys' fees or costs unless Plaintiffs recover on their claims. If you sign and return the Consent to Become Party Plaintiff form, you are entering into an agreement with Plaintiffs counsel concerning attorneys' fees and costs, and all other matters pertaining to this lawsuit. However, the Court retains jurisdiction to determine the reasonableness of any contingency agreement entered into by Plaintiffs with their attorneys, and to determine the adequacy of Plaintiff s counsel.
You also have the right to join this lawsuit and be represented by counsel of your own choosing who will represent only you and will be compensated on the terms as agreed between you and your attorney. You may also proceed pro se, that is on your own and without an attorney. If you choose to do either, you or your attorney must file an " opt-in" consent form by [date 90 days from mailing].
5. TO STAY OUT OF THE LAWSUIT
If you do not wish to be part of the lawsuit, you do not need to do anything. If you do not join the lawsuit, you will not be part of the case in any way and you will not be bound by or affected by the result (whether favorable or unfavorable). Your decision not to join this case will not affect your right to bring a similar case on your own at a future time. If you intend to bring your own action, you should be aware that the statute of limitations is running on your claims, which means you may be losing claims each week that you wait to bring them.
6. NO RETALIATION PERMITTED
Federal law prohibits DelGuerico's or anyone from discharging or in any other manner discriminating against you because you " opt-in" to this case, or have in any other way exercised your rights under the FLSA.
7. YOUR LEGAL REPRESENTATION IF YOU JOIN
If you choose to join this lawsuit and agree to be represented through Plaintiffs attorney, your counsel in this action will be:
Antheil Maslow & MacMinn, LLP
131 W. State Street Doylestown, PA
18901 215-230-7500 - Telephone
215-230-7796 - Fax
calff@ammlaw.com
8. FURTHER INFORMATION
The Complaint and DelGuerico's Answer filed in this lawsuit are available for inspection at the office of the Clerk of the Court. In addition, you may obtain a copy by contacting Plaintiffs counsel who will forward a copy to you.
Further information about this Notice, the deadline for filing a Consent to Become Party Plaintiff, or answers to questions concerning this lawsuit may be obtained by writing, telephoning, or e-mailing the Plaintiffs counsel at the telephone number and addresses stated above.
Antheil Maslow & MacMinn, LLP
131 W. State Street
Doylestown, PA 18901
215-230-7500 Telephone
215-230-7796-Fax
THIS NOTICE AND ITS CONTENTS HAVE BEEN AUTHORIZED BY THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT, HONORABLE ROBERT F. KELLY, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE OF THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA. THE COURT HAS TAKEN NO POSITION IN THIS CASE REGARDING THE MERITS OF PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS OR OF THE DEFENSES OF DELGUERICO'S. PLEASE DO NOT CONTACT THE COURT, THE COURT'S CLERK, OR THE JUDGE. THEY ARE NOT PERMITTED TO ADDRESS YOUR INQUIRIES OR QUESTIONS .
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ZACHARY D. HARRISON, on behalf of himself and all those similarly situated vs. DelGuerico's WRECKING & SALVAGE, INC. and TONY DELGUERICO, Individually
No. 13-05353
CONSENT TO BECOME PARTY PLAINTIFF AND SUE UNDER THE FLSA
I hereby consent to be a plaintiff in an action under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., to secure unpaid overtime pay, liquidated damages, attorneys' fees, costs and other relief arising out of my employment with DelGuerico's Wrecking & Salvage, Inc. and any other associated parties.
I authorize Antheil Maslow & MacMinn, LLP, and any associated attorneys as well as any successors or assigns, to represent me with my claims by joining my claims to an existing lawsuit against Defendants and any other associated parties in which they represent plaintiffs. By signing and returning this consent to sue, I understand that, if accepted for representation, I will be represented by the above attorneys without prepayment of costs or attorneys' fees. I understand that if Plaintiffs are successful, costs expended by attorneys on my behalf will be deducted from my settlement or judgment amount on a pro rata basis with all other plaintiffs. I understand that the attorneys may petition the court for an award of fees and costs to be paid by defendants on my behalf. I understand that the fees retained by the attorneys will be either the amount received from the defendant or 1/3 of my gross settlement or judgment amount, whichever is greater.
Dated: Email:
Signature: Address:
Name: Phone:
To be considered for representation, send the completed form to Antheil Maslow & MacMinn, LLP, 131 W. State Street, Doylestown, PA 18901, or send it by fax to (215) 230-7796, or e-mail it to calff@ammlaw.com. This Consent to Sue is not valid and effective until you have received a receipt from Plaintiffs' Counsel indicating that it has been filed. If you have not received a receipt within 3 weeks from your transmission of the form to us, you must contact us by phone at (215) 230-7500.