Opinion
June 28, 1993
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Floyd, J.).
Ordered that the order is reversed, without costs or disbursements, and the motions are denied.
While it is true that motions for leave to amend pleadings are to be liberally granted in the absence of prejudice or surprise (see, McCaskey, Davies Assocs. v. New York City Health Hosps. Corp., 59 N.Y.2d 755, 757; CPLR 3025 [b]), it is equally true that the court should examine the sufficiency of the merits of the proposed amendment when considering such motions (see, Sharapata v. Town of Islip, 82 A.D.2d 350, 362, affd 56 N.Y.2d 332). Where, as here, the proposed amendments are totally devoid of merit and are legally insufficient, leave to amend should be denied (see, Matter of Consolidated Edison Co. [Neptune Assocs.], 143 A.D.2d 1012; Fiesel v. Nanuet Props. Corp., 125 A.D.2d 292).
It has been stated that "punitive damages are available for the purpose of vindicating a public right only where the actions of the alleged tortfeasor constitute gross recklessness or intentional, wanton or malicious conduct aimed at the public generally or are activated by evil or reprehensible motives" (Gravitt v. Newman, 114 A.D.2d 1000, 1002; see also, Sweeney v McCormick, 159 A.D.2d 832). "In the case of a tort action, the defendant's conduct must be so flagrant as to transcend mere carelessness" (Frenya v. Champlain Val. Physicians' Hosp. Med. Ctr., 133 A.D.2d 1000, 1000-1001). The allegations contained in the plaintiffs' amended complaints amount to nothing more than mere negligence and do not rise to the level of moral culpability necessary to support a claim for punitive damages (see, Taylor v Dyer, 190 A.D.2d 902; Karen S. v. Streitferdt, 172 A.D.2d 440; Sweeney v. McCormick, supra). Thompson, J.P., Bracken, Balletta and Eiber, JJ., concur.