Opinion
Docket No: 003999-2010
04-23-2013
RE: Manuel Ysique Et al. v. Borough of Paramus
Lawrence Diener, Esq. David Bole, Esq. Winne, Dooley and Bole, PC
Judge
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE TAX COURT
COMMITTEE ON OPINIONS
Lawrence Diener, Esq. David Bole, Esq.
Winne, Dooley and Bole, PC
Dear Counsel:
This letter constitutes the court's opinion after trial in the above-referenced matter challenging the assessment on plaintiff's property for tax year 2010. For the reasons explained more fully below the assessment is affirmed.
Plaintiff Manuel Ysique is the owner of a single-family colonial house in defendant Borough of Paramus. The property is designated on the official tax map of the Borough as block 6015, lot 10, and is known as 45 Diaz Place (subject property). For the year 2010 the subject property was assessed as follows:
+-------------------------+ ¦Land ¦$¦266,200 ¦ +-------------+-+---------¦ ¦Improvements ¦$¦752,300 ¦ +-------------+-+---------¦ ¦Total ¦$¦1,018,500¦ +-------------------------+
Plaintiff timely and directly filed an appeal to the Tax Court challenging the assessment on the subject property and the Borough filed a counterclaim. The Borough Chapter 123 ratio for tax year 2010 is 86.81.
Three witnesses appeared at trial, including an expert appraisal witness with respect to value of the subject property presented by each party, without objection, and plaintiff Manuel Ysique, the owner. The court admitted into evidence without objection an appraisal report from each expert. Each of the experts utilized the market approach to establish the value of the subject property and relied on comparable sales of homes in Paramus located through the Multiple Listing Service (MLS) and tax records. The following findings of fact are based on the testimony of the trial witnesses and from the evidence accepted into the record.
Plaintiff's residence was originally built in the mid-1950s as a one and one-half story Cape Cod. Situated in an established suburban and residential neighborhood with mixed Cape Cod and ranch style homes the subject property is located near State Route 17 and the Garden State Parkway but sufficiently separated to enjoy a suburban atmosphere. In April 2008, the property underwent construction to expand the dwelling out the back of the house and add a full second level, additional basement, and a cathedral ceiling, increasing the living space by approximately 2,500 square feet. The Cape Cod was not demolished. Instead, the original foundation was built upon to accommodate the additional gross living area (GLA). The home is in good condition. The quality of construction is average with the exterior being made predominately of stucco and vinyl siding with stone finishes.
The parties agreed that the size of the subject nearly tripled due to the renovation. The property was converted into a two-story colonial style home with a total of eight rooms including four bedrooms, a kitchen, dining room, living room and family room/den, with three full bathrooms, a fireplace and central air conditioning. Interior photographs depict the kitchen with high end amenities including an island with granite countertop and decorative cabinetry finishes. The floors are hardwood and tile and the heating is hot water baseboard with two bathrooms having radiant heat from beneath the tiled floor. The home has an unfinished basement. It also contains a one-car detached garage with storage area, a portico/car port, and an open porch and patio at the back of the home. There are bay windows on the first and second floor out the rear of the home as well as a covered stone or masonry porch which roof serves as a second floor deck/balcony overlooking the back yard.
Both the plaintiff home owner and his expert testified that the home contains four bedrooms. Defendant's expert described the subject as a three bedroom home but relied on four bedroom homes as comparable properties and did not adjust for a difference in the number of bedrooms between the subject and the comparable properties. The court finds that the subject improvement contains four bedrooms.
The house contains a master bathroom, however, at the time of trial plaintiff had not installed a sink, tub, toilet or shower so plaintiff's expert reported two full bathrooms with the master bathroom unusable. Plaintiff's expert admitted that the bathroom was a material part of the master bedroom area and fully expected the bathroom to be made functional. The subject property record included as a part of plaintiff's expert report lists three bathrooms, one five, one four and one three fixture bathroom. In the opinion of defendant's expert the house contains three full bathrooms since the master bathroom was 80% completed upon his inspection of the house in May 2010, after the valuation date. The court finds that the home contains three full bathrooms.
Photographs of the exterior depict a paver walkway and driveway, stone-wrapped front columns, stone work around the front and back of the home extending several feet up from the foundation, and professional landscaping. The roof is made of asphalt shingle. According to plaintiff's expert, homes in the subject's neighborhood sold in the range of $320,000 to $1,300,000 in 2008. In the photographs the improvement appears to be a newly constructed home.
Plaintiff's case
Plaintiff's expert testified that she attempted to locate homes that were not only similar to the subject property but that also had additions to their original foundations. Comparable sale one, 809 Carter Lane, sold for $730,000 on June 25, 2009, three months before the October 1, 2009 valuation date. The colonial style house located approximately a mile from the subject was constructed in 1954 with an addition finished in 1998, ten years prior to the subject's construction. The expert opined that both comparable one and the subject property have an effective age of ten years.
Comparable one contains 3,292 square feet of GLA, a two-car attached garage, and a part-finished basement. Additionally, the home has nine rooms, including four bedrooms, three bathrooms, a patio and a deck. Plaintiff's expert described the quality of both the subject and the comparable home as good and the quality of the construction as average. The expert made the following downward adjustments: $14,600 for market conditions based on a 6% per year (or .05% per month) decline in market, $10,000 for room count; $15,400 for GLA; $7,500 for comparable one's two-car garage as compared with the subject's one-car detached garage; and, $2,500 for comparable one's patio and deck which the subject has only an open porch and no patio. The expert adjusted upward $7,500 for the subject's fireplace which comparable one has none. As adjusted, the sale price of plaintiff's comparable is $718,300. Gross adjustments totaled 9.4%.
Plaintiff's exert was cross-examined as to the reason why she excluded a patio in the description of the subject. The defense attorney directed plaintiff's expert to examine photographs depicting an area at the rear of the subject property constructed with pavers and located adjacent to the open porch. Plaintiff's expert opined that the area was too small to qualify as a patio.
Plaintiff's expert's comparable sale two, 84 Lilac Lane, sold on February 3, 2009 for $770,000 and is located 3.27 miles southeast from the subject. The colonial style home was newly constructed in 1996 or 1998, not built on an older foundation and is in good condition. The expert opined that comparable two has an effective age of five years. The home contains 3,204 square feet of GLA and nine rooms, including four bedrooms, two full bathrooms, one half-bath, a fireplace, a full-unfinished basement, a two-car garage, and a deck. Plaintiff's expert described the quality of both the subject and the comparable home as good, and the quality of the construction as average. The topography of comparable sale two is sloped and differs from the subject which is flat. Comparable two has a higher acreage than the subject. The comparable property backs up to Forest Avenue, a county road with two-lanes in each direction which plaintiff's expert compared to a "freeway" which causes it to sustain noticeable traffic noise. A fence on the property closes the rear of the home from Forest Avenue.
In the plaintiff's expert report the age of the home is listed as twelve years, however the expert testified that the home was built in 1998. The court finds that the home was built at least ten years before the construction of the subject, the actual year of construction does not affect the decision of the court.
Plaintiff's expert made the following downward adjustments: $30,800 for market conditions based on a 6% per year decline in the market; $5,000 to account for greater acreage; $5,000 for comparable two's extra room; $7,500 for the comparable two's two-car garage; and $2,500 for a fence that the subject does not have. An upward adjustment of $19,800 was made for the difference in GLA. As adjusted, the sale price of comparable two is $739,000, with a gross adjustment of 9.5%.
Plaintiff's comparable three, 211 Bona Lane, sold on August 28, 2009 for $825,000 after being only fifteen days on the market. The colonial-style home is located less than a mile west from the subject and was newly built in 1993. The expert opined that comparable three has an effective age of five years. The home contains 3,272 square feet of GLA, nine rooms, including four bedrooms, two full and one-half bathrooms, a full finished basement, a fireplace, a two-car garage and an open porch. The quality of construction of comparable three is described as average. It has the same acreage as the subject. The expert made the following downward adjustments: $8,250 for market conditions based on a 6% per year decline in the market; $5,000 adjustment for comparable three's extra room; $10,000 for a full finished basement which the subject has not; and, $7,500 for an additional car space in comparable three's two-car garage. An upward $16,400 adjustment was made for GLA. As adjusted, the sale price of comparable three is $810,650, with a gross adjustment of 5.7%.
Plaintiff's expert concluded that the value of the subject property was $755,000 as of October 1, 2009.
Defendant's case
Defendant's comparable one, 275 Henry Street, sold for $1,160,000 on April 3, 2009, six months before the October 1, 2009 valuation date. It is a colonial style house in good condition, located three and one-half miles from the subject on the east side of State Route 17 and the Garden State Parkway and near to those highways, as opposed to the subject property which lies further west of those roads. Constructed in 2007 it contains 3,660 square feet of GLA, with eight rooms, including four bedrooms, three full bathrooms and one half-bath, a three-car garage, a full-unfinished basement, a porch and a fireplace.
Defendant's expert made no adjustments for market conditions or location. He made downward adjustments of $10,000 for the extra half-bathroom; $5,000 for GLA; and, $40,000 for comparable one's two-car garage as compared with the subject's one-car detached garage. He adjusted upward $10,000 for the subject's patio which the comparable does not have. As adjusted, the sale price of comparable one is $1,115,000, with gross adjustments of 5.5%.
At trial the expert corrected his description of the comparable. The expert had listed a three-car garage rather than a two-car garage. The dollar figure of the adjustment contained in the report should correctly be downward $20,000 rather than downward $40,000. Defendant's expert's adjusted sale price of comparable one listed in the report as $1,115,000 should be $1,135,000 due to the miscalculation.
Comparable two, 210 Van Buren Drive, sold for $1,155,000 on August 13, 2009, two months before the October 1, 2009 valuation date. Also a colonial style house in good condition, it is located approximately two and one-half miles south of the subject and separated from State Route 17, the Garden State Highway and any major traffic area in Paramus. Constructed in 2003 the home has 3,626 square feet of GLA, a two-car garage, a full-finished basement, and a fireplace. There are nine rooms, including four bedrooms, three full bathrooms, and one half-bath.
Defendant's expert made no adjustments for market conditions or location. He made the following downward adjustments: $10,000 for the extra half-bathroom; $20,000 for the comparable's two-car garage as compared with the subject's one-car detached garage; and, $20,000 for the full finished basement. He adjusted upward $20,000 for the subject's patio and porch. As adjusted, the sale price of comparable two is $1,125,000, with gross adjustments of 6.2%
Comparable sale three, 145 Forest Avenue, sold for $1,355,000 on August 25, 2009, a month prior to the October 1, 2009 valuation date. It is a colonial style house in good condition located on the other side of State Route 17 and the Garden State Parkway approximately four miles from the subject. Constructed in 2005, it contains 4,952 square feet of GLA, nine rooms, including four bedrooms, three full bathrooms, a two-car attached garage, a full unfinished basement, a porch, a patio, a pool, and three fireplaces. While conceding that the comparable is larger than the subject, the expert testified that he selected the sale to serve as a comparable because both properties were built with similar building materials.
Defendant's expert made no adjustments for market conditions or location. He made the following downward adjustments: $101,000 for GLA; $11,000 for lot size; $80,000 for the comparable's fireplaces and pool; and $20,000 for comparable three's two-car garage as compared with the subject's one-car detached garage. As adjusted, the sale price of comparable three is $1,143,000, with total gross adjustments of 18.5%. Defendant's expert places the most weight on comparable sales one and two as being the most similar to the subject in order to arrive to an opinion of value of $1,140,000 for the subject as of October 1, 2009.
Experts' review of opposing comparables
Defendant's expert criticized the plaintiff's expert's comparable properties for the following reasons: they were all of lesser quality than the subject; none of the sales should have been adjusted for time since in his opinion the market had dropped but then remained level. Plaintiff's expert defended the time adjustment and opined that the market was continuing to decline as of October 1, 2009. Regarding plaintiff's comparable two, defendant's expert believed that the low sales price resulted because the rear of the yard of the home is a steep slope, and because the roadway at the back of the property generates loud traffic. As to comparable three, defendant's expert disputed the length of time this comparable was exposed to the market, arguing that fifteen days on the market is not enough time for an "arms length" transaction.
In reviewing the defendant's expert's comparables, plaintiff's expert opined as follows: all of the comparables utilized by defendant's expert were located at least three miles from the subject, in neighborhoods dissimilar to the subject. Comparable one is a completely new construction with a brand new foundation. As to comparable two, the home is located in a new development built in the 2000s on a street containing all new homes, unlike the subject located in the vicinity of ranches and Cape Cod-style homes. Comparable three is also a new construction with a new foundation unlike the subject, and is almost 40% larger than the subject property.
Testimony of plaintiff
Plaintiff Manuel Ysique was called as a rebuttal witness. As owner of the subject he has lived there for fifteen years. He testified that he did not build a new house, rather, he removed the roof but retained the foundation, front and side exterior walls on the first floor and the basement joists present in the original house. Plaintiff first testified that he only added to the back of the house, but then acknowledged that the subject house is a different style home than before the renovation. It is now a two-story colonial home with a cathedral ceiling rather than a one-story Cape Cod home. As to the master bathroom plaintiff testified that he did not purchase fixtures due to the expense, and because it has no fixtures it is not a useable bathroom, he therefore disagreed that the bathroom is 80% completed. Plaintiff also disagreed with the description of the amenities on the property record card to the extent that it listed a Jacuzzi.
At the conclusion of the trial defendant moved to dismiss plaintiff's case for failure to overcome the presumption of validity that attaches to the assessment. R. 4:40-1.
III. Conclusions of Law
The court's analysis begins with the well-established principle that "[o]riginal assessments and judgments of county boards of taxation are entitled to a presumption of validity." MSGW Real Estate Fund, LLC v. Borough of Mountain Lakes, 18 N.J. Tax 364, 373 (Tax 1998). As Judge Kuskin explained, our Supreme Court has defined the parameters of the presumption as follows:
The presumption attaches to the quantum of the tax assessment. Based on this presumption the appealing taxpayer has the burden of proving that the assessment is erroneous. The presumption in favor of the taxing authority can be rebutted only by cogent evidence, a proposition that has long been settled. The strength of the presumption is exemplified by the nature of the evidence that is required to overcome it. That evidence must be "definite, positive and certain in quality and quantity to overcome the presumption."
[Ibid. (quoting Pantasote Co. v. City of Passaic, 100 N.J. 408, 413 (1985) (citations omitted)).]
The presumption of correctness arises from the view "that in tax matters it is to be presumed that governmental authority has been exercised correctly and in accordance with law." Pantasote, supra, 100 N.J. at 413 (citing Powder Mill, I Assocs. v. Township of Hamilton, 3 N.J. Tax 439 (Tax 1981)); see also Byram Township v. Western World. Inc., 111 N.J. 222 (1988). The presumption remains "in place even if the municipality utilized a flawed valuation methodology, so long as the quantum of the assessment is not so far removed from the true value of the property or the method of assessment itself is so patently defective as to justify removal of the presumption of validity." Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. Township of Bernards, 111 N.J. 507, 517 (1988) (citation omitted).
"In the absence of a R. 4:37-2(b) motion . . . the presumption of validity remains in the case through the close of all proofs." MSGW Real Estate Fund, LLC, supra, 18 N.J. Tax at 377 (citations omitted). In making the determination of whether the presumption has been overcome, the court should weigh and analyze the evidence "as if a motion for judgment at the close of all the evidence had been made pursuant to R. 4:40-1 (whether or not the defendant or plaintiff actually so moves), employing the evidentiary standard applicable to such a motion." Ibid. The Court must accept as true the proofs of the party challenging the assessment and accord that party all legitimate favorable inferences from that evidence. Id. at 376 (citing Brill v. Guardian life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 535 (1995)). In order to overcome the presumption, the evidence "must be sufficient to determine the value of the property under appeal, thereby establishing the existence of a debatable question as to the correctness of the assessment." West Colonial Enters., LLC v. City of East Orange, 20 N.J. Tax 576, 579 (Tax 2003) aff'd, 21 N.J. Tax 590 (2004) (citations omitted). Only after the presumption is overcome with sufficient evidence at the close of trial must the court "appraise the testimony, make a determination of true value and fix the assessment." Rodwood Gardens, Inc. v. City of Summit, 188 N.J. Super. 34, 38-39 (App. Div. 1982) (citations omitted). If the Court determines that sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption has not been produced, the assessment shall be affirmed and the Court need not proceed to making an independent determination of value. Ford Motor Co. v. Township of Edison, 127 N.J. 290, 312 (1992); Global Terminal & Container Serv. v. City of Jersey City, 15 N.J. Tax 698, 703-704 (App. Div. 1996).
Plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption of validity attached to the assessment. If the court accepts as credible all of plaintiff's evidence and adopts his argument that his home had a true market value of $755,000 on October 1, 2009, plaintiff has raised a debatable question as to whether the assessment on the subject property accurately reflects its true market value on October 1, 2009 since the 2010 assessment reflects an equalized value of $1,173,251 ($1,018,500 x .8681 = $1,173,251). That evidence is sufficient to overcome the presumption of validity.
This determination alone does not end the court's inquiry. Having determined that plaintiff has overcome the presumption, the court must "turn to a consideration of the evidence adduced on behalf of both parties and conclude the matter based on a fair preponderance of the evidence." Ford Motor Co., supra, 127 N.J. at 312 (citations omitted). Our Supreme Court has held that "although there may have been evidence to overcome the presumption of correctness at the close of plaintiff's case-in chief, the burden of proof remain[s] on the taxpayer throughout the entire case...to demonstrate that the judgment under review was incorrect." MSGW Real Estate Fund, supra, 18 N.J. Tax at 374 (citations omitted). Accordingly, the court now "must weigh and evaluate all the evidence and determine whether either party has established, by a preponderance of the evidence that the true value of the subject property as of the applicable assessment dates was such as to warrant adjustments in the assessments." Id.
The sales comparison approach is an appropriate method of estimating value for a residence. Brown v. Borough of Glen Rock, 19 N.J.Tax 366, 377 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 168 N.J. 291 (2001). The value is derived by comparing similar properties that have recently sold, identifying appropriate units of comparison, and making adjustments to the sales price of the comparable properties based on relevant, market-derived elements of comparison. Appraisal Institute, The Appraisal of Real Estate, 301-02 (13th ed. 2008). It is indisputable that to perform a proper sales comparison approach, there must be substantial similarity between the subject property and the comparable property. Venino v. Borough of Carlstadt, 1 N.J. Tax 172, 175 (Tax 1980), aff'd, 4 N.J. Tax 258 (App. Div. 1981).
In order to prove value, plaintiff's expert compared the subject to three homes constructed or renovated over ten years prior to the subject. Defendant's expert compared the subject to new homes closer in age to the subject construction. According to the uncontroverted testimony the subject property interior and the exterior were replaced in 2009; only partial supports remain of the old structure. Together with those facts, the credible testimony of the witnesses, the improvement sketch and unit descriptions set forth in the property record card contained in plaintiff's expert report, and the photographs of the property and its improvements, the court finds that plaintiff replaced the old home with a new one. Market reaction to the subject two-story colonial home and amenities would be consistent with that of a newly constructed residence based on its appearance and amenities. The property and improvement include such high end finishes as under floor radiant heat, granite, multiple bathrooms, multi-fixture baths, cathedral ceiling, modern professional landscaping, exterior stone finishes, two-story stone wrapped columns and other design elements, including a side portico or car port, paver driveway and paver walk-ways. While the subject colonial home was not newly constructed from the ground up, the court finds nothing to indicate that marketing efforts or market reaction would recognize the subject property as anything other than a new home. ("The actions of market participants are prompted by their expectations about the uses of a property and the benefits that property will offer its users.") Appraisal Institute, The Appraisal of Real Estate, 49 (13th ed. 2008). The court finds as well that the market would value the improvement as it would a new home regardless of the existence of an older foundation and supports based on the style of the home, the amenities and its finishes.
Counsel for plaintiff asked plaintiff's expert to comment on statements contained in the property record card in the "Building Permits/Remarks" section which read "2/14/08 Could Be New House" and in the section labeled "Notes" which read "New House". Counsel for defendant objected to the testimony and the court sustained the objection. That testimony is not considered by the court.
Notably, appraisal techniques for the calculation of depreciation recognize certain physical building components as "short-lived" ie., HVA components, roof covering, interior decorating, floor covering, and structural building components as "long-lived" i.e., foundation, framing, underground piping. See Appraisal Institute, The Appraisal of Real Estate, 414 (13th ed. 2008). Any suggestion that the existence of dated structural supports in the subject improvement would have a measurable effect on its market value is unsupported by the record.
The court finds that plaintiff's expert's overall conclusion of value is unsupported because the sales on which she relied lack sufficient evidence of similarity to the subject. All of the comparable sales were of homes constructed or renovated from ten to seventeen years before the subject. While an "effective age" was assigned to the comparable homes and to the subject as a means of comparison, the record is void of any testimony regarding how the expert arrived at her conclusion. She assigned the same effective age of ten years to both comparable one and to the subject property however the latter underwent extensive construction in 2008/2009 while the comparable was improved in 1998, ten years prior. There was no proof offered as to the nature and extent of the comparable property's 1998 addition to explain whether the existing rooms and amenities were added as part of the renovation or were original to the home.
"Effective age" is a depreciation concept commonly employed in the cost approach method of property valuation to establish a rate to reflect all of the forms of depreciation that affect property. "In the cost approach, a property is valued based on a comparison with the cost to build a new or substitute property. The cost estimate is adjusted for the depreciation evident in the existing property." Appraisal Institute, The Appraisal of Real Estate, 377 (13th ed. 2008). "The three principal methods for estimating depreciation are, [t]he market extraction method[,] [t]he economic age-life method[,] [and] [t]he breakdown method[.] . . . In estimating the total depreciation of an improvement, the age-life concepts most important to market extraction are actual age, total depreciation, annual rate of depreciation, and the implied total economic life that can be estimated. In the economic age-life method, the concepts most important are total economic life, effective age, and remaining economic life." Id. at 411.
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As to comparable numbers two and three, built twelve and seventeen years before the subject, the expert assigned an effective age of five. On cross-examination the expert explained that the seventeen year old home appeared to be "a five year old home after allowing for depreciation," but the conclusion was otherwise unsupported. From the photographs, the exterior design and finishes of comparable properties one and three appear outdated, and no evidence of the condition of the interior amenities is contained in the record to permit comparison with the subject. The record lacks a basis for the expert's conclusion that the market would view the comparable sales as being similar in value to the newly constructed subject.
The court also finds that the location of comparable sales one and two were dissimilar to the subject, however, there was no adjustment to the sales price to reflect the difference. Comparable one is in close proximity to State Route 17 and the Garden State Parkway, in a site between the highways, and near a strip mall. The subject property is located east of State Route 17 and is sufficiently separated to enjoy the perks of a suburban atmosphere. As to sale two, the property's topography is distinct from the subject and results in a steep slope at the rear, which both experts agree backs up to a busy freeway-like roadway that generates noisy traffic. Those conditions would reduce the demand for the property in the real estate market as compared with the location of the subject property. The plaintiff's expert offered no explanation why no adjustment was made for location for comparable sales one and two. In light of these facts, the court finds that plaintiff's expert did not give sufficient consideration to the qualitative differences in the locations of the comparables in relation to the subject property, which is in a superior neighborhood. See e.g., J.C. Penny Co. v. Lawrence Township, 8 N.J. Tax. 473, 491 (Tax 1986), aff'd 9 N.J. Tax 635 (App. Div. 1987), certif. denied, 108 N.J. 664 (1987) ("There is no dispute that location does influence value."). As such, the court finds that the comparable properties relied on by plaintiff's expert do not provide reliable proof as to the value of the subject.
The comparable property sales offered by defendant's expert, sales of new homes built in 2003 and after, are more similar to the subject and provide more reliable indicators of the subject's value than those offered by plaintiff. The court also finds that the adjustments made by defendant's expert are reasonable and reliable, and places the most weight on comparable sales one and two. Comparable one was sold six months before the valuation date and is the most similar to the subject being close in age and nearly identical in size and amenities. Almost equal weight is given by the court to comparable two. Sold only six weeks prior to the valuation date it is the same size as the subject with very similar amenities, but is a few years older. Both comparable properties are slightly superior to the subject since they are brick houses unlike the subject and they are located over three miles from the subject property in more desirable areas. The least weight is attributed to comparable number three since the home is the least similar and is substantially larger than the subject. Additionally, comparable three was exposed to the market only for fifteen days prior to its sale an indication that the sales price may not reflect market value. See Coastal Eagle Point Oil Co. v. West Deptford Township, 13 N.J. Tax 242, 301 (Tax 1993). See also The Appraisal of Real Estate, supra, at 23 (defining "market value" as "the most probable price, as of a specified date, . . . for which the specified property rights should sell after reasonable exposure in a competitive market under all conditions requisite to a fair sale, with the buyer and seller each acting prudently, knowledgeable, and for self-interest, and assuming that neither is under undue duress.")
The defendant's experts' adjusted sales price for comparable one is $1,135,000, and the adjusted price for comparable sale two is $1,125,000. After careful consideration, the court finds that the value of the subject is $1,045,000. The ratio of assessment to value equals 97.46 ($1,018,500 / $1,045,000 = .9746) which falls within the common level range. The Clerk of the Tax Court is directed to enter judgment affirming the assessment.
Very truly yours,
Christine M. Nugent, J.T.C