Opinion
Civil Action No. 99-2010, Section: "C"(4).
July 6, 2000.
ORDER AND REASONS
Benjamin L. DeMoux, a second year law student at Tulane Law School, assisted in the research and preparation of this decision.
This matter is before the Court on a "Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings" filed by defendants Kevin Armstrong, John Fitzpatrick, Charles D. Ott, Jr. and James Neal (collectively, "the troopers"). Plaintiffs, Marilyn Youngblood, wife of/and Bobby Youngblood, individually and on behalf of their minor son, Bobby Youngblood, II, have brought federal and state law claims against various defendants arising from an altercation between state troopers and Bobby Youngblood, II, during a traffic stop. Fitzpatrick and Ott were two of the three state troopers at the scene. Armstrong was then Captain of Troop L, the troop to which Fitzpatrick and Ott belonged. Neal is implicated in the pleadings as possibly being the officer responsible for an allegedly retaliatory traffic stop of one of the plaintiffs, some days after the altercation. Plaintiffs base jurisdiction on 28 U.S.C. § 1983, 1985(3), 1986, and 1988 and on the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Six, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Jurisdiction for state law claims is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The troopers seek dismissal of all state-law claims.
Having considered the record, the applicable law and the briefs of the parties, the Court denies the motion for judgment on the pleadings.
Analysis
1. Standard of Review Pennhurst
In reviewing a motion under Rule 12(c), the Court must base its decision solely on the pleadings. The issues in this case appear to be purely legal and are governed primarily by the Supreme Court decision in Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 104 S.Ct. 900 (1984). In Pennhurst, the Supreme Court abolished the dual standard of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence governing citizen, state-law claims brought against state entities in federal court. The Court held that federal courts may impose neither prospective nor retroactive remedies on any sovereign state based on that state's own laws. In determining whether a claim against a state official constitutes an improper invasion of a state's sovereign immunity, a court must consider whether "the judgment sought would expend itself on the public treasury or domain, or interfere with the public administration, or if the effect of the judgment would be to restrain the Government from acting, or to compel it to act." Id. at 103 n. 11, 104 S. Ct. at 909 n. 11 (citations and internal quotation mars omitted.) It is important to note that the protections of the Eleventh Amendment apply to the state itself, and not, as the troopers improperly aver, to state officials per se. See id. at 102-103, 104 S. Ct. at 908-909.
2. The Role of Hughes v. Savell Reyes v. Sazan
In support of their efforts to dismiss the state-law claims against them, the troopers point to Hughes v. Savell, 902 F.2d 376 (5th Cir. 1990). In that case the plaintiff was a prisoner in state custody and the relevant defendant was a prison guard employed by the State of Louisiana. At trial a verdict was entered for the plaintiff and damages awarded. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that this award implicated the State of Louisiana's protected interests because, by State common law, the guard could only be sued in his official capacity. See, id. at 379. Because the State would have been required to satisfy the judgment, it was the real party in interest. Id. at 378.
The plaintiffs, on the other hand, rely on Reyes v. Sazan, 168 F.3d 158 (5th Cir. 1999), a case with a fact pattern much closer to the case at bar. In Reyes, plaintiffs sought compensation for injuries suffered incident to a traffic stop that they alleged was racially motivated. The court held that the troopers involved could be sued in their individual capacities and that doing so did not necessarily violate of the Eleventh Amendment, the Pennhurst decision and the Hughes decision. See Reyes, at 162-163. Specifically, the Reyes court pointed out a provision of Louisiana law, La.Rev.Stat. § 13:5108.2(5), which provides that the state will indemnify employees only where the damages "did not result from the intentional wrongful act or gross negligence of the official, officer, or employee." The court found that this provision created a question of fact, specifically whether the defendant would be indemnified. See: Reyes at 163. Without indemnity, no protected state interest is implicated. The troopers contend that the holding in Reyes is not binding because, alternatively, it either (1) postdates Hughes, (2) is dicta and/or (3) conflicts with recent case law on indemnity and the Eleventh Amendment. The Court finds all of these arguments unconvincing.
A. The Postdating Argument
The troopers point out correctly that one channel of the circuit may not overrule another, See: Ryals v. Estelle, 661 F.2d 904, 906 (5th Cir. 1981) and they contend that Reyes is an attempt to overrule Hughes. Specifically, the troopers assert that Hughes immunizes state officials "acting in the course and scope of their employment," Hughes at 378, from all state law damage claims under the Eleventh Amendment; a holding that Reyes contradicts. The Court disagrees with the troopers understanding of that case and of the purpose of immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.
The Supreme Court's decision in Pennhurst provides only that "an unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another state." Pennhurst at 100, 104 S.Ct. at 908 (Internal quotation marks and citations omitted). If the relief sought against the officer would in fact operate against the state, then the state is a real party to the suit and immunity attaches, See: id. at 101, 104 S.Ct. at 908. However, the Eleventh Amendment does not confer any substantive immunity on state officials as such. It applies only in so far as the rights of the sovereign are implicated. Any language in Hughes that suggests otherwise is properly viewed as applicable only to those officials who, like the defendant in Hughes, may not legally be subjected to individual liability for damages they cause while performing their official duties.
B. The Dicta Argument
The troopers also argue that Reyes is inapplicable in the instant case. They argue that the court's comments on Eleventh Amendment immunity, as regards lawsuits against state officials in their personal capacity, were dicta because they were unnecessary for the decision. The troopers note that the Reyes defendants "requested only that the claims be dismissed insofar as they are sued in their official capacities." Id. at 162 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court disagrees with the troopers analysis of the Reyes court's holding.
The court in Reyes elected to read the reference to "official capacities" broadly enough to include claims that named the plaintiffs personally, but for which the state would indemnify them. See: id. Hence, the court had to reach the issue of whether or not the plaintiffs were indemnified in the particular case. Because Louisiana law only indemnifies employees whose acts are not intentional or grossly negligent, See, La.Rev.Stat. § 13:5108.2(5), the Reyes court held that question of whether the defendants qualified for indemnity was one of fact and remanded the case for consideration of that question. Had the court found that there was no material issue of fact on this last issue, it could and would have dismissed the state-law claims. Thus, the court's Eleventh Amendment analysis, far from being dicta, was central to the ultimate decision.
C. Relevance of the Indemnity Statute
Finally, the troopers argue that the application of a civil rights indemnity statute like Louisiana's was barred by the Supreme Court decision in Regents of California v. Doe, 117 5. Ct. 900 (1997). In that case the court rejected the attempt by a plaintiff to defeat a state entity's Eleventh Amendment immunity by arguing that it could indemnify itself against any monetary damages and so would not suffer from an adverse judgment. The Court rejected this argument, holding that the possibility of indemnity did not strip a state entity of its immunity. See: id. at 904-905. The troopers attempt to find in this case a prohibition on any consideration of the existence of an indemnitor when making determinations about a defendant's entitlement to Eleventh Amendment immunity. This Court finds that Regents is clearly distinguishable from the case at bar.
In Regents, the Court was concerned with preserving a sovereign state's immunity from risk of adverse judgment. The case at bar is concerned with whether or not a sovereign state will choose to extend this immunity to a number of its employees. Regardless of what a trial court ultimately finds on the state law claims, the State's immunity will be preserved. If the court finds that a defendant acted intentionally or with gross negligence, the State will not be held liable for damages. If the court finds that a defendant did not act intentionally or with gross negligence, then the court must dismiss the claims without awarding damages. The State of Louisiana could have chosen to indemnify all of its officials without regard to their culpability and, in so doing, immunize them against state law claims of the type found in this case. Instead, her governing bodies elected to enact § 12:5108.2 and open the door to claims of this type. As a sovereign state, Louisiana has the right to exert or wave her Eleventh Amendment immunity in any way she chooses. This Court will respect that choice.
4. Conclusion
This court finds that the troopers are not entitled to judgment on the pleadings on the state law claims against them at this time.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED, that the troopers' motion for judgment on the pleadings is DENIED.