Summary
relying on Kettering and finding no "clear indication" under the separation agreement that the obligor spouse's estate was obligated to continue making the monthly maintenance payments
Summary of this case from Williams v. WilliamsOpinion
Sept. 29, 1970.
Editorial Note:
This case has been marked 'not for publication' by the court.
Sheldon, Nordmark & Bayer, Charles W. Sheldon, Jr., Denver, for plaintiff in error.
Yagge, Hall & Evans, Edward H. Widmann, Denver, for defendant in error.
DUFFORD, Judge.
This case was originally filed in the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado and was subsequently transferred to the Court of Appeals under the authority vested in the Supreme Court.
The plaintiff in error was a claimant against the estate of her divorced husband. The claim made by her was for annuity payments in the amount of $350 per month to be paid out of his estate until the death of the claimant or until her remarriage. The probate court denied the claim, and we affirm.
Claimant was divorced from the defendant in September 1964. In December of that year the divorce court entered its order for the division of property and the payment of alimony. Under that order the divorce court awarded 'alimony' of $405 per month until sale of the family residence and $350 per month thereafter, which amount was designated in the order as 'permanent alimony.' By its order the divorce court also awarded claimant-wife the ownership of two life insurance policies covering the life of the defendant. In making the alimony award the divorce court expressly stated that the award was predicated on the general income the decedent was then earning.
Following the entry of the divorce court order, the claimant and the defendant entered into a stipulation dated August 13, 1965. It was recited in this stipulation that the parties desired to terminate certain disputes relative to their property rights and alimony. Under the terms of the stipulation, the decedent agreed to pay to the claimant the sum of $350 per month 'alimony,' which amount is was specified would be the final and permanent amount to be paid to the claimant until her death or remarriage. The stipulation also contined a general covenant of release, under the terms of which claimant released all 'right or other claims * * * except for the alimony' specified in the stipulation. There was no provision in the stipulation by which the claimant reserved any rights against the estate of the decedent, nor was there any provision by which the terms of the stipulation were made binding upon the heirs or personal representatives of the decedent. The terms of the stipulation were reduced to order by the divorce court, and under the terms of its order the monthly payment to be made to the claimant was again specified to be alimony, which was to be payable until the death or remarriage of the claimant wife.
In this appeal claimant argues that the orders of the divorce court and the stipulation which was executed between her and the decedent created in her a right to receive monthly payments in the amount of $350 until her death, and that, is denying her claim against the decedent's estate, the probate court, in effect, abrogated or modified a valid property settlement agreement between her and the decedent.
In our opinion the probate court's denial of the claim was proper. It is settled law in this jurisdiction that, in the absence of a clear agreement or court order to the contrary, a husband's obligation for the payment of alimony to the wife for her maintenance and support is terminated upon the husband's death. International Trust Co. v. Liebhardt, 111 Colo. 208, 139 P.2d 264. Our examination of the court orders and of the stipulation between the parties fails to disclose any clear indication that the decedent's estate was obligated thereby to render payments to the wife after his death. The award of life insurance to her, the absence of any statement that his personal representatives and estate would be bound beyond his death by the terms of the stipulation agreement, and the general release given by the claimant all dictate to the contrary. Such being the case, the decision in In Re Estate of Kettering v. First National Bank of Denver, 151 Col. 202, 376 P.2d 983, is largely dispositive of the issues raised here by claimant, and in our opinion the instant case is not distinguishable from Kettering. Therefore, the rule announced and the result reached in that case controls.
Judgment is affirmed.
SILVERSTEIN, C.J., and COYTE, J., concur.