Opinion
Civil Action No. 20-660
05-08-2020
ANDREY YOUNG, Petitioner, v. JOHN R. WALTON, Warden; WESTMORELAND COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE; and WESTMORELAND COUNTY PRISON, Respondents.
District Judge Marilyn J. Horan/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. RECOMMENDATION
It is recommended that, pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (the "Petition"), ECF No. 3, be dismissed before service as it plainly appears that Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief.
II. REPORT
A. Factual Background.
Andrey Young ("Petitioner"), is a pre-trial detainee currently housed at the Westmoreland County Prison. He is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis.
In the Petition, Petitioner raises the following Ground for Relief:
GROUND ONE: Constitutional violation rule 600 speedy trial. Cruel and unusual punishment.Id. at 6. In response to a question directing him to state the supporting facts for his claim, Petitioner wrote:
From 9-15-19 to 3-16-20 183 days. March 17 2020 Rule 600 was suspended til April 14 2020. Every day after April 14 2020 counts toward this 183 day of the rule 600 violation. I am well passed the 180 allowed for speedy trial.
Id.
B. DISCUSSION
1. Rule 4
The Petition has not been served yet but pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 cases, this Court may dismiss the Petition if it plainly appears on its face that the Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief. Upon review, the Court concludes that it plainly appears from the face of the Petition and items of which the Court can take judicial notice, that Petitioner's claims do not entitle him to relief under Section 2241.
"Courts have used Rule 4 of the habeas corpus rules to summarily dismiss facially insufficient habeas petitions brought under § 2241. Howard v. Haley, 2001 WL 303534, *1 (S.D. Ala. March 8, 2001); Howard v. Certain Unnamed Aircraft Pilots, 1995 WL 431150, *2 (N.D. Ill. July 18, 1995). Because the petition is facially insufficient, it will be dismissed." Perez v. Hemingway, 157 F.Supp.2d 790, 795 (E.D. Mich. 2001). Accord United States v. Recinos-Gallegos, 151 F.Supp.2d 659 (D. Md. 2001) (dismissing petition construed as Section 2241 pursuant to Rule 4). See also Castillo v. Pratt, 162 F.Supp.2d 575, 577 (N.D. Tex. 2001) ("The Supreme Court intended the 2254 Rules to apply to petitions filed under § 2241. See Rule 1(b) of the 2254 Rules"); Ukawabutu v. Morton, 997 F. Supp. 605, 608 n.2 (D.N.J. 1998)("I refer to these rules [i.e., Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases] as the "Habeas Corpus Rules" because they apply to petitions filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 as well as 28 U.S.C. § 2254."); Wyant v. Edwards, 952 F. Supp. 348, 352 (S.D. W.Va. 1997)("the Court has concluded that the § 2254 Rules were intended to apply to § 2241 cases. . .").
Rule 4 provides in relevant part that:
If it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge must dismiss the petition and direct the clerk to notify the petitioner.In interpreting Rule 4, the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 4 observe that:
28 U.S.C. § 2243 requires that the writ shall be awarded, or an order to show cause issued, "unless it appears from the application that the applicant or person detained is not entitled thereto." Such consideration may properly encompass any exhibits
attached to the petition, including, but not limited to, transcripts, sentencing records, and copies of state court opinions. The judge may order any of these items for his consideration if they are not yet included with the petition.
In addition to ordering state court records and/or opinions, a federal habeas court may, under Rule 4, take judicial notice of those state court records and/or state court opinions as well as its own court records. See, e.g., Barber v. Cockrell, 4:01-CV-0930, 2002 WL 63079, at *1 n.4 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2002)(in a Rule 4 case, the court took judicial notice of its own records of a prior habeas petition filed by the petitioner); United States ex. rel. Martin v. Gramley, No. 98 C 1984, 1998 WL 312014, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 3, 1998)(in a Rule 4 summary dismissal, the court took "judicial notice of the opinion of the Illinois Appellate Court in this case."); Barber v. Cockrell, No. 4:01-CV-930, 2002 WL 63079, at * 1 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2002)(in a Rule 4 case, the court stated that from "the face of the petition, and from [state] court records of which this Court can take judicial notice, the court determines that this is a successive petition. . . .").
2. Law Governing Section 2241
"For state prisoners, federal habeas corpus is substantially a post-conviction remedy[.]" Moore v. DeYoung, 515 F.2d 437, 448 (3d Cir. 1975) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1967)). A state prisoner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus is properly brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 when he is in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court. See Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 484-86 (3d Cir. 2001). When an individual is in state custody for reasons other than a judgment of a state court, such as in pretrial detention, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is properly brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Moore, 515 F.2d at 441-43; 1-5 R. Hertz & J. Liebman FEDERAL HABEAS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5.3 n.6 (Nov. 2011) (collecting cases). Section 2241 authorizes a federal court to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a pretrial detainee who "is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." § 2241(c)(3).
3. A violation of Pa. R. Crim. P. 600 fails to merit federal habeas relief.
While the Court has jurisdiction under § 2241 to entertain Petitioner's pretrial habeas corpus petition, it is clear that he is not entitled to habeas relief for a violation of Rule 600, upon which Petitioner seemingly bases his Petition.
Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 600 provides a state law rule for, inter alia, the timing of the commencement of trial for individuals who are incarcerated pre-trial. Petitioner alleges a violation of Rule 600 and seeks relief in this federal habeas proceeding for such an alleged violation. However, violations of state law do not give rise to federal habeas relief.
Rule 600 provides in pertinent part as follows:
(B) Pretrial Incarceration. Except in cases in which the defendant is not entitled to release on bail as provided by law, no defendant shall be held in pretrial incarceration in excess of
(1) 180 days from the date on which the complaint is filed; or
(2) 180 days from the date on which the order is filed transferring a court case from the juvenile court to the trial or criminal division; or
(3) 180 days from the date on which the order is filed terminating a defendant's participation in the ARD program pursuant to Rule 318; or
(4) 120 days from the date on which the order of the trial court is filed granting a new trial when no appeal has been perfected; or
(5) 120 days from the date of the written notice from the appellate court to the parties that the record was remanded.
(C) Computation of Time
(1) For purposes of paragraph (A), periods of delay at any stage of the proceedings caused by the Commonwealth when the Commonwealth has failed to exercise due diligence shall be included in the computation of the time within which trial must commence. Any other periods of delay shall be excluded from the computation.
(2) For purposes of paragraph (B), only periods of delay caused by the defendant shall be excluded from the computation of the length of time of any pretrial incarceration. Any other periods of delay shall be included in the computation.
(3)(a) When a judge or issuing authority grants or denies a continuance:
(i) the issuing authority shall record the identity of the party requesting the continuance and the reasons for granting or denying the continuance; and (ii) the judge shall record the identity of the party requesting the continuance and the reasons for granting or denying the continuance. The judge also shall record to which party the period of delay caused by the continuance shall be attributed, and whether the time will be included in or excluded from the computation of the time within which trial must commence in accordance with this rule.
(b) The determination of the judge or issuing authority is subject to review as provided in paragraph (D)(3).Pa. R. Crim. P. 600.
(D) Remedies
(1) When a defendant has not been brought to trial within the time periods set forth in paragraph (A), at any time before trial, the defendant's attorney, or the defendant if unrepresented, may file a written motion requesting that the charges be dismissed with prejudice on the ground that this rule has been violated. A copy of the motion shall be served on the attorney for the Commonwealth concurrently with filing. The judge shall conduct a hearing on the motion.
(2) Except in cases in which the defendant is not entitled to release on bail as provided by law, when a defendant is held in pretrial incarceration beyond the time set forth in paragraph (B), at any time before trial, the defendant's attorney, or the defendant if unrepresented, may file a written motion requesting that the defendant be released immediately on nominal bail subject to any nonmonetary conditions of bail imposed by the court as permitted by law. A copy of the motion shall be served on the attorney for the Commonwealth concurrently with filing. The judge shall conduct a hearing on the motion.
Habeas relief in federal Courts is only available for violations of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Violations of state law, including evidentiary rulings and violations of state rules of criminal procedure, cannot be the basis for granting habeas relief. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (reemphasizing that "it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions...a federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."). What the District Court stated in Garner v. Philadelphia Prison System, is equally applicable here:
First, Mr. Garner may not seek § 2241 habeas relief on the basis of Pa. R. Crim. P. 600 since this claim does not set forth a violation of Mr. Garner's federal constitutional rights. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3)(stating that a petitioner seeking relief pursuant to § 2241 must show that "[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States."); Blackwell v. Larkins, No. CIV.A.97-1999, 1998 WL 401752, *5 (E.D. Pa. July 6, 1998)("The contention that the petitioner has been denied a speedy trial under Pa. R. Crim. P. 1100 [since renumbered Rule 600] does not state a claim under the United States Constitution because Rule 1100 is not coextensive with the constitution right to a speedy trial."); Kim v. Klem, No. CIV.A.03-1628, 2003 WL 22204549, *5 (July 31, 2003)("Initially, it is noted that to the extent petitioner alleges a violation of Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 1100 (since renumbered Rule 600)...the Court may not address the merits of his claim because it is not cognizable in a habeas petition."). Accordingly, this claim is not cognizable under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and I will dismiss this claim with prejudice.Garner v. Philadelphia Prison System, CV 15-4879, 2016 WL 3854545, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Pa. July 14, 2016).
Accordingly, even assuming that Rule 600 was violated, such a violation would not merit the grant of federal habeas relief.
4. There is no federal violation of Petitioner's speedy trial rights.
In Ground One, Petitioner does refer in a conclusory fashion to a "constitutional right" and "speedy trial." To the extent that Petitioner is asserting some violation of the United States Constitutional provision for speedy trial rights, it is clear on the face of the Petition that he is not entitled to any relief as he fails to establish a violation of his Sixth Amendment to a speedy trial.
The seminal case regarding Constitutional requirements for a speedy trial was Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), which set out the governing standard for determining whether an accused's right to a speedy trial has been violated and announced a four factor test: 1) the length of delay; 2) who is responsible for the delay; 3) whether the accused asserted his right to a speedy trial in the state tribunals and 4) whether the delay caused prejudice. Id. at 530. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has explained:
The threshold question under Barker is whether the length of delay was sufficient to trigger analysis of the remaining factors. This involves "a double enquiry." Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992). "In other words, a court first decides whether the delay is long enough that it should trigger analysis of the other Barker factors.... If it is, the length of the delay is also separately weighed in the court's analysis of the remaining factors." Velazquez, 749 F.3d at 174 (citations omitted). The length of delay is measured "from the date of arrest or indictment, whichever is earlier, until the start of trial." United States v. Battis, 589 F.3d 673, 678 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Hakeem, 990 F.2d at 760).U.S. v. Claxton, 766 F.3d 280, 294 (3d Cir. 2014)
In this case, we find that Petitioner has not established even presumptively prejudicial delay so as to require further analysis of the four Barker v. Wingo prongs.
Petitioner alleges at most a delay of 183 days as calculated from September 15, 2019 to March 16, 2020. Adding all the days from March 17, 2020 to the date of writing this Report and Recommendation, i.e., May 7, 2020, inclusive, i.e., 52 days, yields a total "delay" of 235 days. This is simply insufficient as a matter of law. U.S. v. Wilson, 216 F. Supp. 3d 566, 576 (E.D. Pa. 2016) ("If the delay is short enough—less than approximately one year—then the court can rely on that factor alone and need not consider the other factors. See Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651-52, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992). Once the delay passes that threshold, analysis of the other factors is triggered, with the length of the delay 'also separately weighed in the court's analysis of the remaining factors.' Velazquez, 749 F.3d at 174.").
Accordingly, because Petitioner has established a "delay" of, at most, 235 days, nearly 130 days short of a year, Petitioner has not established any Sixth Amendment speedy trial violation. West v. Howell, 46 F.3d 67 (5th Cir. 1995) ("Although the delay in this case was approximately 13 months, we agree with the district court that the delay is not presumptively prejudicial"). Cf. U.S. v. Claxton, 766 F.3d 280, 294 (3d Cir. 2014) ("In the present case, both parties concede that review of the remaining factors is necessary because the period of time between Claxton's indictment and trial sufficiently exceeds the fourteen-month threshold recognized in Hakeem."). See also Amos v. Thornton, 646 F.3d 199, 206 (5th Cir. 2011) ("The delay between arrest or indictment and trial crosses the line from "ordinary" to "presumptively prejudicial" somewhere around the one-year mark.").
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, it is respectfully recommended that the instant Section 2241 Petition be dismissed pre-service.
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Local Rule 72.D.2, the parties are permitted to file written objections in accordance with the schedule established in the docket entry reflecting the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Objections are to be submitted to the Clerk of Court, United States District Court, 700 Grant Street, Room 3110, Pittsburgh, PA 15219. Failure to timely file objections will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011). Any party opposing objections may file their response to the objections within fourteen (14) days thereafter in accordance with Local Civil Rule 72.D.2.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Maureen P . Kelly
MAUREEN P. KELLY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE Date: May 8, 2020 cc: The Honorable Marilyn J. Horan
United States District Judge
ANDREY YOUNG
3424-2019
Westmoreland County Prison
3000 South Grande Blvd.
Greensburg, PA 15601-9176