Opinion
1:23-CV-160-SPB-RAL
07-18-2024
CORDELL YOUNG and DAVON JONES, Plaintiffs v. SERGEANT WALTERS and SERGEANT HEIDER, Defendants
Report and Recommendation on Defendant's Partial Motion to Dismiss
ECF No. 24
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
RICHARD A. LANZILLO CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that the partial motion to dismiss filed by Defendants Sergeant Walters and Sergeant Heider [ECF No. 24] be granted and that Sergeant Heider be dismissed from this action.
This matter has been referred to the undersigned for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
II. Report
A. Background
For purposes of this motion, the following factual allegations are accepted as true. On June 5, 2021, Young and Jones were in their shared cell at SCI-Albion while Corrections Officer Woods, a non-defendant, was conducting a head count. ECF No. 13 ¶¶ 5-7. Young, a practicing Muslim, was engaged in his morning prayer at the time. Id. ¶ 5. Shortly after Woods took count, Defendant Walters approached the cell door and yelled, “standing count,” before opening the cell door and ordering Young to stop praying. Id. ¶ 8. Walters then asked Jones, who was standing nearby, for his name and identification card. Id. ¶¶ 9-10. When Jones turned to retrieve his card, Walters sprayed both Young and Jones with olean capsicum (“O.C.” or “pepper”) spray. Id. ¶ 11. Walters later falsified a misconduct report against Young and Jones to justify his improper use of O.C. spray. Id. ¶P 12-13.
Several months later, on January 11, 2022, Defendant Heider stopped Young on his way to the shower and told him that it was not his shower time. Id. ¶ 14. After learning from other inmates that it was, in fact, shower time, Heider told Young: “Go ahead. I don't want you to ‘snitch' on me like you ‘snitched' on Sergeant Walters.” Id. Heider then mocked Young's religious beliefs by stating “As Salami and Bacon,” an apparent reference to the common Islamic salutation “As-Salaam-Alaikum.” Id.
Based on the foregoing, Young and Jones contend that Walters violated their Eighth Amendment right to be free from the use of excessive force by entering their cell and maliciously deploying O.C. spray without justification. Id. ¶ 10. Young also asserts First Amendment claims for unlawful retaliation and interference with the free exercise of his religion against Heider based on his statements that Young “snitched” on Walters and his use of the phrase “As Salami and Bacon” to mock Young's religion. Id. ¶¶ 12-13.
Presently pending is Defendants' partial motion to dismiss. ECF No. 24. In their motion, Defendants seek dismissal of both First Amendment claims against Defendant Heider and all claims against Defendants in their official capacities. Id. Notably, although Defendants did not challenge the sufficiency of the pleadings with respect to the excessive force claim against Walters, Plaintiffs focus entirely on that issue in their response brief, arguing only that Walters' use of O.C. spray amounted to excessive force. ECF No. 32. Despite Plaintiffs' failure to respond to either argument raised in Defendants' motion to dismiss, this matter is ripe for review.
B. Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). In deciding a motion to dismiss, the court is not opining on whether the plaintiff will be likely to prevail on the merits; rather, the plaintiff must only present factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d ed. 2004)). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)). A complaint should only be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12 (b)(6) if it fails to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (rejecting the traditional 12 (b)(6) standard established in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). In making this determination, the court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint and views them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. U.S. Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002).
While a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive a motion to dismiss, it must provide more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Moreover, a court need not accept inferences drawn by a plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts as set forth in the complaint. See California Pub. Employee Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the Court accept legal conclusions disguised as factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Papasan, 478 U.S. at 286). See also McTernan v. City of York, Pennsylvania, 577 F.3d 521, 531 (3d Cir. 2009) (“The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”).
Expounding on the Twombly/Iqbal line of cases, the Third Circuit has articulated the following three-step approach:
First, the court must ‘tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.' Second, the court should identify allegations that, ‘because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.' Finally, ‘where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.'Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010)). This determination is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Finally, because Plaintiffs are proceeding pro se, the allegations of their complaint must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). If the court can reasonably read a pro se litigant's complaint to state a valid claim upon which relief can be granted, it must do so despite the litigant's failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Bierley, 141 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969) (petition prepared by a prisoner may be inartfully drawn and should be read “with a measure of tolerance”).
C. Analysis
1. Official capacity claims
Defendants first contend that any claims against them in their official capacities must be dismissed pursuant to the immunity afforded to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania by the Eleventh Amendment. It is axiomatic that “the Eleventh Amendment proscribes actions in the federal courts against states, their agencies, and state officials acting within their official capacities.” See, e.g., O'Donnell v. Pennsylvania Dept, of Corrections, 790 F.Supp.2d 289, 305 (M.D. Pa. 2011) (citing Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996)). As a department of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the DOC is immune from suit in federal court unless said immunity has been abrogated by Congress or waived by the state. MCI Telecomm Corp. v. Bell-Atlantic-Pennsylvania, 271 F.3d 491, 503 (3d Cir. 2001). See also Lavia v. Pennsylvania, Dept, of Corrections, 224 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that, as an agency of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the DOC is entitled to assert the immunities afforded by the Eleventh Amendment). Moreover, “[b]ecause the Pennsylvania DOC is a part of the executive department of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, its employees share in the Commonwealth's Eleventh Amendment immunity to the extent that they were sued in their official capacities.” Johnson v. Wenerowicz, 440 Fed.Appx. 60, 62 (3d Cir. 2011).
It is well-settled that “Pennsylvania has not waived its immunity from suit in federal court.” Toth v. California Univ, of Pennsylvania, 844 F.Supp.2d 611, 648 (W.D. Pa. 2012) (citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8521(b)). Nor did Congress intend by the general language of Section 1983 to override the traditional sovereign immunity afforded to the states. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342-45 (1979); see also Toth, 844 F.Supp.2d at 648. Consequently, the Defendants -each of whom is an employee of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania - are entitled to immunity from any monetary claims against them in their official capacities. Defendants' motion to dismiss on this basis will be granted
2. Retaliation
To state a claim of retaliation in violation of the First Amendment, a plaintiff must allege facts to support that: (1) his conduct was constitutionally protected; (2) he suffered an adverse action at the hands of prison officials; and (3) his constitutionally protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the decision to take the adverse action. Watson v. Rozum, 834 F.3d 417, 422 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333-34 (3d Cir. 2001)). An “adverse action” is one that would “deter a person of ordinary firmness” from exercising his First Amendment rights. Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Suppan v. Dadonna, 203 F.3d 228, 235 (3d Cir. 2000)). Retaliatory motive can be inferred from either: (1) an unusually suggestive temporal proximity between the protected activity and the alleged retaliatory action; or (2) a pattern of antagonism coupled with timing that suggests a causal link. Id. (citing Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 267 (3d Cir. 2007)).
Here, Young's retaliation claim is based on his allegation that Heider accused him of “snitching” on Walters by filing a grievance. Heider's accusation occurred in January 2022, almost seven months after Young engaged in protected conduct. The lapse of time between those two incidents is far too great to support an inference of retaliatory motive. See Thomas v. Town of Hammonton, 351 F.3d 108, 114 (3d Cir. 2003) (concluding that a span of six months between protected activity and adverse action is not unduly suggestive and does not sufficiently establish any causal link); Fischer v. Transue, 2008 WL 3981521, *10 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 2008) (temporal proximity of three weeks insufficient to establish causation); Mar v. City of McKeesport, 2007 WL 2769718, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 20, 2007) (three months); Killen v. N W. Human Servs., Inc., 2007 WL 2684541, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 7, 2007) (seventeen days).
Nor has Young alleged facts to support the existence of “other evidence” of retaliatory animus. See Watson, 834 F.3d at 424 (where temporal proximity is not so close as to be unduly suggestive, the appropriate test is “timing plus other evidence”) (quoting Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 281 (3d Cir. 2000)). Although he alleges that Heider criticized him for filing a grievance against Walters, courts have consistently rejected retaliation claims against one defendant based on protected activity directed at other individuals for lack of retaliatory motive. Victor v. Lawler, 2010 WL 5014555, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2010), aff'd, 565 Fed.Appx. 126 (3d Cir. 2014). As noted in several decisions, “there is no apparent reason why [the moving defendants] would want to retaliate against Plaintiff for filing a lawsuit against others.” Williams v. Nyberg, 2023 WL 4628378, at *9 (W.D. Pa. May 10, 2023) (quoting Evans v. Rozum, 2009 WL 5064490, at *22 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 17, 2009)). See also Royster v. Beard, 308 Fed.Appx. 576, 579 (3d Cir. 2009) (affirming summary judgment in favor of defendant on plaintiffs claim that he was retaliated against by a defendant who was not the target of his protected activity); Horan v. Collins, 2016 WL 5030468, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 2016) (drawing no inference of causation where plaintiff's protected activity was not directed at any defendant). Young's attempt to infer retaliatory animus on the part of Heider based on protected activity directed at another individual is similarly flawed.
Finally, Young has failed to demonstrate that Heider's comment amounted to an adverse action. As this Court has previously acknowledged, “[a]n inmate may experience an adverse action when a prison official calls him a snitch for complaining about other inmates.” Jackson v. O'Brien, 2021 WL 3174687, at *5 (W.D. Pa. July 27, 2021) (emphasis added). Being labeled a snitch “can be a dangerous designation in prison” because it may expose the inmate to a “substantial risk of harm” from other inmates. Id. at *4. However, the same is not true when a guard labels an inmate a snitch for complaining about other prison officials. This type of complaint “presents a different situation” because, “[w]hile prisoners may be motivated to harm a fellow inmate who is or could be informing on them, that motivation for preserving inmate anonymity and solidarity does not exist when the inmate is accused of ‘snitching' to prison officials about a corrections officer or other prison official.” Id. Indeed, “[p]risoners may even favor an inmate who actively points out prison officials' alleged misconduct.” Id. at *5.
Young's allegation in the instant case falls squarely into the latter category. Any objective listener overhearing Heider's accusation would have understood that Young had been accused of snitching against another corrections officer, Walters, rather than a fellow inmate. Because “[a]n inmate of ordinary firmness does not experience an adverse action when a prison official calls him a snitch for officially or unofficially complaining about other prison officials,” dismissal is appropriate. Id. (citing Watson, 834 F.3d at 422).
3. Free exercise of religion
The First Amendment provides, inter alia, that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof...” U.S. Const, amend. 1. An allegation that an inmate's free exercise of religion has been impermissibly burdened by a prison policy or regulation is ordinarily evaluated pursuant to the four-part test elucidated by the United States Supreme Court in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). Here, however, Young is not challenging any specific prison policy or practice. Instead, he contends that Heider individually and personally infringed upon his free exercise rights by using the phrase “As Salami and Bacon” to mock his Muslim faith. To prevail, he must demonstrate that Heider's comment “knowingly or intentionally interfered with his free exercise of his religion.” Mikell v. Folino, 722 Fed.Appx. 304, 309 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 219 (4thCir. 2006)).
Turner requires a court to consider: (1) whether the regulation or practice bears a “valid, rational connection” to a legitimate and neutral governmental objective; (2) whether prisoners have alternative ways of exercising the circumscribed right; (3) whether accommodating the right would have a deleterious impact on other inmates; and (4) whether alternatives exist that fully accommodate the prisoner's rights at de minimus cost to valid penological interests. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-91.
Young's allegations fall well short of this standard. Federal courts have consistently held that verbal “threats or harassment towards inmates did not substantially burden religion.” Mack v. Yost, 63 F.4th 211, 234 (3d Cir. 2023) (collecting cases); Brown v. Dept, of Corr., 2007 WL 4322980, at *15 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 2007) (concluding that an officer's “alleged mere verbal threat” that he would put inmate in administrative custody if he persisted in his religious practices did not impose a substantial burden), aff'd, 265 Fed.Appx. 107 (3d Cir. 2008)). Young has not pled any facts from which it could be inferred that Heider's isolated remark “denied him the opportunity to pray, to eat foods of his choosing, to congregate with inmates of similar belief, to read religious texts, or to choose any other method of exercising his religious beliefs.” Mack v. Yost, 979 F.Supp.2d 639, 652 (W.D. Pa. 2013), affd in part, vacated in part, remanded sub nom. Mack v. Warden Loretto FCI, 839 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2016)). In the absence of any such facts, dismissal is warranted.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, it is respectfully recommended that Defendants' partial motion to dismiss [ECF No. 24] be granted. All claims against Defendant Heider and all claims against Defendant Walters in his official capacity should be dismissed, with prejudice. Plaintiffs' excessive force claim against Walters has not been challenged at this stage of the case and will proceed to discovery.
IV. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties may seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of Objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).