Opinion
No. 2:97-CV-24-B-B.
Filed Date: February 16, 1999.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This cause comes before the court upon the defendants' motion for summary judgment and motion to strike. The court has duly considered the parties' memoranda and exhibits and is ready to rule.
Although the defendants have jointly filed two separate motions for summary judgment, one entitled Motion for Summary Judgment Against Ronnie Young and Patricia Young and the other entitled Motion for Summary Judgment Against Lesley Young, the court will treat the two motions as one, and will simply refer to them as the defendants' motion for summary judgment.
FACTS
Lesley Young graduated from high school in May of 1994 at the age of 18. From July of 1994 through December of 1994, she traveled throughout the United States and Mexico by hitching rides and hopping freight trains. She received no financial support from her parents during this time.
After returning home to Hernando, Mississippi, in December of 1994, Lesley enrolled as a student at Memphis State University for the Spring 1995 semester. She lived on campus and was supported, in large part, by her parents. In May of 1995, at the end of the semester, she left school to resume her nomadic lifestyle.
The day that she left in May of 1995, Lesley's father, Ronnie Young, gave Lesley what cash he had in his wallet, which was approximately $1000.00. Lesley's mother, Patricia Young, drove Lesley to the home of someone known only as "the Riddler" and dropped her off. Lesley's parents did not see her again until after the accident in February of 1996.
On February 23, 1996, Lesley was struck by a car while she was crossing a street in New Orleans. The driver of the car left the scene and has not been found or identified. At the time of the accident, Lesley and seven friends were on their way to the train station to hop a freight train to Austin, Texas. Lesley suffered substantial injuries and has incurred over $150,000.00 in medical bills to date. At the time of the accident, Lesley was 20 years old.
On the date of the accident, Ronnie Young had a health insurance policy with State Farm on which Lesley was a named insured. Ronnie Young also had several automobile insurance policies issued by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company and an umbrella policy issued by State Farm Fire and Casualty Company. Both the automobile and umbrella policies provided for uninsured motorist coverage. The automobile insurance policies defined insureds for purposes of uninsured motorist coverage to include "a person related to you" (the named insured) "who lives with you" (the named insured). The umbrella policy defined a person entitled to uninsured motorist coverage to include "the following residents of the named insured's household: (1) the named insured's relatives, and (2) anyone under the age of 21 under the care of the person named above." Thus, to be eligible for uninsured motorist benefits under the automobile and umbrella policies, Lesley must have either lived with her parents or been a member of her parents household on the date of the accident.
Ronnie Young initially filed a claim only on the health insurance policy. The health insurance division of State Farm notified the automobile insurance division, as there was some question regarding the potential application of uninsured motorist and medical payments coverage under the automobile policies. The health policy contained a provision that excluded any expense that was payable without regard to fault under an automobile insurance policy. When the automobile insurance division contacted Ronnie Young, he stated that he was not making a claim for uninsured motorist coverage. Representatives of State Farm, recognizing the potential uninsured motorist coverage, notified Lesley in writing of her potential claim. Noting some unusual facts about the potential claim, State Farm began an investigation into the facts surrounding the accident and Lesley's status as a member of Ronnie Young's household. When State Farm discovered facts which indicated that Lesley was not a member of her parents' household, it decided to seek a declaratory judgment as to the rights of the insured under the automobile and umbrella policies. However, the plaintiffs beat them to the courthouse, filing the present action one day before Lesley's twenty-first birthday. When served with the suit, the defendants counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment. Through two amended complaints, the latest of which was filed when Lesley was twenty-two years old, the plaintiffs have failed to substitute Lesley Young as the named plaintiff, despite the fact that she has reached the age of majority.
LAW A. Motion to Strike
In opposition to the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs have submitted the affidavits of Dale Crawford and Patricia Young. The defendants have moved to strike the affidavit of Dale Crawford in its entirety and paragraphs 2, 4, 8, and 10 of Patricia Young's affidavit. Crawford has enjoyed a long career in the insurance industry and is being offered as an expert in the field of insurance. Essentially, Crawford's testimony is that in his opinion, Lesley Young was covered under the automobile insurance policy and the defendants had no arguable basis to deny coverage. Crawford's testimony is nothing more than a legal conclusion as to the ultimate issue in the case. While F.R.E. 704 provides that opinion testimony otherwise admissible is not objectionable because is embraces an ultimate issue, F.R.E. 704 does not allow an expert to render conclusions of law. United States v. $9,041,598.68, 163 F.3d 238, 254 (5 th Cir. 1998). As Crawford's opinion is merely a conclusion of law, it is inadmissible. Accordingly, the court finds that the defendants' motion to strike should be granted as it pertains to the affidavit of Dale Crawford.
The court further notes that while Crawford may be an expert in the field of insurance, he has no legal expertise and therefore is not qualified to give a legal opinion, even if such were admissisble.
Patricia Young's affidavit consists, in part, of hearsay, conclusory allegations, and matters that are outside the scope of her knowledge. The court finds that paragraph 2 of the Patricia Young's affidavit should be stricken in that it states a legal conclusion rather than simply providing evidence to support the plaintiffs' position. Likewise, the court finds that the first two sentences of paragraph 4, which purport to convey Lesley's intent as to returning to college and maintaining residency in Hernando, Mississippi, should be stricken as they consist of mere conclusory allegations of which the affiant could not have first-hand knowledge. The court finds that the second sentence of paragraph 8 should be stricken as hearsay. Finally, the court finds that the fourth sentence of paragraph 10 should be stricken as conclusory and as hearsay. Patricia Young cannot possibly testify as to her daughter's supposed intent to return to college and lack of intent to change her residence. Only Lesley could testify as to what her intentions were, and strangely enough, she has failed to provide the court with an affidavit or any other testimony disclosing her intentions.
B. Motion for Summary Judgment
On a motion for summary judgment, the movant has the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265, 275 (1986) ("the burden on the moving party may be discharged by `showing' . . . that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case"). Under Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the burden shifts to the non-movant to "go beyond the pleadings and by . . . affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 274. That burden is not discharged by "mere allegations or denials." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). All legitimate factual inferences must be made in favor of the non-movant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 216 (1986). Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 273. Before finding that no genuine issue for trial exists, the court must first be satisfied that no reasonable trier of fact could find for the non-movant. Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538, 552 (1986).
The benefits under the automobile and umbrella policies were only payable to an insured. Ronnie Young was the named insured on all of the subject policies. For purposes of uninsured motorist coverage, other insureds under the automobile policies included a relative residing with the named insured. Similarly, the umbrella policy included relative residents of the named insured's household as insureds for purposes of uninsured motorist coverage. The Mississippi Supreme Court has cited with approval the Fifth Circuit's decision in Cicciarella v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 66 F.3d 764 (5 th Cir. 1995), in which the court defined household as "a group . . . of individuals . . . who together dwell `under the same roof.'" Merrimack Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. McDill, 674 So.2d 4, 9 (Miss. 1996). The court need not distinguish between the terms "residing with" and "residents of the household," as the evidence clearly shows that Lesley Young neither resided with her parents nor was she a member of her parents' household. At the time of the accident Lesley Young had been gone from her parents' house for nine months, no one knew when or even if she would return, she was not in her parents custody and control, she was living independently and she was providing her own means of support. The plaintiffs have submitted no admissible evidence in support of the contention that Lesley was merely traveling the country before returning home to attend college. Any opinion of Patricia Young as to Lesley's intent is inadmissible. The plaintiffs have submitted no deposition or affidavit testimony of Lesley wherein she affirms that she did intend to return to her parents' household. There is no evidence to show that but for this accident Lesley would have ever returned. The plaintiffs bear the burden of proving that Lesley Young resided with her parents and/or was a member their household, at least one of which must be shown to entitle Lesley to uninsured motorists benefits. In the absence of any proof as to Lesley's intentions, the court finds that she neither resided with her parents nor was she a member of her parents' household at the time of the accident. Accordingly, the court finds that the defendants are entitled to summary judgment.
Although prior to leaving home in May of 1995, Lesley had been living in a dorm at college, she would be considered a member of her parents' household during the semester she was attending Memphis State University.
Although her parents had given her $1000.00 when she left home, she could not possibly live for nine months on $1000.00 and therefore was obviously not dependent upon her parents for support.
The parties spend considerable time arguing issues of emancipation and minority status. However, the terms of the insurance policies are clear and unambiguous, and do not require lengthy legal analysis as to who constitutes an insured. This case turns on the facts and the evidence presented by the parties can only lead to one conclusion. At the time of the accident, Lesley Young was not a college student who was taking a semester off to tour the country before finishing school and settling into the responsibilities of traditional adulthood. She was a young adult, too old to be subject to her parents' control, who had left home and established a life separate and apart from her parents. Her lifestyle, though transient in nature, was permanent in that she had left Hernando, Mississippi, behind with no evidenced intent to ever return.
Since summary judgment has been granted on the aforementioned grounds, the issue of who is the appropriate plaintiff is rendered moot, although the court notes that the defendants have asserted a considerable argument on this issue.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that the defendants' motion for summary judgment should be granted. An order will issue accordingly.
ORDER
In accordance with the memorandum opinion this day issued, it is ORDERED:
that the defendants' motion to strike is GRANTED as it relates to the affidavit of Dale Crawford, and GRANTED in part as it relates to the affidavit of Patricia Young; and
that the defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED and this cause is DISMISSED with prejudice.