Opinion
21-P-185
03-24-2022
Lynn YOUNG v. Anthony SAICH.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The plaintiff and the defendant were previously in a romantic relationship. The plaintiff, pro se, filed this action against the defendant, alleging, inter alia, that he breached an oral and written contract to pay the plaintiff for her assistance in gaining him a position on the board of AMC Entertainment Holdings, Inc. The defendant moved for summary judgment, contending that (1) the contract was made in consideration for the promise to marry and is thus unenforceable under the Heart Balm Act, G. L. c. 207, § 47A ; (2) the plaintiff cannot prove the existence of a contract; and (3) even if an enforceable contact exists, the plaintiff, acting as a broker or finder, could not produce a sufficient writing to satisfy the Statute of Frauds, G. L. c. 259, § 7.
The plaintiff and the defendant met in 2005 at a Harvard University alumni event held in China. The plaintiff enrolled at Harvard University as a visiting research fellow in 2006, and later worked as a senior research associate in Chinese public policy at the Harvard Kennedy School. The plaintiff has also held various public policy and public administration positions in China.
The plaintiff also asserted claims for fraud, intentional interference with contract relations, discrimination, retaliation, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress, but those claims were dismissed.
Following a hearing conducted via Zoom, a Superior Court judge determined that the Heart Balm Act did not bar the entirety of the plaintiff's breach of contract claim but the plaintiff was unlikely to prove that a contract had been formed. Even if she could, the judge reasoned, the contract would nonetheless be unenforceable, because it did not meet the requirements of the Statute of Frauds. The defendant's motion for summary judgment was accordingly allowed. On appeal, the plaintiff primarily assigns error to the conduct of the Superior Court judge at the Zoom hearing, arguing that the judge was biased against the plaintiff, an Asian woman, and colluded with the defendant. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
Zoom refers to the "Internet-based video conferencing platform, Zoom Video Communications, Inc." Vazquez Diaz v. Commonwealth, 487 Mass. 336, 336 (2021).
The plaintiff has appealed from the order allowing summary judgment, not the judgment itself. She did not cure the defect after final judgment entered. Nevertheless, because all claims have been resolved, final judgment has since entered, and the issues are fully briefed, to avoid further delay, we exercise our discretion to treat the appeal as properly before us. See Arch Med. Assocs. v. Bartlett Health Enters., 32 Mass. App. Ct. 404, 405 n.3 (1992) (court may entertain improper appeal where dismissal "would serve no purpose and might require the parties to return to reargue issues already briefed and argued").
The plaintiff does not appear to make any specific arguments related to the merits of the judge's decision on summary judgment.
Discussion. With the exception of a passing reference to the Heart Balm Act, the plaintiff does not cite to a single legal authority in her brief to support her arguments on appeal. Pursuant to Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (9) (A), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019), an appellant's brief must contain "the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, and the reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities and parts of the record on which the appellant relies." The rule "is more than a ‘mere technicality. It is founded on the sound principle that the right of a party to have this court consider a point entails a duty; that duty is to assist the court with argument and appropriate citation of authority.’ " Cameron v. Carelli, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 81, 86 (1995), quoting Lolos v. Berlin, 338 Mass. 10, 14 (1958). While "some leniency is appropriate in determining whether pro se litigants have complied with rules of procedure, the rules nevertheless bind pro se litigants as all other litigants." Brown v. Chicopee Fire Fighters Ass'n., Local 1710, IAFF, 408 Mass. 1003, 1004 n.4 (1990). Because the plaintiff's claims do not rise to the level of appellate argument, they are deemed waived. See Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (9) (A). As a result, we decline to reach them.
Judgment affirmed.