Opinion
1:22-CV-00327-SPB-RAL
01-30-2023
LEONARD YOUNG, Plaintiff v. PA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, SUPERINTENDENT LONNIE J. OLIVER, DEPUTY PATRICIA THOMPSON, CHCA MIKE EDWARDS, CORRECTIONS HEALTHCARE ADMINISTRATOR; DR. CRAIG RUSH, CHIEF PSYCHOLOGIST OF SCI-ALBION; DR. GODESMAN, DR. EVANS, DR. LUCAS, LT. BASHER, CCPM KURT SUESSER, CORRECTIONS CLASSIFICATION PROGRAM MANAGER; C. GIDDINGS, GRIEVANCE COORDINATOR; AND CPT JOHNSON, Defendants
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR EMREGENCY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
IN RE: ECF NO. 24
RICHARD A. LANZILLO, CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that Plaintiffs motion for emergency injunctive relief (ECF No. 24) be DENIED.
II. Report
A. Plaintiffs Motion and Factual Allegations
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Leonard Young's Motion for Emergency Hearing, Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Motion for TRO (“Motion for Emergency Injunctive Relief'). ECF No. 24. Young, a prisoner at the State Correctional Institution at Albion (SCI-Albion), alleges that, as retaliation for filing this civil suit, her cell is not being cleaned, a screen door has been placed over her cell so she cannot see out of it, her legal filings are being confiscated, and Defendants are prohibiting her from exercising, showering, and shaving. Id., ¶¶ 2-5. Additionally, she avers that Dr. Lucas, Dr. Rush, Dr. Evans, Lt. Basher, and CCPM Susser are “refus[ing] to protect [her] from PREA filings,” and “abusive PSS Clothier, as well as the constant threat of refusing to accommodate [her] after [she] made it known she was raped by past cellmates as well as her sexual abuse history that makes her highly vulnerable and a potential sexual assault victim.” Id., ¶ 6. Lastly, she alleges that “Defendants have put [her] on a word of mouth order to staff to not treat her for psych care, transgender accommodations, as well as an approval to allow officer s/staff to mistreat her without fear of disciplinary action.” Id., ¶ 7. For relief, she seeks an order directing Defendants to stop taking her legal documents, as well as clean her cell and permit her to shower, shave, and exercise. She also requests the removal of PSS Clothier and to be transferred out of Defendants' supervision and care. Young's motion is verified and accompanied by two affidavits, an inmate request to staff member, and six grievances.
Plaintiff has advised the Court that her pronouns are she/her/hers.
On January 25, 2023, the Court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the instant motion. Young appeared and testified on his own behalf. The Medical Defendants appeared through counsel, as did the Department of Corrections (“DOC”) and the nine DOC employees named as defendants in this action ECF No. 34. The DOC Defendants called Dr. Evans and Captain Skinner as witnesses.
Medical Defendants are Dr. Rush and Dr. Godesman.
This hearing was scheduled before Defendants had been served. As such, Attorney Warshafsky entered a special appearance on behalf of the DOC, Oliver, Thompson, Edwards, Evans, Lucas, Basher, Suesser, Giddings, and Johnson (DOC Defendants),
Young testified that the alleged retaliatory acts and her difficulties with Clothier, her former mental health counselor, occurred while she was housed in the Restricted Housing Unit (“RHU”) at SCI-Albion, and that these issues are currently not a concern because she was released from the RHU to general population on January 20, 2023. She also testified that she is now housed on a cell block in which she feels relatively safe, though her cellmate is having a difficult time with some of her behaviors. Following this testimony, the DOC Defendants moved to dismiss the motion as moot, and Medical Defendants joined in that motion. Young agreed that her claims based on her RHU experience are moot but asserted that her request for injunctive relief based on her allegations of threats, denial of transgender accommodations, and denial of mental health care remains. For relief, Young now seeks additional mental health treatment and transgender accommodation in the form of a single-cell assignment.
B. Standard of Review
A temporary restraining order is assessed under the same standards as a preliminary injunction. See, e.g., Alves v. Main, 7M Fed.Appx. Ill. 112 n.3 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing Holland v. Rosen, 895 F.3d 272, 285 (3d Cir. 2018)). As a threshold procedural matter, however,
[t]he court may issue a temporary restraining order without written or oral notice to the adverse party or its attorney only if: (A) specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition; and (B) the movant's attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it should not be required.”Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1).
As a matter of substance, the party seeking preliminary injunctive relief has the burden of demonstrating: (1) a reasonable probability of success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) that the issuance of an injunction will not result in greater harm to the non-moving party; and (4) that the public interest would best be served by granting the injunction. Council of Alternative Political Parties v. Hooks, 121 F.3d 876, 879 (3d Cir. 1997); Opticians Ass'n of America v. Independent Opticians of America, 920 F.2d 187, 191-92 (3d Cir. 1990).
As the moving party, Young bears the burden of producing evidence to support the first two factors. See Acierno v. New Castle Cty., 40 F.3d 645, 653 (3d Cir. 1994). Accordingly, the movant must provide facts that clearly support a finding that immediate and irreparable injury will result to the movant if preliminary relief is denied. See United States v. Stazola, 893 F.2d 34, 37 n. 3 (3d Cir. 1990); Hohe v. Casey, 868 F.2d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 1989); ECRI v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 226 (3d Cir. 1987) (it is not enough to merely show irreparable harm: the plaintiff has the burden of showing immediate irreparable injury, which is more than merely serious or substantial harm and which cannot be redressed with money damages). Absent support for either of the first two factors, a court must deny the request for a preliminary injunction. See Acierno, 40 F.3d at 653 (3d Cir. 1994); Adams v. Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475, 484 (3d Cir. 2000).
The purpose of the preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the rights of the parties can be fairly and fully litigated and determined by strictly legal proofs and according to the principles of equity. Wetzel v. Edwards, 635 F.2d 283, 286 (4th Cir. 1980). Thus, the grant of injunctive relief is an “extraordinary remedy which should be granted only in limited circumstances.” American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Winback and Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Frank's GMC Truck Center, Inc. v. General Motor Corp., 847 F.2d 100, 102 (3d Cir. 1988)).
Moreover, in the prison context, a request for injunctive relief “must always be viewed with great caution because ‘judicial restraint is especially called for in dealing with the complex and intractable problems of prison administration.'” Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Rogers v. Scurr, 676 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th Cir. 1982)). Preliminary injunctive relief is “not a tool for prisoners to use to regulate ‘in every way, every day, the terms and conditions of plaintiffs confinement simply because they are “in court” ...”'. Stiel v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 2017 WL 2656646, at *4 (D.N.J. June 19, 2017) (quoting Muhammad v. Director of Corrections, 2009 WL 161075, at *1 (E.D. Ca. Jan. 22, 2009)). Thus, where a plaintiff requests an injunction that would require the Court to interfere with the administration of a prison, “appropriate consideration must be given to principles of federalism in determining the availability and scope of equitable relief.” Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 379 (1976). The federal courts are not overseers of the day-to-day management of prisons. Prison officials require broad discretionary authority as the “operation of a correctional institution is at best an extraordinarily difficult undertaking.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974). Accordingly, prison administrators should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that are needed to preserve internal order and to maintain institutional security. Beard v. Banks, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 2578 (2006); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 527 (1979).
C. Discussion
i. Young's request for injunctive relief based on alleged mistreatment, inadequate treatment, and retaliation in the RHU should be denied as moot.
Young acknowledged during the hearing that the mistreatment and retaliation that she allegedly experienced in the RHU and her difficulties with SCI-Albion mental health professional Clothier ceased when she was released from the RHU. Young explained that her transfer to general population resulted in the removal of the restrictions on activities formerly imposed upon her in the RHU and that this transfer will also result in her assignment to a different mental health professional. As such, Young's request for an order enjoining Defendants from taking her legal documents, failing to clean her cell, and restricting shower access, shaving, and exercise is moot; as is her request for removal of Clothier and transfer out of the RHU Defendants' supervision and care.
ii. Young is not likely to succeed on the merits of her remaining claims.
Young alleges that she is still being threatened by officers and inmates and not receiving transgender accommodation and mental health treatment, including necessary medication. Specifically, she asserts that certain Defendants are still encouraging inmates to hurt her, and that three inmates who threatened her while she was in the RHU have since been released into general population. Young also asserts that she is still not receiving treatment for her gender dysmorphia, schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and PTSD.
Young's evidence at the hearing fell far short of meeting her heavy burden of demonstrating that she will likely succeed on the merits of these claims. While Young “need not prove [her] case with airtight certainty, the moving party nevertheless bears a heavy burden on a motion for a preliminary injunction of establishing a reasonable probability of success on the merits.” Burton v. Wetzel, 2017 WL 4284345, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Sep. 27, 2017) (internal citations, quotations, and additions omitted). This burden is “particularly heavy” where the requested injunction “is directed not merely at preserving the status quo but... at providing mandatory relief,” such as the transfer requested in the instant motion. Punnett v. Carter, 621 F.2d 578, 582 (3dCir. 1980).
Young' testimony belies that she faces any imminent threat to her safety in her current unit assignment:
I will say that the unit that I am on FA, that's the unit and block that I'm on, is actually a really good unit. You know, I don't know whose decision that was, but you know, I got a time cutout, got out the hole, went to FA, it's a very good unit. I do feel -yeah, I actually feel kind of safe there, you know what I mean? I think I could succeed on that unit.
Young went on to identify three inmates she alleges threatened her. She acknowledged, however, that one of the three does not present a genuine danger to her. As to the other two inmates, she did not identify any facts or circumstances to support that either presents a genuine risk to her safety or that prison security measures are inadequate to protect her. She also offered no evidence to support a finding that any inmate has aggressed towards her based on her transgender status or otherwise. Although Young initially testified that she had been raped in prison and that the Defendants are not protecting her from sexual assault in the future, she later acknowledged that the alleged rape occurred at a correctional institution other than SCI-Albion. Young's testimony regarding guards allegedly encouraging inmates to harm him was vague and, at times, inconsistent. Her testimony supports that certain guards may have expressed skepticism to her regarding the genuineness and sincerity of her transition to female. If such comments were made, they were improper and insensitive but, standing alone, they do not support an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim, a First Amendment retaliation claim, or preliminary injunctive relief. Thus, Young has failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of her claims based on allegations that guards are encouraging inmates to harm her or failing to protect her from such harm. See Holiday Inns of Am., Inc. v. B & B Corp., 409 F.2d 614, 618 (3d Cir. 1969) (“The dramatic and drastic power of injunctive force may be unleashed only against conditions generating a presently existing actual threat; it may not be used simply to eliminate a possibility of a remote future injury, or a future invasion of rights.”).
Young's claim that she is not receiving mental health treatment and medications is also not supported by the evidence. Dr. Evans testified that upon Young's arrival at SCI-McKean, she was evaluated by qualified personnel concerning her mental health status and that they diagnosed her with a single mental health condition: anti-social personality disorder. Dr. Evans also testified that Young has been assigned C-Code status, which means she is recognized as having a mental health disorder and receives regular psychiatric evaluation and care.
Young acknowledged that while she was in the RHU, mental health personnel saw her periodically. Although she expresses great dissatisfaction with the care she received from them, especially Defendant Clothier, she does not dispute their visits. Although Young initially asserted that mental health personnel at the prison had provided her with no medication for her mental health condition or conditions, she later acknowledged that she receives regular dosages of Remeron, an anti-depressant that also serves as a sleep aid, and a blood pressure medication that also treats anxiety. Dr. Evans testified that Young has demonstrated extremely poor compliance with taking her medication. Young also expressed her understanding that Dr. Rush intends to change her medication to better suit her mental health needs.
Young also testified that since her transfer to the prison's F unit, she “did see a Dr. Riley who said he would put [her] on his list for you know emergency session to come over and talk to him about [her] cell arrangement, [she] getting different treatment or services..Young stated that this has not yet occurred, but this delay cannot be considered significant given that Young was transferred to F unit a few days earlier.
Young argues that she suffers from mental health disorders in addition to her anti-social personality disorder and that she receives no treatment for these disorders, but as Dr. Evans explained, mental health personnel at SCI- McKean have not diagnosed Young with these other disorders and, therefore, have not determined that treatment for them is appropriate. It is well-established that an inmates' dissatisfaction with a course of mental health treatment or disagreement with medical personnel's diagnosis is not grounds for relief. Based on the record developed during the hearing and applicable law, Young has not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of her mental health-related claims. See e.g., Tillery v. Noel, 2018 WL 3521212, at *5 (M.D. Pa. June 28, 2018) (collecting cases).
iii. The record does not support a probability that Young will suffer irreparable, harm absent injunctive relief.
The record also fails to demonstrate “the probability of irreparable harm if relief is not granted.” Hohe v. Casey, 868 F.2d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 1989). As detailed above, the alleged threats against Young are too vague, abstract, and hypothetical to constitute harms “which are about to occur at any moment or are impending.” See Brown v. Beard, 2009 WL 3064647, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 24, 2009) (quoting Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 315, 313 (3d Cir. 2001)). Nothing in the record supports that any inmate has acted aggressively towards Young. The record also does not support that prison security procedures are inadequate to address any potential threat to Young's safety. Young testified that she grieved the threats against her and, in response, the grievance officer responded that she was forwarding Young's concerns to security and that security would be in touch. And, as Captain Skinner explained, SCI-Albion has a system for addressing inmates' security concerns and providing an avenue for redress. See In re Revel AC, Inc., 802 F.3d 558, 571 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting John Y. Gotanda, The Emerging Standards for Issuing Appellate Stays, 45 Baylor L.Rev. 809, 813-15 (1993) (defining “irreparable injury” as “the harm [ ] the movant will suffer during the pendency of the litigation that cannot be prevented or fully rectified by the tribunal's final decision”); Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 801 (3d Cir. 1989) (plaintiff must allege an injury that cannot ultimately be “redressed by a legal or an equitable remedy following trial”). Lastly, Young has not demonstrated that she faces any imminent irreparable injury in the absence of the additional mental health treatment and transgender accommodations she seeks.
Young's failure to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits or an imminent risk of irreparable harm is fatal to her motion. Therefore, Young's motion for emergency injunctive relief (ECF No. 64) should be denied.
D. Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, it is respectfully recommended that Young's motion for emergency injunctive relief (ECF No. 64) be denied.
E. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties may seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections may waive appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).