Opinion
No. CV 02 0515430 S
May 11, 2004
RULING ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This appeal, by the Young family, nephews of the deceased, Fred Young, is from a probate decree dated May 20, 2002, petitioning for the removal of the estate's former administrator. The appeal raises the following four issues regarding conduct of the former administrator (Bonee): 1. He failed to rescind a purchase agreement between the decedent and Ravenswood Development Corporation (Ravenswood); 2. He failed to compute the appropriate succession tax; 3. He failed to report certain information to the Superior Court while it was considering a condemnation matter involving the estate; and 4. He failed to maintain a probate bond for an appropriate length of time. Bonee has moved for summary judgment.
The affidavit of Bonee and attached court records show that on July 14, 1999, Bonee was appointed administrator by Hon. Sheila Hennessey, Probate Judge for the District of Newington. On December 1, 2000, the Superior Court issued a memorandum of decision in the condemnation case brought by the town of Newington against the estate of Frederick Young. This opinion also awarded an amount to Ravenswood for extinguishment of its contractual claim. On January 9, 2001, Judge Hennessey denied Bonee's request to appeal the condemnation decision. On September 24, 2001 Bonee submitted his final account and this was approved on October 25, 2001.
On October 26, 2001, Judge Hennessey denied the Youngs' motion to compel Bonee to undertake malpractice actions against Bonee's law firm. On November 23, 2001, the Youngs appealed Judge Hennessey's orders of October 25th and 26th, to the Superior Court. On December 26th, the Youngs withdrew their appeals as to all defendants. On March 11, 2002, the Youngs moved for the appointment of an independent fiduciary. On April 4, 2002, Judge Hennessey denied this motion, noting that the issues presented are essentially the same as the Youngs' motion to compel legal action. On May 6, 2002, the Youngs filed their motion for removal of the administrator and Judge Hennessey denied this motion on May 20, 2002. The Youngs timely appealed to this court from this denial in the probate court. Bonee has now moved for summary judgment.
A motion for summary judgment shall be granted "if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Connecticut Practice Book § 17-49. Based upon the prior probate and Superior Court proceedings as set forth above, summary judgment is appropriate as a matter of law for two reasons. First each of the matters raised in this appeal has been or could have been raised in the earlier proceedings.
The first issue, the Ravenswood contract, was considered both by the superior court in the condemnation case and in Judge Hennessey's denial of Bonee's request to appeal. In the Youngs' "objection to affidavit" at point 4 the Youngs state that they raised a similar issue at a hearing in 1999. As to the second issue, the succession tax, the proper tax due on the estate was raised, according to the Youngs' objection to affidavit, at a hearing of June 14, 2000. The final account of October 25, 2001, also finds that "[a]ll succession taxes due to the State of Connecticut have been paid." The third issue, the alleged inappropriate handling of the condemnation by Bonee, was discussed at the January 9, 2001, probate court proceeding. The fourth issue, regarding Bonee's bond, could have been raised on his appointment in July 1999.
Under these circumstances, the Youngs' appeal from Judge Hennessey's May 20, 2002 denial of their petition to remove the fiduciary, is barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. "Summary judgment is an appropriate method for resolving issues of res judicata or collateral estoppel . . . The [probate] court . . . addressed all of those issues and resolved them adversely to the plaintiffs. The court rendered a valid final judgment on the merits. The doctrine of res judicata bars the plaintiffs from raising those claims in these appeals. By doing so, they seek relief on the basis of claims that already have been rejected as a matter of law in another court. Further, the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars the plaintiffs from relitigating issues that underlie the former adverse judgment." Zanoni v. Lynch, 79 Conn. App. 325, 338-39, 830 A.2d 314 (2003).
General Statutes § 45a-24 also provides a ground upon which to grant summary judgment. This section provides in part: "All orders, judgments and decrees of courts of probate, rendered after notice and from which no appeal is taken, shall be conclusive and shall be entitled to full faith, credit and validity and shall not be subject to collateral attack, except for fraud." Here the Youngs withdrew their appeal from Judge Hennessey's approval of Bonee's final account. Thus the decree is final and is not subject to collateral attack. Schiavone v. Snyder, 73 Conn. App. 712, 718 (2002): "Any actual controversy as to the plaintiff's claims ceased to exist upon the Probate Court's order approving the final account and her failure to appeal therefrom."
Bonee's motion for summary judgment is therefore granted. So ordered.
Henry S. Cohn, J.