Opinion
CAUSE NO. 1:02-CV-305
May 5, 2003
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the Court for judicial review of a final decision of the defendant, Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner"), denying the application of the Plaintiff, Allen Young (the "Plaintiff"), for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") beginning December 15, 1997.
Jurisdiction of the undersigned Magistrate Judge is based on 28 U.S.C. § 636 (c), all parties consenting.
Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act ("the Act") provides, inter alia, "[a]s part of his answer, the [Commissioner] shall file a certified copy of the transcript of the record including the evidence upon which the findings and decision complained of are based. The court shall have the power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the [Commissioner], with or without remanding the case for a rehearing." It also provides, "[t]he findings of the [Commissioner] as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g).
For the following reasons, the Commissioner's final decision will be AFFIRMED.
II. THE PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. The Procedural Background
On June 2, 1998, the Plaintiff filed an application for DIB with a protective filing date of October 24, 1997. Social Security denied the Plaintiffs claim initially, but upon reconsideration it granted DIB beginning March 24, 1999, the Plaintiffs 55th birthday, but not before. The Plaintiff then requested an administrative hearing on the sole issue of whether he was entitled to benefits before that date, and on August 15, 2000, the Administrative Law Judge Ann C. Grover (the "ALJ") conducted a hearing at which the Plaintiff was represented by counsel and testified. Also testifying were Cathy Revenger, the Plaintiffs friend, and Robert Bond, a vocational expert ("VE").
On September 19, 2000, the ALJ issued her decision wherein she made the following findings:
1. The claimant met the disability insured status requirements of the Act on December 12, 1997, the date the claimant stated he became unable to work, and has acquired sufficient quarters of coverage to remain insured through June 30, 2002.
2. The claimant has not engaged in disqualifying substantial gainful activity since December 12, 1997.
3. The medical evidence establishes that the claimant has a back condition, and reduced hand grip strength consistent with polyarthritis, impairments which are severe, but which do not meet or equal the criteria of any of the impairments listed in Appendix 1, subpart P. Regulations No. 4.
4. The claimant's testimony concerning his impairments and their impact on his ability to work is not credible.
5. Prior to March 24, 1999, the date the claimant was found disabled based upon the attainment of age 55 and his residual functional capacity to perform light exertional work, he retained the residual functional capacity to perform light exertional work activity absent repetitive gripping or the need to perform fine finger manipulation.
6. The claimant is unable to perform his past relevant work.
7. On the date of his alleged onset, the claimant was 53 years old, an individual "approaching advanced age."
8. The claimant has a GED.
9. The claimant has semi-skilled work experience, but has acquired no transferable work skills.
10. Based on an exertional capacity for light work, and the claimant's age, educational background, and work experience, Section 404.1569 and Rule 202.14, Table 2, Appendix 2, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4, would direct a conclusion of "not disabled."
11. Although the claimant was unable to perform the full range of light work prior to March 24, 1999, he was capable of making an adjustment to work which exists in significant numbers in the national and regional economy. Such work includes employment as a storage facility rental clerk, with 200 jobs; a gate guard, with 150 jobs; and an information clerk, with 100 jobs existing within the region in which the claimant resides. A finding of "not disabled" is therefore reached within the framework of the above-cited rule.
12. The claimant was not under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, at any time prior to March 24, 1999.
(Tr. at 25-26.)
Based on these findings, the ALJ determined that the Plaintiff was not entitled to DIB prior to March 24, 1999. The Plaintiff requested review by the Appeals Council, which was denied on July 30, 2002, leaving the ALJ's decision as the final decision of the Commissioner. This appeal followed.
The Plaintiff filed his opening brief on February 24, 2003. The Commissioner responded with her "Memorandum in Support of the Commissioner's Decision" on April 10, 2003. The Plaintiff replied on April 25, 2003.
B. The Factual Background
The Plaintiff was fifty-three years old in December 1997, the alleged onset date of disability, a "person closely approaching advanced age" as defined in the Act. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563 (d).
The Plaintiff was fifty-six years old at the date of the hearing, a "person of advanced age." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563 (e).
The Plaintiff has a high school equivalency diploma and previously worked as a medium and heavy to very heavy semi-skilled truck driver and bus driver. (Tr. at 15).
The Plaintiff claims a disability due to a back condition, arthritis, degenerative disc disease and depression.
On October 25, 1995, the Plaintiff saw Dr. Gregory Hoffman, an orthopedic surgeon, who reviewed a myelogram computed tomography ("CT scan") which showed mild edema at the LS root with a small herniated disc at the L4-5 vertebrae with a slight impression on the nerve root. (Tr. at 192). Dr. Hoffman opined that surgery would not provide long-term relief. ( Id.)
On September 30, 1997, the Fort Wayne, Indiana Veterans Affairs ("VA") hospital took an X-ray of the Plaintiffs lumbar spine, which showed evidence of progressive degenerative disc disease at L4-5, and as well as mild to moderate bilateral hypertrophic osteoarthritic facet disease at L4-5 and L5-S1. (Tr. at 298). However, an X-ray of the cervical spine was unremarkable. (Tr. at 297).
On December 24, 1997, the Plaintiff underwent a general medical examination at the request of the VA by Dr. William Ungemach, during which he complained about scohosis and a herniated disc in the lumbar region. (Tr. at 292). On physical examination, the Plaintiff had a very prominent anterior tibial tubercle (sometimes called Osgood-Schlatter's disease) of the left knee but his lower extremities were otherwise unremarkable. (Tr. at 293). During a neurological examination, the only abnormality was the Plaintiffs hypoactive tendon reflexes. ( Id.) His back showed forward flexion of 85 degrees, extension of 20 degrees, and tilt to each side of 25 degrees, and rotate to each side of 25 degrees. (Tr. at 294). Dr. Ungemach diagnosed the Plaintiff with L4 disc degeneration, osteoarthritis involving the lumbar spine, Osgood-Schlatter's disease of the left knee, and no sign of scohosis. ( Id.)
A tibidial tubercle is a bony swelling on the surface of the bone giving attachment to a muscle or ligament. See Stedman's Medical Dictionary, at 410, 1498 (5th L.Ed. 1981).
On June 20, 1998, a Compensation and Pension Examination was performed at the request of the VA by Dr. T. Kudaimi. (Tr. at 250-251). The examination focused on the Plaintiffs joints, and he complained of bilateral knee pain beginning some eight or nine years earlier. (Tr. at 250). The Plaintiff reported stiffness in the morning for several hours, and pain and swelling in his wrists, MCP joints and PIP joints since in 1996. ( Id.) Further, he stated that his pain was worse when standing for a long periods, but that Darvocet and Ibuprofen helped. ( Id.) Dr. Kudaimi found that the Plaintiffs complaints were likely consistent with symmetric polyarthritis, and that his examination revealed only minimal synivitis. ( Id.)
On August 19, 1998, Dr. Michael E. Holton performed a disability examination at the request of Social Security. (Tr. at 194-197). During the physical examination, Dr. Holton noticed moderate halting features with apparent increased low back discomfort when the Plaintiff stood up from a chair and when he got on and off the examination table. ( Id.) The examination revealed a slow, somewhat shuffling gait with antalgic features favoring the left lower extremity and mild circumduction. (Tr. at 195). The Plaintiff demonstrated marked instability with heel and toe walking, and he so favored his left leg that Dr. Holton had to help balance him. ( Id.) Indeed, Dr. Holton did not even test the Plaintiffs ability to do tandem walking, hopping, and squatting because of concerns for the Plaintiffs safety. ( Id.) Further, the Plaintiff had palpable tenderness of the paralumbar and paracervical areas with significant guarding of the hips on active range of motion testing. ( Id.) Dr. Holton diagnosed the Plaintiff with degenerative arthritis, chronic low back pain with radicular features consistent with apparent left lower extremity radiculopathy and reported multi-level degenerative disc disease of the spine, and bilateral Osgood-Schlatter disease. (Tr. at 196).
On October 19, 1998, the Plaintiff saw Dr. Sherwin Kepes at the request of Social Security for a mental status examination. (Tr. at 206-210). The Plaintiff reported troubles falling asleep, poor appetite and that he did not cook or clean although he could make a sandwich. (Tr. at 207).
Dr. Kepes noted that the Plaintiff appeared to be dealing with severe physical pain which in part caused distress and depression, but which was compounded by such situational stressors as the Plaintiffs financial resource, divorce, and an uncertain financial and medical future. (Tr. at 209). Dr. Kepes also noted that the Plaintiffs description of alcohol use suggested possible abuse, but was clearly aware of his vulnerability and was motivated to maintain control. (Id.)
Based on his examination, Dr. Kepes opined that the Plaintiff suffered from Major Depressive Disorder, Recurrent, Moderate, Pain Disorder Associated with a General Medical Condition, Low Back, and he ruled out alcohol abuse. (Tr. at 210).
On February 22, 1999, Dr. Kenneth Bundza performed a medical status examination. (Tr. at 220-223). However, Dr. Bundza questioned why the Plaintiff was never prescribed antidepressant medications during his four year treatment at the VA's mental hygiene clinic. ( Id.) Dr. Bundza also observed that while the Plaintiff did not present any outstanding or abnormal physical characteristics, he moved rather slowly and made frequent facial grimaces suggesting that he was experiencing significant underlying pain and discomfort. (Tr. at 221). Dr. Bundza thought the Plaintiff capable of performing some household chores, but noted that the Plaintiff was currently "not do[ing] much of anything," and that he stated that he just did not care any more. (Tr. at 223). Dr. Bundza diagnosed the Plaintiff with a longstanding personality disorder, recurrent and moderate major depressive disorder, and possible alcohol abuse. ( Id.) Dr. Bundza also noted that the Plaintiff demonstrated a number of inconsistencies in his presentation, for example, he claimed to be severely depressed but he had never been prescribed antidepressant medications. (Id.) Furthermore, Dr. Bundza noted that while the Plaintiff claimed to drink only once or twice a month, he had a criminal history including two arrests for driving under the influence. ( Id.)
On February 25, 1999, the Plaintiff saw Dr. W.F. Ungemach at Indiana Rehabilitation Services. (Tr. at 224-227). The Plaintiff reported a herniated L4-5 disc, arthritis, and degenerative disc disease since 1995, and during the physical examination he was able to undress and dress, get on and off the exam table, sit up, and recline, and ambulate with no impairment or assistive device. (Tr. at 224). Dr. Ungemach noted that the Plaintiff had a prominent left tibial tubercle and a past history of Osgood-Schlatter's disease, but that his knees did not seem to be bothering him. (Tr. at 225).
Dr. Ungemach concluded that although the Plaintiff claims that his daily activities included just reading and watching TV, he appeared to be able to do much more. (Id.) For example, Dr. Ungemach noted that while the Plaintiff had left patellar reflex and prominent left tibial tubercle, his range of motion was nearly normal. (Id.) Dr. Ungemach diagnosed the Plaintiff with subjective complaints of neck and low back pain with no objective evidence of back problems. (Tr. at 226).
On July 12, 1999, the Plaintiff saw Dr. Ros for a medical examination at the request of Social Security. (Tr. at 303-306). During the physical examination he was able to get on and off the exam table, reported back pain all of the time, and was wearing a back brace. (Tr. at 304). His gait was slow, and he was unable to walk on his heels, toes, tandem walk, hop, or squat. (Id.) Active and passive range of motion showed deficits at the dorsolumbar region, hips, and knees. (Id.) Muscle strength, muscle tone, and grip strength were all found to be 4/5. (Id.) Dr. Ros concluded that it would be difficult for him to work due to his impairments. (Id.)
On August 31, 1999, X-rays of the Plaintiffs lower back showed no acute osseous abnormality and no significant change since May 19, 1995. (Tr. at 308). On the same date X-rays of the hip showed no acute osseous abnormality, but did reveal degenerative changes involving each hip joint as well as each sacroiliac joint. (Tr. at 309). Finally, X-rays of the left knee showed no acute osseous abnormality but chondrocalcinosis (i.e., calcium salt deposits in cartilage). (Tr. at 310).
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
To be entitled to Social Security benefits, the Plaintiff must establish an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 416 (i)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 423 (d)(1)(A). A physical or mental impairment is "an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques." 42 U.S.C. § 423 (d)(3). It is not enough for the Plaintiff to establish that an impairment exists. It must be shown that the impairment is severe enough to preclude the Plaintiff from engaging in substantial gainful activity. Gotshaw v. Ribicoff, 307 F.2d 840, 844 (4th Cir. 1962); Garcia v. Califano, 463 F. Supp. 1098 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
A five step test has been established to determine whether a claimant is disabled. See Singleton v. Bowen, 841 F.2d 710, 711 (7th Cir. 1988); Bowen v. Yuckert, 482, U.S. 137, 107 S.Ct. 2287, 2290-91 (1987). The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has summarized that test as follows:
The following steps are addressed in order: (1) Is the claimant presently unemployed? (2) Is the claimant's impairment "severe"? (3) Does the impairment meet or exceed one of a list of specific impairments? (4) Is the claimant unable to perform his or her former occupation? (5) Is the claimant unable to perform any other work within the economy? An affirmative answer leads either to the next step or, on steps 3 and 5, to a finding that the claimant is disabled. A negative answer at any point, other than step 3, stops the inquiry and leads to a determination that the claimant is not disabled.Nolen v. Sullivan, 939 F.2d 516, 518 (7th Cir. 1991) (citing Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42, 107 S.Ct. 2287, 96 L.Ed.2d 119 (1987)); Nelson v. Bowen, 855 F.2d 503, 504 n. 2 (7th Cir. 1988); accord Dixon v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 1171, 1176 (7th Cir. 2001); Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 887 (7th Cir. 2001). A claimant has the joint burdens of production and persuasion through at least step four, where the individual's residual functional capacity ("RFC") is determined. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 146 n. 5; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545, 416.945. At step five, the Commissioner bears the burden of proving that there are jobs in the national economy the plaintiff can perform. Herron v. Shalala, 19 F.3d 329, 333 n. 18 (7th Cir. 1994). From the nature of the ALJ's decision to deny benefits, it is clear that step five was the determinative inquiry.
IV. DISCUSSION
Given the foregoing framework, "[t]he question before [this court] is whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence to support the [Commissioner's] findings." Garfield v. Schweiker, 732 F.2d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 1984) (citing Whitney v. Schweiker, 695 F.2d 784, 786 (7th Cir. 1982); 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g)); Burnett v. Bowen, 830 F.2d 731, 734 (7th Cir. 1987). "Substantial evidence" has been described as "more than a mere scintilla." Anderson v. Bowen, 868 F.2d 921, 923 (7th Cir. 1989). It means, "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. . . ." Id. (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971); see also Allen v. Weinberger, 552 F.2d 781, 784 (7th Cir. 1977). "If the record contains such support [it] must [be] affirmed . . . unless there has been an error of law." Garfield, 732 F.2d at 607; see also Schnoll v. Harris, 636 F.2d 1146, 1150 (7th Cir. 1980).
In the present case, the ALJ found that the Plaintiff had not engaged in any substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date. At step two, the ALJ found that the Plaintiffs impairments were severe; however, the ALJ found that the Plaintiffs impairments did not meet or exceed one of the listed impairments under step three. Under step four, the ALJ found that the Plaintiff is unable to perform his past relevant work. However, under step five, the ALJ found that the Plaintiff was capable of performing a significant number of jobs in the regional economy prior to March 24, 1999, the date he was found to be disabled.
The Plaintiff contends that the ALJ's decision is not supported by substantial evidence because she (A) ignored and misrepresented favorable medical evidence which cuts against her Residual Functional Capacity ("RFC") determination, and (B) improperly assessed his credibility.
(A) The ALJ's RFC Determination
The Plaintiff argues that the ALJ's RFC determination is not supported by substantial evidence because she ignored and misrepresented favorable medical evidence. The Commissioner, in turn, claims substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision.
We begin our analysis with the simple observation that the ALJ must evaluate the record fairly. Golembiewski v. Barnhart, 322 F.3d 912, 917 (7th Cir. 2003). "Thus, although the ALJ need not discuss every piece of evidence in the record . . . [she] may not ignore an entire line of evidence that is contrary to the ruling. . . . Otherwise it is impossible for a reviewing court to tell whether the ALJ's decision rests upon substantial evidence." Id. (citations omitted); see also Johansen v. Barnhard, 314 F.3d 283, 287 (7th Cir. 2002); Sims v. Barnhard, 309 F.3d 424, 429 (7th Cir 2002). Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit counsels that "even a `sketchy opinion' is sufficient if it assures us that an ALJ considered the important evidence and enables us to trace its reasoning." Brindisi v. Barnhart, 315 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2003).
The Plaintiff first claims the ALJ ignored evidence related to nerve damage and pain in his lower left leg. Specifically the Plaintiff maintains the ALJ inadequately considered a 1995 myelogram CT scan which showed a herniated disc. However, our review of the record indicates that the ALJ adequately considered this evidence, after all she states that "[a]n October 24, 1995, C.T. scan of the claimant's lumbar spine revealed some mild edema of the left L5 root with a small herniated disc at the L4-L5 level caution minimal impression upon the nerve root, which was not amenable to surgery." (Tr. at 18) (emphasis added). Nevertheless, the Plaintiffs somehow claims that the ALJ completely ignored this evidence, and compares this case to Golembiewski, in which the Seventh Circuit reversed an ALJ who stated that the medical evidence revealed "no herniations" when in fact at least one doctor specifically diagnosed the claimant with "probable herniation." Golembiewski, 322 F.3d at 315. However, Golembiewski (at least this aspect of the case) is inapposite here. Indeed, the ALJ never claimed that the medical evidence revealed an absence of disc herniation, rather, as quoted above, she faithfully recounted the medical evidence as revealing a small herniated disc. (Tr. at 18).
The Plaintiff also complains that the ALJ relied too heavily on X-rays rather than this CT scan in assessing his RFC. However, the ALJ's failure to place the same importance on this evidence as the Plaintiff, does not make her decision unsupported by substantial evidence. Indeed, all that is required of the ALJ is to build "a bridge from the evidence to [her] conclusion." Sims, 309 F.3d at 429; Steele v. Barnhart, 290 F.3d 936, 941 (7th Cir. 2002). Such a bridge is present here because the ALJ acknowledged all of the evidence about which the Plaintiff complains. Sims, 309 F.3d at 429 (bridge built when ALJ acknowledge's evidence). Accordingly, the ALJ's RFC determination is supported by substantial evidence.
The Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ ignored statements by Dr. Holton which showed nerve damage. Specifically, the Plaintiff claims the ALJ ignored Dr. Holton's statements that he had "marked instability with heel toe walking," and that deep tendon reflexes were diminished, left ankle jerk was absent and sensory examination of the left leg showed apparent loss corresponding to the 51 dermatome. ( See Pl.'s Br. at 12) (citing Tr. at 195.) However, the ALJ clearly considered this evidence, stating "[t]he claimant evidenced rather marked instability with heel toe walking," and "[d]eep tendon reflexes were diminished throughout the extremities except for absent bilateral ankle jerks. Sensory examination revealed an apparent loss corresponding to the 51 dermatome of the left lower extremity with no apparent upper extremity losses." (Tr. at 18-19.) Accordingly, since the ALJ specifically considered this line of evidence, her decision is supported by substantial evidence. Golembiewski, 322 F.3d at 917.
Next, the Plaintiff complains that the ALJ ignored similar statements by Dr. Ros that the Plaintiff was unable to perform heel and toe walking, that knee jerk was negative to absent, and that he had a slow gait. (Pl.'s Br. at 12) (citing Tr. at 304-306.) However, once again the ALJ specifically considered this evidence, stating that "[the Plaintiffs] gait was slow" and "subjective allegations of pain were also reported as the reason for the claimant's inability to . . . walk on his heels, toes or tandemly." (Tr. at 19.) Accordingly, as above, we cannot say that the ALJ improperly ignored this evidence, and we find her decision on this point supported by substantial evidence. Golembiewski, 322 F.3d at 917.
The Plaintiff also disputes the ALJ's characterization of his range of motion testing as revealing "some reduced . . . range of motion." (Tr. at 22). Presumably the Plaintiff takes issue with the use of the indefinite modifier "some," because he lists four joints which demonstrated a reduced range of motion, and argues that they "hardly [represent] some reduced rage of motion." (Pl.'s Br. at 13.) However, we cannot say that the ALJ misstated the evidence, particularly given the fact that of the more than 30 joints tested, only the 4 identified by the Plaintiff showed a reduced range of motion. (Tr. at 305.) While the Plaintiff may want the ALJ to employ a more descriptive modifier, she is simply not required to laboriously transcribe the Plaintiffs complete medical records into her decision, or specifically detail the results of every single range of motion test. See, e.g., Johansen, 314 F.3d at 287. Thus, since the ALJ's statement that the Plaintiff had "some" reduced range of motion is entirely accurate and appropriate here, her decision is supported by substantial evidence.
Moreover, the Plaintiff claims the ALJ erred by not mentioning Dr. Ros's opinion that it would be difficult for the Plaintiff to work due to his impairments. However, because this really amounts to an opinion on the ultimate issue of disability (i.e., whether the Plaintiff is capable of performing work), which is specifically reserved for the ALJ, we see no error. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 (e)(1), (2); SSR 96-5p ("Medical sources often offer opinions about whether an individual who has applied for title II or title XVI disability benefits is `disabled' or `unable to work,' or make similar statements of opinions. . . . Because these are administrative findings that may determine whether an individual is disabled, they are reserved to the Commissioner.").
Next, the Plaintiff claims the ALJ failed to consider the effect his hip and knee problems had in combination with his degenerative disc disease. See Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 873 (7th Cir. 2000). To support this argument, the Plaintiff cites extensively to the range of motion testing that Dr. Holton performed in August 1998, which demonstrate that he had some difficulty flexing his legs fully.
However, we believe the ALJ adequately considered the combined effect the Plaintiffs knees, hips, and back may have had on his ability to work. Indeed, while the Plaintiff alleged that his knee condition amounted to a disability, the ALJ specifically considered and fully addressed the impact this condition had on his ability to work. Moreover, as will be addressed infra, there was no evidence alerting the ALJ that this condition impacted his other conditions.
As for his hip condition, an impairment never before alleged, the Plaintiff only cites to a few range of motion tests performed by Dr. Holton and Dr. Ros, and claims that this evidence should have alerted the ALJ that he had a hip condition and that it cumulatively impacted his ability to work. However, because the evidence regarding the Plaintiffs hips was insufficient to alert the ALJ to that condition, we see no error. Indeed, in Clifford, the Seventh Circuit found that even if a claimant has not claimed an ailment as an impairment in his the Disability Report, where "the evidence should have alerted the ALJ that [the claimant] had another relevant impairment that could contribute to the cumulative effect of [his] other impairments," then the ALJ should have considered it. Id. Specifically, the court in that case held that the ALJ should have considered the claimant's obesity because the record contained "numerous references" to her weight problem by examining physicians who noted that the claimant's obesity and excessive weight problem exacerbated her other impairments. Id.
In contrast, this case does not present a situation where the evidence should have alerted the ALJ that the Plaintiffs hip and knee conditions impacted his back condition. Specifically, the Plaintiff claims the ALJ should have scoured the somewhat voluminous record for any evidence that might tend to show that he has hip problems. However, the ALJ is not required to be clairvoyant. Indeed, not only did the Plaintiff never allege a hip impairment, but during the hour long hearing, the Plaintiff never once complained about his hips or knees, nor did he otherwise indicated that they cumulatively impacted his other impairments. And while the Plaintiff had some reduced range of motion in his hips and knees, ( see Tr. at 197 305), no physician ever commented on the aggravating effect they had on his other conditions. Accordingly. because the evidence was insufficient to alert the ALJ that the Plaintiff had aggravating hip and knee conditions, the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence. See Clifford, 227 F.3d at 873.
The Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ failed to consider the fact that his back condition deteriorated around the time he was laid off for non-disability related reasons. (Pl.'s Br. at 14.) Specifically, he notes that some X-rays from 1997 showed "mild to moderate" osteoarthritis at the L4-L5, which apparently was worse than what a 1995 exam revealed. However, a "mild or moderate" condition certainly does not indicated that the Plaintiff was "disabled" as of 1997, the alleged onset date. Because the ALJ accurately reviewed and considered this evidence, and built a logical bridge between the evidence and the conclusion, her decision on this point is supported by substantial evidence. Sims, 309 F.3d at 429
Finally, the Plaintiff claims the ALJ erred in considering his efforts to find medium to heavy work as some indication that he could likely perform light work. Indeed, the Plaintiff points out that a claimant's desire to work does not necessarily imply an ability to work. See Biri v. Apfel, 4 F. Supp.2d 1276, 1279 (D. Kan. 1998) (in dicta). While this proposition can certainly be true, in this instance the Plaintiff sought out heavy work capacity jobs that are far more physically demanding than a gate guard or storage facility rental clerk, two positions the ALJ felt the Plaintiff could perform. What this means is that because the work the Plaintiff sought was so much more taxing than the positions the ALJ identified, the record supports her implication, and the ALJ did not err in considering this evidence as part of determining disability. See Golembiewski, 322 F.3d at 917.
Accordingly, the ALJ's RFC finding is supported by substantial evidence.
B. The ALJ's Credibility Determination
Next the Plaintiff contends that the ALJ's decision finding his testimony incredible was improper.
The Seventh Circuit has repeatedly held that an ALJ's credibility determination will not be overturned so long as the decision has some support in the record and is not patently wrong. Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 887 (7th Cir. 2001); Diaz v. Chater, 55 F.3d 300, 308 (7th Cir. 1994); Herron v. Shalala, 19 F.3d 329, 335 (7th Cir. 1994). After all, a credibility determination often involves inarticulable elements that "leave no trace that can be discerned in this or any other transcript." Herron, 19 F.3d at 335 (quoting Ehrhart v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 969 F.2d 534, 541 (7th Cir. 1992). Nevertheless, when credibility determinations "rest on objective factors or fundamental implausibilities rather than subjective considerations such as a claimant's demeanor," courts have greater freedom to review ALJ decisions. Clifford, 227 F.3d at 872 (quoting Herron, 19 F.3d at 335).
One reason the ALJ gave for discounting the Plaintiffs testimony was his allegation that in 1995, Dr. Ungemach told him that continued truck driving could result in paralysis. However, as the ALJ correctly observed, no medical evidence from Dr. Ungemach even remotely suggests that he said this, and, in fact, it suggests the opposite. Indeed, Dr. Ungemach's records from March 5, 1999, indicate that while all the Plaintiff does each day is read and watch television, he appears to be capable of doing much more, particularly since his range of motion was nearly normal. (Tr. at 225). In fact, Dr. Undemach noted that there was simply "no objective evidence that [the Plaintiff] has anything wrong with his back" at all. (Tr. at 226). Thus, given the ALJ's subjective assessment of the Plaintiffs testimony and this evidence which strongly implies that Dr. Undemach never made such statement, we believe the ALJ's credibility assessment is supported by substantial evidence.
Finally, the Plaintiff criticizes the ALJ for discounting his testimony based on the ALJ's perception that he had misrepresented his work record and education. Apparently, this issue arises because at one point the Plaintiff told a VA vocational counselor that he went to college for broadcasting and journalism and worked in broadcasting, but his work record does not reflect any such work or even that he received a college education. The Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should not have relied on his work record since it only went back to 1983. However, since the evidence does not support the Plaintiffs testimony and the Plaintiff has not pointed to any other evidence, we must conclude that the ALJ properly discounted the Plaintiffs testimony on this point. See 96-7p.
Accordingly, the ALJ's credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, because the decision of the ALJ is supported by substantial evidence, it is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.