Opinion
No. FST CV 05 4004598
November 22, 2005
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Claude Young (claimant) applied for unemployment compensation benefits after his employment with his former employer, LA Limousine, Inc. (employer), ended on July 20, 2004. The claimant had been working for this employer for approximately seven months as a limousine driver. Pursuant to General Statutes § 31-222 et seq., the administrator of the Unemployment Compensation Act (administrator) determined, in a decision dated November 19, 2004, that the claimant left his employment voluntarily without good cause attributable to the employer, and therefore was ineligible to receive unemployment compensation benefits.
In accordance with General Statutes §§ 31-241 and 31-242, the claimant appealed the administrator's decision to the employment security appeals division on November 19, 2004, where it was referred to an appeals referee for a hearing de novo. The appeals referee made the following factual findings: (1) the administrator's decision regarding denial of benefits was mailed to the claimant on October 27, 2004; (2) the claimant filed his appeal on November 19, 2004; and (3) the claimant's excuse for his late filing, that he believed that weekends, Saturdays and Sundays, did not count in calculating the number of days, twenty-one, in which to take an appeal did not constitute "good cause" for a late filing.
In a decision dated December 9, 2004, Appeals Referee Green dismissed the claimant's appeal on the ground that she lacked jurisdiction to decide the appeal because of the late filing. The referee pointed out that "the bottom portion of the Administrator's decision contained a bold print advisement listing November 17, 2004 as the last day to file a timely appeal, [thus] the claimant was sufficiently notified of his need to act." This notice stated that: "To be timely filed, your appeal must be received by the Employment Security Division or postmarked not later than November 17, 2004."
The claimant appealed this decision to the Employment Security Appeals Division Board of Review (board) in accordance with General Statutes § 31-249. In a decision dated February 1, 2005, the board adopted the referee's conclusion that she lacked jurisdiction to decide the appeal and ruled that the claimant had not offered any reason for the late appeal which would satisfy the requirement of good cause. The board also noted that the decision of the administrator contained a notice of the right to appeal in bold and enlarged print indicating that the claimant must file his appeal to the referee by November 17, 2004. The board stated that it had consistently ruled that "a party has not acted diligently in failing to read the notice of appeal rights."
The claimant, referred to hereafter as the plaintiff, appeals to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 31-249b, alleging that he had good cause for not filing a timely appeal of the administrator's decision, i.e., that he had never been made aware that in counting the twenty-one days in which to appeal the administrator's decision, calendar days were counted and weekends were not excluded. The board filed a certified return of record, and a hearing was held before this court on August 5, 2005.
Practice Book § 22-9(a) provides, in pertinent part, that: "Such appeals are heard by the court upon the certified copy of the record filed by the board. The court does not retry the facts or hear evidence. It considers no evidence other than that certified to it by the board and then for the limited purpose of determining whether the finding should be corrected, or whether there was any evidence to support in law the conclusions reached. It cannot review the conclusions of the board when these depend upon the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses." Subsection (b) further provides that: "Corrections by the court of the board's findings will only be made upon the refusal to find a material fact which was an admitted or undisputed fact, upon the finding of a fact in language of doubtful meaning so that its real significance may not clearly appear, or upon the finding of a material fact without evidence."
"[T]he purpose of the unemployment compensation act is to provide income for the worker earning nothing because he is out of work through no fault or act of his own . . ." (Citations omitted.) Cervantes v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 177 Conn. 132, 136, 411 A.2d 921 (1979). "[T]he [unemployment compensation] act is remedial and, consequently, should be liberally construed in favor of its beneficiaries . . . Indeed, the legislature underscored its intent by expressly mandating that the act shall be construed, interpreted and administered in such manner as to presume coverage, eligibility and nondisqualifaction in doubtful cases. General Statutes § 31-274©." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted). Methodic Museum-Methodic Historical Society v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 238 Conn. 273, 278, 679 A.2d 347 (1996).
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has indicated that this court has a limited role when reviewing an unemployment compensation appeal. "To the extent that an administrative appeal, pursuant to General Statutes § 31-249b, concerns findings of fact, a court is limited to a review of the record certified and filed by the board of review. The court must not retry the facts nor hear evidence . . . If, however, the issue is one of law, the court has the broader responsibility of determining whether the administrative action resulted from an incorrect application of the law to the facts found or could not reasonably or logically have followed from such facts. Although the court may not substitute its own conclusions for those of the administrative board, it retains the ultimate obligation to determine whether the administrative action was unreasonable, arbitrary, illegal or an abuse of discretion." (Citations omitted.) United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 209 Conn. 381, 385-86, 551 A.2d 724 (1988).
General Statutes § 31-241(a) provides in pertinent part that a decision of the administrator shall be "final" unless an appeal is taken therefrom "within twenty-one calendar days after such notification was mailed to [the appealing party's] last-known address," unless the "filing party shows good cause, as defined in regulations adopted pursuant to Section 31-249h, for the late filing." General Statutes § 31-249h requires the board to promulgate regulations defining "good cause" relating to the timeliness of filing appeals.
In response to General Statutes § 31-249h, the board of review enacted Section 31-237g-15 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies, which provides that the late filing of an appeal to a referee may be excused "if a reasonably prudent individual under the same or similar circumstances would have been prevented from filing a timely appeal. In determining whether good cause has been shown, the referee shall consider all relevant factors, including but not limited to: (i) The extent to which the party has demonstrated diligence in its previous dealings with [the] administrator and the employment security appeals division; (ii) Whether the party was represented; (iii) The degree of the party's familiarity with the procedures of the appeals division; iv) Whether the party received timely and adequate notice of the need to act; (v) Administrative error by the administrator or employment security appeals division; or the failure of the administrator, the appeals division, or any other party to discharge its responsibilities; (vi) Factors outside the control of the party which prevented a timely action; (vii) The party's physical or mental impairment; (viii) Whether the party acted diligently in filing an appeal once the reason for the late filing no longer existed; (ix) Where there is substantial prejudice to an adverse party which prevents such party from adequately presenting its case, the total length of time that the action was untimely; x) coercion or intimidation which prevented the party from promptly filing its appeal[;] (xi) Good faith error, provided that in determining whether good faith error constitutes good cause[,] the referee shall consider the extent of prejudice to any other party, any prior history of late filing due to such error, whether the appeal is excessively late, and whether the party otherwise acted with due diligence."
"[A]ppeals within the unemployment compensation system must be taken in a timely fashion and, if they are not they come `too late' for review." Gumbs v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 9 Conn.App. 131, 133, 517 A.2d 257 (1986). In the present case, the board determined that the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate good cause for the delayed appeal, based on the factors enumerated in the regulations. The board's conclusion that the plaintiff did not file his appeal in a timely fashion was within the board's competence and should not be disturbed. "[T]he Superior Court does not retry the facts or hear evidence in appeals under our unemployment compensation legislation. Rather, it acts as an appellate court to review the record certified and filed by the board of review." Finkenstein v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 192 Conn. 104, 112, 470 A.2d 1196 (1984). "[O]ur standard of review in administrative proceedings must allow for judicial scrutiny of claims such as constitutional error, jurisdictional error, or error in the construction of an agency's authorizing statute." Id., 113.
Neither the board or this court has jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff's appeal. Without the requisite jurisdiction, this court is powerless to act. "[W]henever a court discovers that it has no jurisdiction, it is bound to dismiss the case, without regard to previous rulings." In re Judicial Inquiry No. 85-01, 221 Conn. 625, 629, 605 A.2d 545 (1992).
The court finds, on the basis of the certified record, that the defendant board was justified in the conclusion it reached concerning the late filing of an appeal to the referee. Therefore, the board's motion (#101) for judgment dated June 30, 2005 is granted, and judgment hereby enters dismissing the plaintiff's appeal.
So Ordered.