Summary
renewing contract dispute involving claims and counterclaim over damages from ar oil well project in Louisiana and holding that both parties’ claims required Texas court to adjudicate title to Louisiana mineral rights, so Texas court had no subject matter jurisdiction
Summary of this case from Bauer v. Braxton Minerals III, LLCOpinion
No. 06-16-00056-CV
06-16-2017
GARY A. YORK, Appellant v. OLEUM OPERATING COMPANY, L.C., Appellee
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2 Gregg County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2011-1933-CCL2 Before Morriss, C.J., Moseley and Burgess, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Oleum Operating Company, L.C., and Gary A. York were joint working interest owners in various oil and gas leases in Calcasieu Parish, Louisiana, including the C Lease in the East Bell City Field. York owned a five percent working interest in, and Oleum operated the C-2 well subject to, the C Lease. Under the governing JOA, Oleum could propose a project on a lease with specific costs to be shared proportionately by joint working interest owners, but, if a joint owner did not timely opt in and assume the appropriate share of the costs, that joint owner would no longer participate in that particular lease.
A property records assignment showed that York owned a 0.03750 net revenue interest in the C Lease pursuant to the Joint Operating Agreement (JOA).
The JOA is dated May 9, 2005, and applies to the C Lease in East Bell City Field in Calcasieu Parish, Louisiana.
York sued Oleum in the County Court at Law of Gregg County, Texas, seeking to recover from Oleum net revenue interest payments in the C-2 well, and Oleum counterclaimed seeking return of costs. After a jury trial, the trial court rendered judgment against York. On appeal, because York's lawsuit and the counterclaim both required the trial court to determine if York had an ownership interest in the Louisiana real property, we conclude that the trial court was without jurisdiction to render the judgment. We, therefore, vacate the judgment and dismiss this case for lack of jurisdiction.
The provision in the JOA that is key to the dispute between York and Oleum requires that a party who desires to join in the cost of reworking a well to notify the party wishing to do the work—within thirty days of receiving notice of the proposed operation—of their desire to participate in the cost of the operation. Failure to respond to the notice of operation within the thirty-day time frame constitutes an election under the JOA by the non-responding party not to participate in the cost of the operation. A party who elects not to participate in the cost of the operation (non-consenting party) is deemed to have relinquished any interest in the borehole to the parties who consented to the operation. The dispute here centers on whether York relinquished his interest in the C-2 well by failure to respond to a notice by Oleum of its intent to rework the well.
"Party" is defined as a party to the JOA.
The JOA provides,
Should any party hereto desire to . . . rework, deepen, or plug back a dry hole drilled at the joint expense of all parties or a well jointly owned by all the parties and not then producing in paying quantities, the party desiring to drill, rework, deepen or plug back such a well shall give the other parties written notice of the proposed operation, specifying the work to be performed, the location, the proposed depth, objective formation and the estimated cost of the operation. The parties receiving such a notice shall have thirty (30) days after receipt of the notice within which to notify the party wishing to do the work whether they elect to participate in the cost of the proposed operation. . . . Failure of a party receiving such notice to reply within the period above fixed shall constitute an election by that party not to participate in the cost of the proposed operation.
. . . .
Upon commencement of operations for the drilling, reworking, deepening or plugging back of any such well by consenting Parties in accordance with the provisions of this Article, each Non-consenting Party shall be deemed to have relinquished to Consenting Parties, and the Consenting Parties shall own and be entitled to receive an assignment in proportion to their respective interests from the Nonconsenting parties in the borehole, and the use of sufficient acreage for an unrestricted production under the rules and regulations of the Conservation Commission in the State of Louisiana.
By letter dated November 18, 2008, Oleum advised York of its intention to recomplete the C-2 well and that York's share of the anticipated expenses necessary for the recompletion of the well was $2,990.00 (the cash call). In response to the cash call, York sent Oleum a check dated November 30, 2008, for his share of the recompletion costs in the amount of $2,900.00. York explained that the ninety-dollar shortfall in the amount of the check was simply an oversight. York thereafter received a letter from Oleum stating that one of the cash call checks had been received, that Oleum could no longer "afford to be a bank for any individual," and that "all cash calls must be paid." The letter further indicated that York's November joint interest billing statement reflected a balance of $2,077.02 and that the $2,900.00 check was applied toward that balance. Finally, the letter stated that Oleum would await payment on the cash call for the C-2 well, that it understood that York wanted to continue in the C-2, but that the cash call funds should be paid "before Christmas in order for [York's] continued ownership." York did not send Oleum additional funds, and in January 2009, Oleum advised York that he was no longer a participant in the C-2 well.
By letter dated November 17, 2008, Oleum advised York of a cash call on a different well on the C Lease—the C-8 well— in the amount of $2,538.25.
The $2,900.00 check was applied to York's joint interest billing for lease operating expenses on other wells that were unpaid, as permitted by the JOA.
The letter, dated January 15, 2009, to York from Mike Snell stated, "I never heard from you regard ing my letter of December 9, 2008, so we have made the appropriate changes to your status on the C-2. This check reflects that change."
According to Mike Snell, the managing member of Oleum, York was removed from the C-2 well because he failed to consent to participate in the cost of reworking the well. Snell testified that there is no dispute that, before the November 18 cash call, York owned five percent of the working interest in the C-2 well. He further testified that, if York had called him in January, "he would be in the C-2 today" if he had directed Snell to apply $2,900.00 to the cash call on the C-2 well.
In the spring of 2009, York contacted Snell and requested that he be permitted to continue to participate in the C-2 well. When that request was rejected, York filed suit against Oleum for breach of contract to recover the five percent net revenue generated by the C-2 well from December 2008. York also alleged that he purchased working interests in other Louisiana leases and that, although York requested written assignments from Oleum for these working interests, Oleum failed and refused to provide York with the requested assignments, among other things. York therefore alleged that Oleum breached the JOA by failing to deliver all written assignments for working interests he owned in wells other than the C-2 well, for which York had a proper assignment. York sought delivery of those requested assignments.
In response, Oleum filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction claiming that, because York was seeking to adjudicate title to realty in Louisiana, the Texas court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction. The trial court issued a letter ruling stating, in essence, that, because York amended his petition to remove the request seeking the delivery of assignments of working interests in Louisiana wells, and because the "crux" of the remaining claims was for monetary damages, it had subject-matter jurisdiction and refused Oleum's request to dismiss the case.
At trial, York testified that he is "seeking damages of a working interest in Louisiana."
Oleum thereafter filed a counterclaim against York for failure to pay debts York owed to Oleum, and the case proceeded to trial. The jury determined that Oleum did not breach the JOA and that York owed Oleum $47,927.72 on its counterclaim. The trial court entered judgment in accordance with the jury's verdict.
The parties submitted all issues regarding attorney fees to the trial court. The trial court issued a letter ruling on March 2, 2016, in which it denied Oleum's attorney fee claim based on Oleum's failure to make a presentment of the total claim submitted to the jury. That letter ruling was incorporated into the May 6, 2016, final judgment.
On appeal, York claims—in a reversal of position—that the trial court incorrectly denied Oleum's motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because a finding for or against York required a determination of whether he owned a working interest in the C-2 well. York therefore contends that we should vacate the trial court's judgment and dismiss this appeal. Oleum likewise has reversed its position, claiming that the trial court had jurisdiction to resolve the dispute. It further contends that, even if the trial court lacked jurisdiction over York's claim, it nevertheless had jurisdiction to decide Oleum's counterclaim, and that we should therefore affirm the judgment in Oleum's favor. On cross-appeal, Oleum claims that the trial court erred in denying its claim for attorney fees based on a lack of presentment, and it asks that we reverse the attorney fee judgment and render an award of attorney fees in the amount of $151,664.90.
York maintains that his claim for damages resulting from a breach of the JOA required the adjudication of his title to a share of the working interest in the C-2 well. That is, if York properly participated in the cost of reworking the C-2 well, he still owned his five percent net revenue interest in that well and was entitled to damages. If, however, York did not participate in the cost of reworking the C-2 well, he no longer owned any interest in that well under the JOA, and he was not entitled to damages. Stated differently, York contends that, because he could not prevail on his claim for damages without proving he owned a working interest and attendant net revenue interest in the C-2 well after December 2008, this case necessarily involved the adjudication of his title to real property. York therefore contends that his action was local in nature and could have been brought only in Louisiana. Conversely, Oleum claims that York's breach of contract claim is transitory and is, therefore, within the trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction.
(a) The Trial Court Did Not Have Jurisdiction to Adjudicate Title to Realty
Whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de novo. Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). A trial court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate title to realty, including interests in oil and gas leases, in another state or country. Devon Energy Prod. Co., L.P. v. KCS Res., LLC, 450 S.W.3d 203, 216 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.); see Trutec Oil & Gas, Inc. v. W. Atlas Int'l, Inc., 194 S.W.3d 580, 583 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.). "[I]nterests in oil and gas rights—such as working interests and royalty interests in oil and gas leases—are considered interests in real property," and "the general prohibition against determining rights in real property located in other states or countries extends to rights in oil and gas leases in other states or countries." Trutec Oil & Gas, Inc., 197 S.W.3d at 583; see Kelly Oil Co., Inc. v. Svetlik, 975 S.W.2d 762, 764 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1998, pet. denied). If, however, "the crux of the action does not hinge on resolution of issues specific to the land, but on conduct of the person, then the cause should be deemed transitory." Greenpeace, Inc. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 133 S.W.3d 804, 809 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, pet. denied). Ultimately, "[t]o determine the extent to which title and possession are involved, we look to the 'nature of the suit, the injury complained of, and the relief sought.'" Merit Mgmt. Partners I, L.P. v. Noelke, 266 S.W.3d 637, 649 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, no pet.) (quoting Dauenhauer v. Devine, 51 Tex. 480, 487 (1879)).
This case hinges on the resolution of issues specific to York's ownership interest in the C-2 well. York's live pleading at the time of trial is instructive. In it, York claims that, in 2008, he was a working interest owner in oil and gas leases in Calcasieu Parish, Louisiana, and that Oleum was a joint working interest owner and operator of the "C Lease," which included the C-2 well. York alleges that he sent "his check number 1230 dated November 30, 2008[,] to pay his share of the C-2 workover expense, marking on the check that he intended for it to be applied to the C-2 Well on his Oleum account number 17000." York further claimed that he sent the referenced check well within the thirty-day period prescribed by the JOA to respond to a proposal to participate in a reworking operation and that, "after misappropriating" the referenced check, "Oleum removed the C-2 Well from York's joint interest billing statements." Consequently, York complained that, "[s]ince December, 2008[,] Oleum has failed and refused to pay York any net profit from the sale of oil and gas from the C-2 well despite York's timely payment of his share of the cost of recompleting the C-2 in December, 2008." York thus claimed that he was damaged in an amount equal to five percent of the net profit from the C-2 well and that he should have received five percent net profit from the C-2 well since December 2008. At trial and on appeal, Oleum maintains that York did not own an interest in the C-2 well after December 2008, since he failed to participate in the cost of reworking that well. In its claim for offset, Oleum asserted that, "if . . . York prevails on his breach-of-contract claim, then . . . York owns an interest in the C-2 well and therefore owes his share of costs and expenses on" that well.
These pleadings are premised on the notion that York's ownership interest in the C-2 well is determinative of the issue of whether Oleum owes York monetary compensation. To resolve this issue, the fact-finder was necessarily required to determine whether York owned a five percent working interest in the C-2 well after December 2008. Moreover, the JOA unequivocally states that each non-consenting party "shall be deemed to have relinquished to Consenting Parties, and the Consenting Parties shall own and be entitled to receive an assignment in proportion to their respective interests from the Nonconsenting parties in the borehole." Based on this language, if York did not participate in the cost of reworking the C-2 well, he was automatically deemed to have relinquished his interest in that well to the consenting parties, who would own the interest on such relinquishment. The fact that the consenting parties are entitled to an assignment of such a relinquished interest is merely a formality to document ownership that automatically transferred to the consenting parties.
Although the phrase "non-consenting party" is not defined in the JOA, by context it is clear that a non-consenting party is one who does not elect to participate in the cost of the proposed operation within the allotted time.
We find Trutec instructive here. In that case, Trutec and Moni Pulo, a Nigerian company, entered into a consultancy agreement pursuant to which Trutec agreed to perform certain services relating to an oil prospecting license in exchange for ten percent "of equity and . . . of buying in fees realised [sic] in [the license] and any leases granted therefrom." Trutec Oil & Gas, Inc., 194 S.W.3d at 582. Moni Pulo thereafter entered into a joint venture with Brass Exploration, which obtained an oil and gas lease related to the oil prospecting license. Id. Trutec filed suit against Moni Pulo and Brass Exploration, among others, alleging that it was entitled to a "10% . . . undivided participating interest in [the lease] granted to [Moni Pulo] . . . ." Id. That lawsuit, filed in Nigeria, was ultimately dismissed. Id.
Trutec then filed suit in Harris County, Texas, against the same defendants, alleging various theories of recovery, including breach of contract, conversion, unfair business practices, breach of fiduciary duty, and civil conspiracy based on its agreement with Moni Pulo. Id. Trutec also sought an accounting, a constructive trust, and declaratory relief. Id. at 583. The trial court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Id.
On appeal, Trutec acknowledged, as does Oleum in this case, the general prohibition against Texas courts adjudicating interests in non-Texas property, but argued the general rule did not apply. As Oleum claims in this case, Trutec insisted that its breach of contract claim—among others not applicable here—was "only tangentially related to the real property." Id. at 583-84. After analyzing Trutec's pleadings and the evidence, our sister court recognized that "Trutec's core complaint throughout is that it has been wrongfully deprived of its interest in" the oil producing license and the resulting oil and gas lease. Id. at 585. Our sister court reasoned that Trutec was arguing it received a ten percent interest in an oil and gas lease but had not seen any of the fruits of the ten percent interest. Id. at 588. In order to reach the merits of its claims, the trial court would have had to determine if Trutec had an ownership interest in the real property outside of Texas. Id. at 591.
Trutec alleged that "Moni Pulo conveyed to Plaintiffs a 10% interest in all oil and hydrocarbons produced from block Oil Prospecting License 230" and that "[t]he failure of the Defendants to pay Plaintiffs on and after March 1999 their 10% caused Plaintiffs a legal injury and damage for which it seeks redress." Trutec, 194 S.W.3d at 585-86.
In reaching this conclusion, our sister court disagreed with Trutec's position that the "principal relief [it] requested was the trial court's determination of issues arising from an agreement . . . , not issues specific to Nigerian real property." Id. at 588. According to Trutec, in order to provide the relief sought, the trial court needed only to "construe the terms of the agreement and to consider Appellee's actions related to the agreement." Id. While the court noted that "Trutec's brief was well-crafted and Trutec did its best to distance its suit from the general rule that Texas courts cannot adjudicate interests and title in non-Texas real property," it still concluded that the general rule applied to Trutec's claims. Id. at 591.
Here, as in Trutec, York is not entitled to the "net profit from the sale of oil and gas from the C-2 well" unless York had an ownership interest in the C-2 well. This conclusion is likewise supported by Kelly Oil. In that case, Svetlik received an assignment of an overriding royalty interest applied to leases in Mississippi. Kelly Oil, 975 S.W.2d at 763. When Svetlik ceased to receive royalty payments on the leases due to termination by cessation of operations clauses found within the underlying leases, he sued to recover his royalty payments. Id. at 763-64. Our sister court recognized that "the validity of Svetlik's claims hinged on a finding that the original oil and gas leases through which Svetlik claimed, were still in existence." Id. at 764. If those leases were still in existence, then "Svetlik remain[ed] the owner of an overriding royalty under the original oil and gas leases via the assignment." If, however, "the original leases expired on their own terms due to the absence of production or operations," Svetlik's royalty interest was terminated. Id. Consequently, the outcome of the lawsuit depended on a determination of who owned the title to a real property interest. Id. The court explained,
Contrary to the manner in which Svetlik pleaded his claims, his lawsuit is not one for breach of contract or conversion. While it is true that an oil and gas lease is a contract in the sense that it is a conveyance of realty on terms and conditions which may be contractual in nature, Svetlik's claim for breach of contract admittedly depends on a finding that he is the owner of an overriding royalty under the original oil and gas leases.Id. As such, the court lacked jurisdiction over the merits of Svetlik's claim. Id. This reasoning applies to York's claims as well. See Renwar Oil Corp. v. Lancaster, 276 S.W.2d 774, 776 (1955) (suit is for recovery of interest in land despite being cast as one for declaratory judgment); Prairie Producing Co. v. Angelina Hardwood Lumber Co., 882 S.W.2d 640, 647 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1994), modified on reh'g, 885 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1994, writ denied) ("A Texas jury cannot do indirectly what the law prohibits it from doing directly, i.e., a jury cannot award damages based on its own determination of title to foreign realty."); Carmichael v. Delta Drilling Co., 243 S.W.2d 458, 460 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1951, writ ref'd) (plaintiffs' claim for proceeds from oil sales not severable from underlying dispute regarding existence of alleged ownership in an oil and gas lease located outside Texas); see also Merit Mgmt. Partners I, L.P. v. Noelke, 266 S.W.3d 637, 649-50 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, no pet.) (noting that "suit for the 'recovery of land' is a suit that determines title" and that dispute over existence of easement "necessarily involved the trial of title to real estate" (quoting Coughran v. Nunez, 127 S.W.2d 885, 887 (Tex. 1939))).
In Carmichael, the parties entered into a joint operating agreement whereby Delta Drilling Company furnished former company employees with two drilling rigs to drill for oil and gas outside of the State of Texas. Carmichael, 243 S.W.2d at 458. Delta and the former employees signed a joint operating agreement which provided for the division of production profits. The former employees sued Delta, claiming that they were not paid their share of the profits and that they entered into an oral agreement with Delta to convey an undivided one-fourth interest in an Indiana lease. Id. at 459. The former employees sought an accounting for the oil produced from the lease and for specific performance to convey the interest in the lease to them. Id. This Court held that, "to determine the rights of appellants . . ., it would have been necessary for the trial court to try the title" to the Indiana leasehold, "since their allegations amount to a claim by them of a present equitable title to an undivided one-fourth interest in said lease, as distinguished from an equitable right to title." Id. at 460.
We, therefore, conclude that York's suit requires the adjudication of property interests outside the State of Texas. Consequently, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case and erred in failing to dismiss it for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Trutec, 194 S.W.3d at 588; Kelly Oil, 975 S.W.2d at 764; Carmichael, 243 S.W.2d at 460.
(b) The Trial Court Did Not have Jurisdiction over Oleum's Counterclaim Against York
Oleum's counterclaim against York was filed as a partial breach of contract and a suit on account, but was submitted to the jury on the account theory only. The basis of Oleum's claim was York's account with Oleum, which included a number of different wells in which York owned a share of the working interest. For several years before December 2008, that account included the C-2 well. After December 2008, York's Oleum account did not include the C-2 well. York claims that the trial court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over this counterclaim because York was entitled to have Oleum prove that it had properly deprived him of his interest in the C-2 well in order for the account to be accurate and the prices charged to be just and true. He contends that Oleum could not prove its entitlement to the damages it recovered on York's account from the operations of a number of wells, including the C-2 well, without proving when York was properly included in that well and when he was properly excluded from the well. This proof, claims York, requires the same analysis as York's damage claim against Oleum.
On the other hand, Oleum claims that the requirement to swear that all lawful offsets have been applied is merely a pleading requirement intended to relieve a party of its evidentiary burden. See Prompt Prof'l v. RSC Equip. Rental, Inc., No. 05-08-00398-CV, 2009 WL 1211810, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 5, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.). That case, however, involved a suit on a sworn account in which the plaintiff attached a proper affidavit in support of its petition in accordance with the requirements of Rule 185 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at *1. In response, the defendant filed a verified denial specifically denying that the amount of the account was due and that all just and lawful offsets, payments, and credits had been allowed. Id. In that scenario,
after the evidentiary presumption created by rule 185 is "destroyed" by a sworn denial, a plaintiff seeking summary judgment in a suit on account is required to prove three elements: (1) the sale or delivery of goods, wares, or merchandise, (2) that the amount of the account is "just"-for [sic] example, the prices charged are pursuant to an express agreement, and (3) that the outstanding amount remains unpaid.Id. at *3 (citing Powers v. Adams, 2 S.W.3d 496, 499 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet). Given this statement of the law, Oleum contends that it was required to prove only the foregoing three elements and that it was not required to prove that all just and lawful offsets had been applied. That burden, it contends, was on York. Oleum's live pleading at the time of trial stated a counterclaim as a suit on account, as follows:
45. Oleum provided goods and services to York on account in the form of developing and operating various wells in which York owned or owns an interest. York accepted these goods and services and became bound to pay his proportionate share of development and operating costs.
46. The prices charged are just and true because they were according to a contract or because they were the usual, customary, and reasonable prices.
47. The charges were kept in a systematic record in the form of monthly billing statements regularly sent to Gary York.
48. All lawful offsets, payments, and credits have been applied to the account.This claim, however, was not supported by an affidavit of Oleum, its agent, or its attorney taken before an officer authorized to administer oaths. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 185. Consequently, these allegations were not prima facie evidence of Oleum's claim. See id. In this scenario, Oleum contends that it did not have the burden to prove that all lawful offsets applied to the account, claiming instead that York was required to prove whatever offsets were due. Here, the court's charge to the jury resolved this issue. The jury was asked the following question, which it answered in the affirmative:
49. The account remains unpaid.
50. The damages are liquidated.
Did Oleum Operating Company, L.C.[,] provide goods and services to Gary York, charge prices to Gary York that were just and true, and keep an accurate account of its transactions with Gary York, and did Gary York fail to pay the account balance?The jury was specifically asked if Oleum kept an accurate account of its transactions with York and was instructed that an accurate account of transactions requires keeping a "systematic record of the transactions, and all offset, payments and credits must be applied to the account." So, in order to prove that it was entitled to recover on its counterclaim, under the charge of the court as submitted, Oleum had to prove that all offsets were applied. And, those offsets necessarily included amounts related to the C-2 well. Oleum therefore was required to show when York was properly excluded from the well. Oleum acknowledged as much in its own claim for offset when it stated that, "if . . . York prevails on his breach-of-contract claim, then . . . York owns an interest in the C-2 well and therefore owes his share of costs and expenses on" that well. The converse is also true—if York did not prevail on his breach of contract claim, then York did not own an interest in the C-2 well and therefore did not owe Oleum any payments related to the C-2 well.
Prices are just and true when (1) the prices are charged according to the terms of a contract, or (2) the prices are the usual[,] customary, and reasonable prices, if there was no contract.
For a party to keep an accurate account of transactions, it must keep systematic record of the transactions, and all offset, payments[,] and credits must be applied to the account.
Oleum further claims that, because the burden was on York to prove any claim of offset, that claim was a "counter-counterclaim" and not an affirmative defense. It then argues that, because York's "counter-counterclaim" may not be used to deprive a trial court of jurisdiction, the trial court had jurisdiction over Oleum's counterclaim.
The jury also concluded that the prices charged to York were "just and true." The trial court instructed the jury that prices are just and true when the prices are charged according to the terms of a contract. In this instance, the contract was the JOA, which included language, as previously discussed, providing that a non-consenting party was automatically deemed to have relinquished his interest in the well to the consenting parties.
Either way, the proper measure of Oleum's counterclaim damages requires the same determination of York's ownership interest in the C-2 well as did York's claim against Oleum. We, therefore, conclude that the trial court likewise did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over Oleum's counterclaim against York. See Kelly Oil, 975 S.W.2d at 764.
Because we conclude that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to hear the entirety of the case below, we do not address the parties' remaining points of error.
Because we conclude that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to address the merits of York's claim against Oleum as well as Oleum's counterclaim against York, we vacate the trial court's judgment and dismiss the case. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2.
Josh R. Morriss, III
Chief Justice Date Submitted: April 4. 2017
Date Decided: June 16, 2017