Opinion
NO. 2015-CA-001562-MR NO. 2016-CA-000178-MR
12-09-2016
PAUL DWAYNE YORK APPELLANT v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Paul Dwayne York, pro se Pineville, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Perry T. Ryan Frankfort, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED APPEAL FROM MASON CIRCUIT COURT
HON. JAY B. DELANEY, SPECIAL JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO. 88-CR-00006-002 APPEAL FROM BRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HON. JAY B. DELANEY, SPECIAL JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO. 88-CR-00003 OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: DIXON, J. LAMBERT AND NICKELL. DIXON, JUDGE: Paul Dwayne York appeals from the Mason Circuit Court's order entered September 16, 2015 and the Bracken Circuit Court's order entered December 30, 2015. Both orders deny duplicate motions to seal criminal records that were previously segregated pursuant to KRS 17.142. We affirm the circuit courts.
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
In early March, 1988, the appellant Paul Dwayne York and his co-defendant, William Frederick Turner, were charged with multiple counts of burglary in Bracken, Fleming, and Mason Counties, Kentucky. Following a jury trial on September 1, 1988, York was acquitted of the charges in Bracken County. In Mason County, however, York was found guilty on the charge of second-degree burglary and of being a first-degree persistent felony offender. York was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment for the Mason County offenses, but the Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed his conviction on the basis of insufficient evidence. The Mason Circuit Court granted a motion on October 15, 1991, for segregation of York's criminal records for that reversed conviction, pursuant to KRS 17.142. On October 16, 1991, the Bracken Circuit Court granted a similar motion to segregate records relating to York's not-guilty verdict.
Pursuant to KRS 431.076, York filed motions to expunge criminal records relating to his indictments on May 22, 1999 (Bracken County) and on May 25, 1999 (Mason County). The circuit courts denied the motions to expunge, and a panel of this Court affirmed these denials in a consolidated appeal. Taking a different approach, York filed motions on May 26, 2015 (Mason County) and on October 20, 2015 (Bracken County), to seal the records of these cases, arguing that the courts were required by statute to do so under KRS 17.142(4). The circuit courts denied the motions on September 16, 2015 (Mason County) and on December 30, 2015 (Bracken County), ruling that "Section 4 of KRS 17.142 does not mandate, or even grant authority to the Court for the sealing of defendant's records." This appeal follows.
York v. Commonwealth, 2002-CA-000320-MR, 2002-CA-000331-MR, 2004 WL 68514 (Ky. App. Jan. 16, 2004).
"Because statutory interpretation is a question of law, our review is de novo." Commonwealth v. Love, 334 S.W.3d 92, 93 (Ky. 2011). York's previous efforts regarding the Mason County and Bracken County indictments focused upon expungement. In York's 2004 appeal, a different panel of this Court affirmed denial of his motions for expungement, finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. York's current efforts rely upon a different statute, KRS 17.142(4), which he contends should oblige the court to seal his criminal records. York asserts several arguments, but all of them rely upon a fundamental misinterpretation of this statute. KRS 17.142 requires, upon written request of the arrestee, segregation of criminal records for one who "is found innocent of the offense for which the records were made; or [h]as had all charges relating to the offense dismissed; or [h]as had all charges relating to the offense withdrawn." The last portion of the statute, KRS 17.142(4), simply states that "[r]ecords subject to the provisions of KRS 431.076 or 431.078 shall be sealed as provided in those statutes." KRS 431.078 and KRS 431.076 are the expungement statutes, in which KRS 431.078 applies to misdemeanors, violations and traffic infractions, while KRS 431.076 applies to those found not guilty of crimes, for whom charges have been dismissed with prejudice, or against whom charges have not resulted in an indictment.
KRS 17.142(1)(a)-(c).
In his arguments relating to KRS 17.142(4), York focuses intently on the phrase "records... shall be sealed," while disregarding "as provided in those statutes," which immediately follows. In York's view, KRS 17.142(4) provides a "sealed record" alternative to KRS 431.076 expungement. Furthermore, because of the mandatory "shall" language in the statute, he contends that KRS 17.142(4) does not allow courts any discretion to deny these motions to seal records, which courts do possess for KRS 431.076 expungement purposes. We can find no authority for York's interpretation of KRS 17.142(4), however.
In Shouse v. Commonwealth, 183 S.W.3d 204, 205 (Ky. App. 2006), a panel of this Court summarized the distinction between KRS 17.142 and KRS 431.076 as follows: "[S]egregation applies to 'dismissed' cases and does not affect court records; expungement requires that a case be 'dismissed with prejudice' and seals court records." This alone should signify that sealing records is a property of the expungement statutes, and not KRS 17.142. Citing Shouse, the Supreme Court of Kentucky has held that "[KRS 17.142] would allow [Appellant] to have the records held by any public agency segregated and removed from the public record. This statute does not however apply to judicial records." Commonwealth v. Holloway, 225 S.W.3d 404, 408 (Ky. 2007) (emphasis added).
Smith v. Commonwealth, 354 S.W.3d 595 (Ky. App. 2011) contained similar reasoning. In that case, the Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss an indictment without prejudice, which was granted by the circuit court. When no further activity against that appellant was forthcoming after nine years, the appellant attempted to have the courts expunge the indictment. Even though a panel of this Court had no choice but to deny relief under KRS 431.076, the court said that "[the appellant] is left with the less-comprehensive relief of KRS 17.142. That statute permits application for the segregation of records when all charges have been dismissed, without the requirement of a dismissal with prejudice." Smith, 354 S.W.3d at 597.
At the time Smith was rendered, KRS 431.076 expungement was not available to individuals "against whom felony charges originally filed in the District Court have not resulted in an indictment by the grand jury." The General Assembly recently added a provision to KRS 431.076(1) allowing expungement for these individuals; see 2016 Ky. Acts, ch. 94, § 2. --------
The Bracken Circuit Court also made an excellent point in its denial of York's motion, which is that York's interpretation of the statute would render KRS 431.076 superfluous:
If the Court were to follow the defendant's argument to its logical conclusion, all defendants acquitted or having their charges dismissed with prejudice would apply for segregation of their records under [KRS] 17.142 which, as the defendant correctly states, is mandatory. It would then be further mandated that the records be sealed pursuant to Section 4. Why would any defendant apply
for expungement under KRS 431.076 which is discretionary? Application for expungement under KRS 431.076 would become obsolete. It is nonsensical that the legislature intended such an interpretation.(Citation omitted). We concur with the circuit court, and add that rules of statutory construction provide that statutes should be interpreted in such a way as not to contradict each other and to harmonize whenever possible. "The Legislature is presumed to be aware of the existing law at the time of enactment of a later statute." Stogner v. Commonwealth, 35 S.W.3d 831, 835 (Ky. App. 2000). "We presume that the General Assembly intended for the statute to be construed as a whole, for all of its parts to have meaning, and for it to harmonize with related statutes." Shawnee Telecom Res., Inc. v. Brown, 354 S.W.3d 542, 551 (Ky. 2011).
In sum, our courts have declared that KRS 17.142 provides relief outside the expungement statutes, but this relief is confined to segregation of the records, which has already been applied in York's case. There is no mandatory and hitherto undiscovered sealed record relief pursuant to KRS 17.142(4) lurking in our statutes and case law. We find that the circuit courts were correct in viewing KRS 17.142(4) as clarification, indicating that an aggrieved party seeking a sealed record must do so via KRS 431.076 and KRS 431.078 expungement, complying with the appropriate provisions of those statutes, before that form of relief becomes available.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the orders entered by the Bracken Circuit Court and the Mason Circuit Court denying York's motions for relief under KRS 17.142(4).
ALL CONCUR. BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Paul Dwayne York, pro se
Pineville, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Perry T. Ryan
Frankfort, Kentucky