Opinion
C089820
05-15-2020
In re O.S. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. YOLO COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. S.S., Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. Nos. JVSQ191031, JVSQ191032, JVSQ191033)
The juvenile court exercised dependency jurisdiction over three minors and removed them from their parents' custody. Their mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting both of these actions. She further contends the Yolo County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) failed to comply with the inquiry and notice requirements under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.).
We conclude substantial evidence supports the jurisdiction and removal orders, and proceedings under the ICWA were sufficient. Accordingly, we affirm the orders of the juvenile court.
BACKGROUND
Shana S. (mother) and Robin S. (father) are married and have three sons together, O.S. born in 2003, G.S. born in 2006, and K.S. born in 2007. Mother homeschooled all the minors, and they were constantly together with little outside social interaction; father worked outside the home and left the minors alone in mother's care.
Mother also has adult twins, Kayla and Jacob, from a previous relationship. Maternal grandmother (grandmother) obtained guardianship over Jacob (who is severely disabled) at the age of nine due to concerns of general neglect. Kayla moved in with grandmother when she was 18 years old due to physical, emotional, and verbal abuse from mother.
Mother has a history of mental health issues. She was diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder when she was in high school and obtained special education services. Father claimed that mother's mental health issues, including delusions and paranoia, escalated in January 2019. Mother denies having any mental health-related problems.
The family initially came to the Agency's attention in October 2017 when it received a report of general neglect involving Kayla. The report also alleged that between 2004 and 2009 mother and father physically and emotionally abused Kayla. Between 1997 and 2008 Santa Clara County also received several physical abuse and general neglect reports regarding the family.
The Agency received another report in July 2018 stating that mother had sent e-mails to a family member claiming that her real father was the musician Jim Morrison, that she had a stalker, that the stalker had killed members of her family, and that grandmother planned on "offing" her to collect insurance money.
That same month, mother took O.S., G.S., and K.S. to Chico where Kayla and grandmother lived. Mother repeatedly knocked on neighbors' doors looking for Kayla, claiming Kayla was sick. Mother acted irrationally for four hours, yelling that a stalker was after them; the three minors were fearful and crying during the episode.
The Agency received another general neglect report about the family in December 2018. According to the report, mother accused the staff of the gymnastics center where the minors attended of using fake identification and of engaging in some sort of sexual misconduct. It was also reported that mother had posted on her Facebook page that the FBI was out to get her, that her family was involved in sex trafficking, and that family, friends, law enforcement, teachers, and coaches were going to harm her and her family.
Social Worker Salaam Shabazz tried multiple times to interview the minors and the parents at their home, but no one answered the door. Mother eventually returned Shabazz's call and accused Shabazz of stalking her. Mother also spoke telephonically with social worker supervisor Breanna Kraft. Mother again accused the Agency of stalking her, and claimed that she was related to Shabazz, Kraft, and another social worker supervisor. During the conversation, mother made incoherent statements regarding a legal claim to inheritance and her suspicions regarding family, neighbors, and social media.
Mother claimed during the interview that she removed the minors from gymnastics because it was too expensive and focused on competition. And she said her Facebook account, which contained numerous postings with incoherent ramblings and conspiracy theories, had been hacked.
Detention and Jurisdiction
Shabazz and law enforcement executed a protective custody warrant on March 28, 2019, later placing the minors with grandmother and Kayla over mother's objection. Father declined to answer questions about mother's mental health and was unable to open the door during execution of the warrant because it was barricaded. After police twice directed mother to come out of the house with the minors, she emerged without them; she was hostile and accused the social worker and law enforcement of wanting her "trust fund," or trying to "steal her inheritance."
The day the minors were removed into protective custody, mother was placed on an involuntary psychiatric hold under Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150 and transported to the hospital for evaluation. There, she tested positive for amphetamines and tetrahydrocannabinol (THC). The involuntary 72-hour psychiatric hold under section 5150 was later extended 13 days under section 5250.
Further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
In April 2019 the Agency filed a section 300 petition seeking court jurisdiction over then 15-year-old O.S., and his younger brothers, 13-year-old G.S. and 11-year-old K.S. The petition alleged the minors had suffered or were at a substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm or illness due to mother's inability to protect, monitor, and supervise due to her mental health impairments. Mother, it was alleged, had untreated mental health issues, including unresolved trauma, paranoid and delusional statements, and memory impairments; she also exhibited significant paranoid and persecutory beliefs and ideas of grandeur with magical thinking. As relevant here, the petition further alleged the minors were at risk of physical harm as a result of mother's substance abuse, and that father was incapable of protecting the minors from mother's untreated mental illness.
The court detained the minors at a hearing in April 2019 where father was present. Mother was still on the section 5150 psychiatric hold. Following the hearing, father completed a JV-225 form, noting that mother had "undiagnosed mental issues" or "undiagnosed mental health issues."
At a contested jurisdiction hearing on April 29, 2019, the Agency submitted a jurisdiction report outlining the above facts. Attached to the report were several of mother's text messages with the gymnastics staff regarding that there was "a black market organ thing going on" at the gym, among other paranoid texts. Copies of her social media posts on Facebook were also included; among other things she claimed to be a direct descendant of Jane and Leland Stanford, and that the Stanford Trust caused children and family members to be murdered, go missing, or have "accidental" deaths.
According to the jurisdiction report, father confirmed that the allegations regarding mother's mental health were "pretty accurate." Although he sometimes tried to take the minors out of the house, mother would object because she was paranoid they would be kidnapped or murdered. She would make the family turn around when halfway to gymnastics class because she believed someone was following them; father did not believe anyone was following them. In father's view, mother was "frantic to protect [the minors]," although he did not believe she would hurt them. While he agreed mother needed mental health help, he did not know where to obtain help because mother did not believe she had any mental health problems.
Interviews with each of the children were also included in the report. It suffices to say that none felt unsafe in mother's care.
As relevant here, mother testified at the contested jurisdictional hearing that her Facebook account had been hacked. After the juvenile court asked counsel to focus on mother's mental health issues, mother testified no one told her why the involuntary 72-hour stay was extended for 13 days. She claimed a doctor said he did not see any problem with her and that she did not need medication. Mother later admitted, however, that she was prescribed medication during the hold, that a medical doctor at the hospital had diagnosed her as having an unspecified psychosis, and that upon her release, she was given an appointment with a psychiatrist. She refused to take the prescribed medication, even after the social worker offered to pay for it, claiming her own doctor had not said the medication was necessary.
With regard to the positive drug test when admitted to the hospital for the section 5150 hold, mother claimed she had been prescribed amphetamine as a diet pill, and that she was prescribed marijuana for anxiety and stomach issues. She could not remember the name of the doctor who prescribed the marijuana.
As far as outside activities, mother testified she takes the minors out, and had removed them from gymnastics only due to the cost. She denied recognizing the text messages referenced above and claimed she did not remember texting gym staff that the minors were unsafe in the gymnastics program.
Mother admitted she asked the social workers whether they were related because she is very interested in genealogy. She testified that her family had supposedly been here since the "Roanoke times" and she was probably related to most people.
Social worker Cori Chapin who prepared the jurisdiction report testified that while mother provided her with her California accreditation as a homeschool provider, she had been unable to obtain proof of course work completion. Chapin was concerned the minors were not enrolled in any math or science courses, and that they may have been missing certain school subjects.
Chapin was very concerned that mother presented a physical risk of harm to the minors given her untreated mental health symptoms, which mother adamantly denied having. The paranoia and manipulation that Chapin had witnessed and how that impacted those around mother was very concerning and made mother's reactions unpredictable; also concerning were the past accusations of abuse and neglect.
Based on the testimony and documentary evidence, the juvenile court found substantial risk of serious injury to the minors based on mother's serious untreated mental health condition. The court noted that the duration and nature of the psychiatric holds alone signaled that mother was found to be danger to herself or others or unable to provide food, clothing and shelter. While father admitted mother was seriously ill and out of control, he was unable or unwilling to take effective actions to protect the minors from mother and her mental health symptoms.
The court specifically found mother's testimony and numerous denials not credible, characterizing her testimony as disassociated from reality. She had no legitimate explanation for why she was hospitalized for 13 days, or for the positive drug tests. The court further found that mother had sent delusional text messages to the gym. The minors were isolated and had no meaningful contact or social interactions with anyone outside the home, the parents had failed to provide proper dental care, meaningful information regarding the minors' homeschooling activities was absent, and there was a family history of contact with child protective services based on abuse and neglect claims involving mother's older children.
While the court acknowledged the minors were articulate and intelligent, and that they did not feel unsafe in their mother's presence, the court found that father and the minors did not understand the extent and seriousness of mother's mental health issues. The court found a serious risk of physical harm given mother's untreated mental health issues, which rendered her behavior unpredictable. The fact that mother refused to acknowledge her mental health-related problems and refused medication or coordinated care with mental health professionals only exacerbated the risk.
After taking jurisdiction of the minors under section 300, subdivision (b), the court ordered mother to submit to a drug test to determine whether she was still using amphetamine and marijuana and set the matter for contested disposition hearing at mother's request.
Disposition
At the contested disposition hearing on June 19, 2019, the Agency submitted a disposition report recommending family reunification services be provided to both parents. The report outlined continued concerns with mother's denial of her mental health issues, and the effects her symptoms had on the minors. It noted that mother had missed the ordered drug test, but then tested and self-reported using phentermine, Imitrex, and marijuana. An addendum report filed June 19, 2019, stated that mother continued to refuse to sign a release of information for her current medical provider or her hospitalization for the section 5150 hold. Mother also continued to report being stalked by people online and being bullied.
At the hearing, mother called Dr. Donald Siggins, a licensed psychologist and marriage and family counselor, as an expert in forensic psychological testing and mental health diagnosis. Siggins met with mother and administered two psychological tests commonly used in the field of psychology; he also reviewed the reports. He testified that her results were within the normal limits. Although mother had a "turbulent" personality, Siggins testified that mother did not evidence any serious psychopathology or personality disorder and was not manifesting any psychosis at the time he assessed her. The unspecified psychosis she was diagnosed with during the section 5150 hold was merely a temporary reaction to having the minors removed by the Agency. Siggins found that no psychological factors generated a substantial risk to her parenting of the minors at that time.
During cross-examination, Siggins conceded that he had not reviewed mother's medical records related to her involuntary psychiatric hold. He did not interview any outside sources and did not review the text messages or Facebook posts attached to the Agency reports. He accepted her explanation that her Facebook account had been hacked.
Father's brother testified that mother had sent him angry e-mails and text messages, some of which seemed paranoid to him. She also claimed she was being stalked without evidence. At a dinner in September 2018, mother felt it was unsafe for the family to dine at a particular restaurant and she was adamant that they leave. She also told him several times she was related to social worker Shabazz.
Social worker Valerie Zeller testified she met with mother at the visitation center. Mother became agitated about the corrupt social workers and the child welfare system. She claimed she was being stalked online and believed the social workers were impersonating other persons; mother specifically believed social worker Chapin was disguising herself as a PG&E employee.
Mother again denied having any mental health problems, claiming the schizoaffective diagnosis she received in high school was fake and that there was no basis for the section 5150 psychiatric hold. She also continued to refuse to authorize the release of her medical or therapy records. Mother was also unwilling to sign a release for the minors' academic records.
Although Zeller acknowledged the minors were intelligent and well-spoken, she expressed the Agency's continued concerns about her mental health issues, the minors' lack of socialization, and their academic performance.
Father testified that he and mother had marital conflict that might affect the minors if they were returned home. He was concerned about testifying because he feared mother's reaction. Further, he was concerned the minors were not being properly educated, and that mother was isolating them and becoming more resistant to taking them outside; she required that they be supervised to take out the trash. He believed mother still harbored delusional and paranoid beliefs. While the cost of gymnastics was an issue, mother also removed the minors from the activity because she believed the gym was unsafe and that staff was not who they claimed to be. Father did not observe anything to support mother's belief.
As relevant here, mother claimed she received an anonymous call the week prior threatening she should stop fighting the Agency or there would be an "accidental suicide." She denied ever claiming that the social workers were working for the FBI or any other similar allegations. She claimed the Agency never asked her for any records regarding the minors' schooling.
The court found by clear and convincing evidence that since taking jurisdiction of the minors nothing had changed, and the Agency had proved detriment to the minors stemming from mother's mental health issues. Mother continued to have a serious mental health condition; her paranoid symptoms were ongoing and the minors had begun to adopt her paranoid views. Mother lacked insight in the circumstances that led to the minors' removal and she was not treating her mental health issues. Because mother controlled the household, the court deemed the situation highly volatile and unsafe for the minors given mother's untreated mental health problems. The court discounted Siggins' report, noting it was short in detail, he did not review the underlying hospital records related to the psychiatric hold, and he did not probe into mother's past erratic behavior or her history with therapists. He also failed to consider the family's full CPS history, including the issues related to mother's adult children.
The court ordered mother to undergo a full psychological evaluation and to start counseling. It further ordered family reunification services to both parents with a six-month review. Mother appealed.
DISCUSSION
I
Jurisdictional Findings
Mother contends there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision (b). She argues the Agency failed to prove her behaviors related to a mental illness that created a risk of harm to the minors, and alternatively, that even if the evidence were sufficient to establish that she suffered from a mental illness, that fact alone was insufficient to support jurisdiction. We disagree.
The social services agency must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the minor comes within the juvenile court's jurisdiction. (§ 355, subd. (a); In re Isabella F. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 128, 137 (Isabella F.).) As relevant here, section 300, subdivision (b)(1) authorizes dependency jurisdiction when "[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or her parent . . . to adequately supervise or protect the child, . . . or by the inability of the parent . . . to provide regular care for the child due to the parent's . . . mental illness, developmental disability or substance abuse."
We review a jurisdictional challenge for substantial evidence, asking whether the record contains evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to find jurisdiction. (Isabella F., supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 137.) In doing so, we consider the record as a whole, resolving all conflicts and drawing all reasonable inferences to support the juvenile court's findings; we may not reweigh the evidence or consider the credibility of witnesses. (Id. at pp. 137-138.) We affirm the order even if other evidence supports a different finding. (Ibid.)
Mother first argues that because the record does not contain a report from a medical professional diagnosing her with a mental illness, and no other medical information showed she was diagnosed with a mental health disorder or that she was currently being treated for any mental health issues, the evidence was insufficient to establish that she suffered from a mental illness. While she concedes she has an "unorthodox, sometimes delusional and paranoid view of the world," she contends that view is insufficient to establish the requisite "mental illness" within the meaning of section 300, subdivision (b).
Nothing in the statute's plain language limits proof of a parent's mental illness to a diagnosis from a medical professional. (See People v. Arias (2008) 45 Cal.4th 169, 177 [statute's plain meaning controls the court's interpretation unless its words are ambiguous]; In re Rebecca C. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 720, 725 [medical diagnosis was not a required element of proof to find substance abuse under section 300, subdivision (b)].) We will not insert words into a statute, nor rewrite it to conform to an intent not apparent from its plain language. (People v. Mathews (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 485.)
Here, the record contains evidence that mother was diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder as a teen, and with an unspecified psychosis by medical professionals during her involuntary section 5150 hold, which was extended for nearly two weeks under section 5250. Thus, multiple medical professionals diagnosed mother with a mental illness. We likewise reject mother's argument that without the medical records regarding the involuntary psychiatric hold, which she refused to release, no evidence showed the hold was a result of a mental health issue. Mother herself admitted that she had been diagnosed with an unspecified psychosis during the hold and the doctors had deemed her "gravely ill."
Under section 5150, a person may, upon probable cause, be detained for a period of up to 72 hours for assessment, evaluation, and crisis intervention when, as a result of a mental health disorder, the person is a danger to others, or to himself or herself, or gravely disabled. (§ 5150, subd. (a).) The 72-hour period may be extended under section 5250 for up to 14 days of intensive treatment related to a mental health disorder when "the professional staff of the agency or facility providing evaluation services has analyzed the person's condition and has found the person is, as a result of a mental health disorder or impairment by chronic alcoholism, a danger to others, or to himself or herself, or gravely disabled." (§ 5250, subd. (a).) Given the statutes under which mother was held for 13 days, the juvenile court was amply justified in finding mother suffered from a mental illness within the meaning of section 300, subdivision (b)(1).
Mother next contends that even if the evidence was sufficient to show she suffered from a mental illness, the juvenile court lacked substantial evidence that her mental illness posed a risk of harm to the minors.
Juvenile dependency proceedings are intended to protect not only children who are currently being abused or neglected, but also "to ensure the safety, protection, and physical and emotional well-being of children who are at risk of that harm." (§ 300.2; In re T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 133 (T.V.).) " 'The court need not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take the steps necessary to protect the child.' " (Id. at p. 133.)
While it is true, as mother argues, that a mental illness alone is insufficient to support dependency jurisdiction, the juvenile court here did not merely presume harm from the fact of mother's mental illness. Instead, the court considered how that mental illness and mother's refusal to treat her mental health issues affected the minors and their physical and mental well-being.
The court's jurisdictional findings show it was concerned mother was not getting the treatment she needed for her mental illness. (In re Travis C. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1219, 1226 [risk of harm established where evidence showed mother with mental illness not taking her medication; dependency jurisdiction proper even though agency was unable to precisely predict how the mother's mental illness would harm the children].) The court could also reasonably infer that mother was self-medicating using amphetamine and THC rather than obtaining proper treatment for her condition. And, as the court found, mother severely limited the minors' access to the outside world. As we have described, she withdrew them from gymnastics based on her delusional beliefs about the gym staff including fake identifications, sexual misconduct, and organ harvesting. Her delusions and paranoia kept her and the minors constantly locked inside a barred home.
The evidence also showed mother had physically abused Kayla as reported in October 2017, and that Jacob was removed from mother's care and placed under guardianship with grandmother based on concerns of general neglect. Such evidence was indicative of the need to protect the younger minors from mother's untreated mental illness and her volatile behaviors. (In re Diamond H. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1135, disapproved on other grounds in Renee J. v. Superior Court (2001) 26 Cal.4th 735, 748, fn. 6; T.V., supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 133.)
While mother argues these reports of abuse were not specific enough to be credible, the juvenile court found the evidence essentially uncontradicted. We do not reweigh credibility on appeal. (Isabella F., supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at pp. 137-138.) In any event, rather than vague allegations, Kayla reported specific instances of physical abuse at mother's hand.
Mother's past abusive conduct was "a good predictor of future behavior" (T.V., supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 133) and compelling evidence the minors were at risk of harm due to mother's untreated mental health issues and were in present need of the juvenile court's protection (In re Petra B. (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1163, 1169).
We earlier described the Chico incident; when interviewed about the incident, the minors endorsed mother's paranoid statements and reported they believed people were watching them. The court could reasonably infer from this evidence that mother's mental illness and delusional thoughts were harming the minors' emotional and physical well-being. Further, the Morrison claim and other relationship claims and paranoid expressions showed the depth of mother's denial of her own mental health issues.
The record shows mother's mental illness and choices created a substantial risk of some serious physical harm or illness to the minors. (In re Travis C., supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 1227 [recognizing it is not necessary for the social services agency or the juvenile court to precisely predict what harm will come to children because a parent fails to consistently treat his or her illness].) The record supported jurisdiction.
II
Dispositional/Removal Findings
Mother contends insufficient evidence supported the juvenile court's disposition order removing the minors from her custody. She reasons that because insufficient evidence supported the court's jurisdictional findings, the same evidence was insufficient to support removal under a higher standard of proof. She also again argues she was not mentally ill. We are not persuaded..
Before removing a minor from his or her parent's custody, the court must find, by clear and convincing evidence, that "[t]here is or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were returned home, and there are no reasonable means by which the minor's physical health can be protected without removing the minor from the minor's parent's . . . physical custody." (§ 361, subd. (c)(1); In re T.W. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1163; In re Javier G. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 453, 462.)
"A removal order is proper if it is based on proof of (1) parental inability to provide proper care for the minor and (2) potential detriment to the minor if he or she remains with the parent." (In re T.W., supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 1163; In re Jeannette S. (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 52, 60.) It is not required that the parent be dangerous or that the child have been harmed before removal is appropriate. (T.W., at p. 1163.) "The focus of the statute is on averting harm to the child." (Ibid.)
Jurisdictional findings are prima facie evidence that a minor cannot safely remain in the home. (§ 361, subd. (c)(1); T.V., supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at pp. 135-136.) Having rejected mother's argument that insufficient evidence supported the juvenile court's jurisdictional findings, those findings are prima facie evidence that removal was proper. Following the disposition hearing, the juvenile court considered its jurisdictional findings and determined that "not much has changed." Mother continued to have a serious mental health condition that resulted in controlling, erratic, and paranoid behavior, which she refused to acknowledge or treat.
As we have described above, the juvenile court specifically considered Siggins' opinion and rejected it for multiple, supported reasons. We decline to second-guess the court's credibility determination regarding this evidence.
Mother argues the juvenile court could have kept the family together and placed the minors under the supervision of the social worker at home. But as the Agency points out, the parents lived together and father had been unable to protect the minors from mother's detrimental behaviors. And mother's history of hiding from, avoiding, or refusing to cooperate with social workers and evading lawful service of court orders made any potential oversight of the minors by a social worker while in her care unmanageable.
The record supports a finding that mother was unable to provide proper care for the minors, that they would be at risk of harm if they remained in her custody given her untreated and unacknowledged mental illness, and that no alternatives to removal existed. (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) The juvenile court's disposition order removing the minors from mother's custody and ordering reunification services was proper.
III
ICWA
Mother contends the Agency failed to comply with ICWA's inquiry and notice requirements. We disagree.
Although mother originally denied having any Native American ancestry, on May 7, 2019, mother filed an ICWA-020 form claiming that one or more of her parents, grandparents, or other lineal descendants is or was a member of a federally recognized Indian tribe. The form listed "King Haigler" as an unspecified ancestor with no other relevant information. Mother did not list any tribal affiliation.
The Agency ultimately sent ICWA-030 Notices for each child to the Catawba Indian Nation of South Carolina. The forms list mother's name, address, birthdate, and the Catawba tribe. It also lists grandmother and her address, and mother's father, his former address, date of birth, and place of death in 1984. The forms then list the name of mother's grandmother, as well as mother's grandfather, the city where he formerly resided, and the year and place of his death. No information was listed in the box for "other relative information (e.g., aunts, uncles, siblings, first and second cousins, stepparents, etc.)." The name "King Haigler" was not included on the forms.
We agree that the juvenile court and the county welfare department have an affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether a child for whom a dependency petition has been filed is or may be an Indian child. (§ 224.2, subd. (a).) The duty of inquiry includes "asking the child, parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members, others who have an interest in the child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child . . . ." (§ 224.2, subd. (b); In re Robert A. (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 982, 989 ["A 'social worker has "a duty to inquire about and obtain, if possible, all of the information about a child's family history" ' required under regulations promulgated to enforce ICWA"].)
References to section 224.2 are to the statute in effect from January 1, 2019, to December 31, 2019, when the proceedings in the juvenile court occurred.
ICWA notices sent to Indian tribes must contain enough identifying information to be meaningful. (In re Robert A., supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 989.) Such information, if known, includes the name, birthdate, and birthplace of the child, the name of the Indian tribe in which the child is a member or may be eligible for membership, all names known of the Indian child's biological parents, grandparents, and great-grandparents or Indian custodians, including maiden, married and former names or aliases, as well as their current and former addresses, birthdates, places of birth and death, tribal enrollment information of other direct lineal ancestors of the child, and any other known identifying information. (25 C.F.R. § 23.111(d)(1)-(4); § 224.3, subd. (a)(5).)
"[E]rrors in an ICWA notice are subject to review under a harmless error analysis." (In re Brandon T. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1415.) Error is not presumed. It is mother's obligation to present a record that affirmatively demonstrates error. (In re D.W. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 413, 417-418.)
Mother first argues the agency should have interviewed other extended family members, although she fails to identify who she believes the Agency should have interviewed. The record shows that mother had no siblings. Because the purported Indian ancestry was through her paternal line, and both her father and paternal grandfather were deceased, it is unclear who else should have been interviewed. We conclude that interviewing mother, father, and grandmother satisfied the Agency's duty of inquiry.
Mother next contends the Agency failed to provide proper notice to the Catawba Tribe, claiming the notices omitted several important pieces of information about the children's maternal relatives. She asserts the following relevant information was omitted: (1) the maternal grandmother's address, birth date and place; (2) the maternal grandfather's address, birth date, and place; (3) the maternal great-grandparents' address, former address, and birth date and place; and (4) the name "King Haigler."
As the Agency argues, however, the notices included the names of the great-grandparents, as well as the former city where the great-grandfather lived and where he died in 1985. The notices also included the name, date of birth, former address, and year and place of death for mother's father (the children's grandfather). While the notices did not include grandmother's address, birth date and place, such information was not relevant because mother claimed Indian ancestry through her father, not her mother. Although it may have been error to omit information about grandmother, she did not claim Indian heritage and mother did not claim such ancestry through grandmother. Thus, any error was harmless. (In re Brandon T., supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1414-1415.)
Regarding the omission of the name King Haigler, mother had listed that name on the form without any further information; she did not specify her supposed relationship to King Haigler or identify any specific tribal affiliation. As we have explained, at the time of the inquiry the ICWA required that the notices contain names of known biological parents, grandparents, and great-grandparents or Indian custodians, as well as any information on documented tribal affiliations. There is no indication in the record that the King fit into any of those categories requiring inclusion on the notices. We see no error in his omission. Conditional reversal for ICWA compliance is not required.
DISPOSITION
The orders of the juvenile court are affirmed.
/s/_________
Duarte, J. We concur: /s/_________
Robie, Acting P. J. /s/_________
Krause, J.