YOLLES v. GOLF CLUB OF AVON, INC.

Full title: ANNE L. YOLLES v. GOLF CLUB OF AVON, INC

Court: Connecticut Superior Court, Judicial District of Hartford at Hartford

Date published: Jan 6, 2004

2004 Ct. Sup. 345 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2004)

Opinion

No. CV 00-0802636

January 6, 2004

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

SHELDON, JUDGE.

In this case, plaintiff Anne L. Yolles ("the plaintiff" or "Mrs. Yolles") has brought suit against her country club, The Golf Club of Avon, Inc. ("the defendant" or "the Golf Club"), to recover money damages for certain losses she claims to have suffered as a result of the defendant's alleged discrimination against her on account of her sex, in alleged violation of General Statutes § 52-571d, and to enjoin certain continuing conduct by the defendant which she claims to constitute such discrimination. A codification of Public Act 97-85, entitled "An Act Concerning Discrimination By Golf Country Clubs," Section 52-571d has provided as follows since it first became law on January 1, 1998:

(a) For the purposes of this section, "golf country club" means an association of persons consisting of not less than twenty members who pay membership fees or dues and which maintains a golf course of not less than nine holes and (1) receives payment for dues, fees, use of space, facilities, services, meals or beverages, directly or indirectly, from or on behalf of nonmembers or (2) holds a permit to sell alcoholic liquor under chapter 545.

(b) No golf country club may deny membership in such club to any person on account of race, religion, color, national origin, ancestry, sex, marital status or sexual orientation.

(c) All classes of membership in a golf country club shall be available without regard to race, religion, color, national origin, ancestry, sex, marital status or sexual orientation. CT Page 346

(d) A golf country club that allows the use of its facilities or services by two or more adults per membership, including the use of such facilities or services during restricted times, shall make such use equally available to all adults entitled to use such facilities or services under that membership. The requirements of this subsection concerning equal access to facilities or services of such club shall not apply to adult children included in the membership. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to affect the assessment by a golf country club of any fees, dues or charges it deems appropriate, including the ability to charge additional fees, dues or charges for access by both adult members during restricted times.

(e) A golf country club that has food or beverage facilities or services shall allow equal access to such facilities and services for all adults in all membership categories at all times. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to require access to such facilities or services by any person if such access by such person would violate any provision of the general statutes or a municipal ordinance concerning the sale, consumption or regulation of alcoholic beverages.

(f) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit a golf country club from sponsoring or permitting events that are limited to members of one sex if such club sponsors or permits events that are comparable for members of each sex.

(g) Any person aggrieved by a violation of the provisions of this section may bring a civil action in the Superior Court to enjoin further violations and to recover the actual damages sustained by reason of such violation or two hundred fifty dollars, whichever is greater, together with costs and a reasonable attorney's fee.

(h) If, in an action brought under subsection (g) of this section, the court finds that a golf country club holding a permit to sell alcoholic liquor under chapter 545 has violated any of the provisions of this section, it may, in addition to any relief ordered under said subsection (g), order the suspension of such permit until such time as it determines that such club is no longer in violation of this section. The plaintiff shall send a certified copy of such order to the Department of Consumer Protection. Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 4-182 and 30-55, the department shall, upon receipt of such order, suspend such permit in accordance with such order. Upon determination by the court that such club is no longer in violation of this section, such club shall send a certified copy of such determination to the department and the department shall reinstate such permit.

In her five-count Amended Complaint ("Complaint") dated December 7, 2000, the plaintiff claims that the defendant has violated subsections (b), (c) and (d) of Section 52-571d by engaging in the following types of conduct: (1) establishing a two-tiered system of golf membership, under which access to the golf course at preferred playing times ("Prime Time") is restricted to Primary Members, who allegedly must pay excessive initiation fees, prohibitive to women, for their full golf privileges; (2) conducting all gender-specific tournaments for women on weekdays, when working women including the plaintiff usually cannot play, while conducting all tournaments primarily or exclusively for men — including five male-only Primary Member tournaments in 1999 and all subsequent Primary Member Tournaments, which are contested mostly by men — at Prime Time on weekends; and (3) since officially opening all Primary Member tournaments except the Men's Club Championship to Primary Members of both sexes in the 2000 golf season, requiring all participants in such tournaments, regardless of gender, to contest them solely from the middle or back (men's) tees. She has made these claims, either singly or in combination, in the following series of mutually overlapping counts.

In Count One of her Complaint, the plaintiff claims that the Golf Club's above-described tournament tee-off rule, which allegedly was "imposed . . . to discourage and inhibit women golfers, such as the plaintiff, from availing themselves of Primary Member status"; id., Count I, ¶ 26; has "inhibit[ed her] ability to obtain the full use and enjoyment of her Primary Member status"; id., Count I, ¶ 24; and "inhibit[ed her] ability to effectively compete in all weekend program Primary Member tournaments"; id., Count I, ¶ 25; thus "deny[ing] women golfers, on account of their sex, the availability of a [P]rimary [M]embership in violation of [General Statutes] § 52-571d(c)." Id., Count I, ¶ 27.

In Count Two of her Complaint, the plaintiff further claims that the Golf Club's imposition of the challenged tournament tee-off rule has purposefully "den[ied] the [p]laintiff, on account of her sex, the equal availability of its facilities and services utilized by other male Primary Members during restricted Prime Time in violation of [General Statutes] § 52-571d(d)." Id., Count II, ¶ 26. This claim is based on the Golf Club's allegedly disparate treatment of male and female Primary Members in Primary Member tournaments with respect to playing the game "as they always have." Id., Count II, ¶ 23. By requiring women who play in such tournaments to tee off from different tees than they traditionally use to play the game while allowing men to tee off from the sane tees they usually play from, the Golf Club allegedly makes those tournaments "not equally available" to women, and thus engages in actionable sex discrimination.

In Count Three of her Complaint, the plaintiff claims that the Golf Club has also violated Section 52-571d(d) by charging her and other women golfers excessive initiation fees to become Primary Members with full golf privileges along with their husbands under their family memberships. Insisting that the amount of the initiation fee is not reasonably related to any additional expense incurred by the Golf Club in allowing two spouses instead of one to exercise full golf privileges under a single family membership, the plaintiff contends that the fee is not "appropriate" within the meaning of subsection (d).

In her fourth count, which was also brought under subsection (d) of Section 52-571d, the plaintiff complains that the defendant's Primary Member system, tournament structure and allegedly discriminatory tournament tee-off rule, in combination, have intentionally preserved men's historical dominance over the golf course during Prime Time, and thus have discriminated against women. This, she claims, has been accomplished by ensuring that men, who have no gender-specific weekday tournaments of their own, become Primary Members who always play in Prime Time on weekends; id, Count IV, ¶ 25; while women, who do have gender-specific tournaments on weekdays; id, Count IV, ¶ 24; are "effectively precluded from competitively participating in Prime Time weekend tournaments." Id., Count IV, ¶ 26. By continuing this course of conduct, claims the plaintiff the defendant fails to make use of its facilities during restricted Prime Time equally available to women golfers." Id., Count IV, ¶ 27.

The plaintiff's final claim of discrimination, made in Count Five of her Complaint, is that the defendant's Primary Member system, allegedly excessive and arbitrary fee structure for a second Primary Member under a single family membership, and allegedly discriminatory tournament tee-off rule are designed to discourage and in fact have discouraged women, including the plaintiff, from "selling equal access to membership at the [Golf] Club," in alleged violation of General Statutes § 52-571d(b). Id., Count V, ¶ 23.

The case is now before this Court on the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Motion") dated November 21, 2002. The central thrust of that Motion, as more fully explained below, is that none of the defendant's alleged conduct constitutes a violation of any part of Section 52-571d, as that statute must assertedly be read on its face and interpreted in light of its purpose and legislative history.

The defendant has supported its Motion with three substantial memoranda of law and extensive materials documenting its adoption and implementation of the rules and procedures here claimed to be discriminatory. Included in such materials are sworn affidavits from Leonard J. DelGallo, Sr., the defendant's past President and Tournament Chairman, Elizabeth S. Torkelsen, its current legal counsel, and Belinda Berman, Manager of Legal Services — Intellectual Property and Litigation for the United States Golf Association ("USGA"). Attached to the Torkelsen and Berman Affidavits are several exhibits that will be identified and discussed, as appropriate, below. The plaintiff has opposed the defendant's Motion with two substantial legal memoranda of her own, and has supported her opposition with her own sworn affidavit and that of an expert witness, Mr. Thomas W. Tatnall, together with accompanying documentation.

The motion was orally argued on June 9, 2003 and October 28, 2003.

I. THE STANDARD

"The only purpose for a motion for summary judgment is to eliminate an unnecessary trial of issues as to which there is no real dispute for the trier of fact to resolve." Ralph P. Dupont, Dupont on Connecticut Civil Practice vol. 2, § 17-49.1 (LEXIS Law Publishing 2002) (citing Dowling v. Kielak, 160 Conn. 14 (1970); Dorazio v. M.B. Foster Elec. Co., 157 Conn. 226 (1969)). Specifically, summary judgment is proper when "pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Wilson v. New Haven, 213 Conn. 277, 279 (1989) (citations omitted).

"Although the party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any material fact, it is incumbent upon the party opposing summary judgment to establish a factual predicate from which it can be determined, as a matter of law, that a genuine issue of material fact exists. The presence of an alleged adverse claim is not sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment." (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) Wadia Enterprises, Inc. v. Hirschfeld, 224 Conn. 240, 247 (1992).

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court does not try the facts presented, but must view them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party in order to determine whether a genuine issue as to any material fact exists. If there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the motion for summary judgment must be granted.

II. THE FACTS

The defendant Golf Club is a private club with approximately 750 golfing members who maintain different levels of access to its 27-hole golf course depending upon the types of membership they hold. Aff. Leonard J. DelGallo, Sr. (11/21/02), ¶ 3. Because the golf course is a limited resource that can only accommodate a finite number of golfers at one time, the Golf Club has "instituted categories of membership that limit access to the course[;]" Aff. L. DelGallo, Sr., ¶ 4; especially during "Prime Time," which includes "weekend and holiday mornings between 7:00 a.m. and 12:00 noon and weekdays between 11:30 a.m. and 12:30 p.m." Aff. L. DelGallo, Sr., ¶ 5.

Prior to the enactment of Public Act 97-85, which became effective on January 1, 1998, the Golf Club instituted what is commonly referred to as a "family membership." "Under such membership," claims Mr. DelGallo, "one spouse has access to the golf course during Prime Time and the other spouse has restricted access to the golf course, that is, access to the golf course during non-Prime Time." Aff. L. DelGallo, Sr., ¶ 7. According to Mr. DelGallo, "[w]omen have been permitted to join as full golfing members with access to the course during Prime Time since at least 1994 when [one woman] became a full golfing member." Aff. L. DelGallo, Sr., ¶ 6. The plaintiff, however, claims that she requested admission as a full golfing member on several occasions prior to 1998 but was always denied.¹ Aff. Anne L. Yolles (4/21/03), ¶ 4. In any event, the parties agree that prior to 1998, the plaintiff was a spousal member of the defendant Golf Club under a "family membership," and thus had only limited, non-Prime Time access to the golf course as the spouse of her husband, Michael Yolles, who had full golf privileges.

1 In her affidavit in support of this Motion, the plaintiff described several dismissive, demeaning responses by certain club members and officers to her repeated efforts to become a full golfing member before January 1, 1998. Because neither the particulars of such responses nor the identities of those who allegedly made them are material to the Court's disposition of this Motion, those details need not be described herein.

After Public Act 97-85 went into effect on January 1, 1998, the Golf Club continued to offer its members the option of joining under "family memberships." In addition, however, it began to offer members what it called a "Primary Membership," under which "Primary Member" status was for the first time made available to "all adults on an individual basis, including both spouses of a family." Aff. L. DelGallo, Sr., ¶ 8. Members of the Golf Club were informed of this change in membership policy in a letter from the Board of Governors and Membership Committee dated January 8, 1998. The letter stated that prior to March 1, 1998, each household would have the opportunity to "designate one `Primary Golfer' . . . who will have full access to the golf course including prime playing times." Aff. Elizabeth Torkelsen (11/21/02), Ex. C (Letter to Members from the Board of Governors and Membership Committee, dated January 8, 1998). The letter also stated that

For members wishing to have two (2) Primary Golfers in one family membership . . . the member requesting golf full status must pay the then current initiation fee so established by the Board of Governors, which is currently $6,500. However, the Board has approved the following one time exception: spouse members in good standing as of December 1st, 1997, who request to become a golf full member prior to March 1, 1998 will be charged a golf initiation fee of $4500.00 payable over two years, or $4000.00 if paid in full by March 1, 1998.

After receiving the foregoing letter, the plaintiff promptly requested a Primary Membership, was billed and paid the initial $2,500 installment of her initiation fee, and was placed on a waiting list. Aff. E. Torkelsen, Ex. E (Transcript of Deposition of Anne L. Yolles on April 23, 2002 (hereinafter "Depo. A. Yolles")), pp. 17, 19; see also, Aff. E. Torkelsen, Ex. F (Memorandum from Michael Yolles to "Joline" at the Golf Club, dated January 26, 1998); Aff. E. Torkelsen, Ex. G (Letter from William Shea, Secretary of the Country Club, to Anne L. Yolles, dated February 3, 1998). In August of 1998, the plaintiff finally came off the waiting list and became a Primary Member of the Golf Club.

The plaintiff's Primary Membership gave her access to the golf course during Prime Time, though according to the defendant, it did not "convey any rights to [her] concerning tournament play." Aff. L. DelGallo, Sr., ¶ 12. To participate in the remaining Primary Member tournaments in 1998, which were conducted every Saturday and Sunday of the golf season in Prime Time, the plaintiff paid a modest additional annual tournament fee in the amount of $70. Aff. A. Yolles, ¶ 8.

In 1999, the plaintiff's first full season as a Primary Member, she once again paid the separate annual tournament fee, but was not permitted to play in all Primary Member tournaments because four of them were designated as male-only tournaments. Id., ¶ 10; see also Depo. A. Yolles, p. 20. According to the plaintiff, Primary Members who did not participate in these male-only tournaments were typically permitted to use the golf course while such tournaments were being conducted. The sole exception to this practice was the Men's Club Championship. Id., p. 21. By contrast, claims the plaintiff, Primary Members who did not participate in the Women's Club Championship were allowed to use the golf course while that tournament was underway. Id., p. 22.

The plaintiff complained, both verbally and in writing, to Mr. DelGallo, then the defendant's President and Tournament Chairman, concerning the holding of male-only Primary Member tournaments. According to the plaintiff, Mr. DelGallo initially responded by telling her that she "had to understand that the Board never thought anyone would take them up on the offer for [a] second primary membership." Depo. A. Yolles, p. 61. To that he allegedly added that, "[T]here [a]re men on the golf course who didn't want women on the golf course at all, or ever." Id. Thus, she was allegedly told, "[she] had to understand that this was going to take time, and [she] just had to bear with it." Id.

In specific response to the plaintiff's complaint that the Golf Club was violating General Statutes § 52-571 by scheduling gender-specific tournaments for men in Prime Time on weekends but gender-specific tournaments for women in non-Prime Time on weekdays, Mr. DelGallo wrote her as follows in a letter dated April 21, 1999:

With reference to the State law concerning comparable tournaments for members of each sex, the members of both Men's and Women's Tournament Committees met several times in January and February, which led to the March 24th, 1999 letter to the members, after being approved by the Board of Governors. In our committee discussions we selected comparable tournaments [for men] in prime time and [for women] during the week since there are only three women that have paid the prime time tournament fee making it impossible to schedule comparable [female-gender specific] tournaments for primary golfers during prime time on the weekends . . . Keep in mind the selected gender tournaments only include the Club Championships and three other tournaments. There is a balance over 70 tournaments open to all primary members. More importantly, the golf course will remain open for all primary member play during each of these selected tournaments.

Aff. E. Torkelsen, Ex. D (Letter to Anne L. Yolles from Leonard J. DelGallo, Sr., dated April 21, 1999). Thereafter, claims the plaintiff, "the country club issued a second letter dated June 7, 1999, explaining its decision to maintain the scheduling of Men's Tournaments during restricted Prime Time, `based on what we believe to be the overall membership preference.' "Complaint, Count I, ¶ 18. The plaintiff testified at her deposition that, to her knowledge, members were never polled as to their tournament-scheduling preferences.

While competing in mixed Primary Member tournaments during the 1998 and 1999 golf seasons, the plaintiff played either from the forward tees or from one of two temporary sets of tees that were specially established for her by the club pro. Through Mr. DelGallo, the defendant has explained its reasons for initially adopting this practice as follows. Though golfers are not required to tee off from any particular tee location, it is customary for "professionals, semiprofessionals or those who want to tee-off the farthest from the hole [to] use the back or blue tee; men usually play from the middle [or white] tees; and women usually play from the forward [or red] tees." Aff. L. DelGallo, Sr., ¶ 13. In 1998, when the plaintiff became one of the first women to participate in Primary Member tournaments, the Golf Club "was uncertain where she should tee off in order to ensure fair competition." Id., ¶ 14. Therefore, the plaintiff was initially permitted to play in such tournaments from the forward tees, where she had always teed off. On two holes, however, which were usually par fives for women and par fours for men, the defendant's golf pro equalized the par to four for both men and women by creating temporary tees for women approximately 75 yards farther forward than the existing forward tees. Aff. A. Yolles, ¶ 9.

The defendant claims, through Mr. DelGallo, that, "[f]ollowing the 1999 golf season, a number of members complained that the tee placement for [the plaintiff] gave her an unfair advantage, including allowing her to bypass obstacles at certain holes that those playing from the middle tees had to negotiate, including water hazards and hills." Aff. L. DelGallo, Sr., ¶ 16. As a result, after confirming with the handicap section of the United States Golf Association (hereinafter "USGA") that it could fairly conduct its mixed-gender tournaments from a single set of tees, if the course was rated for those tees for both men and women, instead of from different sets of tees, as it had done in the past; Aff. E. Torkelsen, Ex. H (E-mail correspondence from Dick Strickland to Rick Lawson, dated January 9, 2000); see also Aff. E. Torkelsen, Ex. I (Memorandum from Dick Strickland, entitled "Handicapping Men and Women from All Tee Locations," dated); the Golf Club's Tournament Committee, which included four women, voted unanimously to require that all future mixed-gender Primary Member tournaments be contested only from the middle or back tees. Aff. L. DelGallo, Sr., ¶ 17; see also Aff. E. Torkelsen, Ex. J (Board of Governors Meeting Minutes, dated February 10, 2000). This rule has remained in effect from the year 2000 through the present, and thus still applies to all weekly Primary Member tournaments and all monthly Primary Member/guest tournaments. Aff. A. Yolles, ¶¶ 16, 18.

The plaintiff concedes that in adopting and enforcing the challenged rule, the Golf Club has implemented the United States Golf Association (hereinafter "USGA") Handicap System, the stated purpose of which "is to make the game of golf more enjoyable by enabling golfers of differing abilities to compete on an equitable basis," whether men and women play from the same or different sets of tees. The USGA Handicap System, § 1-1 (USGA 2002); see also the prior edition of The USGA Handicap System, § 1-1 (USGA 1997).² Furthermore, she does not dispute evidence presented by the defendant that since the rule was adopted, she and other women have competed successfully in Primary Member tournaments.³ Even so, she advances two reasons why the challenged tournament tee-off rule does "not permit [her] to partake of and enjoy the game on the same basis as the male `primary golfers,' and [thus that she] is denied the same access to the rights and privileges of membership and to the golf course facilities as other `primary golfers' who happen to be male." Aff. A. Yolles, ¶ 20. First, she claims that playing from the men's tees inhibits her personal ability to play well, and thus diminishes her enjoyment of playing, in Primary Member tournaments. On this score, she avers as follows:

2 Aff. Cindy Cooper (6/13/03), ¶ 4 (acknowledging her authorship, as the USGA Coordinator of Handicapping and Course Rating, of an e-mail to Thomas Tatnall on April 15, 2003, in which she stated that "the [USGA] Handicap System allows for a fair match or competition when players play from any set of tees, regardless of ability level or gender"). On this score, specifically, The USGA Handicap System provides as follows:

a. Different Tees: Men vs. Men; Women vs. Women; Women vs. Men

Different tees usually have different USGA Course Ratings. Because Course Ratings reflect the probable scores of scratch golfers, the higher-rated course is more difficult, and the player playing from the set of tees with the higher USGA Course Rating receives additional strokes equal to the difference between the Course Ratings, with .5 or greater rounded upward. The additional strokes are added to the Course Handicap of the player playing from the higher-rated set of tees.

b. Same Tees: Men vs. Women

Men and women playing from the same set of tees will have different USGA Course Ratings. Since the women's Course Rating usually will be higher, women receive additional strokes equal to the difference between the USGA Course Ratings, with .5 or greater rounded upward. CT Page 385

The USGA Handicap System, § 3-5 (USGA 2002).

3 In the September 24, 2000 Member-Member Primary Member tournament, for example, the plaintiff and her husband came in third in their flight and were Sweeps winners, receiving separate cash prizes for both. Aff. E. Torkelsen, Ex. M. Shortly thereafter, at the October 20, 2000 Banquet Day Primary Member tournament, the plaintiff and her husband had the lowest net score on their course, beating many pairs of men and winning $90.00 apiece. Id. In 2002, moreover, the plaintiff won cash prizes in three Primary Member tournaments. Id. Other women have also performed successfully in Primary Member tournaments, with two women winning the 2002 end-of-year tournament. Aff. L. DelGallo, Sr., ¶ 18.

I am an avid although quite average recreational golfer. I enjoy regular and non-primary golfer tournament play as I play from the "forward" or "women's" tees which are designed for the use and maximum enjoyment of women. My level of enjoyment is greatly diminished when playing in "primary golfer" tournaments when I am forced to play from the "men's" tees as I do not have the same strength as the male "primary golfers" and, thus, I am required to play the course with considerable more difficulty and with a good deal less success, hole for hole, as do the male "primary golfers[.]"

Aff. A. Yolles, ¶ 19. Second, she claims that the defendant's adoption and enforcement of the rule has prevented her from conducting business on the golf course with her female clients. On that score, she explains that on one occasion shortly after the rule was adopted, when she brought a female client as her guest to a member/guest tournament, her "guest was extremely discomfited to have been required to play from the `men's tees' which negatively affected our business relationship." Aff. A. Yolles, ¶ 18. As a result of that experience, the plaintiff avers, "[i]n order to avoid a repeat with another female client, I have elected not to invite women clients to play in those tournaments in order to avoid attendant embarrassment and loss of business." Id.

In addition, the plaintiff has presented the sworn affidavit and deposition testimony of her disclosed expert, Mr. Thomas W. Tatnall, who avers as follows:

[A]s women, on average, have considerably less strength than do men, when women golfers are forced to play from the `men's' or `middle' tees, it negatively affects their enjoyment of the game of golf as it has been designed to be played and denies them the opportunity to realize and enjoy the design strategies in playing the golf course[,] . . . denying them full and equal access to the golf course in that it denies them the ability to partake of and enjoy the benefits of membership on a basis equal to male members.

Aff. Thomas W. Tatnall, ¶¶ 7-8 (April 14, 2003). Mr. Tatnall has also opined that "increasing the handicaps of women golfers . . . only has the effect of arguably leveling out the scores but does not remedy the diminution of the enjoyment of the game as well as the attendant denial of equal access to the golf course and to the privileges of membership enjoyed by male `primary golfers.'" Aff. T. Tatnall, ¶ 10. (Emphasis in original.)

On the basis of these facts, and others that will be detailed below, the defendant has moved for summary judgment on each and every count of the plaintiff's Complaint.

III. THE STATUTE

Before discussing the particulars of the defendant's challenges to the plaintiff's claims against it under General Statutes § 52-571d, it is first appropriate to examine the general structure and specific provisions of the statute in light of its purpose and legislative history.

The bill that was ultimately enacted as Public Act 97-85, which is now codified as General Statutes § 52-571d, was originally designed to abolish invidious discrimination among existing members of Connecticut golf country clubs on the basis of sex, marital status and other impermissible considerations. Born initially of outrage at the many degrading, demeaning ways in which such clubs had historically treated their own female members — such as by denying them equal voting rights, equal golf playing privileges and equal access to club food and beverage facilities — the legislation in question, as initially discussed before the Joint Committee on the Judiciary on March 31, 1997, directly targeted such practices in language similar to that which now appears in subsections (c), (e) and (f) of the current statute.

At the public hearing before the Judiciary Committee,⁴ legislators were regaled with stories of discriminatory practices by golf country clubs against their own female members by women who had either witnessed them or been subjected to them personally. On the basis of these stories, the legislators were urged by many speakers, including Attorney General Richard Blumenthal and several of their fellow legislators, to take immediate action against such discrimination by approving the proposed legislation.

4 The hearing before the Joint Judiciary Committee is published in Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary, Pt. 8, 1997, pp. 2428, 2432, 2448-56, 2515-32, 2571-90, 2598-2600.

In that same public hearing, however, concerns were raised by certain legislators and others about the possible consequences of the proposed legislation. Some questioned the constitutionality of any attempt by the legislature to regulate the internal affairs of private clubs. There was no state action in the operation of such clubs, they contended, and thus no legitimate basis for the State to interfere with club operations, even for the high-minded purpose of eradicating discrimination. The appropriate place to take action against discrimination by private golf country clubs, they argued, was in the board rooms of those clubs, where women members could appeal to club leaders or fellow club members to change discriminatory policies and practices. Supporters of the legislation countered such arguments by claiming that there was indeed state action in the operation of golf country clubs, as evidenced by the granting of State liquor licenses and/or other governmental benefits to many such clubs.

Another concern voiced at the public hearing was that passage of the proposed legislation might substantially increase the number of golfers eligible to play at preferred playing times, thereby threatening the ability of any club to give its full golfing members what they had paid for when they joined the club — that is, the right to make reasonable use of the golf course at such preferred times. Since most private golf clubs have only limited golfing facilities, they noted, clubs must be allowed to control access to such facilities, particularly at times of peak demand, by establishing special classes of membership with special access privileges for which special dues or fees are charged. Though all persons who spoke on this subject acknowledged the legitimacy of this concern, none proposed that it could properly be dealt with by prohibiting women from playing at preferred playing times on the basis of their sex. In brief, the tenor of the debate was that if women paid for full golf privileges, then they no less than men should have the right to exercise those privileges at preferred playing times.

One traditional way of controlling access to private golf courses, the Judiciary Committee was told, was to issue family memberships, under which only one member of a family, typically the husband, could play at preferred playing times while all others, including the wife, could only play at other times. Several legislators acknowledged the benefits of such a system, including that of lowering costs of membership to families. However, they universally rejected the notion that men who joined clubs under family memberships should presumptively be given the right to play at preferred times instead of their wives. To the contrary, they voiced the view that under such a family membership system, the only fair way to determine which family member should have and exercise full golf privileges was to leave that decision up to the family itself. Furthermore, they voiced the view that if two or more adult members of a single family wished to have and exercise full golf privileges under a single family membership, they should all be afforded the opportunity to do so, albeit at a higher rate than would typically be charged for a traditional family membership.

After the public hearing, the proposed legislation was redrafted by its sponsors to reflect certain suggestions which had been made at the public hearing. So redrafted, the legislation was first presented to the House of Representatives in the form of two amendments, both of which were ultimately approved as presented.

The first such amendment, which contained all the language now appearing in subsections (a) and (c) through (h) of the statute, was introduced as follows by its chief sponsor and spokesperson, Representative Eileen Scalettar of the 114th District:

This bill arises from a situation which has come to my attention and that of many of my colleagues here in this chamber about ongoing discrimination against women at Connecticut's golf clubs.

We've been quite surprised to hear of the culture at these clubs and the demeaning manner in which women are treated there.

Women are denied access to the golf course at certain prime times and certain days. They are denied voting memberships, denied equal access to restaurants within clubs. Single women may not have full memberships in certain clubs and divorced women may [be] forced to give up their memberships.

In some clubs, Madam Speaker, a woman can pay full dues to join the club and full membership fees, yet be denied full access to facilities to which her young male sons have access.

Madam Speaker, this issue was before the General Assembly before in 1990 when Representative Dillon proposed eliminating discrimination in the clubs. At that time, the country clubs argued vociferously that this is a matter that should be left up to them and that they would cure the problems. It is now seven years later . . . and the problems persist at Connecticut's country clubs.

I have heard examples of business women who have been humiliated in front of clients by having to wait while the tees are left open for men to play even when there are no men using the golf course.

It is time for us to make significant changes in these practices and end this demeaning attitude towards women in the clubs.

40 H.R. Proc., Pt. 6, 1997 Sess., pp. 2116-18. Thereafter, when asked to summarize the amendment for her colleagues, Representative Scalettar addressed the House as follows:

Thank you, Madam Speaker. This is a strike all amendment. It requires country clubs and golf clubs to make all classes of membership available regardless of race, religion, sex, sexual orientation, or marital status. And to make all facilities and services equally available to all members.

The amendment does not, Madam Speaker, limit other restrictions which a country club may apply.

For example, if a club wishes to control access to certain times based on the length of time it takes a player to play or other reasonable restrictions, this amendment would not affect that in any way.

Madam Speaker, Section 1 of the amendment defines the type of club to which this bill would apply. And it is golf country clubs as defined. Golf country clubs are defined here as and include an association of people that maintain at least a 9-hole golf course and receive payment for dues or fees from non-members or hold a permit to sell alcoholic liquor.

It requires[, in Section 2,] that all classes of membership be made available without regard to race, religion, color, national origin, ancestry, sex, marital status or sexual orientation.

And what that means, Madam Speaker, is that the situation which now exists where a woman and a man may both [want] what is called, a full membership, and pay full membership fees, they will both have full access to all facilities. It would be impossible to discriminate against one or the other based on sex.

Where there is a family membership or a couple, Madam Speaker. [Section 3 of] this bill would now require that both members, both adult members, who use that membership have the ability to have full access to all facilities. It does not in any way prohibit a family membership, but says that if both members of the family, both members of the couple wish to have full access for example, to restricted tee times, that option must be made available. It would be up to the club how the [op]tion is made available and how the club would wish to charge for that additional access. CT Page 361

The bill also requires[, in Section 4 thereof,] that access to food or beverage facilities and services be equally available to all members.

And it also specifically notes[, in Section 5,] that single sex events are still permitted regardless of any language in the bill as long as the club provides for comparable events for both men and women.

I would just like to make clear, Madam Speaker, that comparable events are not, for example, an event for women on Tuesday and an event for men on Saturday. Likewise, Saturday morning times are not comparable to Saturday afternoon times and I think people within the clubs will know and understand what is reasonably comparable in that sense.

A person aggrieved by a violation of the statute, Madam Speaker, can bring an action in the Superior Court for actual damages or for an injunction [under Section 6 of the bill]. And if there are no actual damages can recover statutory damages and attorneys fees. In addition, [under Section 7,] the court can order suspension of an alcoholic license (sic) for the period that the club is not in compliance with the law.

Madam Speaker, I move adoption of the amendment . . .

Id., pp. 2141-44.

So explained, the first amendment was approved by the House after an extended debate in which almost all who spoke on it voiced disapproval of discrimination by golf country clubs, some questioned and others defended the appropriateness of legislating as to the conduct of private clubs, and still others sought clarifications of key provisions from Representative Scalettar. Among the clarifications given by Representative Scalettar were the following: first, that the right of equal access to the services and facilities of golf country clubs, as extended under Section 3 of the amendment to married women who paid for full golf privileges under their family memberships, was extended to all women who joined such clubs and paid for full golf privileges under Section 2 of the proposed legislation;⁵ second, that any golf country club which had already attempted to "solve" the problem of discrimination against its female members by providing family memberships, under which families could choose one member to exercise full golf privileges at restricted playing times, could continue to offer such family memberships as long as it also gave both adult members under any such membership the option of exercising full golf privileges if they paid for them;⁶ and third, that the first amendment, as proposed, applied only to members of golf country clubs, not to those who had merely applied for club membership.⁷ The second amendment, which was not presented or debated until the first amendment was finally approved by the full House, added the language now appearing in subsection (b) of the statute to the text of the bill. As succinctly summarized by Representative Scalettar,

5 The relevant exchange, between Representative Merrill of the 54th District and Representative Scalettar, was as follows:

REP. MERRILL: For legislative intent, I see that there is specific language in the bill about two or more adults per membership and what kind of family membership, what this bill would do for that. I am also concerned about testimony we heard from single women who are also members and experience certain sorts of practices and I just want to make sure that this bill would include what effects situations in which single women have memberships and where certain restrictions have been placed on their ability, either to access facilities or services. So I would ask the proponent of the amendment if the bill would cover that situation.

Through you, Madam Speaker.
DEPUTY SPEAKER HARTLEY: Representative Scalettar.

REP. SCALETTAR: Thank you. Through you, Madam Speaker, yes that is specifically covered in Section 1b [subsection (c) of the current statute] which requires that all classes of membership be made available without regard to sex. So that whatever benefits accrue to any specific membership category must be made available to all members.

Id., pp. 2178-79.

6 The relevant colloquy between Representative Kerensky of the 14th District and Representative Scalettar was as follows:

REP. KERENSKY: If a club has already tackled this issue and arrived through its own governing body at rules that allow the family itself to decide which member would be the most appropriate to play in a highly restricted time zone, would that practice be made illegal by our passage of this bill?

DEPUTY SPEAKER HARTLEY: Representative Scalettar.

REP. SCALETTAR: Thank you, Madam Speaker. That practice would not be illegal. However, the club would have to offer the option to have access available to both members of the couple and the club could charge an additional fee for that or arrange it however it wanted to as long as the option were available.

Id., pp. 2149-51.

7 The relevant colloquy between Representative Metz of the 101st District and Representative Scalettar was as follows:

REP. METZ: And through you, Madam Speaker, Representative Scalettar, would this legislation or the existing law prohibit the formation of a club by a group of women who could then play whenever they wanted or a group of men only who could play whenever they wanted?

DEPUTY SPEAKER HARTLEY: Representative Scalettar.

REP. SCALETTAR: Through you, Madam Speaker. No, it would not because this legislation only applies to people who are accepted into the club. It does not deal with who may later become a member of the club. So this does not affect, for example, as I understand it, there is an all male club in the State of Connecticut now. Women are not permitted in that club and this does not reach that situation. This has to do with people who are in the club.

Id., p. 2189-90.

This amendment . . . prohibits the denial of membership in golf country clubs a[s] defined in the previous amendment on the basis of race, religion, color, national origin, ancestry, sex, marital status, or sexual orientation.

Id., p. 2205. Upon the approval of this amendment, which occurred with almost no further debate, the amended bill was passed by the House and sent on to the Senate in the form that ultimately became law.

In presenting the bill to the Senate, Senator Donald Williams initially summarized its provisions as follows:

Madam President, I would just like to briefly run through the bill itself so that we can be familiar with the exact provisions. This pertains to golf country clubs.

And that means an association of persons not less than twenty members who pay membership fees or dues, and where there is a golf course of at least nine holes. Or the club holds a particular permit to sell alcoholic beverage.

This legislation would not permit discrimination for membership in any such golf country club on the basis of race, religion, color, national origin, ancestry, sex, marital status, or sexual orientation. At such clubs, all classes of membership would have to be available without regard[, a]gain, to race, religion, color, national origin, ancestry, sex, marital status, or sexual orientation. At such clubs there must be equal access to the facilities that serve food and beverages. The legislation also notes, Madam President, that single sex events are still okay.

That you can have a ladies golf tournament, as someone just said. A men's golf tournament. That's not prohibit[ed], as long as there are similar events for members of both sex[es]. A remedy for violation of this piece of legislation can be brought in superior court[.]

Madam President, this is important legislation, because I've heard from very many women, professional women, housewives, spouses, who have told me what if the difference was that Catholics or Jews or members of minority groups, African Americans, what if they were told they couldn't tee off in the morning on a Saturday or a Sunday.

Or they couldn't sit down and have a sandwich in the dining area. None of us would tolerate that for an instant. And yet, that is the discrimination that women have been subject to. Now I haven't been able to be impressed with any rational basis as to why that sort of discrimination should be allowed to continue.

I've heard stories of specific instances. A woman who was divorced who had two sons, bought a family membership at a country club. Played golf, but could not tee off with her two sons on a Saturday morning. An attorney, a woman attorney who had a membership, but who could not eat a sandwich in the dining area.

The stories go on and on. As we know in country clubs, it's more than just entertainment, it's networking, it's where business is often conducted. It's where businesses and corporations often buy memberships for their officers and employees, specifically for the purpose that they be able to network and conduct business. CT Page 364

So, Madam President, this discrimination cannot be allowed to continue. And I would very strongly urge the passage of this bill.

40 S. Proc., Pt. 6, 1997 Sess., pp. 1944-47. In the debate that followed, Senator Williams clarified that the bill, as amended by the House, was significantly different than that which had been debated before and approved by the Joint Judiciary Committee, primarily because it outlawed discrimination in the membership policies and practices of golf country clubs, not just in their treatment of existing members. Id., p. 1949. In addition, he conceded that, although the new legislation was based in part upon legislators' concerns that the State should not promote discriminatory practices by golf country clubs by permitting them to operate food and beverage facilities under State liquor licenses while engaging in such discrimination, the legislation applies with equal force to golf country clubs that have no such State licences. Id., p. 1953. The bill was passed as presented with only one dissenting vote.

Against the foregoing background, the statute's seven substantive provisions, in subsections (b) though (h) thereof, can best be grouped and explained as follows. The first group, including subsections (b), (c) and (e) of the statute, generally prohibit discrimination on any of the bases listed in the statute in the membership policies and facilities-access practices of Connecticut golf country clubs. To that end, initially, subsection (b), though the last subsection added to the statute, makes the broad threshold declaration that "no golf country club may deny membership in such club to any person on account of race, religion, color, national origin, ancestry, sex, marital status or sexual orientation." This essential provision unambiguously forbids golf country clubs from basing their initial decisions as to the acceptance or rejection of new members on any of the impermissible considerations listed in the statute.

Subsection (c), in turn, provides that "[a]ll classes of membership in a golf country club shall be available without regard to race, religion, color, national origin, ancestry, sex, marital status or sexual orientation." This provision prohibits golf country clubs from complying with the letter but not the spirit of subsection (b), which they might otherwise do by formally admitting new members without regard to sex or other impermissible considerations, then denying them access to preferred classes of membership or the benefits thereof based on those same considerations. It thus prohibits golf country clubs from establishing de facto caste systems among their members, effectively relegating particular subgroups of members to second-class citizenship on a discriminatory basis. More broadly, it implies, as Representative Scalettar clearly stated before the House,⁸ that all rights pertaining to any particular class of club members must be extended in substance, not merely in form, to each and every member of that class.

8 See note 5, supra at p. 26-27.

The third provision in the statute which broadly prohibits golf country clubs from discriminating on any impermissible basis therein listed is subsection (e), which provides in part as follows: "A golf country club that has food or beverage facilities or services shall allow equal access to such facilities and services for all adults in all membership categories at all times." This provision expressly prohibits the exclusion of any group except children from a golf country club's food and beverage facilities or services, at any time or for any reason, including membership status. It thus addresses, and formally prohibits, some of the most bizarre and offensive practices to which women golfers were routinely subjected by Connecticut golf country clubs before 1998, to wit: denial of the right even to enter, much less to be served in, the bars, grill rooms and restaurants of their own clubs.

The second group of related provisions in Section 52-571d specifically concern the transition of golf country clubs from essentially male to mixed-gender memberships, and the manner in which clubs must manage their affairs during this transition and thereafter to ensure that members of both sexes have equal access to club facilities and services. The first such provision, in subsection (d) thereof provides as follows:

A golf country club that allows the use of its facilities or services by two or more adults per membership, including the use of such facilities or services during restricted times, shall make such use equally available to all adults entitled to use such facilities or services under that membership. The requirements of this subsection concerning equal access to facilities or services of such club shall not apply to adult children included in the membership. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to affect the assessment by a golf country club of any fees, dues or charges it deems appropriate, including the ability to charge additional fees, dues or charges for access by both adult members during restricted times.

The second related provision is in subsection (f) of the statute, which provides that

Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit a golf country club from sponsoring or permitting events that are limited to members of one sex if such club sponsors or permits events that are comparable for members of each sex.

Read together in light of their plain language and legislative history, these two provisions stand for several related propositions.

First, golf country clubs may continue to restrict access to their golfing facilities, as opposed to their food and beverage facilities, as long as they do so in a non-discriminatory manner. Play at preferred tee times may thus be restricted to persons who belong to particular membership classes, as long as membership in those classes is not itself restricted on a discriminatory basis and all members of each such class are granted equal access to the club's services and facilities, regardless of their sex.

Second, though golf country clubs may continue to offer their members the option of joining under "family memberships" or their equivalent, under which two or more adults may use the club's services and facilities, including the use of such services or facilities at restricted times, under a single membership, they must make all rights exercisable by any one adult under that membership equally available to all adults except adult children who join the club under that same membership. This provision thus abolished the widespread pre-existing practice of offering family memberships under which only one adult family member, traditionally the husband, could exercise full golf privileges, while all others, including the wife, had only limited access to the golf course at non-preferred playing times. By so doing, it guaranteed that all current women members of golf country clubs who wished to obtain full golf privileges could do so if they were willing to pay for them.

Third, however, because permitting new members to use a club's golf facilities at restricted times would predictably put a strain on those facilities, making them less available to all members who had specially paid to use them at those times, the statute expressly permitted clubs to assess additional fees, dues or charges for any family membership under which more than one member elected to have and exercise full golf privileges. The only statutory limitation on the amount of such additional fees, dues or charges is that the club itself must have "deem[ed them] appropriate."

Fourth and finally, subsections (d) and (f) stand for the proposition that, although men and women who obtain full golf privileges at golf country clubs must have "equal access" to the club's services and facilities without regard to sex, clubs may continue to hold events limited to members of one sex as long as they sponsor or conduct "comparable" gender-specific events for members of both sexes. Though the term "comparable" is not defined in the statute, its meaning in this context is quite clear. As discussed by those legislators who addressed this issue when the bill was debated, the term connotes functional equivalency in terms of the number, type and scheduling of gender-specific events.

The final group of related provisions in Section 52-571d establish remedies and sanctions for proven violations of any of the substantive statutory provisions described above. Subsection (g) of the statute, under which the instant action was brought, grants the right to bring a civil action for injunctive relief and actual or nominal damages, attorneys fees and costs to "[a]ny person aggrieved by a violation of the provisions of this section." Subsection (h), in turn, provides in part that:

If, in an action brought under subsection (g) of this section, the court finds that a golf country club holding a permit to sell alcoholic liquor under chapter 545 has violated any of the provisions of this section, it may, in addition to any relief ordered under said subsection (g), order the suspension of such permit until such time as it determines that such club is no longer in violation of this section.

(Emphasis added.) The latter provision, as its language suggests, establishes a further sanction which the Court may impose upon any golf country club that is proved to have violated any substantive provision of the statute in a civil action brought and successfully prosecuted by an aggrieved person under Section 52-571d(g). Importantly, the provision does not make such remedy available in any other kind of action or proceeding, including any proceeding brought by one who is not personally aggrieved by conduct violative of the statute.

IV. CHALLENGE TO PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS BASED UPON THE DEFENDANT'S ALLEGED CHARGING OF EXCESSIVE INITIATION FEES FOR HER FULL GOLF PRIVILEGES

The plaintiff's claim, as made in the Third and Fifth Counts of her Complaint, that the defendant charged her an excessive initiation fee, prohibitive to women, to become a second Primary Member of the Golf Club under her family membership, finds no support at all in Section 52-571d. To begin with, the text of subsection (d) of the statute expressly contemplates that, although golf country clubs must make use of their facilities or services "equally available" to all adults except adult children who may use them under a single membership that permits such use during restricted times, such clubs may charge more money for the extension of such privileges to multiple members, and may do so in any amount they "deem appropriate." From this language it is apparent both that the mere charging of an additional fee to a second Primary Member under a single family membership does not violate the statute, and that the appropriateness of any such fee is not subject to measurement under any absolute statutory standard, but instead is left to the judgment and discretion of each golf country club that decides to assess one.

The plaintiff here challenges the defendant's setting of her initiation fee, claiming that the fee was excessive and inappropriate because it was not reasonably related to the additional expense to the Golf Club of her exercise of full golf privileges. So presented, however, her claim is a bare assertion, unsupported by any facts at all as to the marginal additional cost, if any, other exercise of full golf privileges compared with her prior exercise of limited privileges as a spousal member.

More importantly, however, the plaintiff's cost-based argument takes no account of the true reason why golf country clubs were statutorily permitted to charge additional fees for the extension of full golf privileges to additional adult members under single family memberships, to wit: to control access to their golfing facilities at times of peak demand, especially on weekend and holiday mornings. Access control was widely recognized by the legislature to be essential to ensuring that the club's full golfing members would receive what they paid for in joining the club, specifically the reasonable opportunity to make use of the golf course at preferred playing times. The charging of appropriate initiation fees to all who wish to use the club's limited golfing facilities can be a fair, neutral way of achieving such access control if it is done in a nondiscriminatory manner.

Here, of course, the plaintiff has suggested that her $4,500 initiation fee discriminated against her on account of her sex. The evidence, however, clearly shows that the imposition of this fee was completely gender-neutral for two reasons. First, as initially adopted by the Golf Club in early January of 1998, the new family membership system did not grandfather in male members under single family memberships, definitively or presumptively designating them instead of their wives as Primary Members, who alone could exercise full golf privileges. Instead, the Golf Club expressly left that decision up to each family with a family membership, requiring them to notify the Golf Club by March 1, 1998 as to which of their adult members should be designated the Primary Member, and thus the person who would exercise full golf privileges under its membership. Cf. WCC Members For Fair Play v. Wethersfield Country Club, 23 Conn. L. Rptr. 25, 1998 Conn.Super. LEXIS 2549 (J.D. Middlesex, Aurigemma, J., August 12, 1998) (finding that the defendant golf country club had violated Section 52-571d(d) by presumptively according preferential status to males who had joined it under family memberships instead of letting families choose which of their adult family members should have that status, and thus have full golf privileges under its membership). The plaintiff thus could have become the Primary Member under her family membership had she and her husband so decided and informed the Golf Club by the March 1, 1998 deadline. That, however, was not their decision.

A second reason why the new initiation fee charged to family members who wished to become additional Primary Members with full golf privileges under their family memberships did not discriminate against women was that the amount of the fee was exactly the same for similarly situated persons of both sexes. That is, if the family designated the wife as the Primary Member, then advised the Golf Club that it also wished the husband to have full golf privileges, the same additional initiation fee would be assessed.

Finally, the Court must note that in spite of the crude, openly hostile attitudes allegedly displayed by some of the Golf Club's male members towards women golfers in general and the plaintiff in particular, the Golf Club's official approach to complying with Section 52-571d was marked by openness and acceptance rather than resistance to the prospect of having female spouses of male Primary Members become Primary Members with full golf privileges. This is evidenced both by its offering to its family members of the opportunity to designate a woman as the family's Primary Member and by the relaxation of two requirements for Primary Membership for the sole benefit of families that wished to have both spouses become Primary Members: first, the initiation fee, which was reduced on a one-time basis from $6,500 to $4,500, payable over two years; and second, the requirement of a credit check, which was dispensed with altogether. A golf country club that was determined to keep women golfers off its golf course at preferred playing times would hardly have acted so quickly and decisively to make it easier for spouses of male members with full golf privileges to obtain such privileges themselves.

Of final note in regard to the plaintiff's claim as to the Golf Club's assessment of a $4,500 initiation fee is that the plaintiff herself was not deterred in the slightest by the assessment of that fee. To the contrary, she informed the Golf Club that she intended to pay the fee within three weeks of first learning that she could become a Primary Member if she did so, and she promptly paid the fee thereafter without objection or complaint.

For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby concludes that there is no genuine issue of material fact that the defendant Golf Club did not violate the plaintiff's rights under any subsection of General Statutes § 52-571d by assessing her an initiation fee of $4,500 to become a second Primary Member under her family membership. No facts have been adduced to suggest that the fee was not "appropriate" for its statutorily permitted purpose of controlling access to the golf course at restricted times, or that it was otherwise excessive in any way, much less in a way that discriminated against women. In fact, the only evidence is to the contrary, clearly showing that the fee was identical in amount to that charged to all other spousal members of either sex who sought to become Primary Members along with their Primary Member spouses in the relevant time frame, and in fact that it was lower than the fee then charged to outsiders of either sex who applied to join the Club.

The defendant is thus entitled to summary judgment on the Third Count of the plaintiff's Complaint, for that count is based solely upon her claim of excessiveness and resulting inappropriateness of her initiation fee under subsection (d) of the statute. In addition, the defendant is entitled to summary judgment on that portion of the plaintiff's Fifth Count which is based upon the claim that the defendant's "excessive and arbitrary fee structure for a second Primary Member [is] . . . designed to discourage and ha[s] discouraged women, including the Plaintiff, from seeking equal access to membership at the [Golf] Club[,]" in alleged violation of subsection (b) of the statute. There are three straightforward reasons for the latter conclusion.

First, as previously noted with respect to the Third Count, there is no evidence to suggest that the Golf Club's assessment of an additional initiation fee for a second Primary Membership with full golf privileges under the plaintiff's family membership was anything but an appropriate, non-discriminatory exercise of its judgment and discretion, expressly permitted by the statute, as to how it should control access to its limited golfing facilities at preferred playing times. There is no evidence, in particular, that the assessment of such a fee discriminated against women in any way, for to reiterate, the fee was identical in amount for both men and women in the plaintiff's situation, and in fact it was less than the fee then charged to outsiders who then wished to join the Golf Club.

Second, there is no evidence that the assessment of the fee "discouraged" the plaintiff from doing anything at all, much less from "seeking equal access to membership at the [Golf] Club[,]" as she has alleged. Having learned that she could obtain full golf privileges by paying the fee, she quickly announced her intention to pay it, then promptly did so. She was clearly not discouraged by the fee from seeking Primary Membership in the Golf Club. Nor, moreover, was she discouraged, as she has alleged, from "seeking equal access to membership at the [Golf] Club[,]" for she had already been a member for many years when the fee was assessed, and her membership, as distinct from her membership status, could not have been affected by her decision whether or not to pay it. Therefore, even if there were evidence, which there is not, that the assessment of the fee constituted prohibited discriminatory conduct, the plaintiff would have no legal right to complain of such conduct under subsection (b) of Section 52-571d, as alleged in her Fifth Count.

Third and finally, to the extent that the plaintiff has claimed in her Fifth Count that the defendant's "excessive and arbitrary fee structure . . . ha[s] discouraged [other] women . . . from seeking equal access to membership at the [Golf] Club," that claim must be rejected for lack of standing as well as lack of proof. Subsection (g) of the statute expressly conditions a party's right to complain of alleged violations of the statute on his or her personal aggrievement by those violations. Plainly, then, even if the plaintiff had adduced competent evidence to support this bare allegation, which she has not, plaintiff could not base a claim upon it because she cannot claim personal aggrievement based upon the alleged violation of other people's rights.

V. CHALLENGE TO PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS BASED UPON DEFENDANT'S TOURNAMENT TEE-OFF RULES

The defendant's second challenge to the factual and legal sufficiency of the plaintiff's claims against it is directed to those counts of her Complaint which are predicated, in whole or in part, upon its adoption of the rule that all golfers in Primary Member tournaments must contest those tournaments from the middle or back (men's) tees. The basis for this challenge is twofold: first, that all but one of the plaintiff's claims about the challenged rule are totally unsupported by the evidence presented on this Motion; and second, that the plaintiffs only factually supportable claim — that enforcement of the rule inhibits her personally from fully enjoying the game during Primary Member tournaments — is legally insufficient, even if proved at trial, to establish a violation of General Statutes § 52-571d.

A. The Plaintiff's Claim Under Section 52-571d(b) That the Challenged Rule Has Discouraged Her and Other Women from Seeking Equal Access to Membership at the Golf Club

The plaintiff, to reiterate, has based four of her five claims against it on the defendant's imposition of the challenged rule. She claims most globally, in her fifth count, that the rule in question, in combination with other allegedly discriminatory practices, was "designed and intended to discourage and ha[s] discouraged women, including the plaintiff, from "seeking equal access to membership at the [Golf] Club," in alleged violation of subsection (b) of Section 52-571d. The defendant claims, and the Court agrees, that whatever else may be said of the rule in question, it certainly has not discouraged the plaintiff from seeking equal access to membership" at the Golf Club, for she was already a member there for many years before the rule was first adopted, and its adoption has not affected her membership in any way. In addition, to the extent that the plaintiff, in her fifth count, purports to make a claim of discrimination on behalf of other women, she has no standing to make that claim because she cannot be personally aggrieved by any alleged violation of their statutory rights. In sum, this claim is without merit for the same reasons discussed in Part IV of the Memorandum of Decision, supra at 28-30, with respect to the plaintiff's parallel claim in her fifth count based upon the defendant's allegedly "excessive and arbitrary fee structure." There is simply no factual or legal basis in this record for either such claim. Accordingly, the defendant's Motion must be granted in its entirety with respect to Count Five of the plaintiff's Complaint.

B. The Plaintiff's Claims Under Section 52-571d(c) and (d) That the Challenged Rule Has Prevented Her from Competing Effectively in Primary Member Tournaments

The defendant next claims, in Counts One and Four of her Complaint, that the challenged tournament tee-off rule has violated her rights under subsections (c) and (d) of Section 52-571d, respectively, by "inhibit[ing her] ability to effectively compete in all weekend Primary Member tournaments [;]" Complaint, Count I, ¶ 25; and thus "effectively preclud[ing her] from competitively participating in [such] tournaments, part of [her] rights as a Primary Member[.]" Id., Count IV, ¶ 26. The plaintiff claims that the rule's allegedly anti-competitive impact upon women Primary Members has violated subsection (c) of the statute by "discourag[ing] and inhibit[ing] women golfers, including [herself], from availing themselves of Primary Member status"; id., Count I, ¶ 26; and thus "deny[ing them], on account of their sex, the availability of a [P]rimary [M]embership" in the Golf Club. Id., Count I, ¶ 27. By enforcing the rule against women who do become Primary Golfers, moreover, the plaintiff claims that the defendant has violated subsection (d) of the statute by "fail[ing] to make use of its facilities during restricted Prime Time equally available to women golfers." Id., Count IV, ¶ 27.

This allegation, like that in the plaintiff's fifth count, discussed above, is utterly lacking in factual support for several reasons. First, the plaintiff and other women have competed effectively in Primary Member tournaments ever since the rule was first adopted for the 2000 golf season. Women, including the plaintiff, have regularly played and won prize money in Primary Member tournaments since that time, as documented in several exhibits presented by the defendant on this Motion without rebuttal or contradiction.⁹ Secondly, the reason for the plaintiff's and other women's success in such tournaments is explained by the Golf Club's adoption and implementation of the USGA Handicap System, which is designed to ensure, and whose use has admittedly resulted in, the equalization of all players' net scores in order to foster fair competition among golfers of all ages and ability levels, regardless of sex. Even the plaintiff's expert, Mr. Tatnall, has grudgingly agreed that under that System, all golfers can fairly and effectively compete in Primary Member tournaments.

9 See note 3, supra at p. 17.

In sum, the plaintiff's claim that the challenged rule has "inhibit[ed her] ability to effectively compete in all weekend Program Primary Member tournaments at the [Golf] Club," and thus "effectively precluded [her] from competitively participating in [such] tournament," is simply not true. Hence, the defendant is entitled to summary judgment on those portions of Counts One and Four which are based upon that unsupported claim.

C. The Plaintiff's Claim Under Section 52-571d(d) That the Challenged Rule Has Deprived Her of Equal Availability of Its Services and Facilities During Primary Member Tournaments

The plaintiff's third claim based upon the defendant's adoption and implementation of its challenged tournament tee-off rule, as pleaded in Count Two of her Complaint, is that the rule has denied her "the same availability and use of its facilities as it provides to male Primary Members, i.e. the ability to play the same golf game as they always have." Complaint, Count II, ¶ 23. As a result, complains the plaintiff, she "is being denied the same privileges" as male golfers, particularly "equal availab[ility]" of "Primary Member Prime Time tournaments"; id. Count II, ¶ 24; and "[being] denied] . . ., on account of her sex, the equal availability of [the Golf Club's] facilities and services utilized by other male Primary Members during restricted Prime Time in violation of [General Statutes] § 52-571d(d)." Id., Count II, ¶ 26.

This claim, though broadly stated, is actually very narrow when considered in light of the facts adduced to support it. In fact, its scope is essentially identical to that of the plaintiff's fourth and final claim, made in Count One of her Complaint, that the challenged tournament tee-off rule has "inhibit[ed her] ability to obtain the full use and enjoyment of her Primary Member status." Id., Count I, ¶ 24. This is so for the following reasons.

First, of course, there can be no claim that by imposing this rule, the defendant is depriving the plaintiff of full access to its golfing facilities during Prime Time. This is so because, with the exception of the weekend when the Men's Club Championship is being contested, to which she does not object, Primary Members who do not choose to play in Primary Member tournaments may always play golf while such tournaments are underway, and may do so from whatever tee they choose. Therefore, there is no factual basis for the plaintiff's claim that the defendant's tournament tee-off rule denies her equal access to club golfing facilities during Prime Time.

As for the plaintiff's claim that the rule in question denies her equal availability of the Golf Club's services — to wit, its Primary Member Prime Time tournaments — it is equally clear, for reasons previously stated, that she can participate in such tournaments and has regularly done so since the rule was adopted, competing successfully with male and female golfers of all ages and abilities due to the Golf Club's use of the USGA Handicap System. Hence, the only alleged benefit of membership which the plaintiff can legitimately claim to have lost or been deprived of due to the defendant's imposition of the challenged rule is her ability to enjoy the game of golf while playing in Primary Member tournaments, which assertedly would be greater if she could contest those tournaments from the women's tees.

D. The Plaintiff's Claims Under Section 52-571d(c) and (d) That the Challenged Rule Has Deprived Her of Equal Enjoyment of the Game of Golf During Primary Member Tournaments

In support of its challenge to the plaintiff's claim that the defendant's tournament tee-off rule violates her rights under Section 52-571d by diminishing her subjective enjoyment of the game of golf during Primary Member tournaments, the defendant makes two essential arguments. First, it contends that nothing in the text or the legislative history of the statute discloses any intent by its framers to grant women or others any enforceable right to enjoy the game of golf as it is played at golf country clubs. Second, it argues that even if the statute can somehow be read to give rise to a right to equal enjoyment of the game of golf at Connecticut golf country clubs without regard to sex or other impermissible, statutorily listed considerations, there is no genuine issue of material fact that, on the record before this Court, the plaintiff cannot prevail on such a claim.

Having correctly noted in its Reply Memorandum that neither the word "enjoyment" nor any reference to the rules of golf appears either in the statute or in the legislative history; id., at 8; the defendant insists that such matters were obviously not the concern of the legislature when it enacted the statute, and thus that the statute does not purport to govern them. Instead, it argues, quoting from the plaintiff's own Opposition Memorandum, that "[t]he driving motivation behind the legislation was to prohibit discrimination in membership and access to private golf club facilities and services." Id. at 14. This argument is succinctly restated as follows in the Defendant's Supplemental Memorandum In Support of Motion For Summary Judgment dated June 20, 2003:

As its extensive legislative history demonstrates, [Section] 52-571d ("the Statute") is directed at ensuring that golf clubs give members and prospective members access to the golf club and its facilities without regard to race, religion, color, national origin, ancestry, sex, marital status or sexual orientation. It is not aimed at ensuring that each and every member likes the way each and every tournament at the club is conducted. Such a claim is not, nor was it ever, contemplated to be within the intent of the Statute. The Statute sought to address equal access to facilities, not to mandate the rules of golf.

Defendant's Supp. Memo. (6/20/03), p. 1.

The plaintiff responds to this argument by contending that, while the statute does not expressly grant members of golf country clubs the right to "equal enjoyment" of the benefits of club membership, such a right is implicit in the statutory scheme, at least as applied to the facts of this case. Hence, she first argues, the statute not only guarantees equal access to club membership, under subsection (b) thereof, but equal access to all classes of club membership, under subsection (c), in order to ensure that no club member is precluded from obtaining the fullest possible benefits of club membership, to wit: full access to and the right to make full and effective use of the club's services and facilities. Furthermore, she notes that under subsections (c) and (d) of the statute, as explained to the House of Representatives by its chief sponsor and spokesperson, Representative Scalettar, all adult members of each club membership class must be accorded the same rights of access to club services and facilities as all other members of their class, including, where class members have paid for it, the right of access to the club's golfing facilities at restricted times. In light of these provisions, claims the plaintiff, the legislature's manifest purpose for enacting the statute was to ensure that all rights arising under each class of club membership would be honored in substance as well as in form, and thus that all benefits due to members of each club membership class would be equally available to all members of that class, without regard to sex or any other impermissible, statutorily listed consideration.

Applying this analysis to the record before the Court, the plaintiff advances three reasons why the defendant's enforcement of the challenged tournament tee-off rule violates the statute by diminishing her enjoyment of playing golf in Primary Member tournaments. First, her expert witness, Mr. Tatnall, expressly states in his affidavit, and thus allegedly raises a genuine issue of material fact as to the proposition, that "[o]ne of the privileges of membership in a private membership golf club is the enjoyment of tournament play." Aff. T. Tatnall, ¶ 9. Second, Mr. Tatnall opines, and thus allegedly raises a genuine issue of material fact as to the further proposition, that women golfers' enjoyment of golf is "negatively affect[ed]" if they must tee off from longer men's or middle tees than from the shorter women's or forward tees from which they traditionally play. Id., ¶ 7. Such "lessening of . . . enjoyment . . . cannot be remedied," Mr. Tatnall continues, "by increasing the handicaps of women golfers, and in this case of the plaintiff, as that only has the effect of arguably leveling out the scores but does not remedy the diminution of the enjoyment of the game as well as the attendant denial of equal access to the golf course and to the privileges of membership enjoyed by male "primary golfers" of the defendant golf club." Id., ¶ 10 (emphasis in original). Third, the plaintiff claims that the defendant has admitted that enjoyment of tournament play is a benefit of Primary Membership, because it has adopted the USGA Handicap System, whose stated purpose "is to make the game of golf more enjoyable by enabling golfers of different abilities to compete on an equitable basis." Plaintiff's Supplemental Letter Brief In Opposition To Motion For Summary Judgment (6/20/03), p. 2 (quoting, with added emphasis, from the USGA Handicap System, as quoted in Defendant's Reply Memorandum at p. 8).

The defendant responds to these arguments, for reasons to be developed more fully below, that Mr. Tatnall is incompetent to establish the impact of the challenged rule on women generally and that its own use of the USGA Handicap System has unquestionably succeeded in promoting enjoyment of the game in the only way that matters, to wit: by fostering equitable competition among golfers of different abilities in Primary Member tournaments. In sum, claims the defendant, the plaintiff has no basis for her claim other than that the challenged rule makes tournament play less enjoyable for her personally, which is assertedly insufficient to establish a statutory violation as a matter of law.

The Court agrees with the defendant that the primary purpose of the statute was to promote equal access to membership in and access to the services and facilities of golf country clubs by persons of all races, religions, colors, national origins, ancestries, sexes, marital statuses and sexual orientations. The defendant is clearly correct in its assertion that the statute was not designed or intended to regulate the game of golf as played at Connecticut golf country clubs, in tournaments or otherwise, or to grant persons who play golf at such clubs an enforceable right to equal enjoyment of the game, for such matters are not addressed in the text of the statute and were not discussed at any point in the debates that led to its enactment. Even so, the Court agrees with the plaintiff that the intent of the statute was to ensure that all who join golf country clubs have equal access to the services and facilities of such clubs, including equal access to the full benefits of whatever class of membership they pay for, without regard to sex or any other impermissible, statutorily listed consideration. On that basis, the Court concludes that a golf country club's adoption of any policy or practice that operates to deny any club member the full benefits of her club membership, or materially interferes with her ability to obtain those benefits, constitutes an actionable violation of the statute.

In light of this conclusion, this Court must next inquire whether, on this record, there is any basis for the claim that equal enjoyment of tournament play is an essential benefit of Primary Membership in the defendant Golf Club, and if so, whether there is any genuine issue of material fact that the defendant's adoption of the challenged rule has denied her that benefit, or materially interfered with her ability to obtain it, on the basis of her sex. Here, although the Court agrees with the plaintiff that there is at least a colorable basis for claiming that equal enjoyment of tournament play is an essential benefit of such Primary Membership, it finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact that the challenged rule has not denied the plaintiff that benefit, or materially interfered with in her ability to obtain it, on the basis of her sex. The reasons for this conclusion are as follows.

First, it is apparent that Primary Member tournaments play a major role of the yearly golf program of the defendant Golf Club. Over 70 such tournaments are conducted every year, all during Prime Time on weekend mornings. Thus, the case can certainly be made that such tournaments constitute a major part, if not the very centerpiece, of the Golf Club's recreational and social program for Primary Members. Though it is true that participation in such tournaments requires the payment of a modest additional annual fee, the right to play in such tournaments upon paying that fee belongs only to Primary Members.

Second, the evidence before this Court also makes it apparent that Primary Member tournaments at the Golf Club are actively contested by its Primary Members, who not only play in them but compete in them for prizes, keeping detailed records of their performances. See, e.g., Aff. E. Torkelsen, Ex. M. Members obviously care deeply about equalizing the competition in such tournaments so that all can compete fairly in them. This is evidenced by the defendant's initial attempt to equalize competition in such tournaments in 1998 and 1999 by having its golf pro establish new forward tee boxes on certain holes for the plaintiff and other women, by members' reported reactions after the 1999 golf season to the perceived unfairness of letting women contest such tournaments from the forward tees, and by the defendant's consistent use of the USGA Handicap System to level her scores among competitors of all abilities in such tournaments after its adoption of the challenged tee-off rule. The stated purpose of the USGA Handicap System, as both parties have noted, "is to make the game of golf more enjoyable by enabling golfers of different abilities to compete on an equitable basis." In light of the defendant's strict adherence to that System in Primary Member tournaments, the record plainly supports the inference that equal enjoyment of Primary Member tournaments, in the sense of equal ability to compete fairly in them, is considered an essential benefit of Primary Membership in the Golf Club.

Apart from the foregoing, however, these is no competent evidence to establish that Primary Membership in the Golf Club carries with it any broader right to equal enjoyment of the game during Primary Member tournaments than the right to compete fairly in them. The plaintiff, to be sure, has averred that upon joining the Golf Club, she expected that she "would be able to enjoy and partake in the same benefits and privileges of membership to which all `primary golfers' are entitled," including, by implication, all Primary Member tournaments. Aff. A. Yolles, ¶ 20. This averment, however, must be discounted because it offers no factual basis for its self-serving conclusion. A party does not raise a genuine issue of material fact merely by stating that there is one.

Moreover the affidavit of the plaintiff's expert, Thomas Tatnall, fares no better than the plaintiff's own affidavit in this regard. Mr. Tatnall's flat suggestion that enjoyment of tournament play is "[o]ne of the privileges of membership in a private membership golf club" is simply that — a bare, unsupported suggestion with no factual basis and no claimed or demonstrated applicability to the defendant Golf Club. Despite his long experience as a golf professional, Mr. Tatnall has no personal knowledge of the Golf Club or of the membership rights and privileges of its Primary Members. Instead, the only factual basis he can offer for his conclusion is rank hearsay, based exclusively upon what the plaintiff and her husband have told him.

Against this background, the Court must conclude that, on this record, there is no genuine issue of material fact that the defendant has not violated the plaintiff's right to equal enjoyment of tournament play in Primary Member tournaments by adopting the challenged tournament tee-off rule. Understood, as it must be, as a limited right to compete fairly in such tournaments, that right has been fully honored by the defendant as a result of its use of the USGA Handicap System. Because the System has worked as it was designed to — promoting fair competition among golfers of all strengths and abilities, including the plaintiff and other women, by equalizing their net scores in Primary Member tournaments — the plaintiff has no basis for claiming a denial of her right to equal enjoyment of such tournament play.

The foregoing analysis does not end the Court's inquiry, however, for although the plaintiff has presented no basis for claiming any broader right to equal enjoyment of tournament play than the right to compete fairly in such tournaments, it nonetheless remains possible for her to establish that the defendant has materially interfered with her ability to play in such tournaments at all, and thus denied what is plainly an essential benefit of her Primary Membership. Interference with the right to play at all in Primary Member tournaments could come in many different forms. Some such forms of interference could be physical, resulting from the adoption of unreasonable rules or requirements that would make it impractical, if not impossible, for most female golfers to play the game. Examples might include the adoption of rules requiring all tournament participants to play with oversized golf clubs that the average female golfer could not swing, to carry heavy golf bags which the average female golfer could not carry, or, of special interest here, to tee off from tees from which the average female golfer would have no realistic hope of putting the ball in play. Other forms of interference could be non-physical, such as fostering an atmosphere so hostile, demeaning or offensive to women as to dissuade female golfers from participating in tournaments despite their equal right to do so. In that sense, then, any conduct by a golf country club that materially deprived women, on account of their sex, of the essential social, recreational or business benefits for which they had paid with their initiation fees and annual dues would be actionable under the statute as a denial of equal access to club services and facilities.

Notwithstanding the theoretical availability of these alternative bases for claiming that the defendant's challenged rule violated her right of equal access to Primary Member tournaments, there is no support in this record for any such alternative claim. To begin with, though the plaintiff has complained that the challenged rule makes the defendant's golf course longer and less enjoyable for her to play, she has never claimed that enforcement of that rule makes it impossible for her to play in Primary Member tournaments. In fact, as previously noted, she has competed in such tournaments with considerable success ever since the challenged rule went into effect.

On the one occasion, moreover, when the plaintiff invited a female business client to play with her in a Primary Member tournament, the client's discomfort, as the plaintiff herself has described it, stemmed from her embarrassment at playing poorly, not from her inability to play the game at all. Even, then, if this single experience with a female business client of unknown golfing ability or temperament could somehow be extrapolated from to establish the general effect of the challenged tournament tee-off rule upon women, which plainly it cannot in light of the documented success of women golfers in contesting Primary Member tournaments at the Golf Club, it would not tend to establish material interference with women's physical ability to play the game at all that would be actionable under the statute.

Not surprisingly, then, the plaintiff's expert witness, Thomas Tatnall, has offered no opinion that the defendant's golf course, or any hole thereof, is physically impossible for the plaintiff or other women to play. To the contrary, when Mr. Tatnall and Mr. Joseph Hallett, another golf professional who played with him at the Golf Club on the one day he actually visited it for the purpose of reaching his opinions in this case, hit their drives with irons from the middle tees to replicate the driving distances of the average female golfer, they hit their balls safely into the fairway even on the longest, most difficult hole on the golf course. Deposition of Joseph Hallett (5/28/03), p. 24.

Here, moreover, although substantial evidence has been presented that certain club members conducted themselves shamefully towards the plaintiff, both before and after the statute went into effect, subjecting her to a barrage of demeaning, offensive, sexually explicit remarks, she has not based any of her claims, including her challenge to the defendant's tournament tee-off rule, upon it. Accordingly, such evidence at most establishes the background against which the plaintiff's true claims are alleged to have arisen.

For all of the foregoing reasons, this Court concludes that there is no genuine issue of material fact that the defendant's challenged tournament tee-off rule has not denied the plaintiff equal access to club services and facilities during Primary Member tournaments. The defendant is thus entitled to summary judgment on Counts One and Two of the plaintiff's Complaint.

VI. CONCLUSION

Upon reviewing the defendant's challenges to the plaintiff's many overlapping claims against it, the Court agrees with the defendant that it is entitled to summary judgment on all five counts of the plaintiff's Complaint, insofar as the claims therein presented are based upon the charging of additional fees for a second Primary Membership under the plaintiff's family membership and/or the adoption and enforcement of the rule requiring all participants in club Primary Member tournaments to tee off from the middle or back tees. The defendant's Motion is therefore granted, for the above-stated reasons, as to Counts One, Two, Three and Five of the plaintiff's Complaint in their entirety, and to so much of Count Four as is based upon the charging of additional fees and the imposition of the challenged tournament tee-off rule.

It appears, however, that the defendant is not entitled to summary judgment on the entirety of Count Four because, quite simply, the defendant has not challenged each claim therein presented in the instant Motion. The unchallenged portion of the count in question is that in which the plaintiff complains of the defendant's alleged holding of four gender-specific Primary Member tournaments for men, all in Prime Time on weekends, in the 1999 golf season, while holding its only gender-specific tournaments for women in that season on weekdays. The Court offers no opinion on the merits of this unchallenged claim, but notes particularly, for the benefit of the parties, that the specific tournament-scheduling practice here at issue was discussed and disagreed upon by two legislators when the relevant subsections of the statute were debated before the House of Representatives.¹⁰ Their dispute must await resolution when these parties or other brief and argue it in this or another case.

10 Compare the remarks of Representative Scalettar, who, while summarizing the statute for her House colleagues, opined that Tuesday morning events for women could not be considered "comparable" to Saturday morning events for men; Conn. House, Transcripts of Debate, Gen. Assembly (May 7, 1997), p. 79; with the later remarks of Representative Metz, who flatly disagreed with her as follows:

REP. METZ: . . . Madam Speaker, through you, Representative Scalettar, if I could refer you to Section 1(e) [later, as codified, subsection (f) of the statute]. Early in the debate you expressed the opinion that I think you said Tuesday morning is not comparable to Saturday morning and that Saturday morning is not comparable to Saturday afternoon. For the purposes of this legislation and I expect you are attempting to establish legislative intent by saying that.

Could I ask you that if in your opinion Saturday morning at eight o'clock is comparable to Saturday morning at ten o'clock?

DEPUTY SPEAKER HARTLEY: Representative Scalettar.

REP. SCALETTAR: Through you, Madam Speaker. I have no opinion as to that.

I think there's a question that has to be left to people who know golf much better than I do. I do know, however, in working on this bill, there were club representatives who said to me, why are women complaining that they can't play on Saturday morning. They can play on Tuesday morning. And they said why should women be able to play on the weekends? We men work hard all week and we should be able to play on the weekend. So since I know that this is an issue that comes up, I did mention [it] in the legislative history. I also understand that Saturday mornings are prime time that are reserved for men and women are restricted to play after the men. So I know from my discussions with people about this that those are not comparable times.

I am not a golfer myself, so I really could not say how eight a.m. compares to ten a.m., but perhaps some of the golfers here could.

Through you, Madam Speaker.

DEPUTY SPEAKER HARTLEY: Thank you, Madam. Representative Metz.

REP. METZ: Madam Speaker, I think I would just like to take issue with Representative Scalettar. I think that perhaps it may be her opinion that Tuesday is not comparable to Saturday and that Saturday morning is not comparable to Saturday afternoon. When in fact, I think it might be appropriate to say that Tuesday morning is not the same as Saturday morning and Saturday morning is not the same as Saturday afternoon, but in fact, the two are comparable. There is a difference, but the two certainly are comparable and I think that maybe as Representative Scalettar was not able to draw the distinction down to the fine point of whether eight o'clock and ten o'clock on Saturday morning were comparable, I think that opinions could differ as to whether or not a Thursday morning or a Tuesday morning might be comparable[,] a Thursday morning or a Saturday morning might be comparable[,] and I think that's an issue that's yet to be determined and I don't think that the fact that Representative Sealettar expressed that opinion necessarily is determinative of legislative intent . . .

[I]n polling the golf course I am most familiar with, I found that many of the concerns about this bill were expressed by the women members. The women members are a minority in that club by about 200 to 1,200 . . . [M]ost of the . . . women who are members of that club has (sic) some trepidation about it because at this point Thursday morning is reserved for those players, women players, to the exclusion of men and the feeling was that if we were to remove this restriction that the majority of that minority would be swamped by the retired men and other men who are available to play at that time and there wouldn't be a time when women could go and sign up.

In that respect I think for those people who have been a majority of the women members of that club, Thursday morning certainly is comparable to Saturday morning and it was a practice that they wished to keep in mind.

For all of the foregoing reasons, the defendant's Motion is hereby GRANTED AS PRESENTED, with the proviso that the plaintiff may continue to prosecute her unchallenged claim for damages, as pleaded in Count Four of her Complaint, that the defendant's scheduling of gender-specific tournaments in 1999 denied her equal access to the defendant's services and facilities, in alleged violation of Section 52-571d(d).

IT IS SO ORDERED this 6th day of January 2004.

MICHAEL R. SHELDON, JUDGE.