Opinion
No. 5794
February 27, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION TO DISMISS
The plaintiff, the Young Men's Christian Association of Stamford, filed a complaint against the defendant, Priscilla Bentley, seeking a declaratory judgment that pursuant to General Statutes § 47a-2(a)(3), the defendant's residency at the plaintiff's residential facility is not governed by Chapter 830 of the General Statutes and §§ 47a-21, 47a-23 to 47a-23b, inclusive, 47a-26 to 47a-26g, inclusive, 47a-35 to 47a-35b, inclusive, 47a-41a, 47a-43 and 47a-46 of the General Statutes, and, therefore, the plaintiff may proceed with a lockout of the defendant from her unit at the plaintiff's residential facility because the defendant failed to pay her rent.
General Statutes § 47a-2(a) provides in relevant part: "Unless created to avoid the application of this chapter and sections 47a-21, 47a-23 to 47a-23b, inclusive, 47a-26 to 47a-26g, inclusive, 47a-35 to 47a-35b, inclusive, 47a-41a, 47a-43 and 47a-46, the following arrangements are not governed by this chapter and sections 47a-21, 47a-23 to 47a-23b, inclusive, 47a-26 to 47a-26g, inclusive, 47a-35 to 47a-35b, inclusive, 47a-41a, 47a-43 and 47a-46 . . . (3) occupancy by a member of a fraternal or social organization in the portion of a structure operated for the benefit of such organization . . ."
A declaratory judgment hearing was held in this matter on September 9, 2003. The plaintiff presented the testimony of Thomas J. Steen, the plaintiff's chief executive officer, who testified to the following facts. The plaintiff is a non-profit community service organization, whose bylaws indicate that the purpose of the plaintiff is social, in part. The residential portion of the organization is operated as a program of the plaintiff and the revenues generated by the residential facility are listed as a line item revenue source for the entire organization. All residents of the plaintiff are required to become members of the plaintiff before being rented a room.
The plaintiff also presented the testimony of Ronald B. Kazi, the plaintiff's associate executive director, who testified to the following facts. The defendant, by renting a room, became a member of the plaintiff and was required to pay, on a bi-weekly basis, $420, of which $402.50 was allotted for the room charge and $17.50 was allotted for the membership dues. The defendant made her last rental payment on September 20, 2002.
Following the conclusion of the plaintiff's case, the defendant moved for a dismissal for failure to make out a prima facie case on the ground that the plaintiff did not offer any evidence to show that the plaintiff is a fraternal or a social organization, as required by § 47a-2(a)(3). The court heard oral argument on the motion, but deferred judgment until the conclusion of the evidence. At the close of evidence, the court requested that the parties submit post-trial memoranda of law and brief the issues raised by the defendant's motion to dismiss.
On September 23, 2003, the plaintiff filed a post-trial memorandum of law and an opposition to the defendant's motion for dismissal for failure to make out a prima facie case. On September 25, 2003, the defendant filed a memorandum of law in support of her motion for dismissal for failure to make out a prima facie case. Accordingly, on October 7, 2003, the plaintiff filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the defendant's motion for judgment of dismissal for failure to make out a prima facie case. The defendant filed a reply to the plaintiff's post-trial memorandum of law on October 9, 2003.
The plaintiff, on October 15, 2003, filed a motion to strike Sections C and D of the defendant's reply memorandum of law. On October 31, 2003, the defendant filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the plaintiff's motion to strike. Pursuant to the court's November 4, 2003 order, the plaintiff filed a surrelpy memorandum of law to address the defendant's arguments made in Sections C and D of the defendant's reply memorandum of law. Presently, only the defendant's motion for dismissal is pending before the court.
Practice Book § 15-8 provides in relevant part: "If, on the trial of any issue of fact in a civil action tried to the court, the plaintiff has produced evidence and rested his or her cause, the defendant may move for judgment of dismissal, and the judicial authority may grant such motion, if in its opinion the plaintiff has failed to make out a prima facie case . . ."
"[A] motion for judgment of dismissal has replaced the former motion for nonsuit . . . for failure to make out a prima fade case . . . When such a motion has been granted, the question is whether sufficient facts were proved to make out a prima facie case . . . The fight of the court to grant such a motion is to be sparingly exercised . . . where the granting of a nonsuit must depend in any appreciable degree upon the court's passing upon the credibility of witnesses, the nonsuit should not be granted . . . where a case is close, the preferable course is to deny a motion for a nonsuit . . . A prima facie case . . ., is one sufficient to raise an issue to go the trier of fact . . . In order to establish a prima facie case, the proponent must submit evidence which, if credited, is sufficient to establish the fact or facts which it is adduced to prove . . . In evaluating a motion to dismiss, [t]he evidence offered by the plaintiff is to be taken as true and interpreted in the light most favorable to [the plaintiff], and every reasonable inference is to be drawn in [the plaintiff's] favor." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Grondin v. Curi, 262 Conn. 637, 647-48 n. 12, 817 A.2d 61 (2003).
In order to make out a prima facie case under § 47a-2(a)(3), the plaintiff must prove that there was an "occupancy by a member of a fraternal or social organization in the portion of a structure operated for the benefit of such organization . . ." General Statutes § 47a-2(a)(3). "The issue [of whether an arrangement falls under the exceptions of § 47a-2(a)] must be decided upon the basis of reasonable inferences to be drawn from the circumstances of the transaction between them." Bourque v. Morris, 190 Conn. 364, 369, 460 A.2d 1251 (1983).
The defendant moves for dismissal on the ground that the plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case under § 47a-2(a)(3), because the plaintiff failed to prove that the plaintiff is a social organization. The defendant also asserts, in her post-trial memorandum of law, that the plaintiff has failed to prove that the defendant is a member of the plaintiff and that the defendant resides in a portion of the plaintiff that is operated for the benefit of the organization. Additionally, the defendant argues that the plaintiff failed to prove that the arrangement between the plaintiff and the defendant was not created to avoid the application of Chapter 830 of the General Statutes and §§ 47a-21, 47a-23 to 47a-23b, inclusive, 47a-26 to 47a-26g, inclusive, 47a-35 to 47a-35b, inclusive, 47a-41a, 47a-43 and 47a-46.
The plaintiff asserts that its arrangement with the defendant is not governed by Chapter 830 of the General Statutes and §§ 47a-21, 47a-23 to 47a-23b, inclusive, 47a-26 to 47a-26g, inclusive, 47a-35 to 47a-35b, inclusive, 47a-41a, 47a-43 and 47a-46 because the plaintiff's arrangement with the defendant qualifies as an "occupancy by a member of a fraternal or social organization in the portion of a structure operated for the benefit of such organization." General Statute § 47a-2(a)(3). The plaintiff argues, more specifically, that the plaintiff is a social organization within the meaning of § 47a-2(a)(3) and that the defendant is a member of the plaintiff, who resides in a portion of the plaintiff that is operated for the benefit of the plaintiff. The plaintiff further espouses that the issue of whether the arrangement between the plaintiff and the defendant was created to avoid the application of Chapter 830 of the General Statutes and §§ 47a-21, 47a-23 to 47a-23b, inclusive, 47a-26 to 47a-26g, inclusive, 47a-35 to 47a-35b, inclusive, 47a-41a, 47a-43 and 47a-46 is an exception to the general applicability of § 47a-2(a)(3), and, therefore, the defendant, not the plaintiff, bears the burden of proving that the exception applies. The plaintiff asserts, nonetheless, that its arrangement with the defendant was not created to avoid the application of the applicable provisions of the General Statutes.
The defendant moves for a dismissal for failure to make out a prima facie case on the ground that the plaintiff failed to offer any evidence demonstrating that the plaintiff is a social organization. Section 47a-2(a)(3) requires that the plaintiff prove that it is either a fraternal or social organization. The plaintiff argues that the plaintiff is a social organization within the meaning of § 47a-2(a)(3).
"The objective of statutory construction is to give effect to the intended purpose of the legislature . . . [Ordinarily, where] the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, it is assumed that the words themselves express the intent of the legislature and there is no need for statutory construction." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Wrinn v. State, 234 Conn. 401, 405, 661 A.2d 1034 (1995). "In the construction of the statutes, words and phrases shall be construed according to the commonly approved usage of the language . . . To ascertain the commonly approved usage of a word, it is appropriate to look to the dictionary definition of the term." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Perodeau v. Hartford, 259 Conn. 729, 736, 792 A.2d 752 (2002). "The words of a statute are to be given their commonly approved meaning unless a contrary intent is clearly expressed." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Oxford Tire Supply, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 253 Conn. 683, 696, 755 A.2d 850 (2000).
The term "social organization" is not defined by § 47a-2(a)(3). It is appropriate, therefore, to consider the dictionary definition of the terms "organization" and "social." The term "organization" is defined as "an administrative and functional structure." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (10th Ed. 1993). The Stamford YMCA is a non-profit corporation that has a board of directors, a board of trustees, by-laws, a formal mission statement and members. (Hearing transcript, September 9, 2003, pp. 9-14.) The commonly approved meaning of the term "organization" encompasses an entity like the plaintiff because it is a formal, hierarchal structure that has been established to coordinate and execute the activities of the plaintiff.
The term "social" is defined as "of or relating to human society, the interaction of the individual and the group, or the welfare of human beings as members of society." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (10th Ed. 1993). The 1933 legislative amendment to the YMCA charter describes the primary purpose of the organization as to "carry out various charitable projects for the religious, social and educational improvement of its members." (Emphasis added.) (Plaintiff's exhibit 3.) The 1933 amendment constitutes an express legislative declaration that the purpose of the plaintiff is social, in part. Similarly, the plaintiff's by-laws also state that the purpose of the organization is "to assist and encourage persons to develop Christian character through participation in a program designed to contribute to their own and other's physical, mental, social, and spiritual growth." (Emphasis added.) (Plaintiff's exhibit 1.)
The plaintiff's mission statement expresses the community oriented focus of the organization. The mission statement states that "[t]he [plaintiff] is a non-profit community service organization that builds strong kids, strong families and a strong community. [The plaintiff does] this by instilling, fostering and developing our core values: caring, honesty, respect and responsibility." (Plaintiff's exhibit 7.)
Aside from its express social purpose, the plaintiff's programs exemplify the plaintiff's commitment to promoting the welfare of its members. The plaintiff offers a variety of adult and youth programs, in addition to its housing program. These programs include recreational programs, health programs, educational programs and financial assistance programs. (Hearing transcript, September 9, 2003, p. 17.) The plaintiff also provides educational and vocational training to its members and connects its members with social service agencies in the Stamford area. (Hearing transcript, September 9, 2003, pp. 17-18, 23-24.)
Accordingly, the court finds that the plaintiff is a social organization for purposes of § 47a-2(a)(3).
The court concludes that the plaintiff has established that the defendant is a member of the plaintiff. The defendant became a member of the plaintiff when she registered for a room. During the room registration process, the defendant signed a registration card, in which the defendant acknowledged that by renting room she became a member of the plaintiff's organization. (Plaintiff's exhibit 13.) Additionally, each month the defendant remitted to the plaintiff, as part of her monthly rent, $17.50 in membership dues. (Plaintiff's exhibit 16.) The court finds the defendant's testimony that she was unaware and unadvised she was becoming a member of the plaintiff when she registered for a room unpersuasive. (Hearing transcript, September 9, 2003, p. 85.)
Pursuant to § 47a-2(a)(3), the plaintiff must also prove that the defendant occupies a portion of the plaintiff that is operated for the benefit of the plaintiff. The court finds that, although the defendant may receive an incidental benefit from her residency at the plaintiff's residential facility, the residence portion of the plaintiff is operated for the benefit of the plaintiff.
The 1933 amendment to the plaintiff's legislative charter provides that "all real estate owned by said corporation, or the income thereof, shall be used exclusively for carrying out its corporate purpose." (Plaintiff's exhibit 3.) Additionally, the plaintiff's by-laws specify that the net income of the plaintiff's properties must be transferred to the board of directors for the work of the organization. (Plaintiff's exhibit 1.) The residential portion of the plaintiff is operated as an important program of the organization. (Hearing transcript, September 9, 2003, p. 16; plaintiff's exhibit 8.) Furthermore, the residential facility is not operated as a separate economic or business entity because the plaintiff's financial records list the revenues generated by the plaintiff's residential facility as one of the several line item sources of revenue for the overall financial operations of the plaintiff. (Hearing transcript, September 9, 2003, pp. 19-20; plaintiff's exhibit 11.)
The defendant argues that the plaintiff has not proven that the plaintiff's residential facility is operated for the benefit of the organization. The defendant asserts that the plaintiff has failed to offer any evidence to prove that "without the revenue generated from its residents, it would be incapable of providing any of the various programs it does." (Defendant's memorandum of law in opposition to plaintiff's post-trial memorandum of law, p. 6.) The defendant maintains that the residents, not the plaintiff, are the persons who derive a benefit from the operation of the plaintiff's residential facility because the residents obtain housing and access to social and mental health services.
In support of her arguments, the defendant relies on Shriro v. Naugatuck YMCA, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. SPWA 9608-1381 (September 18, 1996, Munro, J.), an oral bench decision. In Shriro, a YMCA resident sought injunctive relief to prevent the Naugatuck YMCA from locking the plaintiff out of his rented room at the Naugatuck YMCA. The court concluded that "[b]ased upon all the totality of [the factual circumstances] the [c]ourt finds that while the YMCA is a social fraternal organization for the portions of its premises that are not rented, the provisions of [§]47a-2(3) may well apply. But the portions that are rented the [c]ourt does not find that [the provisions of [§]47a-2(3)] necessarily apply because the [c]ourt finds that they are operated not only for the benefit of that organization but for the benefit of the town which has an apparent on-going social service relationship with the YMCA but — and also for the benefit of its residents who are its tenants." (Transcript of Shriro v. Naugatuck, supra, Docket No. SPWA 9608-1381, p. 10.)
The defendant has submitted the transcript from this proceeding.
The Shriro court's conclusion, however, is distinguishable from the circumstances of the present case because the Shriro court, in ruling on an application for a temporary injunction, applied a diminished burden of proof. "[U]nder an application for temporary injunction, the [c]ourt need only make findings as . . . to whether there is a reasonable likelihood, probability that the [moving party] will succeed on the merits." (Transcript of Shriro v. Naugatuck, supra, Docket No. SPWA 9608-1381, p. 9.) The court, in granting the temporary injunction, emphasized "that because there are lots of questions the [c]ourt has and for a final injunction or a hearing on the verified complaint the [YMCA] may ultimately present a laundry list of other evidence which would ultimately result in a finding to the contrary. So it's only based on the evidence before this [c]ourt." (Transcript of Shriro v. Naugatuck, supra, Docket No. SPWA 9608-1381, p. 9.)
Under § 47a-2(a)(3), the plaintiff is not required to prove that there was occupancy in the portion of a structure operated for the exclusive benefit of the organization, but only that there was occupancy in the portion of a structure operated, at least in part, for the benefit of the organization. The plaintiff is also not required to prove that the plaintiff would be incapable of providing any of the programs it does without the income generated by the residential facility. It is inevitable that in an arrangement similar to the rental arrangement between the plaintiff and the defendant that the tenant will derive a housing benefit and the landlord will derive an economic benefit. The defendant's argument that the plaintiff does not meet the statutory requirements of § 47a-2(a)(3) because the plaintiff's residential facility is not operated for the benefit of the organization is unpersuasive. The court, therefore, finds that the plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to prove that its residential program is operated for the benefit of the plaintiff.
Section 47a-2(a) contains an enumerated list of arrangements that are not governed by Chapter 830 of the General Statutes and §§ 47a-21, 47a-23 to 47a-23b, inclusive, 47a-26 to 47a-26g, inclusive, 47a-35 to 47a-35b, inclusive, 47a-41a, 47a-43 and 47a-46. Each enumerated arrangement qualifies for an exemption so long as the arrangement was not created to avoid the application of Chapter 830 of the General Statutes and §§ 47a-21, 47a-23 to 47a-23b, inclusive, 47a-26 to 47a-26g, inclusive, 47a-35 to 47a-35b, inclusive, 47a-41a, 47a-43 and 47a-46. This caveat is an exception to the general applicability of § 47a-2(a). "[W]hen a party claims that an exception to [an] act is applicable, that party generally bears the burden of proving the exception." Deer Hill Arms II LTD. v. Planning Commission of Danbury, 239 Conn. 617, 624 n. 11, 686 A.2d 974 (1996).
Section 47a-2(a) provides, in pertinent part: "1) Residence at an institution, public or private, if incidental to detention or the provision of medical, geriatric, educational, counseling, religious service or any similar service; (2) occupancy under a contract of sale of a dwelling unit or the property of which such unit is a part, if the occupant is the purchaser or a person who succeeds to his interest; (3) occupancy by a member of a fraternal or social organization in the portion of a structure operated for the benefit of such organization; (4) transient occupancy in a hotel or motel or similar lodging; (5) occupancy by an owner of a condominium unit; and (6) occupancy by a personal care assistant or other person who is employed by a person with a disability to assist and support such disabled person with daily living activities or housekeeping chores and is provided dwelling space in the personal residence of such disabled person as a benefit or condition of such employment."
The defendant argues that this exception to the general applicability of § 47a-2(a) applies in this case because the plaintiff is attempting to circumvent the application of Chapter 830 of the General Statutes and §§ 47a-21, 47a-23 to 47a-23b, inclusive, 47a-26 to 47a-26g, inclusive, 47a-35 to 47a-35b, inclusive, 47a-41a, 47a-43 and 47a-46, by labeling occupants of the residential facility as members rather than as tenants, occupants or guests. The defendant, therefore, bears the burden of proving that this exception applies. The defendant, however, has failed to submit sufficient evidence to prove that the plaintiff created its arrangement with the defendant to avoid the application of the applicable provisions of the General Statutes. It is unconvincing that the plaintiff is attempting to circumvent the application of the applicable provisions of the General Statutes simply because the plaintiff requires anyone renting a room to become a member of the plaintiff and labels its residents as such. The court finds that the defendant has failed to prove that the plaintiff created its arrangement with the defendant to avoid the application of the law. This court finds that the plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence to prove that it is entitled to an exemption under § 47a-2(a)(3). Accordingly, the defendant's motion to dismiss is denied.
COCCO, J.