Opinion
No. B-8589.
October 31, 1979. Rehearing Denied January 16, 1980.
Appeal from the District Court, No. 60, Jefferson County, Combs, J.
Provost, Umphrey, Doyle McPherson, Jon B. Burmeister, Port Arthur, for petitioner.
Orgain, Bell Tucker, Jo Ben Whittenburg, Beaumont, Baker Botts, Walter Conrad, Jr. and Randall A. Hopkins, Houston, Lamson Plessala, Frank M. Lamson, Port Arthur, for respondents.
The trial court rendered a take nothing judgment against petitioners on their claim under chapter seven of the Consumer Credit Act. See Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 5069-7.01 to 7.10 (Vernon 1971). The court of civil appeals affirmed this judgment, holding that the mobile home in question was not a motor vehicle within the definition of § 7.01(a) of the Act because it was not a mobile home designed and used primarily to transport persons or property on a public highway. 582 S.W.2d 509.
In refusing petitioners' application for writ of error with the notation no reversible error, we do not intend to exclude installment sales of any mobile homes from the Act's regulation. A mobile home that does not meet the definition of motor vehicle under § 7.01(a) is a "good" under § 6.01(a) of the Act, and its credit sale is regulated by chapter six. See Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 5069-6.01 to 6.09 (Vernon 1971 Supp. 1978-1979). See also 1979 Tex.Sess Law Serv., ch. 672, § 39, at 1576 (Vernon) (after August 27, 1979, credit sales of "manufactured homes" will be regulated by chapter 6A).
Petitioners' application for writ of error is refused, no reversible error.