Opinion
BOARD No. 67845-86
Filed: September 29, 1995
REVIEWING BOARD DECISION
(Judges Fischel, Wilson and McCarthy)
Frederick Golder, Esq., for employee.
John J. Maloney, Esq., for insurer.
The employee appeals from the June 25, 1992 amended decision of the administrative judge filed after remand from the reviewing board. See Yates v. ASCAP, 6 Mass. Workers' Comp. Rep. 97 (1992). In the amended decision, as in the prior April 17, 1987 decision, the judge denied and dismissed the employee's claim for temporary total incapacity benefits for allegedly work related emotional incapacity. Because we find the judge failed to made adequate findings as to the issues denoted in Yates v. ASCAP, supra, (Yates I) we vacate the decision and return this case for hearing de novo.
The employee filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits for emotional incapacity based on a series of stressful work-related events culminating in the events of July 18, 1980 when he was terminated from employment. The claim was not accepted by the insurer, and after hearing, the administrative judge found that the employee failed by a preponderance of the evidence to prove that his claim for benefits arose out of and in the course of his employment and denied and dismissed the claim. Id. The employee appealed from that decision.
In Yates I the reviewing board found merit in the employee's argument that the decision was not supported by substantial evidence, and remanded the case. Id. at 104. The reviewing board observed that at the time of the alleged injury in 1980 the Workers' Compensation Act in 1980 did not contain statutory language including mental or emotional disabilities within the meaning of "personal injury" for purposes of compensability. Id. at 101-102. Thus, the standard of proof that the employee was required to meet was set out in Fitzgibbons' Case, 374 Mass. 633 (1978) and Albanese's Case, 378 Mass. 14 (1979). Id. at 102. In order to prevail, the employee was required to prove that the incapacity he claimed in 1980 was causally related to a single traumatic event or to a series of specific stressful incidents at work. Yates I at 102.
While not relevant to this case, we note that the definition of personal injury was altered in 1986 and again in 1991. Section 1(7A) as amended by St. 1985, c. 572 and St. 1986, c. 662, § 6 provides that personal injuries include mental or emotional disabilities where a significant contributing cause was an event or series of events in the employment. That amendment applies prospectively to injuries occurring on or after January 1, 1986. See Day v. Lumbermen's Mutual Case. Co., 4 Mass. Workers' Comp. Rep. 312, 316 n. 4 (1990). Section 14 of St. 1991, c. 398 substituted the word "predominant" for a "significant" contributing cause. The amendment under St. 1991 c. 398, s. 106 is substantive and applies prospectively only to injuries on or after December 23, 1991. Gratton v. Worcester State Hospital, 8 Mass. Workers' Comp. ___ (May 17, 1995).
The board noted in Yates I that the employee had testified to a series of stressful work-related events, occurring over a relatively brief period of time, as the purported cause of his emotional incapacity. Id. The factual basis for the claim is set forth in detail in Yates I. The employee also testified regarding personal problems.Id. at 99. The board found that the decision of April 14, 1987 contained no clear and detailed findings as to whether the work-related incidents or the employee's personal problems were the source of his emotional disability. Id. at 102. The Reviewing Board remanded the case because it could not discern whether the judge applied correct principles of law in denying and dismissing the claim. Id. at 102, 104; Pelc v. William Sullivan Company, 4 Mass. Workers' Comp. Rep. 105 (1990).
The board noted as well that the administrative judge failed to set out why he chose not to adopt the opinion of Dr. Appleton, the only medical expert to testify. Yates I at 102. A judge may not, without stating his reasons, reject the uncontradicted testimony of a medical expert when disability and causal relation are beyond the knowledge of a layperson. Id. at 103, citing Galloway's Case, 354 Mass. 427, 431 (1968);Martins v. Longview Fibre Company, 7 Mass. Workers' Comp. Rep. 72, 73 (1993).
The reviewing board in Yates I observed that Dr. Appleton testified that the employee's prior predisposition to depression was reasonably under control until specific events at work caused loss of mutual trust between the employee and his co-workers, precipitating his complete immobilization which rendered the employee unable to work from July 1980 to December 1980.Yates I at 103. The reviewing board stated that the "expert testimony introduced tended to establish that the employee's pre-existing depression was exacerbated by the events at work," and that since "there was no medical testimony which contradicted the expert opinion of Dr. Appleton, the judge needed to set out why he chose not to adopt it." Id.
The reviewing board noted that the judge had found the employee's predisposition to depression rendered him extremely vulnerable to stresses (Dec. I at 12; Yates I at 103), but that it was unclear from the decision whether the judge based his general finding of nonentitlement on the fact of that predisposition, despite the legal requirement that the employer take the employee "as is", with any peculiar vulnerabilities to injury. Id. at 103.
For the reasons above enumerated, the reviewing board concluded inYates I that it could not discern from the subsidiary findings how the judge arrived at his finding of no compensable injury. Id. The board remanded the matter for specific, detailed subsidiary findings, and for consideration and application of the standard articulated inAlbanese's Case, 378 Mass. 14 (1979). Yates I at 103-104.
On appeal from the amended decision, the employee argues that the administrative judge again failed to provide detailed subsidiary findings with respect to the various stresses in the employee's life. We agree. The decision presently on appeal fails to provide detailed subsidiary findings with respect to the various stresses in the employee's life. Nor are there adequate findings as to the other issues denoted in Yates I: the unexplained rejection of uncontradicted medical opinion, and the question of whether there had been a work related aggravation of a preexisting condition. Without these findings, there is no adequate basis for decision rendering. When a record is presented to the reviewing board that does not conform to the standard of review, the board must recommit the case for further findings of fact and rulings on matters of law. Praetz v. Factory Mutual Engr. Research, 7 Mass. Workers' Comp. Rep. 45, 47 (1993).
Because the administrative judge who previously heard this case no longer serves the department, we return the case to the senior judge for reassignment to a different administrative judge for hearing de novo. So ordered.
Judges McCarthy and Wilson concur.
_____________________________ Carolynn N. Fischel Administrative Law Judge
_____________________________ William A. McCarthy Administrative Law Judge
_____________________________ Sara Holmes Wilson Administrative Law Judge
Filed : September 29, 1995