Opinion
F074238
11-02-2017
CHANG DOUA YANG, Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and Appellant, v. KONG MENG LEE, Defendant, Cross-complainant and Respondent.
Chang Doua Yang, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant. Xai C. McDonald for Defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 14CECG03481)
OPINION
THE COURT APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Jeffrey Y. Hamilton, Jr., Judge. Chang Doua Yang, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant. Xai C. McDonald for Defendant and Respondent.
Before Gomes, Acting P.J., Franson, J. and Peña, J.
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Plaintiff Chang Doua Yang (Plaintiff-buyer) appeals from a judgment entered after a one-day bench trial in which the trial court determined he failed to meet his burden of proof on causes of action arising out of a real estate transaction. Plaintiff-buyer asserts he is of Hmong descent and has difficulty understanding legal terminology and its application, a difficulty shared by the translator. He contends this difficulty caused him not to understand technical aspects of the legal language used in connection with the admission of evidence and, thus, he did not know how to submit admissible evidence in accordance with court procedures.
On April 29, 2016, Plaintiff-buyer obtained an order in Fresno County Superior Court case No. 16CECG00714 changing his name from "Chang Doua Yang" to "D.J. Yangnouyi." In documents filed in this court, Plaintiff-buyer has used his former name.
Plaintiff-buyer argues this court should exercise its discretion to decide this case under equitable principles using the documentary evidence presented to the superior court during various stages of the case. Alternatively, he argues the case should be remanded to the trial court with directions for that court to (1) consider all the documents for which the parties requested judicial notice and (2) adjudicate the case on its merits.
We obtained and reviewed the original superior court file and the trial exhibits before evaluating Plaintiff-buyer's arguments. It is unclear from the file and trial exhibits what would be a fair and equitable outcome. Contrary to Plaintiff-buyer's view, the documents are inconsistent as to the purchase price for the real property and the amount financed by a promissory note. Thus, it is unclear whether the amount owed after application of the $37,500 down payment was $50,000 as claimed by Plaintiff-buyer or was $87,500 as stated in the promissory note. Accordingly, the parties' dispute required a court sitting as a trier of fact to make credibility determinations about which of the conflicting versions of events occurred. As a court of review, we cannot determine from the documents alone which version is more credible. As a result, the record before this court does not show a miscarriage of justice occurred when the trial court determined Plaintiff-buyer failed to carry his burden of proof.
We therefore affirm the judgment.
FACTS
This litigation involves real property located on North Brawley Avenue in Fresno and assigned Assessor's Parcel No. 326-110-26S. Defendant Kong Meng Lee (Seller) acquired the property from JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association. The transfer of title to Seller from the bank was accomplished by recording a grant deed on December 3, 2012.
Later in December, Plaintiff-buyer and Seller entered into negotiations for the sale of the property. Seller lived in Riverside County and the transaction was handled through a real estate agent, Peng Moua, who stated he was employed by Valley Wide Homes. The parties signed a California Residential Purchase Agreement dated December 28, 2012, stating the property's purchase price was $87,500 without identifying a down payment amount. Plaintiff-buyer alleges the total purchase price was $87,500 and the $37,500 down payment he made on January 3, 2013, reduced the balance owed to $50,000.
Addendum No. 1 to the copy of the purchase agreement submitted by Seller as an exhibit at trial identified the loan amount as $87,500 and stated Plaintiff-buyer would pay 8.5 percent interest on that amount. In accordance with the addendum, the parties subsequently executed an installment note and agreement dated February 1, 2013, (Note). The Note listed the principal balance owed as $87,500 and provided for monthly payments of $672.80 from February 2013 to February 2016. The Note stated it was "secured by a Deed of Trust which both Borrower and Beneficiary commenced in this agreement."
Plaintiff-buyer alleged the Note fraudulently stated the principal amount was $87,500 and failed to acknowledge the reduction made by the down payment. In discovery responses, Plaintiff-buyer provided the following explanation for why he signed documents stating he owed $87,500: "All the paperwork was done by the broker. I was told that everything was done according to the laws. I was not given the chance to ask any questions regarding the purchase of this property. I was just told to sign the documents. [¶] ... [¶] I had not read the papers and did not know that the down payment had not been noted on the purchase documents."
Plaintiff-buyer's breach of contract cause of action alleged (1) Seller was to execute and record a grant deed transferring the property from Seller to him; (2) Seller executed a grant deed on March 8, 2013; (3) Seller failed to record the grant deed; and (4) Seller subsequently stated he owned the property and Plaintiff-buyer was only a tenant.
The copy of the first page of the grant deed attached to Plaintiff-buyer's complaint referred to Seller as beneficiary and Plaintiff-buyer as trustor. It stated the Plaintiff-buyer irrevocably granted, transferred and assigned the property "to Trustee in Trust, with Power of Sale," but did not identify who was the trustee.
From February 2013 through August 2014, Plaintiff-buyer made the monthly payments of $672.80 specified in the Note. On August 20, 2014, the Fresno County Sheriff's Department mailed to Seller an administrative citation for cultivating marijuana on the property. The citation stated (1) the property was in violation of a Fresno County ordinance prohibiting the cultivation of medical marijuana; (2) a fine/penalty of $95,000 had been imposed pursuant to county ordinance that assessed $1,000 for each plant cultivated; and (3) payment was due on September 13, 2014. Seller reacted to the citation by sending Plaintiff-buyer a copy with a cover letter demanding that he pay the fine amount or resolve the issue with the county. Plaintiff-buyer's response to a special interrogatories stated he did not know who cultivated the medical marijuana and he evicted the lessee, Lue Lor, when he learned of the medical marijuana.
In September 2014, Plaintiff-buyer did not make the monthly payment due under the Note. Plaintiff-buyer alleged he stopped making payments because of Seller's claim that Plaintiff-buyer was not the owner. His complaint stated he would "deposit the agreed upon monthly payments into a Trust account pending the resolution of this Complaint." Seller's Version of Events
Seller contends the parties agreed the original purchase price would be $125,000 and the $87,500 price listed in the purchase agreement reflected the application of the cash down payment to the purchase price. Seller contends Plaintiff-buyer requested the transaction be handled in this manner because Plaintiff-buyer did not want to document the $37,500 cash down payment in the contract as he would not qualify for welfare benefits if the Social Services Department learned he had that amount of cash.
Seller contends Plaintiff-buyer defaulted on his monthly payment obligation under the Note after receiving a copy of the citation for marijuana cultivation on the property. Seller contends Plaintiff-buyer refused to vacate the property or deliver possession back to Seller after the payments stopped. Seller contends he has incurred costs, expenses and attorney fees (1) defending the marijuana violation caused by Plaintiff-buyer and (2) attempting to evict Plaintiff-buyer from the property. Seller also contends he was harmed because the rental value of the property while Plaintiff-buyer was in possession was approximately $50,000 and, in addition, Plaintiff-buyer caused more than $30,000 in destruction and damage to the property.
Seller also contends (1) Plaintiff-buyer entered into a lease-to-purchase agreement with Lue Lor to sell him the property for $150,000; (2) the agreement was documented as a lease with an option to purchase; (3) Plaintiff-buyer took $30,000 from Lue Lor; and (4) Plaintiff-buyer refused to deliver possession of the property to Lue Lor and refused to return the $30,000. Seller states Lue Lor was forced to file a lawsuit against Plaintiff-buyer to get his money back. Lue Lor's Lawsuit
About a year after the citation for marijuana cultivation was issued and 9 months after Plaintiff-buyer filed this lawsuit, Lue Lor sued Plaintiff-buyer in the Fresno County Superior Court and the action was assigned case No. 15CECG02476. Lue Lor's complaint alleged (1) Plaintiff-buyer entered into a lease-to-purchase contract with him on February 3, 2014; (2) Lue Lor paid $30,000 as a down payment upon signing the contract; (3) the deed for the property was in Seller's name; (4) Plaintiff-buyer did not disclose he was not named on the deed for the property; (5) Plaintiff-buyer was supposed to turn the property over to Lue Lor in June 2014 and failed to do so; and (6) Lue Lor suffered damages in the amount of $30,000.
The deed referred to is the grant deed recorded on December 3, 2012, that transferred the property from JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association, to Seller.
Plaintiff-buyer states the contract provided that Lue Lor would not commit any unlawful acts in or on the property and, without Plaintiff-buyer's knowledge, Lue Lor planted marijuana on the property. Plaintiff-buyer states he evicted Lue Lor and regarded the option or deposit money as forfeited.
The lease-to-purchase contract referred to the $30,000 as a "non-refundable down payment."
In October 2016 (after the notice of appeal in this case), Lue Lor's lawsuit ended when the superior court filed a "Court Trial Minute Order." The order contained a judgment for Lue Lor against Plaintiff-buyer for $30,000. Plaintiff-buyer states he chose not to appeal the judgment because he did not have the money to do so and correctly argues his choice not to appeal has no impact on this case.
PROCEEDINGS
In November 2014, Plaintiff-buyer filed a complaint against Seller for declaratory relief, quiet title, wrongful foreclosure, breach of contract and fraud. The complaint requested (1) "a determination of [Plaintiff-buyer's] title in and to the subject property" and (2) compensatory and punitive damages according to proof. The breach of contract cause of action alleged Seller's breach caused Plaintiff-buyer to suffer damages in a minimum of $87,500.
In January 2015, Seller filed a cross-complaint against Plaintiff-buyer. The cross-complaint alleged claims for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, complete indemnity, equitable indemnity, declaratory relief and damages. Plaintiff-buyer's answer to the cross-complaint reasserted the purchase price was $87,500 and stated no document evidenced the $125,000 price claimed by Seller. His answer also stated Seller "might want to explain to the IRS and his ex-wife as to why he hid $37,500 in cash."
In March 2015, Seller filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The motion argued Plaintiff-buyer's complaint failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Seller supported the motion with a request for judicial notice of documents that had been submitted previously to the court and were part of the court's file. The request listed six documents: (1) the partial California Residential Purchase Agreement attached to Plaintiff-buyer's complaint as Exhibit A; (2) one page of the Note, which was signed by Plaintiff-buyer as borrower and attached to Plaintiff-buyer's complaint as Exhibit D; (3) a complete copy of the California Residential Purchase Agreement that Seller had filed with the court; (4) a complete copy of the Note with the trust agreement; (5) the complaint in the related case filed by Lue Lor; and (6) a social security benefit letter dated August 21, 2015, and submitted as part of a declaration Plaintiff-buyer previously filed with the court. The documents for which judicial notice was requested appear to be relied upon by Plaintiff-buyer in asserting the documentary evidence establishes the fairness and equities of his claims.
Plaintiff-buyer's argument about equity and fairness asserts this court should consider all of the documentary evidence before the trial court, not just the documents admitted into evidence at trial. Accordingly, some of the motions made prior to the trial and the documents submitted with those motions are described here for two reasons. First, to identify the documents Plaintiff-buyer uses to support his broad argument about equity and fairness. Second, to identify the specific factual disputes raised during the course of the litigation—disputes Plaintiff-buyer contends can be resolved by analyzing the documents.
In April 2015, Plaintiff-buyer filed papers opposing Seller's motion for judgment on the pleadings. The superior court denied the motion after (i) noting the dispute about the purchase price and (2) accepting as true the allegation that the price was $87,500.
After losing his motion for judgment on the pleadings, Seller filed a motion to have the payments owed under the Note deposited with the court. Seller referred to paragraph 3.9 of Plaintiff-buyer's complaint, which stated Plaintiff-buyer would "deposit the agreed upon monthly payments into a Trust account pending the resolution of this Complaint."
In June 2015, the superior court issued a minute order granting the motion, identifying $672.80 as the monthly payment amount due, and directing Plaintiff-buyer to "deposit any past due payments as well as any future payments with the court." Plaintiff-buyer filed a request to set aside or modify the order. The court granted the request in part by modifying the monthly payment amount to $354.17, which reflected the interest owed on a balance of $50,000 instead of $87,500.
In August 2015, Plaintiff-buyer filed a motion for summary judgment. His separate statement asserted (1) the true purchase price was $87,500; (2) he made a down payment of $37,500; (3) the Note listed a balance of $87,500 with no credit for the $37,500 down payment; (4) Seller executed a grant deed to Plaintiff-buyer that was never recorded and showed the consideration for the deed was $87,500; and (5) Seller falsely stated he was the owner of the property and Plaintiff-buyer was a tenant; and (6) there are no documents stating the purchase price was $125,000. The supporting points and authorities referred to the statute of frauds.
Seller's opposition papers included a declaration from Peng Moua, which stated he was the real estate agent employed by Valley Wide Home who handled the purchase and sale transaction. Peng Moua stated (1) he represented both sides in the transaction and negotiated the terms and conditions of the purchase and sale; (2) Plaintiff-buyer agree to purchase the property for $125,000 with a down payment of $37,500 and a promissory note for the balance of $87,500; (3) Plaintiff-buyer requested the down payment not be noted or documented because he had a child support lien and did not want to disclose the large cash down payment; (4) Plaintiff-buyer failed to pay for homeowner's insurance so Moua paid for the insurance policy through State Farm General Insurance Company to cover the full purchase price up to $127,000; and (5) the Note amount of $87,500 was the portion of the purchase price financed.
In November 2015, the superior court denied the motion for summary judgment. The court's order stated the moving papers did not explain how Plaintiff-buyer was entitled to summary judgment as to any of the five causes of action alleged. For example, the court set forth the five required elements of a cause of action for fraud and stated the evidence presented failed to establish those elements.
On May 11, 2016, a one-day bench trial was held without a court reporter. Plaintiff-buyer represented himself and Seller was represented by an attorney. The parties stipulated to the admission of Seller's Exhibit No. 1, the purchase agreement, and the court received it into evidence. Next, Kong Peng Vang was sworn and testified on behalf of Plaintiff-buyer. ! Seller's Exhibit Nos. 14 and 21 were received into evidence and then Kong Peng Vang was excused subject to recall. It appears that no more witnesses or documents were offered as part of Plaintiff-buyer's case in chief. The next entry in the trial minutes states: "[Plaintiff-buyer] has failed to meet his proof burden. Court rules in favor of [Seller]."
The superior court then proceeded with the claims under Seller's cross-complaint. Seller's first witness was Plaintiff-buyer, followed by Seller himself. Seller's Exhibit Nos. 10 and 13 were received into evidence. Two witnesses, Bobby Thaying Vang and Brian Wong, testified and then Seller was recalled to the stand. After the close of evidence, the court ruled against Seller. The trial minutes state: "Failure of proof on cross-complaint."
On May 27, 2016, the court filed a judgment on the complaint in favor of Seller. The judgment stated Plaintiff-buyer "failed to meet his burden of proof" and Seller was the prevailing party for purposes of costs. In June 2016, Buyer filed a memorandum of costs requesting $4,129. In July 2016, Plaintiff-buyer filed a notice of appeal from the judgment after court trial.
DISCUSSION
I. BACKGROUND
A. Issues Raised on Appeal
Plaintiff-buyer represented himself in the superior court proceedings and is representing himself in this appeal. His opening appellate brief raised two main issues.
First, Plaintiff-buyer states he is of Hmong descent and had difficulty understanding the legal terminology and its application. He also states the interpreter did not understand the case or the technical aspects of the application of the legal language. Thus, Plaintiff-buyer argues he "was not well served [by the interpreter] and did not know how to submit admissible evidence according to the Court procedures." We view this argument as asserting a procedural flaw that affected his right to meaningful access to the court.
Second, Plaintiff-buyer asserts that the majority of the same documents were submitted to the superior court by both parties under penalty of perjury and by requests for judicial notice. He contends "the case could be decided applying equitable principles, what is fair and what is right, to the facts and the documentary evidence in this case." He states his understanding is that this court has discretion to either decide in equity or remand the case back to the superior court and have the case adjudicated on its merits based on the documentary evidence presented. We interpret this argument as asserting the documents presented during the superior court proceedings demonstrate Plaintiff-buyer should prevail on the merits or, at a minimum, should obtain a new trial.
B. Constitutional Role of Appellate Courts
Our review of Plaintiff-buyer's contentions on appeal are subject to the limits the California Constitution places on the powers of state appellate courts. Pursuant to the California Constitution, appellate courts may not set aside a judgment or grant a new trial "unless, after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice." (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) When Plaintiff-buyer's contentions are placed in this constitutional context, those contentions assert, in effect, two grounds resulted in a "miscarriage of justice."
C. The Appellate Record
As a general rule, establishing a miscarriage of justice occurred during the superior court proceeding requires an adequate appellate record of what happened in the trial court. (See Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 574 (Ballard) [appellate record was inadequate].) Accordingly, we describe the record before this court.
1. Record Submitted
Plaintiff-buyer elected to submit an appellant's appendix under California Rules of Court, rule 8.124. His appendix contained 11 documents and a total of 72 pages. There is no reporter's transcript or settled statement setting forth the testimony presented or the procedural rulings made by the superior court during the one-day bench trial. Also, the trial exhibits that were received into evidence were not part of the appellate record submitted by Plaintiff-buyer. To summarize, the appellate record submitted by Plaintiff-buyer presented an incomplete picture of what happened during the superior court proceedings.
Subsequent references to numbered rules are to the California Rules of Court.
The appellate record created by Plaintiff-buyer left this court with two options. The first option was to deny the appeal and uphold the judgment on the ground Plaintiff- buyer failed to present a record sufficient to carry his burden of affirmatively demonstrating a miscarriage of justice—that is, prejudicial error. (See Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1295-1296 [where appellant fails to provide an adequate record as to an issue raised on appeal, the issue must be resolved against the appellant].) The second option was to exercise our discretionary authority and augment the appellate record to provide additional information relevant to the arguments made by Plaintiff-buyer. Under this option, we would reach Plaintiff-buyer's substantive arguments about what the documentary evidence showed. We chose the second option because the arguments raised touched upon the right to meaningful access to court.
2. Augmented Record
On September 6, 2017, this court issued an order granting its own motion to augment the appellate record pursuant to rule 8.155. We directed the clerk of the superior court to send this court (1) the original superior court file in this case, (2) an up-to-date register of actions, and (3) the trial exhibits admitted, refused or lodged with the superior court. Two days later, the clerk complied with the order.
To reduce the time and costs incurred by the clerk of the superior court in complying with this order, our order stated the "clerk need not prepare the file as described in rule 8.128(b)." That rule states the "clerk must put the superior court file in chronological order, number the pages, and attach a chronological index and a list of all attorneys of record, the parties they represent, and any unrepresented parties." (Rule 8.128(b)(2).)
In a subsequent order, we notified the parties of our intention to take judicial notice of the contents of the original superior court file, the register of actions and the trial exhibits. The order afforded each party a reasonable opportunity to respond to the proposed judicial notice of those documents. (See Evid. Code, §§ 455, subd. (a) & 459, subd. (c).) Neither party responded and we granted our own motion for judicial notice. II. ACCESS TO JUSTICE
A. Basic Principles
1. Access to Court
The United States Supreme Court has "grounded the right of access to court in the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause [citations], the First Amendment Petition Clause [citations], the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause [citations], and the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection [citation] and Due Process Clauses [citations]." (Christopher v. Harbury (2002) 536 U.S. 403, 415, fn. 12.) A California decision states access to court is "a right guaranteed to all persons by the federal and state Constitutions." (Jersey v. John Muir Medical Center (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 814, 821.) It arises from the right to petition the government for redress of grievances contained in article I, section 3 of the California Constitution. (Jersey, supra, at p. 821.)
"Access to justice is a fundamental and essential right in a democratic society. It is the responsibility of government to ensure that all people enjoy this right." (California Commission on Access to Justice, The Path To Equal Justice: A Five-Year Status Report on Access to Justice in California (October 2002) Finding A, p. 36.) Providing access to justice through the civil court system is a multidimensional problem, the scope of which is illustrated by the symposia sponsored by the Civil Justice Program at Loyola Law School Los Angeles. Two aspects of the access problem are raised in this case: (1) the treatment of litigants who represent themselves and (2) the provision of interpreters for litigants who are not fluent in English.
Symposium, Access to Justice: It's Not for Everyone (2009) 42 Loy. L.A. L.Rev. 859; Symposium, Access to Justice: Law and Popular Culture (2007) 40 Loy. L.A. L.Rev. 539; Symposium, Access to Justice: The Economics of Civil Justice (2006) 39 Loy. L.A. L.Rev. 683; Symposium, Access to Justice: Can Business Coexist with the Civil Justice System (2005) 38 Loy. L.A. L.Rev. 1009.
A prevalent issue affecting access to court involves court fees and the waiver of those fees for indigent parties—an issue the Legislature has addressed. (See Gov. Code, §§ 6863068641 [waiver of court fees and costs].)
2. Self-Represented Litigants
"Providing access to justice for self-represented litigants is a priority for California courts." (Rule 10.960(b) [effective Jan. 1, 2008].) This priority can be addressed in different ways. (See Buhai, Access to Justice for Unrepresented Litigants: A Comparative Perspective (2009) 42 Loy. L.A. L.Rev. 979, 985-993.) For example, self-represented litigants could be allowed to proceed under relaxed rules of procedure and evidence. California has taken a different path and has decided to address the problems faced by self-representing litigants by providing services that prepare individuals to better represent themselves. (Id. at p. 993; see Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 985 [difficulties of providing special treatment to parties who represent themselves].) Specifically, self-representing litigants may receive assistance from brick-and-mortar and online self-help centers.
The stated purpose of the self-help centers is to improve the delivery of justice to the public by facilitating the timely and cost-effective processing of cases involving self-represented litigants. (Rule 10.960(b).) "The information and education provided by court self-help centers must be neutral and unbiased, and services must be available to all sides of a case." (Rule 10.960(d).) An Online Self-Help Center is available to the public at www.courts.ca.gov/selfhelp.htm. (See rule 1.6(22) [definition of "California Courts Web Site"].) A web page titled "Going to Court" addresses the preparation of evidence by stating:
"There are rules of evidence that everyone must follow. These rules exist to make sure that the judge gets reliable, relevant, and accurate evidence to consider when making decisions about your case. [¶] ... [¶] There are many laws that set rules for what evidence can be used in court. Together, these laws are called the California Evidence Code. You will have to follow these rules even if you are self-represented. You will not get any special treatment just because you are not a lawyer. And the judge and the court staff cannot help you prepare or present your case." (<http://www.courts.ca.gov/1094.htm>)
That web page also includes a link to a two-page handout or pamphlet published in July 2007 that provides an overview of getting evidence and presenting it to the court. The handout reiterates that (1) everyone, even a person representing himself, has to follow the laws for presenting evidence to the court and (2) the judge and court staff cannot assist litigants in preparing or presenting their case.
In this case, Plaintiff-buyer has not argued he is entitled to more lenient treatment because he represented himself and is not a lawyer. Rather, he has mentioned his self-representation as a factor that explains the difficulty he had introducing evidence at trial and understanding the interpreter's translation of legal terminology.
3. Interpreters
In Jara v. Municipal Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 181 (Jara), a defendant in a property damage action alleged he was indigent and unable to speak or understand English and filed a motion for the appointment of an interpreter skilled in English and Spanish without expense to himself. (Id. at p. 183.) The court denied the motion. The defendant filed a petition for writ of mandate directing the appointment of an interpreter. (Ibid.) The court denied the petition and the California Supreme Court affirmed. (Ibid.) Our Supreme Court rejected the argument that the refusal to appoint an interpreter deprived him of access to the court in violation of the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection of the law. (Id. at pp. 185-186.)
Shortly after the decision in Jara, the California Legislature addressed the use of interpreters in court proceedings by enacting Government Code sections 68560 through 68566. (Stats. 1978, ch. 158, § 1, pp. 388-389.) Another statute involving interpreters in civil cases is Evidence Code section 756, which addresses the reimbursement of a court by the Judicial Council for court interpreter services provided in civil actions. Rules 2.890 through 2.895 address various issues involving the use and qualifications of interpreters. In spite of the apparent need for qualified court interpreters in civil actions in California, civil litigants are responsible for arranging and paying for interpreters. (See Super. Ct. Fresno County, Local Rules, rule 2.8.2.)
Standards for the professional conduct of interpreters are set forth in rule 2.890. For instance, interpreters must use their best skills and judgment to interpret accurately. (Rule 2.890(b).) Of particular relevance to this appeal, an interpreter (1) must be impartial and unbiased; (2) must not make statements to any person, including a party, about the merits of the case until the litigation has concluded; and (3) must not give legal advice to parties or witnesses. (Rule 2.890(c) & (e).)
B. Analysis of Access
1. Effectiveness of Interpreter
For purposes of this appeal, we will assume without deciding that Plaintiff-buyer's right to meaningful access to court in a civil lawsuit includes a right to have an effective interpreter. In this context, effective means an interpreter who provides an accurate interpretation, is unbiased, and complies with the standards for professional conduct contained in Rule 2.890. Thus, an effective interpreter must not give legal advice or comment on the merits of the case.
Here, Plaintiff-buyer argues he was not well served by the Hmong interpreter, which made it difficult for him to get his evidence properly admitted. Thus, he implies difficulties of translation ultimately led to the trial court's determination that he failed to meet his burden of proof.
In addressing his point about the interpreter, our first consideration is its factual foundation—namely, whether Plaintiff-buyer was or was not well served by the interpreter. Seller has not conceded the point, so we must evaluate the information available to see if we can determine whether the assertion is accurate. The information available does not include a reporter's transcript. A court reporter was not present for the one-day trial and there is nothing the parties or this court can do to create a reporter's transcript of the trial. The only information available to us about the interpreter is provided by the minute order that describes the proceedings on the day of trial. An entry in the minute order states Plaintiff-buyer "is assisted by Certified Court Hmong Interpreter."
The foregoing description of the information available about the interpreter shows how limited that information is. Faced with so little information, we cannot determine whether Plaintiff-buyer has accurately described the assistance (or lack of it) obtained from the interpreter. The most we can say is that it is uncertain whether the interpreter provided effective assistance to Plaintiff-buyer.
Uncertainty over what actually happened in the lower court is not a problem unique to this appeal. The uncertainty problem occurs often enough that California courts have developed principles of appellate procedure to address it. One of those well-established principles provides that when an appellate court cannot determine from the record what happened in the lower court's proceedings, it presumes those proceedings were regular and there was no error. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564; Boyer v. City of Long Beach (1920) 47 Cal.App. 617, 619 [in the absence of a record of the proceedings, "the presumption is that they were regular"].) This principle applies to the interpreter issue raised in this appeal because the augmented record contains no information showing the services provided by the interpreter where ineffective. Consequently, we are required by that principle to conclude the interpreter's services were effective and did not cause a miscarriage of justice. Stated another way, we cannot accept Plaintiff-buyer's factual assertion that he was not well served by the interpreter.
2. Admission of Evidence
Next, we consider Plaintiff-buyer's assertion that his lack of understanding of legal language and court procedures prevented him from getting evidence before the trial court that would have proven his claims. As with his argument about the interpreter, we consider the factual foundation of this assertion—specifically, whether Plaintiff-buyer was hindered in getting evidence before the trial court.
The lack of a reporter's transcript means we cannot review particular instances where Plaintiff-buyer struggled to present evidence and was unsuccessful. The trial minutes and the two-page "exhibit record" list only one Plaintiff-buyer's exhibit premarked for identification. That exhibit, the receipt for the $37,500 down payment, was received into evidence. Therefore, whatever problems Plaintiff-buyer may have had in getting the receipt into evidence, the record shows he overcame those problems and the receipt was admitted. Also, it shows Plaintiff-buyer did not have any other documents premarked for identification.
Next, we take a different perspective and consider what the trial minutes do not show. Most notably, there is no recorded instance of Plaintiff-buyer requesting the admittance of a document and having that request denied by the trial court.
Consequently, the limited information available to this court does not definitively establish, one way or the other, whether Plaintiff-buyer actually had difficulties in getting documents received into evidence. Consequently, we cannot accept the accuracy of his assertion that he had difficulties getting evidence admitted. As a result, Plaintiff-buyer's argument relating to the admission of evidence does not establish a miscarriage of justice occurred.
3. Equity and Fairness: The Documentary Evidence
Plaintiff-buyer's theory of the case is that (1) the correct purchase price was $87,500; (2) he never received credit for the $37,500 cash down payment; (3) Seller gouged him with interest on $87,500 instead of $50,000; and (4) the grant deed signed by Seller on March 8, 2013, was fraudulent because it referred to Assessor's Parcel No. 326-110-226, which does not exist. In his view: "This whole process was created by [Seller] to steal my $37,500 cash down payment and then to steal back the property."
The purchase agreement referred to Assessor's Parcel No. 326-110-26 S and the December 3, 2012, grant deed Seller received from the bank referred to Parcel No. 326-110-26. --------
A legal theory Plaintiff-buyer presented in his motion for summary judgment was based on the statute of frauds. He contended (1) the statute of fraud applied to the transaction because it involved the sale of an interest in real property; (2) all of the purchase documents had been submitted to the court; (3) the price listed in the purchase agreement was $87,500; and (4) there is no writing or documentary evidence that the purchase price was $125,000. Plaintiff-buyer argued the documents presented established (1) the purchase price was $87,500 and (2) he did not receive credit for the $37,500 cash down payment.
Based on our review of the documentary evidence presented throughout the proceedings, we cannot determine Plaintiff-buyer's version of events is correct and the amount owed after the application of the down payment was $50,000. The reason we cannot conclude the amount owed was $50,000 is that the Note signed and dated by Plaintiff-buyer on February 15, 2013, states more than once that $87,500 is the principal amount owed. For example, the text of the Note contains the promise to pay Seller "the sum of Eighty Seven Thousand Five Hundred and No/100's dollars ($87,500), with interest."
Plaintiff-buyer's responses to special interrogatories states the paperwork was done by the broker, he "was just told to sign the documents," and he did not read the papers and did not know that the down payment had not been noted on the documents. The important point for purposes of this appeal is that the documents themselves are not consistent as to the purchase price and amount owed after the down payment. Perhaps the purchase agreement is correct and the total purchase price was $87,500. Alternatively, perhaps the Note is correct and the balance of the purchase price owed to Seller in February 2013 (a month after receipt of the down payment of $37,500) was $87,500. The documentary evidence does not show which alternative actually reflects the understanding reached by the parties. Therefore, the documentary evidence is insufficient for this court to reach, as Plaintiff-buyer requests, an independent determination of what is fair and equitable in this case.
In other words, the resolution of the parties' dispute required a court sitting as a trier of fact to make credibility determinations about which of the conflicting versions of events occurred. The credibility of those versions cannot be determined by an appellate court based on the documents alone. Consequently, we are unable to conclude a miscarriage of justice occurred when the trial court determined Plaintiff-buyer failed to carry his burden of proof.
4. Equity and Fairness: Return of the Down Payment
Plaintiff-buyer claims it is not fair or equitable to allow Seller to keep the $37,500 down payment and the property as well. Again, there is insufficient information before this court to evaluate what is fair and equitable. It might be that Plaintiff-Buyer's version of events is accurate, but even that version acknowledges that he stopped making payments on the Note. Consequently, Plaintiff-buyer has not fully performed the contract and, as a result, is not entitled to have us grant his request for quiet title and direct Seller to transfer the property to him.
An alternate remedy to ordering specific performance of the contract and quieting title in Plaintiff-buyer is rescinding the transaction and directing the down payment be returned to Plaintiff-buyer. This remedy attempts to unwind the transaction and return the parties to their original position. However, Seller's statements about the citation for marijuana cultivation and the damage to the property might be true. If the property was damaged as Seller alleges, then the property could not be returned to him in its original condition. In view of the conflicting versions of events, we are unable to determine whether or not returning the down payment to Plaintiff-buyer would be fair and equitable. It follows that we cannot reverse the judgment and require restitution on equitable grounds.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover his costs on appeal.