Opinion
Civil Action 24-12020-NMG
10-07-2024
MALACHI I. YAHTUES, Plaintiff, v. STEPHEN KENNEDY, MATTHEW PONTES, JOY GALLANT,WELL-PATH, ANN LI, and JAMES O'GARA, JR., Defendants.
ORDER
NATHANIEL M. GORTON, United States District Judge
Before the Court is Plaintiff Malachi I. Yahtues's (“Yahtues”) Motion in Opposition to the Court's Order After Initial Screening of Complaint Application and Request for Amendment to that Order Issued August 16, 2024 (“Motion Regarding the Court's August 16, 2024 Order”), ECF No. 10, and Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint, ECF No. 12.
After review of Yahtues's filings, the Court rules as follows.
1. Yahtues's Motion Regarding the Court's August 16, 2024 Order, ECF No. 10, is DENIED in part as MOOT with respect to its initial screening inasmuch as the Motion to Amend the Complaint is being allowed and the amended complaint screened below. The motion is DENIED with respect to the request for recusal because it is premised upon disagreement with the Court's Order. See Talley v. Tyer, 648 F.Supp.3d 276, 282 (D. Mass. 2023) (citing Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 ("[J]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.")).
The Court does not disturb its original ruling of Yahtues's in forma pauperis eligibility and assessment of the initial filing fee.
2. Yahtues's Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint is ALLOWED, the Amended Complaint, ECF No. 12-1, the amended complaint is deemed filed, and is subject to screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
As this Court has previously explained to Yahtues, Section 1915 authorizes the federal courts to dismiss an action in which a plaintiff seeks to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee if, among other things, the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary damages from an immune party. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). In conducting this review, the Court construes the Yahtues's complaint "with some liberality" because he is are proceeding pro se. Institute de Educacion Universal Corp, v. U.S. Dept. of Educ., 209 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 2000) (citing Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam)).
As an initial matter, "[j]ails, prisons, and other correctional facilities are only buildings; they are not suable entities." Thomas v. Barnstable Cnty. Correctional Facility, No. CV 21-10398-ADB, 2021 WL 2224264, at *2 (D. Mass. June 2, 2021). Indeed, Old Colony Correctional Center is not a "person" under 42 U.S.C § 1983 and therefore must be, and is, dismissed from the action. See e.g. Cromartie v. Old Colony Correctional Ctr., No. CV 20-11926-JCB, 2020 WL 7185646, at *2 (D. Mass. Dec. 7, 2020); Gebo v. Old Colony Correctional Ctr., No. CV 17-11308-DJC, 2017 WL 4364173, at *1 (D. Mass. Sept. 29, 2017); Velazquez v. Old Colony Correctional Ctr., No. CIV.A. 12-11926-FDS, 2013 WL 812490, at *2 (D. Mass. Mar. 1, 2013). Further, while prisons are subject to the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act, the entity responsible for the prison (i.e. the Department of Corrections or official capacity claims against public officials), and not the prison building, is the proper defendant, see Velazquez v. Old Colony Correctional Ctr., No. CIV.A. 12-11926-FDS, 2013 WL 812490, at *3 (D. Mass. Mar. 1, 2013); Reaves v. Dept, of Correction, 195 F.Supp.3d 383, 418 (D. Mass. 2016) (naming entity and not prison building).
As to the remaining defendants, claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for official capacity monetary damages against the individual state officials are barred under Eleventh Amendment Immunity and under 42 U.S.C. §1983, itself. '"[A] suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment'" to the United States Constitution. Davidson v. Howe, 749 F.3d 21, 27 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974)). "This is true whether the named defendant is the state itself or, as here, a state official in her official capacity." Id. Furthermore, to the extent that Yahtues seeks monetary relief for actions taken in their "official" capacities, the claims are not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. §1983, see Will v. Michigan Dept, of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989), because government officials in their official capacity are not "persons" for purposes of 42 U.S.C. §1983. Id. Accordingly, official capacity monetary damages under Section 1983 against any of the individual defendants in their official capacity are dismissed. Inasmuch as Yahtues apparently misunderstood the Court's August 16, 2024 Order, the Court clarifies that it takes no position as to any potential qualified immunity defenses as to the individual defendants in their personal capacities.
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity pertains to official capacity claims, as opposed to qualified immunity which pertains to personal capacity claims. "When government officials are sued in their individual capacities for money damages, the doctrine of qualified immunity shields them from pecuniary liability unless their conduct violated 'clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Lawless v. Town of Freetown, 63 F.4th 61, 67 (1st Cir. 2023) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)).
3. Re-Issuance of Summonses.
Subject to the claims dismissed in paragraph 2, supra, the Clerk is directed to reissue summonses only as to defendants Stephen Kennedy, Matthew Pontes, Joy Gallant, Well-Path, Ann Li, and James O'Gara, Jr. The Clerk shall send the summonses, complaint, and this Order to Yahtues, who must thereafter serve the defendants in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). Yahtues may elect to have service made by the United States Marshals Service. If directed by Yahtues to do so, the United States Marshals Service shall serve the summonses, complaint, and this Order upon the above-identified defendants, in the manner directed by Yahtues, with all costs of service to be advanced by the United States. Notwithstanding this Order to the United States Marshals Service, it remains Yahtues's responsibility to provide the United States Marshals Service with all necessary paperwork and service information. Notwithstanding Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m) and Local Rule 4.1, Yahtues shall have 90 days from the date of this Order to complete service.
SO ORDERED.