Opinion
C. A. 1:23-2484-JFA-SVH
03-12-2024
Samuel Wyse, Plaintiff, v. Jennifer Granholm as Secretary of the Department of Energy, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
SHIVA V. HODGES, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
In this employment discrimination case, Samuel Wyse (“Plaintiff”) and his former employer have been involved in proceedings before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) multiple times over the last ten years, and Plaintiff now sues his former employee alleging he was again discriminated and retaliated against in that his former employer impermissibly changed his time and attendance records after his retirement in 2011. His former employer seeks dismissal of his complaint arguing in part that Plaintiff's complaint is time-barred.
Plaintiff, now proceeding pro se, originally filed this suit in the Northern District of Georgia on June 27, 2022, against Jennifer Granholm, as Secretary of the Department of Energy (“DOE” or “Defendant”). [ECF No. 1].The case was transferred to this court on June 6, 2023. [See ECF No. 22]. Plaintiff alleges discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (“Title VII”). This matter comes before the court on Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). [ECF No. 33]. The motion having been fully briefed [ECF Nos. 44, 48], it is ripe for disposition.
When Plaintiff filed suit, he was represented by counsel. [See ECF No. 41].
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e) (D.S.C.), this case has been referred to the undersigned for all pretrial proceedings. For the reasons that follow, the undersigned recommends the district judge grant Defendant's motion. I. Relevant Factual Background
Plaintiff is a former employee of the DOE's Savannah River Operations Office in Aiken, South Carolina. [ECF No. 1 ¶ 9].
A. First EEO Action
Plaintiff alleges that while he was working for Defendant during 2010, his immediate supervisor was David Hepner (“Hepner”). [ECF No. 1 ¶ 10]. Plaintiff alleges that Hepner repeatedly called him racist names and made multiple changes to Plaintiff's time and attendance records and that Hepner was the “primary and only person who could have made these changes.” Id. ¶¶ 18, 23, see also Id. ¶ 15 (“It was then that Director Hepner would refer to Mr. Wyse-who is black, African-American, and originated from Sierra Leone-as the terms ‘boy' and ‘Sambo.'”)
On August 12, 2010, Plaintiff filed a complaint of discrimination that was assigned Case No. 10-0107-SRO. [ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 24-25, ECF No. 33-1].The parties resolved this matter via settlement agreement on October 22, 2010 (“Settlement Agreement”). See Id. Among other terms, Plaintiff agreed to dismiss with prejudice his formal EEO complaint and to retire no later than October 31, 2010, and Defendant agreed to the following: a lump sum payment of $39,871 to Plaintiff; payment of $5,000 in attorneys' fees; and restoration of Plaintiff's 240 hours of accrued sick leave. [ECF No. 33-1 at 1].
Although courts generally do not consider matters outside the pleadings in ruling on a motion to dismiss, Am. Chiropractic Ass'n v. Trigon Healthcare, Inc., 367 F.3d 212, 234 (4th Cir. 2004), or motion for judgment on the pleadings, a court may consider documents outside the pleadings without converting a motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment if those documents are “integral to and explicitly relied on in the complaint” and their authenticity is unchallenged. Copeland v. Bieber, 789 F.3d 484, 490 (4th Cir. 2015). “In the employment context, a court may consider an EEOC charge and other EEOC documentation [when considering a motion to dismiss] because such documents are integral to the complaint as Plaintiff necessarily relies on these documents to satisfy the time limit requirements of the statutory scheme.” Pierce v. Office Depot, Inc., C/A No. 0:13-3601-MGL, 2014 WL 6473630, at *5 (D.S.C. Nov. 18, 2014) (citing Williams v. 1199 Seiu United Healthcare Workers East, C/A No. 12-72, 2012 WL 2923164 at * 1 n. 1 (D. Md. July 17, 2012)); see also Adams v. 3D Sys., Inc., C/A No. 019-00663-JMC-KDW, 2019 WL 8754875, at *2 (D.S.C. Nov. 26, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, C/A No. 0:19-00663-JMC, 2020 WL 1527056 (D.S.C. Mar. 31, 2020) (same). Here, both parties have submitted numerous documents explicitly relied on in the complaint, as recounted above, and no party challenges the authenticity of any of the documents submitted.
Plaintiff states in his complaint that the “adverse consequences to [his] compensation and his credit,” as resolved in the Settlement Agreement, “do not form the basis of the instant litigation.” [ECF No. 1 ¶ 19].
B. Second EEO Action
Plaintiff initiated a second EEO action, alleging that Defendant failed to comply with the Settlement Agreement. [ECF 1 ¶ 27]. The EEOC agreed and found on February 5, 2016, Defendant had breached the Settlement
Agreement by taking the following actions:
The Agreement required the Agency to restore 240 hours of sick leave. The record does not show that the Agency met its commitment . . . .
At the time of Complainant's retirement, Complainant had 98.5 hours of accrued annual leave “vacation” [annual] leave on Time and Attendance. The Agency mistakenly issued Complainant a lump sum payment in the amount of $5,323.92. The Agency does not dispute that the lump sum payment of annual leave was made by [the Defense Finance Accounting Service (“DFAS”)] (DOE's payroll provider) in error. On October 18, 2011, the Agency issued an invoice to Complainant, advising him that he was required to make immediate restitution.
It also paid Complainant less than 240 hours and computed the “Sick leave” based on a rate of $54.05 an hour, which it said was added to his pension . . . .
The Agreement was specific in requiring the restoration of 240 hours of sick leave, not 120 hours and not a credit to Complainant's retirement benefit calculations.[ECF No. 33-2 at 2, 5].
The EEOC ordered that DOE restore 240 hours of sick leave to Plaintiff; rescind or desist in any collection efforts against Plaintiff related to DOE's lump-sum payment to Plaintiff for accrued annual leave; refund Plaintiff $4,366.68 for the erroneous collection of the initial $5,323.92 paid for 98.5 hours of “sick leave”; and take steps necessary to clear damage to Plaintiff's credit rating. [ECF No. 33-2 at 6, see also ECF No. 33-3 (clarifying February 5, 2016 order)].
On May 3, 2017, an EEOC Compliance Officer issued a letter indicating that Defendant had provided sufficient documentation of compliance. [ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 27, 53, ECF No. 33-4, see also ECF No. 33-5 at 3 (“On May 3, 2017, the Commission's Compliance Division determined that the Agency had provided adequate documentation to support a determination that it had restored the 240 hours of sick leave and closed the matter because the Agency was in compliance.”)].
Plaintiff alleges, however, “to date, the agency has failed to provide sufficient proof that it complied with the EEOC decision.” [ECF No. 1 ¶ 27].
C. Third and Fourth EEO Actions
Plaintiff alleges that following the parties entering into the Settlement Agreement, “someone at the Department of Energy, one again, altered [his] timecards,” further alleging that the circumstances and similarity to the previous altering indicates Hepner again made the alterations. [ECF No. 1 ¶ 26, see also Id. ¶ 29 (“Meanwhile, in May 2018, Mr. Wyse received correspondence from [DFAS], which indicated that additional, retroactive, post-retirement changes had been made to Mr. Wyse's time and attendance records in 2011.”) (emphasis in original))].
As alleged by Plaintiff, beginning in May 2018, DOE's payroll provider DFAS sent correspondence to Plaintiff informing him that he owed $5,323.92 in overpayment. [ECF No. 1 ¶ 29, ECF No. 33-5 at 3]. Plaintiff clarifies in his complaint that these “changes are not the same as the ones that [he] had referenced in prior EEOC activity . . . .” [ECF No. 1 ¶ 31].
Plaintiff's allegation that there were two separate determinations that he owed $5,323.92 resulting in two separate collection efforts against him is in tension with documentation submitted by the parties. [See, e.g., ECF No. 33-5 at 3 (“beginning in May 2018, Complainant received correspondence from DFAS informing him that he still owed $5,323.92 overpayment for the erroneous payment of 98.5 hours of annual leave”) (emphasis added)); ECF No. 33-8 at 11 (“Ms. Wall informed Complainant that DFAS had reinstated the debt after an internal debt audit earlier in 2018”)].
On July 25, 2018, DFAS sent correspondence to Plaintiff, providing the following explanation for the collection efforts undertaken by DFAS:
Our records indicate in the pay period ending February 26, 2011, you were notified via letter, of an overpayment in the gross amount of $5,323.92. This debt was later forwarded to the Office of Personnel Management [(“OPM”)] on May 5, 2018 . . . .
Our records indicate in the pay period ending November 6, 2010, you were originally separated from service with your agency effective October 31, 2010. At the date of separation, you originally had a remaining annual leave balance of 3.5 hours. In turn, you received a total gross payment of $189.18 for your annual leave during this time frame (3.5 hours times $54.05).
However, in the pay period ending December 18, 2010, a series of retroactive time and attendance corrections caused 98.5 hours of annual leave used to be changed to sick leave used. In turn, this action caused the generation of a retroactive payment in the gross amount of $5,323.92 (98.5 hours times $54.05).
In the pay period ending February 12, 2011, another series of retroactive time and attendance corrections were performed by your agency. This action reversed the 98.5 hours of sick leave used back to annual leave used. In turn, this action removed your entitlement to the gross payment in the amount of $5,323.92, leading to the creation of a debt in the same gross amount. Additionally, this action left you with 240 hours of sick leave at the date of separation with you being entitled to the earlier received payout of 3.5 hours of annual leave. In turn, this debt was discovered by our office during a debt clean-up project in the second quarter of 2018 and was then forwarded to OPM for collection on May 5, 2018 . . . .[ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 30, 33, ECF No. 33-6, ECF No. 44-1 at 7-8].
Defendant informed the EEOC that it had not issued a request for recovery in 2018. [ECF No. 33-5 at 5]. Upon learning of the collection efforts undertaken by OPM, Defendant, on August 2, 2018, issued a letter titled “Demand to Cancel All Garnishment as in Violation of a Court Order and Issue Refund of All Garnished Monies to [Complainant]” to both entities. Id. (alterations in original). The letter stated as follows:
Any indebtedness that [Complainant] may have owed DOE has been waived. We demand that all garnishment activity be stopped, and all funds garnished be returned to [Complainant] immediately as this action is in violation of the attached court order. DOE did not institute this recent garnishment, nor did DOE submit a Request for Recovery. DOE was unaware that [any] collection activities has been received by OPM. . . . DOE is not attempting to collect on any debt alleged to be owed, nor did DOE initiate the current debt collection. Garnishment of [Complainant's] pension for 98.5 hours lump sum annual pay period ending 11/06/10 is in direct violation of an U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Order, dated February 5, 2016.Id. at 5 (alterations in original).
On July 22, 2018, and August 3, 2018, Plaintiff attempted to file an EEO complaint regarding this erroneous garnishment attempt initiated by DFAS. [ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 35-36, ECF No. 33-7]. Although Defendant's Office of Civil Rights maintained that his claim could not be processed as he was not a “federal employee, applicant[] for employment, [or] recent former employee[] . . . .,” on March 12, 2019, the EEOC ordered that Defendant process Plaintiff's EEO claim. [ECF No. 33-7 at 1-3].
Concurrent with the third EEO action, Plaintiff submitted letters to Defendant requesting his time and attendance records from 2009 to 2014 (“Civilian Leave & Earnings Statements”). [ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 34-35, ECF No. 33-8]. Defendant informed Plaintiff that it had given him the limited document in its possession and that “all retired employees' personnel records transfer to OPM upon retirement” and “DFAS controlled the records of [Plaintiff's] ‘Civilian Leave and Earnings Statements,'” further explaining how to reach out to the relevant agencies for documentation. [ECF No. 33-8 at 15].
On June 22, 2019, Defendant processed Plaintiff's EEO claim alleging discrimination and retaliation based upon the following allegations:
1. [Plaintiff] received a Request for Recovery of Debt Due to the United States Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) in May 2018, which Complainant contends was due to the actions of Defendant of Energy (DOE);
2. [Plaintiff] received a letter from DFAS on July 25, 2018, in reference to changes made to his time and attendance by the DOE, Complainant alleged these were erroneous changes;
3. On June 15, 2019, [Plaintiff] submitted a letter to the Office of Chief Counsel requesting his time and attendance
records from 2009 to 2014, and the responsible management official refused to respond to the letter or produce the records.[ECF No. 1 ¶ 50, ECF No. 33-5 at 3]. On March 28, 2022, the EEOC found by the “preponderance of the evidence of record [did] not establish that discrimination occurred.” [ECF No. 33-5 at 4, 6].
In this case, Plaintiff challenges the additional changes made to his time and attendance records sometime in 2011 that he became aware of when he received correspondence from DFAS in May 2018. [ECF No. 1 ¶ 29]. Plaintiff alleges that these changes were not the same one referenced in his first and second EEO actions but that “[t]he debt that DFAS attempted to collect from Mr. Wyse happened to be in the same amount as the agency's prior, erroneous attempts to collect $5,323.92 for a supposed overpayment.” Id. ¶¶ 30-32. Plaintiff alleges that although Defendant disclaims responsibility for the relevant changes, instead blaming DFAS and OPM, Defendant “is necessarily responsible” in that it “had control over [his] time and attendance records, even after he retired, or even if Defendant had forwarded such records for action by another agency. Id. ¶¶ 37-39. Plaintiff alleges Hepner made the relevant changes and “OPM's and DFAS's actions . . . were necessarily the result of changes that Defendant made” to the records. Id. ¶¶ 40-42.
Plaintiff alleges he was discriminated based on race, color, and national origin, in violation of Title VII in that he “was subjected to an adverse employment action to the extent that retroactive changes were made to his time and attendance records and Civilian Leave & Earnings Statements after his retirement,” changes Plaintiff alleges were made by Hepner, that resulted “in other agencies attempting to collect a debt from Plaintiff.” [ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 60-63, see also Id. ¶¶ 74, 88]. Plaintiff further alleges he was retaliated against following his filing of a formal EEO complaint in October 2010 when he “was subjected to an adverse employment action to the extent that retroactive changes were made to his time and attendance records and Civilian Leave & Earnings Statements after his retirement.” Id. ¶¶ 100, 102. II. Discussion
A. Standard on Motion to Dismiss
After pleadings are closed, a party may move for judgment on the pleadings. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). “A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) is assessed under the same standards as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” Occupy Columbia v. Haley, 738 F.3d 107, 117 (4th Cir. 2013). To withstand a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a complaint must contain facts sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). Mere “labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “In resolving a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 12(c), a district court may . . . consider a ‘written instrument' attached as an exhibit to a pleading.” Occupy Columbia, 738 F.3d at 116. Under Rule 10(c) “[a] copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is part of the pleading for all purposes.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(c).
B. Analysis
1. Timeliness of Plaintiff's Claims
Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that his records were altered multiple times in 2010 as well as, as relevant to his instant complaint, “in the pay period ending on February 12, 2011.” [See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 18, 23, 26, 29]. Plaintiff has also submitted to the court the July 25, 2018, DFAS document that states in part as follows:
Our records indicate in the pay period ending February 26, 2011, you were notified, via letter, of an overpayment in the gross amount of $5,323.92. This debt was later forwarded to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) on May 5, 2018 . . . .
In the pay period ending February 12, 2011, another series of retroactive time and attendance corrections were performed by your agency. This action reversed the 98.5 hours of sick leave used back to annual leave used. In turn, this action removed your entitlement to the gross payment in the amount of $5,323.92, leading to the creation of a debt in the same gross amount . . . .[ECF No. 44-1 at 7 (emphasis added), see also ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 33-34 (“According to DFAS correspondence on July 25, 2018, the changes were made to Mr. Wyse's time and attendance records and Civilian Leave & Earnings Statement. The changes were made to the pay period ending on February 11, 2011. Subsequently, Mr. Wyse has taken substantial measures to dispute the changes to his time and attendance records and seek supporting documentation.”)].
Plaintiff challenges the retroactive changes made to his records that occurred in 2011 after Plaintiff retired in 2010, arguing these changes were discriminatory and retaliatory. However, taking Plaintiff's allegations in light most favorable to him, including the records he has submitted in support of his complaint, Plaintiff was informed of these changes in 2011 but did not seek to challenge these changes until after he received notification from DFAS in 2018 of a related garnishment and debt collection effort.
It appears that this garnishment and collection effort has been reversed. DFAS's July 25, 2018, letter indicates that DFAS discovered Plaintiff was entitled to the $5,323.92 and planned to contact OPM “in order to have your debt cancelled.” [ECF No. 44-1 at 8].
Title VII provides that a charge of discrimination “shall be filed within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). However, as stated by the Fourth Circuit as to Title VII cases, “[t]o the extent that notice enters the analysis, it is “notice of the employer's actions, not the notice of a discriminatory effect or motivation, that establishes the commencement of the pertinent filing period.” Hamilton v. 1st Source Bank, 928 F.2d 86, 88-89 (4th Cir. 1990) (emphasis in original)). The Fourth Circuit has held, for example, in the context of a discriminatory discharge case that the court counts the 180 days “from either the time of discharge or from the moment the employee received advance notice of the pending discharge.” Id.
Here, the challenged actions occurred in 2011, and it appears that Plaintiff had notice of the same in 2011. Plaintiff failed to file a charge of discrimination within 180 days following either the challenged actions or the notice of those actions and instead attempted to file an EEO complaint addressing the challenged actions on July 22, 2018. [See ECF No. 33-7 at 1].
Defendant argues that “Plaintiff alleges the February 2011 changes were not discovered until 2018, when DFAS and OPM initiated garnishment actions” but that when Plaintiff discovered the February 2011 changes “is irrelevant.” [See ECF No. 33 at 11]. However, review of Plaintiff's complaint does not reveal this allegation, and as stated above, Plaintiff has submitted documentation that he was notified of the February 2011 changes in 2011. Plaintiff has failed to address Defendant's arguments that his complaint is time barred. [See ECF No. 44].
Based on the above, Plaintiff's claims are time barred. See, e.g., Felty v. Graves-Humphreys Co., 785 F.2d 516, 519 (4th Cir. 1986) (“A plaintiff's lack of knowledge of the discriminatory nature of an employment decision and the reasons for that lack of knowledge are relevant to an analysis of equitable tolling but play no part in determining the beginning of the statutory limitation period.”).
Although not addressed by the parties, the undersigned further recommends that equitable tolling does not apply in the instant case where “equitable tolling is ‘reserved for those rare instances where-due to circumstances external to the party's own conduct-it would be unconscionable to enforce the limitation period against the party and gross injustice would result.'” Battle v. Ledford, 912 F.3d 708, 718 (4th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted).
Accordingly, the undersigned recommends the district judge grant Defendant's motion, finding that Plaintiff's complaint is time-barred.
2. Post-Employment Discriminatory Acts
Additionally, Plaintiff's Title VII discrimination claims are subject to dismissal in that the challenged actions occurred after Plaintiff's retirement.
Title VII's antidiscrimination provision prohibits discrimination in the “terms [and] conditions . . . of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). However, in Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. V. White, the Supreme Court clarified that “the antiretaliation provision, unlike the substantive [discrimination] provision, [of Title VII] is not limited to discriminatory actions that affect the terms and conditions of employment.” 548 U.S. 53, 64 (2006).
Here, Plaintiff's Title VII discrimination claims concern retroactive changes made to his records that occurred in 2011, after he retired. Based on case law from this circuit, Plaintiff cannot maintain his discrimination claims where he complains of Defendant's actions taken after his retirement:
Case law confirms that Plaintiff cannot proceed with a Title VII discrimination claim premised on post-employment conduct. While the antiretaliation provision of Title VII applies to post-employment conduct, courts have consistently held that alleged post-employment actions cannot serve as a predicate for a Title VII discrimination claim. See Meadows v. Blue Ridge Comm. Colege, No. 1:19-cv-251, 2020 WL 2761037, at *6 (W.D. N.C. May 5, 2020) (“[Discrimination claims may not be supported by acts of post-employment discrimination.”); Colahar v. Christmas, No. DKC 11-3389, 2012 WL 6213751, at *3 n.5 (D. Md. Dec. 12, 2012) (“The allegations regarding Enterprise's post-termination efforts to interfere with [plaintiff's] unemployment benefits claim cannot serve as the basis for a Title VII discrimination claim.”). The Fourth Circuit has indicated the same. See Robinson v. She l Oil Co., 70 F.3d 325, 331 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting that “unlawful employment practice” in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1) covers “discrimination with respect to certain aspects of employment” and thus “does not redress discriminatory practices after the employment relationship has terminated”) rev'd on other grounds, 519 U.S. 337 (1997).Pearson v. Prince Wi liam Cnty. Sch. Bd., C/A No. 1:22-377-RDA-IDD, 2023 WL 2506415, at *4 (E.D. Va. Mar. 14, 2023) (footnote omitted); see also, e.g., McEachern v. Gray, C/A No. 4:14-1234-BHH, 2015 WL 5089613, at *13 (D.S.C. Aug. 27, 2015).
Accordingly, the undersigned recommends the district judge grant Defendant's motion as to Plaintiff's Title VII discrimination claims.
Given the recommendations above, the court need not address Defendant's additional argument “[t]o the extent Plaintiff seeks to hold DOE liable for DFAS and OPM's garnishment actions, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,” in that “DFAS and OPM independently initiated garnishment proceedings, despite DOE having previously released any debts owed by Plaintiff to the Department.” [ECF No. 33 at 12].
III. Conclusion and Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends the district judge grant Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings, dismissing Plaintiffs complaint with prejudice. [ECF No. 33].
Plaintiff submitted his complaint while represented by counsel but submitted his opposition to Defendant's instant motion while proceeding pro se. In his opposition to Defendant's motion, he indicates he is entitled to reimbursement for fees it appears were paid to an attorney he did not consent to represent him and for compensatory damages in connection with the EEOC's first and second orders. [See ECF No. 44 at 3]. However, these issues were not presented to the court in Plaintiffs complaint, and “Plaintiffs cannot amend their complaint by asserting new . . . theories for the first time in opposition to Defendants' motion to dismiss.” Doe 1 v. Varsity Brands, LLC, C/A No. 6:22-2957-HMH, 2023 WL 7222851, at *2 (D.S.C. Nov. 2, 2023) (citing K.D. ex rel. Duncan v. White Plains Sch. Dist, 921 F.Supp.2d 197, 209 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).