Opinion
Case No. 21-cv-10029-CRB
2023-03-01
Brittany WYNN, Plaintiff, v. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC., Defendant.
Chaim Shaun Setareh, Nolan E. Dilts, William Matthew Pao, Setareh Law Group, Beverly Hills, CA, for Plaintiff. Aileen H. Kim, John Alexander Vogt, Jones Day, Irvine, CA, Jacob Moshe Roth, Pro Hac Vice, Madeline Clark, Pro Hac Vice, Jones Day, Washington, DC, for Defendant.
Chaim Shaun Setareh, Nolan E. Dilts, William Matthew Pao, Setareh Law Group, Beverly Hills, CA, for Plaintiff. Aileen H. Kim, John Alexander Vogt, Jones Day, Irvine, CA, Jacob Moshe Roth, Pro Hac Vice, Madeline Clark, Pro Hac Vice, Jones Day, Washington, DC, for Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
CHARLES R. BREYER, United States District Judge
In this case, Plaintiff Brittany Wynn alleges that Defendant United Parcel Service ("UPS") willfully failed to comply with the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA") by including extraneous information in its disclosure. First Am. Compl. ("FAC") (dkt. 45). UPS now moves to dismiss the FAC for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Mot. (dkt. 47). In addition, UPS moves for judicial notice or incorporation by reference of three California superior court cases, and the FCRA disclosure and authorization forms it provided to Wynn. Request for Judicial Notice ("RJN") (dkt. 47-2). Wynn opposes the MTD and objects to the RJN as to the FCRA disclosure and authorization forms. Opp'n (dkt. 52-1); Objection to RJN (dkt. 51-2). UPS replies. Reply (dkt. 54). As explained below, finding this matter suitable for resolution without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court GRANTS UPS's motion to dismiss without leave to amend, GRANTS UPS's RJN as to the FCRA disclosure and authorization forms, and DENIES UPS's RJN as to the three California superior court cases.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Plaintiff's Allegations
Wynn applied for employment with UPS, a package delivery company, through its website. Wynn Decl. (dkt. 26-2) at 1; Boyd Decl. (dkt. 22-3) at 1. UPS routinely acquires consumer reports to conduct background checks on "prospective, current, and former employees." FAC ¶ 2. Accordingly, UPS "procured a 'consumer report' " on Wynn when she applied to be a Driver Helper. Id. ¶ 24. At issue in this case is whether UPS properly disclosed to her that it would acquire that consumer report. Id.
UPS provided two FCRA forms to Wynn: (1) an FCRA disclosure form and (2) an FCRA authorization form. Boyd Decl. at 1. Wynn alleges that UPS's disclosure form contains three elements that violate the FCRA. First, the disclosure form includes a checkbox for Wynn to acknowledge that her "electronic signature is the legally binding equivalent to [her] handwritten signature" and that she had reviewed and understood "this Agreement." FAC ¶ 23. Second, the disclosure form allegedly misstates the law by stating: "These consumer reports may be obtained by UPS at any time after the receipt of your authorization to obtain the reports, and, if you are hired by UPS, throughout your employment with UPS, subject to applicable law." Id. Third, the webpage displaying the disclosure form contained external links, such as "[t]abs across the top of the page," "[l]inks to various social media platforms," and "[l]inks at the bottom of the page." Id. Wynn alleges that UPS's violations were willful because the FCRA "unambiguously indicates that lack of disclosure and authorization violates" the law, and UPS is a "large entit[y] with access to legal advice." Id. ¶ 34.
Based on these allegations, Wynn brings this class action on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, and asserts a single claim: willful violation of the FCRA. Id. ¶¶ 21-36.
B. Procedural History
Wynn sued, alleging that UPS willfully failed to comply with the FCRA by including extraneous information in its disclosure. Compl. (dkt. 1). UPS moved to dismiss Wynn's original complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, to stay the case pending the United States Supreme Court's decision in Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon, 596 U.S. 450, 142 S. Ct. 1783, 213 L.Ed.2d 27 (2022). Motion to Dismiss ("MTD") (dkt. 22-1). The Court granted a stay without reaching the merits of the MTD. Order Granting Stay (dkt. 31). Following the Supreme Court's decision in Saxon, UPS moved to compel arbitration. Motion to Compel Arbitration (dkt. 36-1). The Court denied the motion to compel arbitration, and granted the pending MTD with leave to amend. Order Granting MTD (dkt. 44). The Court held that Wynn's allegations did not satisfy FRCP 8 because Wynn never alleged how UPS's disclosure violates the FCRA. Id. at 9.
In the FAC, Wynn alleges that three elements of UPS's disclosure form violate the standalone disclosure requirement of the FCRA: (1) the checkbox agreement; (2) the statement of law regarding future consumer reports; and (3) the external links. FAC ¶ 23.
UPS now moves to dismiss Wynn's amended complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Mot. UPS also moves for judicial notice or incorporation by reference of: (1) Moore v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. RG19003535, 2021 WL 7980989 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 7, 2021); (2) Pitre v. Walmart Inc., No. RG1700927449 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jul. 8, 2022) at RJN Ex. B; (3) Kaufman v. Marsh & McLennan Cos., Inc., No. 20CV361891, 2021 WL 7980990 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 17, 2021); and (4) the FCRA disclosure and authorization forms that UPS provided to Wynn. RJN.
Wynn objects to the MTD, and opposes the RJN as to the disclosure and authorization forms because these documents "are not the type of records that are judicially noticeable." Objection to RJN at 2. Wynn does not challenge the authenticity of the forms, nor does she object to the RJN as to the California superior court cases. See id.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Rule 12(b)(6) applies when a complaint lacks either a "cognizable legal theory" or "sufficient facts alleged" under such a theory. Godecke v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 937 F.3d 1201, 1208 (9th Cir. 2019). Whether a complaint contains sufficient factual allegations depends on whether it pleads enough facts to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. However, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice" to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955). When evaluating a motion to dismiss, the Court "must presume all factual allegations of the complaint to be true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party." Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). But the Court is "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986); Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1994).
If a court dismisses a complaint for failure to state a claim, it should "freely give leave" to amend "when justice so requires." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). But leave to amend "is not to be granted automatically." In re W. States Wholesale Nat. Gas Antitrust Litig., 715 F.3d 716, 738 (9th Cir. 2013). A court has discretion to deny leave to amend due to "undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [and] futility of amendment." Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ'g, 512 F.3d 522, 532 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962)).
III. DISCUSSION
The Court discusses the issues in the following order: (A) UPS's Request for Judicial Notice; (B) the FCRA's requirements; and (C) the alleged violations of the FCRA.
A. Request for Judicial Notice
UPS moves for judicial notice or incorporation by reference of: (1) Moore, No. RG19003535; (2) Pitre, No. RG1700927449; (3) Kaufman, No. 20CV361891; and (4) the FCRA disclosure and authorization forms it provided to Wynn. RJN. Wynn objects only to the FCRA disclosure and authorization forms, arguing that they "are not the type of records that are judicially noticeable." Objection to RJN at 2. The Court denies UPS's RJN as to Moore, Pitre, and Kaufman, and grants the RJN as to the FCRA disclosure and authorization forms.
Courts may consider documents attached to the complaint, matters of judicial notice, or documents incorporated by reference in the complaint when ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 907-08 (9th Cir. 2003). Courts regularly take judicial notice of public records, including court cases that have "a direct relation to matters at issue." U.S. ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Harris v. County of Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 2012) ("We may take judicial notice of undisputed matters of public record . . . including documents on file in federal or state courts."). Documents are subject to incorporation by reference if a plaintiff refers to them "extensively" or they form the basis of the complaint. Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 1002 (9th Cir. 2018).
Here, Moore, Pitre, and Kaufman do not have "a direct relation to matters at issue." See Borneo, 971 F.2d at 248. Pitre and Kaufman consider FCRA authorization and disclosure forms used by other employers. See RJN Ex. B at 2; RJN Ex. C at 1. While Moore addressed a prior UPS disclosure, it is irrelevant to the Court's resolution here because the forms have changed. See RJN Ex. A at 3; Borneo, 971 F.2d at 248. In contrast, the FCRA disclosure and authorization forms are subject to incorporation by reference because Wynn "extensively" refers to them, and they are the basis of her complaint. See FAC ¶¶ 2, 16, 22-23, 33-35; Khoja, 899 F.3d at 1002.
Accordingly, the Court denies UPS's RJN as to the California superior court cases, and grants UPS's RJN as to the FCRA disclosure and authorization forms.
B. Fair Credit Reporting Act
To obtain an applicant's consumer report, a prospective employer must provide the applicant a written "clear and conspicuous disclosure . . . in a document that consists solely of the disclosure, [indicating] that a consumer report may be obtained for employment purposes." 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(a)(ii). The employer must also obtain the applicant's written authorization to obtain the report. Id. Employers must follow the "standalone disclosure requirement," which prohibits employers from including any information on the disclosure document except for the disclosure itself. Walker v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 953 F.3d 1082, 1087-88 (9th Cir. 2020). However, there is one statutory exception to this requirement: the employer may obtain the applicant's authorization on the disclosure document. Syed v. M-I, LLC, 853 F.3d 492, 500 (9th Cir. 2017); 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(ii).
In addition, according to the caselaw, an employer can include the following information in a disclosure form: (1) the phrase "a consumer report may be obtained for employment purposes"; (2) "some concise explanation of what that phrase means"; (3) an explanation about "what a 'consumer report' entails"; (4) an explanation of how the report "will be obtained"; and (5) an explanation "for which type of 'employment purposes' it may be used." Walker, 953 F.3d at 1088-89. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that this information is not extraneous because it "would further the purpose of the disclosure by helping the [applicant] understand the disclosure," rather than "pull the applicant's attention away from his privacy rights." Id. at 1089-90.
Finally, while employers who "negligently" violate the FCRA are liable only for "actual damages," employers who "willfully fail[ ] to comply" must pay statutory penalties and "punitive damages as the court may allow." 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681o, 1681n(a). The standard for willfulness is high: a consumer must establish that the violator acted in reckless disregard of the statute. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 69, 127 S.Ct. 2201, 167 L.Ed.2d 1045 (2007). Here, Wynn alleges that UPS's conduct was willful. FAC ¶¶ 34-35. However, because the Court concludes that Wynn does not state a plausible claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court need not reach the issue of willfulness.
C. Alleged Violations
Wynn alleges that three elements of UPS's disclosure form violate the FCRA's standalone requirement: (1) the checkbox agreement; (2) the statement of law; and (3) the external links. The Court finds that none of these elements violate the FCRA.
Wynn argues that, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), "Defendant must assume the factual allegations stated in the FAC to be true, including Plaintiffs' allegations that the disclosure form provided to her was not clear and conspicuous and did not comply with the standalone disclosure requirement; that she was deprived of the right to information and the right to privacy guaranteed by Section 1681b(2)(A)(i)-(ii); and that Defendant's conduct was willful." Opp'n at 7. Wynn is mistaken. These statements are legal conclusions, which the Court is "not bound to accept as true." See Papasan, 478 U.S. at 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932.
1. Checkbox Agreement
Wynn argues first that UPS's disclosure form violated the FCRA because it contained a checkbox agreement. FAC ¶ 23. UPS's disclosure form is reproduced below. The text ("Disputed Text") is within the red box. It reads: "[v] I agree that my electronic signature is the legally binding equivalent to my handwritten signature. By my electronic signature, I acknowledge that I have carefully reviewed this Agreement and understand its contents."
Image materials not available for display. Boyd Decl. Ex. A. Wynn argues that the checkbox agreement violates the FCRA's requirement that the document consist solely of the disclosure. Opp'n at 9. UPS counters that the checkbox agreement did not "pull[ ] the applicant's attention away from [her] privacy rights protected by the FCRA," but rather "focus[ed] the applicant's attention on the FCRA disclosure." Mot. at 13; see Walker, 953 F.3d at 1088. UPS further states that "the FCRA expressly allows an employer to seek an applicant's authorization on the disclosure itself." Id. at 14.
As discussed in Section III.B, there is one express statutory exception to the standalone disclosure requirement: the employer may obtain the applicant's authorization on the disclosure document. Syed, 853 F.3d at 500; 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(ii). Further, the Ninth Circuit, in listing the types of information that an employer could include in a disclosure, emphasized that such information "would further the purpose of the disclosure by helping the [applicant] understand the disclosure," as opposed to "pull[ing] the applicant's attention away from his privacy rights." Walker, 953 F.3d at 1089-90.
Here, the Disputed Text is part of UPS's authorization. It is not part of the disclosure because it does not state that "a consumer report may be obtained for employment purposes" or elaborate on what that phrase means. See Walker, 953 F.3d at 1088-89. Rather, it asks an applicant to confirm that they have read the disclosure and understand it. Boyd Decl. Ex. A ("I acknowledge that I have carefully reviewed this Agreement and understand its contents."). The Disputed Text is also not extraneous information because it differs from the information that the Ninth Circuit found extraneous elsewhere. Instead, the Disputed Text's only conceivable purpose is to confirm that an applicant understands the disclosure before authorizing UPS to obtain a consumer report. See Boyd Decl. Ex. A ("I acknowledge that I have carefully reviewed this Agreement and understand its contents."). This purpose is in line with the Ninth Circuit's holding that "[a]n authorization requiring the job applicant's signature focuses the applicant's attention on the nature of the personal information the prospective employer may obtain, and the employer's inability to obtain that information without his consent." See Syed, 853 F.3d at 502.
The Ninth Circuit held that the information at issue in three cases—involving liability waivers, state-mandated disclosures, and an applicant's right to inspect consumer reports—was extraneous because it pulled "the applicant's attention away from his privacy rights protected by the FCRA." Syed, 853 F.3d at 502; Gilberg v. Cal. Check Cashing Stores, LLC, 913 F.3d 1169, 1176 (9th Cir. 2019); Walker, 953 F.3d at 1090-91. Here, the Disputed Text focuses Wynn on her FCRA rights.
Additionally, UPS's authorization form demonstrates that the disclosure form's Disputed Text is in fact part of the authorization. In the application process, Wynn completed the FCRA disclosure form immediately before the authorization form. Boyd Decl. at 1. The authorization form states: "I voluntarily and fully authorize United Parcel Service, Inc. ("UPS") to obtain consumer reports on me for employment purposes as set forth in the Disclosure of Intention to Obtain Consumer Report for Employment Purposes, which I received separately and signed to acknowledge my receipt and understanding." Boyd Decl. Ex. B (emphasis added). If an applicant does not sign the checkbox agreement on the disclosure form, the applicant cannot authorize UPS to procure a consumer report. See id. Because the applicant must sign both the disclosure form and the authorization form before UPS can obtain a consumer report, the Disputed Text is part of UPS's authorization.
Thus, the checkbox agreement does not violate the FCRA.
2. Statement of Law
Wynn argues next that UPS's disclosure form violated the FCRA because it misstated the law. FAC ¶ 23. The statement in question reads: "These consumer reports may be obtained by UPS at any time after the receipt of your authorization to obtain the reports, and, if you are hired by UPS, throughout your employment with UPS, subject to applicable law." Id. Wynn argues that this misstates the law because the FCRA requires that an employer obtain authorization before each consumer report. Opp'n at 10. UPS responds that the statement of law is accurate because the FCRA does not require a new disclosure and authorization for each consumer report. Reply at 10; see also Kelchner v. Sycamore Manor Health Ctr., 135 F. App'x 499, 502 (3d Cir. 2005); FTC Adv. Op., 1998 WL 34323729, at *2 (Aug. 5, 1998). In the alternative, UPS argues that the FCRA does not "prohibit misstatements of the law that otherwise comply with the FCRA's requirements." Mot. at 15. The Court holds that this statement does not violate the FCRA.
Although the Ninth Circuit does not seem to have addressed this issue, it considered a disclosure form stating that the employer could procure a credit report "throughout the course of your employment to the extent permitted by law." Gilberg, 913 F.3d at 1177. The court did not address whether an employer can procure more than one credit report. See id. at 1176. The Third Circuit addressed this precise issue and held that a blanket authorization entitling an employer to obtain an applicant's credit report in the future did not violate the FCRA. Kelchner, 135 F. App'x at 500. The court reasoned that "[t]he requirement that an employer obtain authorization 'at any time before the report is procured' is unambiguous. The plain language of the statute authorizes the employer to obtain an employee's written authorization at 'any time' during the employment relationship." Id. at 502. Likewise, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") published a staff opinion letter in which it said that the FCRA:
does not require that a consumer consent each time his or her report is procured. Consequently, a person may comply with the requirements of this section by making the proper disclosure to a consumer and obtaining the consumer's blanket, written authorization to obtain his or her consumer report for employment purposes at any time during the tenure of the consumer's employment.Division of Credit Practices, 1998 WL 34323729, at *1-2.
The Court finds the reasoning in Kelchner and the FTC's staff letter persuasive. While the law details the procurement of a single consumer report, it states that such procurement may take place where a "clear and conspicuous disclosure has been made in writing to the consumer at any time before the report is procured." 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i) (emphasis added). The provision thus allows an employer to procure several consumer reports based on a one-time, blanket authorization so long as authorization occurred "any time" before the reports are procured. That is precisely what UPS stated here. Wynn thus misconstrues the statute's focus on a single "consumer report" instead of several "consumer reports." See Opp'n at 10. Because the statement of law is accurate and helps the applicant understand the disclosure process, UPS can include it on the disclosure form. See Walker, 953 F.3d at 1089-90.
Moreover, even if UPS misstated the law, that would not violate the FCRA. As the court held in a similar case, whether an employer is:
legally permitted to obtain the breadth of information that it claimed it could . . . is not the kind of problem with which the FCRA is concerned. If a disclosure is "overbroad" in nature, that does not prevent a prospective employee from giving knowing consent; the prospective employee is not being misled about what type of information the employer wants to get.Juster v. Workday, Inc., No. 21-CV-07555-EMC, 617 F. Supp. 3d 1128, 1137 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2022).
Thus, this statement of law does not violate the FCRA.
3. External Links
Finally, Wynn argues that UPS's disclosure form violated the FCRA because the website contained external links. FAC ¶ 23. UPS's disclosure is reproduced below. The external links are within red boxes.
According to Wynn, the external links are the tabs at the top of the page, search window, location identifier, dropdown menu containing Wynn's name, yellow tabs titled "My Applications" and "Edit Profile," three progress bars, yellow buttons titled "Document List" and "Continue," links to social media websites, and links across the bottom of the page. FAC ¶ 23.
Image materials not available for display. Boyd Decl. Ex. A. Wynn argues that the webpage's "[e]xternal links throughout" are "extraneous and not clear and conspicuous." FAC ¶ 23. UPS counters that the links are not extraneous information because they are not "information at all." Mot. at 17. The Court holds that the external links do not violate the FCRA.
The Ninth Circuit analyzed extraneous information in Syed, Gilberg, and Walker. It held that the information at issue in those cases—liability waivers, state-mandated disclosures, and an applicant's right to inspect consumer reports—was extraneous because it pulled "the applicant's attention away from his privacy rights protected by the FCRA." Syed, 853 F.3d at 502; Gilberg, 913 F.3d at 1176; Walker, 953 F.3d at 1090-91. While the Ninth Circuit appears not to have addressed the presence of website links on a disclosure online, it held that a physical disclosure form with employer logos and signature lines did not violate the standalone requirement. See Luna v. Hansen & Adkins Auto Transp., Inc., 956 F.3d 1151, 1153-54 (9th Cir. 2020). Moreover, in Gilberg, the court rejected the argument that an employer violated the FCRA by including its disclosure within a four-page employment packet. Gilberg, 913 F.3d at 1174. It reasoned that no "judicial authority, legislative history or dictionary definition" supported this interpretation, and that if such interpretation were enforced, it would be "difficult to see how an employer could ever provide an applicant" with a standalone document. Id.
Here, the external links differ from the information the Ninth Circuit has found extraneous elsewhere. See Syed, 853 F.3d at 502; Gilberg, 913 F.3d at 1176; Walker, 953 F.3d at 1090-91. A liability waiver, for example, is extraneous information because it requires the reader to contemplate a separate topic, thereby pulling "the applicant's attention away from his privacy rights protected by the FCRA." See Syed, 853 F.3d at 502. The external links are not extraneous information because, just like an employee logo, they are not "likely to confuse" an applicant who is accustomed to reading materials on a website. See Gilberg, 913 F.3d at 1176; Luna, 956 F.3d at 1153-54. A webpage link does not pull "the applicant's attention away from his privacy rights protected by the FCRA." See Syed, 853 F.3d at 502.
To the contrary, UPS's webpage focuses the applicant on the FCRA disclosure by placing it under a tab titled "FCRA Disclosure" and then below a bolded title in all capital letters that reads "DISCLOSURE OF INTENTION TO OBTAIN CONSUMER REPORT FOR EMPLOYMENT PURPOSES." Boyd Decl. Ex. A. Applicants completing the UPS disclosure "can be expected to notice a standalone document featuring a bolded . . . capital-lettered heading." See Luna, 956 F.3d at 1154. Lastly, Wynn presents no case law, nor can the Court find any, suggesting that the presence of website links on a disclosure form violates the FCRA. Instead, Wynn asks the Court to make a novel ruling based on her interpretation of the statute. No "judicial authority, legislative history or dictionary definition" supports her interpretation, and if such interpretation were enforced, it would be "difficult to see how an employer could ever provide an applicant" with a standalone document online. See Gilberg, 913 F.3d at 1174.
Thus, the external links do not violate the FCRA.
UPS also argues that the disclosure was a standalone document because "the links were not a part of the 'document' that contained the disclosure." Mot. at 17. Because the external links are not extraneous information, the Court does not need to resolve this issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS UPS's motion to dismiss. The Court denies Wynn leave to amend because amendment would be futile. See Leadsinger, 512 F.3d at 532. In its prior order, the Court gave Wynn leave to amend because her original complaint did not allege how UPS's disclosure violated the FCRA. Order Granting MTD at 9. Further amendment is unlikely to cure the deficiencies in the FAC.
Finally, the Court GRANTS UPS's RJN as to the FCRA disclosure and authorization forms, and DENIES UPS's RJN as to the California superior court cases.
IT IS SO ORDERED.