Opinion
WWMCV156010579S
04-12-2017
Ralph Wyncoop v. Windham Region Transit District
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION (MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, NO. 115, SHORT CALENDAR, FEBRUARY 14, 2017)
Harry E. Calmar, J.
The defendant moves for summary judgment asserting there is no genuine issue of material fact that a contract was not formed--and there is no evidence of bad faith.
FACTS
This case arises out of a dispute regarding the ability of the plaintiffs to take breaks during the work day. The second amended complaint, operative for the purposes of this memorandum, was filed on May 13, 2016. The plaintiffs, Ralph Wyncoop (Wyncoop), Theresa Benzi, and Mark Heckler, allege breach of contract and breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing against the defendant, Windham Region Transit District. The defendant filed the motion for summary judgment on November 10, 2016 (Docket Entry no. 115); along with a supporting memorandum of law (Docket Entry no. 117). On January 31, 2017, the plaintiffs filed an objection to the defendant's motion for summary judgment; (Docket Entry no. 123); along with a supporting memorandum of law; (Docket Entry no. 124).
" The voluntary filing of an amended complaint operates as a withdrawal of the prior complaint, and, thereafter, the earlier complaint, though remaining in the files and constituting part of the history of the case, can furnish no basis for a judgment, nor can any previous ruling on it be made a subject of appeal." Connecticut Bank of Commerce v. Giordano, 67 Conn.App. 79, 81, 787 A.2d 9 (2001), cert. denied, 259 Conn. 929, 793 A.2d 253 (2002).
Along with the motion and supporting memorandum, the defendant filed the following: an affidavit of Rose Kurcinik (Docket Entry no. 116); a deposition of Ralph Wyncoop (Docket Entry no. 118); a deposition of Theresa Benzi (Docket Entry no. 119); a deposition of Mark Heckler (Docket Entry no. 120); and an excerpt of the defendant's personnel policies manual dated May 20, 2008; (Docket Entry no. 121).
Along with the objection and supporting memorandum, the plaintiffs filed the following exhibits: (A) evidence of the receipt of the defendant's personnel policies manual on the part of plaintiffs Mark Heckler and Theresa Benzi; (B) a deposition of Rose Kurcinik; (C) an excerpt of the defendant's personnel policies manual dated May 20, 2008; (D) a statement by Ewan Mark; (E) a statement by Ewan Mark; (F) a deposition of Mark Heckler; (G) a deposition of Ralph Wyncoop; (H) a deposition of Theresa Benzie. (Docket Entry no. 125.)
DISCUSSION
" [S]ummary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cefaratti v. Aranow, 321 Conn. 637, 645, 138 A.3d 837 (2016). " A material fact is a fact that will make a difference in the result of the case . . . The facts at issue are those alleged in the pleadings . . . The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Recall Total Information Management, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 147 Conn.App. 450, 456, 83 A.3d 664 (2014), aff'd, 317 Conn. 46, 115 A.3d 458 (2015). " [T]he party moving for summary judgment . . . is required to support its motion with supporting documentation, including affidavits." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Romprey v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 310 Conn. 304, 324 n.12, 77 A.3d 726 (2013). " The existence of the genuine issue of material fact must be demonstrated by counter-affidavits and concrete evidence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bruno v. Whipple, 162 Conn.App. 186, 214, 130 A.3d 899 (2015), cert. denied, 321 Conn. 901, 138 A.3d 280 (2016).
" [O]nly evidence that would be admissible at trial may be used to support or oppose a motion for summary judgment . . . Practice Book § [17-45], although containing the phrase including but not limited to, contemplates that supporting documents to a motion for summary judgment be made under oath or be otherwise reliable . . . [The] rules would be meaningless if they could be circumvented by filing [unauthenticated documents] in support of or in opposition to summary judgment." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Nash v. Stevens, 144 Conn.App. 1, 15, 71 A.3d 635, cert. denied, 310 Conn. 915, 76 A.3d 628 (2013). The trial court has discretion in determining whether to consider documentary evidence submitted by a party in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment. See Bruno v. Whipple, 138 Conn.App. 496, 506, 54 A.3d 184 (2012) (" Whether a trial court should consider documentary evidence submitted by a party in relation to a motion for summary judgment presents an evidentiary issue to which we apply an abuse of discretion standard").
As a preliminary matter, the plaintiffs and the defendant have filed evidence without proper authentication. Because none of the parties have objected to their adversary's mutual reliance on unauthenticated evidence, however, the court, in its discretion, may consider this evidence. See, e.g., Barlow v. Palmer, 96 Conn.App. 88, 92, 898 A.2d 835 (2006); Practice Book § 1-8 (interpret rules liberally to facilitate business and advance justice when strict adherence will work surprise or injustice).
I
BREACH OF CONTRACT
The plaintiffs' breach of contract allegations are based on language in the defendant's personnel policy manual, which provided for a half-hour lunch and two ten-minute breaks per workday; (see Pl.'s Exhibits, Ex. C, Docket Entry no. 125.) The defendant argues that Wyncoop cannot rely on the personnel policy manual to form a contract because he did not receive it when hired in 2010; and the plaintiffs' work schedules included break time exceeding that of the personnel policy. The plaintiffs argue that there exist genuine issues of material fact as to whether Wyncoop received the personnel policy manual and whether the plaintiffs were actually afforded scheduled breaks.
" The elements of a breach of contract action are the formation of an agreement, performance by one party, breach of the agreement by the other party and damages." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ibar v. Stratek Plastic Ltd., 145 Conn.App. 401, 410, 76 A.3d 202, cert. denied, 310 Conn. 938, 79 A.3d 891 (2013). " [Statements in an employer's personnel manual], under appropriate circumstances, may give rise to an express or implied contract between employer and employee . . . The intention of the parties manifested by their words and acts is essential to determine whether a contract was entered into and what its terms were . . . In the absence of definitive contract language . . . the determination of what the parties intended to encompass in their contractual commitments is a question of the intention of the parties, and an inference of fact." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Finley v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 202 Conn. 190, 198-99, 520 A.2d 208 (1987), overruled on other grounds by State v. Sanchez, 308 Conn. 64, 60 A.3d 271 (2013).
" [A]ll employer-employee relationships not governed by express contracts involve some type of implied contract of employment. There cannot be any serious dispute that there is a bargain of some kind; otherwise, the employee would not be working . . . To determine the contents of any particular implied contract of employment, the factual circumstances of the parties' relationship must be examined in light of legal rules governing unilateral contracts . . . Pursuant to the legal principles governing such contracts, in order to find that an implied contract of employment incorporates specific representations . . . contained in provisions in an employee manual, the trier of fact is required to find the following subordinate facts. Initially, the trier of fact is required to find that the employer's . . . issuance of a handbook to the employee was an offer--i.e., that it was a promise to the employee that, if the employee worked for the company, his or her employment would thereafter be governed by those . . . written statements . . . If the . . . handbook constitute[s] an offer, the trier of fact then is required to find that the employee accepted that offer." (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Torosyan v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 234 Conn. 1, 13-14, 662 A.2d 89 (1995). " When an employer issues an employment manual that confers on an employee greater rights than he or she previously had, the employee's continued work for the employer thereafter ordinarily demonstrates that the employee has accepted that offer of new rights." Id., 18.
" Whether there was a breach of contract is ordinarily a question of fact . . . Further, where a breach of contract is alleged, [t]he amount, if any, of the [defendant's] actual damages is a question of fact." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ridgefield v. Eppoliti Realty Co., 71 Conn.App. 321, 338, 801 A.2d 902, cert. denied, 261 Conn. 933, 806 A.2d 1070 (2002).
Although Wyncoop testified that he did not receive the defendant's personnel policy manual when he was hired in 2010 (see Def.'s Mem. Supp., Ex. A-1, Wyncoop Dep., p. 9, Docket Entry no. 118); the plaintiffs have submitted evidence that Wyncoop did in fact receive such manual (see Pl.'s Exhibits, Ex. B, Docket Entry no. 125); creating a genuine issue of material fact as to this point. The following evidence has been put forth supporting the plaintiffs' claim that a contract was formed under Torosyan on the basis of the language in the personnel policies manual: all three plaintiffs received the manual when they were hired, i.e., communication of the offer (see Pl.'s Exhibits, Ex. A, B, Docket Entry no. 125); and the plaintiffs commenced work thereafter, i.e., acceptance of the offer (see Answer ¶ ¶ 2, 12, 22, Docket Entry no. 111). See Torosyan v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc., supra, 234 Conn. 18. This evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact for the jury. See id., 13-14. It is also a question for the jury whether language in the personnel policies manual, which is silent as to remuneration; (Def.'s Mem. Supp., Ex. B, Docket Entry no. 121) [" (a)ll full day work assignments will include a lunch break" ]); created an obligation to pay the plaintiffs for the lunch break. See Finley v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., supra, 202 Conn. 198-99.
Evidence that neither a lunch break nor the ten-minute breaks were actually provided; (see Pl.'s Exhibits, Heckler Dep., Ex. F, p. 15, Docket Entry no. 125); creates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the contract was breached. See Ridgefield v. Eppoliti Realty Co., Inc., supra, 71 Conn.App. 338. For the foregoing reasons, the court denies the defendant's motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiffs' claims for breach of contract.
II
BREACH OF IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
The defendant argues that there was neither a contract, which is a necessary precursor to an implied covenant thereof, nor is there evidence of bad faith. " Every contract carries an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing requiring that neither party do anything that will injure the right of the other to receive the benefits of the agreement . . . To constitute a breach of that covenant, the acts by which a defendant allegedly impedes the plaintiff's right to receive benefits that he or she reasonably expected to receive under the contract must have been taken in bad faith . . . Bad faith in general implies both actual or constructive fraud, or a design to mislead or deceive another, or a neglect or refusal to fulfill some duty or some contractual obligation, not prompted by an honest mistake as to one's rights or duties, but by some interested or sinister motive . . . Bad faith means more than mere negligence; it involves a dishonest purpose." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Alexandru v. Strong, 81 Conn.App. 68, 80-81, 837 A.2d 875, cert. denied, 268 Conn. 906, 845 A.2d 406 (2004).
" The Restatement (Second) of Contracts . . . recognizes an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every contract without limitation . . . Essentially it is a rule of construction designed to fulfill the reasonable expectations of the contracting parties as they presumably intended. The principle, therefore, cannot be applied to achieve a result contrary to the clearly expressed terms of a contract, unless, possibly, those terms are contrary to public policy." (Citations omitted.) Magnan v. Anaconda Industries, Inc., 193 Conn. 558, 566-67, 479 A.2d 781 (1984).
As discussed previously, there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the language in the personnel policies manual makes up part of an implied contract. Language therein expressly provides for a half-hour lunch break and two ten-minute breaks per workday. (See Def.'s Mem. Supp., Ex. B, Docket Entry no. 121.) There is also evidence that agents of the defendant threatened to replace the plaintiffs when they brought up the fact that they were not allowed these breaks. (See Pl.'s Exhibits, Ex. G, Wyncoop Dep., pp. 25-27, Docket Entry no. 125.) For the foregoing reasons, the court denies the defendant's motion for summary judgment in its entirety.