Opinion
24A-CR-1
06-11-2024
Chedric Demetrius Wright, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Lisa Diane Manning Plainfield, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Steven J. Hosler Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Hendricks Superior Court The Honorable Rhett Stuard, Judge Trial Court Cause Nos. 32D02-2008-F2-23, 32D02-1905-F3-15
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Lisa Diane Manning Plainfield, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Steven J. Hosler Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
BRADFORD, JUDGE.
Case Summary
[¶1] Chedric Wright was sentenced to a lengthy term in community corrections followed by probation after pleading guilty to Level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon ("SVF") in cause number 32D-1905-F3-15 ("Cause No. F3-15"), pleading guilty to Level 4 felony possession of methamphetamine and Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement in cause number 32D02-2008-F2-23 ("Cause No. F2-23"), and admitting to being a habitual offender. Wright violated the terms of his placement two different times in October of 2023. After the State filed written notices of violation and Wright admitted to the violations, the trial court revoked Wright's communitycorrections placement and probation and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in the Department of Correction ("DOC"). Wright contends that he was denied due process because he had not been given adequate notice that the State's revocation request had included both his community-corrections placement and his probationary term. He also contends that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his placements and ordering that he serve the entirety of his remaining sentence in the DOC. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] On May 31, 2022, Wright pled guilty in Cause No. F3-15 to Level 4 felony possession of a firearm by an SVF. In exchange for Wright's guilty plea, the State agreed to dismiss four additional felony charges, two misdemeanor charges, and a claim that Wright was a habitual offender. The trial court accepted Wright's guilty plea and sentenced him to an eight-year term, with four years served in the DOC and four years served in community corrections, with two of those years to be served on work release and the remaining two years to be served on home detention.
Wright was given credit for 1215 days served and ordered to serve the remaining two hundred forty-five days in the DOC.
[¶3] On June 22, 2023, Wright pled guilty in Cause No. F2-23 to Level 4 felony possession of methamphetamine and Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement. Wright also admitted to being a habitual offender. In exchange for Wright's guilty plea and admission, the State agreed to dismiss three additional felony charges and three misdemeanor charges. The trial court accepted Wright's guilty plea and sentenced him to a sixteen-year term, with ten years served in community corrections on work release and the remaining six years suspended to probation.
[¶4] Wright was placed on work release on July 11, 2022, in Cause No. F3-15 and on August 15, 2023, in Cause No. F2-23. Wright's whereabouts were unaccounted for from 12:30 p.m. on October 11, 2023, until 1:45 a.m. on October 12, 2023, for a total of thirteen hours and fifteen minutes. Wright's whereabouts were unaccounted for from 1:15 p.m. on October 17, 2023, until 1:45 a.m. on October 18, 2023, for a total of twelve hours and thirty minutes.
[¶5] Hendricks County Work Release ("HCWR") filed a notice of violation and petition to revoke Wright's work-release placement in Cause No. F3-15 on October 23, 2023. The notice of violation informed Wright that he was alleged to have violated the terms of his work-release conditions by possessing intoxicating substances and having unaccounted time. It further stated that HCWR "recommends to the Court that [Wright's] Work Release be revoked [and] all or any portion of the sentence be imposed[.]" Appellant's App. Vol. III p. 169 (emphasis added).
[¶6] HCWR filed a notice of violation and petition to revoke Wright's work-release placement in Cause No. F2-23 on October 31, 2023. This notice informed Wright that he had been "[t]erminated from the program" following his alleged violation of his work-release conditions and again stated that HCWR "recommends to the Court that [Wright's] Work Release be revoked [and] all or any portion of the sentence be imposed[.]" Appellant's App. Vol. III p. 23 (emphasis added).
[¶7] During an evidentiary hearing on the notices of violation, Wright admitted that he had violated the terms of his placement "by being out of place" on both October 11, and October 17, 2023, "for a total of [twenty-five] hours and [forty-five] minutes unaccounted for outside the facility." Tr. Vol. II p. 22. The trial court accepted Wright's admission and found that Wright had violated the terms of his community-corrections placement in both Cause Nos. F3-15 and F2-23. The trial court revoked Wright's remaining community-corrections placement in both causes and his probation in Cause No. F2-23, ordering him to serve his remaining sentence in the DOC.
The trial court indicated that Wright "may request purposeful incarceration after successfully completing [three] years." Appellant's App. Vol. III pp. 32, 188.
Discussion and Decision
[¶8] A community-corrections program is "a program consisting of residential centers and work release, home detention, or electronic monitoring." Ind. Code § 35-38-2.6-2.
For purposes of appellate review, we treat a hearing on a petition to revoke a placement in a community[-]corrections program the same as we do a hearing on a petition to revoke probation. The similarities between the two dictate this approach. Both probation and community[-]corrections programs serve as alternatives to commitment to the [DOC] and both are made at the sole discretion of the trial court. A defendant is not entitled to serve a sentence in either probation or a community[-]corrections program. Rather, placement in either is a matter of grace and a conditional liberty that is a favor, not a right.Cox v. State, 706 N.E.2d 547, 549 (Ind. 1999) (cleaned up).
I. Wright Was Not Denied Due Process
[¶9] Wright first contends that he was denied due process, claiming that he had not received sufficient notice that the State sought to revoke his probation in addition to his work-release placement in Cause No. F2-23.
The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause applies to probation revocation proceedings. However, a probation revocation proceeding is in the nature of a civil action and is not to be equated with an adversarial criminal proceeding.
Therefore, a probationer is entitled to some, but not all, of the rights afforded to a criminal defendant. The due process right applicable in a probation revocation proceeding allows for procedures that are more flexible than in a criminal prosecution. Such flexibility allows courts to enforce lawful orders, address an offender's personal circumstances, and protect public safety.
Thus, a probationer is entitled to (a) a written notice of the claimed violations, (b) disclosure of the evidence against him or her, (c) the opportunity to be heard in person and present witnesses and evidence, (d) the right to confront and crossexamine witnesses, (e) a neutral and detached hearing body, and (f) a written statement by the factfinder regarding the evidence relied upon and reason for revocation.McCauley v. State, 22 N.E.3d 743, 748 (Ind.Ct.App. 2014) (internal citations omitted), trans. denied. The due-process requirements for probation-revocation proceedings "are also required when the trial court revokes a defendant's placement in a community[-]corrections program." Cox, 706 N.E.2d at 549.
[¶10] Wright was sentenced under Cause No. F2-23 to sixteen years, with ten years served on work release and six years suspended to probation. Wright acknowledges that "a violation of work release was filed," but claims that he "was never given notice that the State was seeking to revoke his probation or alleging that he violated the terms of probation" as no separate notice of probation violation was filed. Appellant's Br. p. 12; Appellant's Reply Br. p. 6. Thus, he claims that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking the portion of his sentence that had been previously suspended to probation. For its part, the State argues that the notice given to Wright satisfied due-process requirements. We agree with the State.
[¶11] Indiana Code section 35-38-2.6-5 provides that following a violation of the terms of an individual's community-corrections placement, the State may request that the trial court revoke the community-corrections placement and order the individual to serve the "remainder of the person's sentence." Wright was found to have violated the terms of his work-release placement after the State had filed two notices of violation. Both notices of violation explicitly requested not only that Wright's work-release placement be revoked but also that "all or any portion of the sentence be imposed." Appellant's App. Vol. III pp. 23, 169 (emphasis added). The trial court advised Wright during the initial hearing on the notices of violation that "[i]f the Court finds that you have violated a condition of your Work[-]Release commitment, the Court may order you to serve the remainder of your sentence[.]" Tr. Vol. II p. 8 (emphasis added). The trial court also advised Wright at the beginning of the evidentiary hearing that the notices of violation applied to both Cause Nos. F2-23 and F3-15. (Tr. Vol. II pp. 13-14) In addition, Wright indicated at the start of the evidentiary hearing that he understood that sanction for the alleged violations could include an order that he serve "all [of his] backup time at the DOC." Tr. Vol. II p. 14 (emphasis added).
[¶12] While not specifically including the word "probation," the written notices of violation were seeking to have Wright's community-corrections and probation placements revoked as the State requested that "all" of the sentence be imposed. In addition, the trial court's advisement of the potential penalty made clear that it could order Wright to serve the full remainder of his sentence if it found Wright to have violated the terms of his work-release placement, and Wright acknowledged this fact. Given the record before us, we conclude that Wright was given adequate notice of the scope of the revocation proceedings and, as a result, was not denied due process. See McCauley, 22 N.E.3d at 748 (providing that the defendant was not denied due process as he had received ample notice that the State had sought to revoke both his home-detention placement and his term of informal probation when the State's notice of violation had alluded to both and defendant had indicated that he understood a finding that he could be ordered to serve the full amount of his remaining sentence if he was found to have violated the terms of his placement); Patterson v. State, 750 N.E.2d 879, 885 (Ind.Ct.App. 2001) (providing that the defendant's due-process rights were not violated when he indicated that he understood that he could be ordered to serve the remainder of his sentence if he was found to have violated the terms of his placement).
In his reply brief, Wright additionally argues that the State had failed to disclose the evidence against him and that he had been denied the opportunity to be heard. We disagree, noting that the substance of the allegations had been clearly set forth in the October 23, 2023 notice of violation and Wright was both given the opportunity to and did participate in the evidentiary hearing, ultimately admitting that he had violated the terms of his work-release placement. Moreover, these additional arguments are arguably waived as Wright does not appear to have raised them in his Appellant's brief. See James v. State, 716 N.E.2d 935, 940 n.5 (Ind. 1999) ("Issues raised for the first time in a reply brief are not available for appellate review.").
II. The Trial Court did Not Abuse its Discretion in Revoking Wright's Community-Corrections Placement and Suspended Sentence
[¶13] Wright also contends that the trial court "abused its discretion in revoking [his] community[-]corrections placement in both cases and remanding him to serve his entire executed sentence in the [DOC]." Appellant's Br. p. 13. "Placement in community corrections is at the sole discretion of the trial court." Sullivan v. State, 56 N.E.3d 1157, 1160 (Ind.Ct.App. 2016). Following a violation, the State may request that the court revoke the placement and commit the person to the DOC for the remainder of the person's sentence. Ind. Code § 35-38-2.6-5. Revocation of a community-corrections placement is a two-step process. Sullivan, 56 N.E.3d at 1160 . "First, the trial court must make a factual determination that a violation of a condition of [placement] actually occurred." Id. "Then, if a violation is proven, the trial court must determine if the violation warrants revocation" of the defendant's placement. Id. "[V]iolation of a single condition of placement is sufficient to revoke placement." Treece v. State, 10 N.E.3d 52, 60 (Ind.Ct.App. 2014), trans. denied.
[¶14] Again, Wright was sentenced under Cause No. F3-15 to four years in community corrections. He was sentenced under Cause No. F2-23 to ten years in community corrections and an additional six years were suspended to probation. Wright admitted that he had violated the terms of his placement "by being out of place" on both October 11, and October 17, 2023, "for a total of [twenty-five] hours and [forty-five] minutes unaccounted for outside the facility." Tr. Vol. II p. 22. The trial court accepted Wright's admission and found that Wright had violated the terms of his community-corrections placement in both Cause Nos. F3-15 and F2-23.
[¶15] Wright argues that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his community-corrections placement and ordering him to serve the remainder of his sentence in the DOC, claiming that he had accepted responsibility and was remorseful for his actions. We disagree. The trial court noted that it had sentenced Wright to community corrections and probation over the objection of the State, which had "argued vehemently that [Wright] should go to the DOC." Tr. Vol. II p. 32. It speaks poorly of Wright's willingness or ability to comply with the terms of a conditional community-corrections placement that he chose to breach the trial court's award of leniency by violating the conditions of his placement on two separate occasions.
[¶16] Wright also has an extensive criminal history, including more than twenty misdemeanor convictions and at least seven felony convictions. In addition, prior attempts at leniency have failed as he has previously been found to have violated the terms of his parole, probation, home detention, and supervised release. He is also considered a high risk to reoffend. In light of his criminal history and his violations at issue in this case, the HCWR indicated during the evidentiary hearing that Wright was no longer a viable candidate for the program. Based on the record before us, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking Wright's community-corrections placement and ordering him to serve the remainder of his sentence in the DOC.
[¶17] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Crone, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.