No. 05-03-01082-CR
Opinion issued December 3, 2004. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.
On Appeal from the 195th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F-0253279-LN. Affirmed.
Before Justices WRIGHT, RICHTER, and MAZZANT.
Opinion By Justice MAZZANT.
Willie Lloyd Wright appeals his conviction for unlawful placement of a serial number with intent to change identity. Appellant pleaded true to two enhancement paragraphs, and the court assessed punishment at seventy-five years' confinement. In three issues, appellant argues the court erred in denying his motion to suppress and the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the conviction. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Background
Auto theft division detective W.J. Skinner received an anonymous tip that appellant had two stolen vehicles on his property-a white Cadillac with a blue top and a white Suburban. Skinner and his partner, Detective Nails, went to appellant's home, saw two cars matching the descriptions, and set up surveillance. Shortly thereafter, appellant came out of the house and drove away in the Cadillac. Skinner and Nails followed appellant to a convenience store about one block away. When appellant stopped in the convenience store parking lot, he stopped and opened his door. Skinner noticed the Nader sticker had been removed which was a violation of the law. Appellant went into the store, and when he came back out, Skinner and Nails approached him. Based on the Nader sticker violation, Skinner and Nails detained appellant to find out if the car had been stolen. The car appellant was in was a 1988 white Cadillac with a blue top. The vehicle identification number (VIN) plate on a car can normally be found attached to the dashboard of the car on the driver's side, viewable through the front windshield. Skinner looked though appellant's windshield to see the VIN plate on the car appellant was driving, and he noticed the VIN plate was attached with glue. This indicated to Skinner the VIN plate was false because "no VIN plates are attached with glue"; VIN plates are attached with rivets. Skinner next tried to determine the true VIN for the vehicle. He found the true VIN located in a confidential area on the car as well as the motor number. Those numbers were not the same as the number on the VIN plate glued to the dashboard. Skinner ran the true VIN and determined the car had been stolen. Skinner arrested appellant for driving a stolen car. After being arrested, appellant gave Skinner and Nails an auction sales receipt. The sales receipt contained a VIN that was the same as that on the VIN plate glued to appellant's dashboard. Skinner also had a vehicle information form from the Dallas City Pound that likewise reflected the same number. Both the sales receipt and the form from the pound referenced a 1988 gold Cadillac and showed that appellant had purchased the gold Cadillac for $150 in April 2002. Based on the price and the "salvage" notation on the receipt, Skinner said the car would have been in poor condition. He later agreed that not all cars that are "salvage" are in poor condition. However, Skinner said the white Cadillac had never been painted gold. Also after the arrest, Skinner and Nails obtained a search warrant for appellant's house. There they found a white Suburban that had been stolen. A false plate had been glued where the original VIN plate should have been. Skinner found three trailers with removed VINs and a stolen four-wheeler without its VIN. Kathryn Leon testified she previously owned a 1988 white Cadillac with a blue roof. Just before her car was stolen, she had spent about $10,000 "redoing the whole car." She presented an insurance statement reflecting the VIN for her car; that VIN matched the true VIN of the white Cadillac appellant was found driving. Motion to Suppress
In his first issue, appellant contends the court erred by denying his motion to suppress. He argues the police officer lacked probable cause to arrest. Appellant contends that because appellant presented documentation showing he had purchased a 1988 Cadillac at an auction, Skinner would have lacked probable cause to believe appellant changed the VIN himself. When reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we give deference to the trial court's determination of any historical facts and review de novo the application of the law of search and seizure. See Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997). Probable cause for arrest exists when the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge at the time of the arrest and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient to warrant a prudent person's belief that a particular individual had committed or was committing an offense. See Amores v. State, 816 S.W.2d 407, 413 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991). An officer may arrest a suspect for an offense committed within his presence. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 14.01 (Vernon 1977). It is not necessary, however, that the officer be certain that the offense was committed as long as he has reasonably trustworthy information to warrant a prudent person in believing that the suspect has committed the offense. See Beverly v. State, 792 S.W.2d 103, 105 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990) The record shows that Officer Skinner had received an anonymous tip that appellant possessed two stolen cars at his house-both vehicles having been described by make and color — and that the VIN plates had been switched. Skinner confirmed that both cars described by the anonymous caller were at appellant's residence. Skinner then followed appellant to determine if the tip the cars were stolen had validity, and in doing so, Skinner observed that the Nader sticker was missing. Skinner testified that removing a Nader sticker, a place where the VIN is located on a car, is a violation of the law. Further, Skinner saw the glued-on VIN plate on the dashboard, and discovered the true VIN of the car did not match that on the plate on the dashboard. In his brief, appellant does not contest the car was stolen. He also does not contest appellant was driving the car. These facts and tampering with the identification on the Nader sticker were the reasons for appellant's arrest articulated by Skinner during the motion to suppress hearing. Further, although penal code § 31.11 allows an owner to remove the Nader sticker, that is but an affirmative defense to prosecution. We conclude the facts and circumstances within Skinner's knowledge at the time of the arrest were sufficient to warrant a prudent person's belief that appellant had committed an offense. See Amores, 816 S.W.2d at 413; see also Brown v. State, 986 S.W.2d 50, 54 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1999, no pet.) ("NCIC information [that the car defendant was driving was stolen] available to the officers here established probable cause for the warrantless arrest."). We resolve appellant's first issue against him. Legal and Factual Sufficiency
In his second and third issues, Appellant argues the evidence is both legally and factually insufficient. Appellant contends the State presented no evidence that appellant himself placed the false VIN plate on the white Cadillac's dashboard "with intent to change the identity of the vehicle." We disagree. When we review evidence to determine if it was legally sufficient to support a verdict, we view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, asking whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Sanders v. State, 119 S.W.3d 818, 820 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003). The factual sufficiency standard for guilt requires us to ask, viewing all the evidence in a neutral light, whether the evidence of the appellant's guilt, taken alone, is too weak to support the finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, or the evidence contrary to the verdict is so strong that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard could not have been met. Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477, 484-85 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004). Under either review, the fact finder is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of witness testimony. Jones v. State, 944 S.W.2d 642, 647, 648 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). Under the transportation code, a person commits an offense if he places a serial number on a vehicle with the intent of changing the identity of the vehicle. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 501.151(a) (Vernon 1999). Thus, the statute requires that appellant acted with the specific intent to change the identity of the vehicle. A person acts intentionally with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 6.03(a) (Vernon 2003). Intent may be proved by circumstantial evidence, and it may be inferred from the acts, words, and conduct of the accused. See Manrique v. State, 994 S.W.2d 640, 649 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999). Appellant was found driving a stolen vehicle. That car previously had about $10,000 worth of work completed on it. The auction sales receipt showed appellant paid only $150 for the car he bought and that it was a "salvage" car. Further, the car appellant was driving was white, and the sales receipt showed appellant had purchased a gold car. The white car had never been painted gold. The white car had the gold car's VIN plate glued to its dashboard. Further, Skinner found additional property at appellant's residence that had VIN plates removed or the VIN information obliterated. We conclude this is both legally and factually sufficient circumstantial evidence for the jury to have found appellant placed the gold car's serial number on the stolen white car in order to change its identity. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude the trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Sanders, 119 S.W.3d at 820. Also, viewing all the evidence in a neutral light, we conclude the evidence of appellant's guilt is not too weak to support the finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; likewise, we conclude the evidence contrary to the verdict is not so strong that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard could not have been met. See Zuniga, 144 S.W.3d at 484-85. We resolve appellant's second and third issues against him. We affirm the trial court's judgment.