Opinion
No. 4-028 / 03-0496
Filed February 27, 2004
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Scott D. Rosenberg, Judge.
G. Alan Wright appeals from the district court's ruling on judicial review reversing an industrial disability award. REVERSED.
Jacob Peters of Peters Law Firm, P.C., Council Bluffs, for appellant.
Kerrie Plummer of Gonzalez, Saggio Harlan, L.L.P., West Des Moines, for appellee.
Considered by Zimmer, P.J., and Miller and Hecht, JJ.
G. Alan Wright appeals from the district court's ruling on judicial review reversing an industrial disability award. We reverse.
I. Procedural History.
In an arbitration decision filed on June 21, 2000, the Iowa Workers' Compensation Commissioner found Wright suffered a fifteen percent industrial disability as a result of a compression fracture of his L-3 vertebra when he fell while working at a construction site. The disability was based, in part, on an agency finding that the injury made it impossible for Wright to perform the physically demanding functions of a journeyman electrician and therefore caused a "loss of access to the job market." Wright's employer, Mid-American Energy, sought judicial review.
The district court filed a ruling on judicial review on February 5, 2001, reversing the agency's decision. The ruling noted that Wright had not performed the heavy work of a journeyman electrician for more than thirteen years and concluded the agency had "incorrectly determined that [Wright] was entitled to industrial disability based upon his `inability to return to work for which he has prior training and experience.'" In reaching this conclusion, the district court was influenced by "uncontroverted evidence . . . that [Wright's] work related injury has not affected his ability to perform his duties as a design technician." The district court's ruling directed the agency "to determine whether [Wright] has sustained an industrial disability that has affected [his] ability to be gainfully employed in the job market, not simply examining [his] ability to be gainfully employed as a journeyman electrician."
On appeal, this court affirmed the district court's ruling. We agreed "with the trial court's determination that a more comprehensive assessment of Wright's employment history and future earning capacity [was] necessary." Wright's application for further review was denied by our supreme court.
Mid-American Energy v. Wright, No. 01-0312 (Iowa Ct. App. May 15, 2002).
In his remand decision, the Interim Workers' Compensation Commissioner reviewed the record and found Wright sustained a ten percent industrial disability as a result of the subject injury. The commissioner reasoned that although the injury did not result in a rating of permanent physical impairment or cause Wright to lose earnings in his present occupation, the claimant had proved a loss of earning capacity in this case. Although Wright had not been employed as a journeyman electrician since 1983, the commissioner was persuaded that residual physical symptoms caused by the vertebral fracture "make him unable to return to the full range of work performed by a journeyman electrician" and "will similarly impact [Wright] in any other occupation that involves similar physical activity." The commissioner provided the following explanation of why the work-related restriction of Wright's access to the labor market as a journeyman electrician was probative of a loss of earning capacity:
Mr. Trier was subsequently appointed and now serves as Iowa's Workers' Compensation Commissioner.
[Wright] has not been employed as a journeyman electrician since 1983. He has been a design technician, a position with higher pay and lesser physical demands than a journeyman electrician. It is a specialized position, however, that exists with much less frequency in the job market than journeyman electrician. While his job presently appears relatively secure, there is little true job security in the general job market. Many employees are employed at will. It is commonplace for a company to merge, reorganize, lay off employees, or go out of business. When that happens it is not uncommon for an employee to be compelled to re-enter the workforce, often in a less desirable position, often in a type of work that the person has not performed for many years. The fact that a person is qualified for a particular type of work does not mean that a position is available or that the person will be hired. While it is certain the claimant would not voluntarily choose to return to being a journeyman electrician rather than design technician, that choice could readily be forced upon him by circumstances beyond his control with little notice. Even if he remains with his current employer and retires, it is not uncommon for a retired person to be compelled to reenter the workforce. There is no assurance that claimant would be able to become re-employed as a design technician. The residuals from the injury do not impact claimant in his current job but they would adversely impact his employability and earning capacity in other jobs that have physical demands greater than those of a design technician or comparable to those of a journeyman electrician. Claimant would clearly be disadvantaged in seeking work in a competitive environment due to his loss of access to the other type of work for which he is shown to be qualified and experienced, work as a journeyman electrician.
The commissioner acknowledged that if the agency were to consider only the impact of the injury on Wright's ability to perform his current job, no loss of earning capacity would be established in this case. However, the commissioner noted that the applicable legal standard required the agency to consider the impact of the injury on Wright's access to "the job market as a whole."
Mid-American again sought judicial review, and the district court reversed the agency's remand decision in a ruling on judicial review filed February 26, 2003. The court concluded that the evidence in this case was insufficient to support a finding of industrial disability and remanded the case to the agency with an instruction to "enter a finding of zero percent (0%) industrial disability on the part of Wright." The district court posited that its decision to reverse the agency's remand decision was supported by certain language included in the opinion filed by this court in the previous appeal. Wright again appeals.
As noted above, the previous decision of this court agreed "with the trial court's determination that a more comprehensive assessment of Wright's employment history and future earning capacity [was] necessary." Other language in this court's earlier opinion observed that "[a] comparison between Wright's potential earning capacity prior to the accident and his earning potential after the accident reveals no change."
II. Scope and Standards of Review.
Our review of a final decision of the workers' compensation commissioner, like that of the district court, is for correction of errors of law. Second Injury Fund of Iowa v. Shank, 516 N.W.2d 808, 812 (Iowa 1994). In determining whether the district court erred in exercising its power of judicial review, we apply the standards of Iowa Code section 17A.19(8) (2001) to the agency action to determine whether our conclusions are the same as those of the district court. Williamson v. Wellman Fansteel, 595 N.W.2d 803, 806 (Iowa 1999); E.N.T. Assocs. v. Collentine, 525 N.W.2d 827, 829 (Iowa 1994). The agency's findings are akin to a jury verdict, and we broadly apply them to uphold the decision. Shank, 516 N.W.2d at 812.
We may reverse, modify, or remand to the commissioner for further proceedings if that agency's action was affected by an error of law, or if it is not supported by substantial evidence when the record is viewed as a whole. Quaker Oats Co. v. Ciha, 552 N.W.2d 143, 150 (Iowa 1996). Evidence is substantial if a reasonable mind would find it adequate to reach the same findings. Murillo v. Blackhawk Foundry, 571 N.W.2d 16, 17 (Iowa 1997). The commissioner's decision does not lack substantial evidential support merely because inconsistent conclusions could be drawn from the same evidence. Id. The ultimate question is not whether the evidence supports a different finding, but whether it supports the finding the commissioner actually made. Id. III. Merits.
The adjudication of an industrial disability claim requires a determination of whether an injury diminished the claimant's earning capacity. Thilges v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 528 N.W.2d 614, 616 (Iowa 1995). Although changes in actual earnings are probative of a loss of earning capacity, the question of whether claimant's earnings in a particular position or occupation have decreased as a result of an injury is not dispositive. The focus of the industrial disability analysis is instead upon whether the injury has diminished the claimant's ability to be gainfully employed and earn in the competitive job market. Second Injury Fund of Iowa v. Nelson, 544 N.W.2d 258, 266 (Iowa 1995).
If it had been Wright's burden in this case to prove his ability to earn as a design technician or supervisor decreased as a result of the injury, we would affirm the district court's decision. Wright's ability to earn wages in his current position or occupation was clearly not diminished by the injury. Although relevant to industrial disability, Wright's earnings since the injury are not dispositive of his industrial disability claim. We conclude the agency's thoughtful analysis of Wright's loss of labor market access is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the district court erred in substituting its judgment for that of the agency on the industrial disability issue in this case.
We note that the district court's ruling quotes certain language in the Court of Appeals' previous decision in this case as a justification for finding insubstantial the evidence supporting the agency's industrial disability determination. In particular, the district court focused upon our suggestion that "[a] comparison between Wright's potential earning capacity prior to the accident and his earning potential after the accident reveals no change." We conclude the district court misapprehended the meaning of our words. Our reference to Wright's "earning potential after the accident" adverted to his ability to earn in his post-injury employment with Mid-American. We did not intend to communicate with those words a conclusion that Wright's industrial disability claim must fail on this record as a matter of law. Indeed, our previous decision affirmed that the decision on industrial disability was for the agency when we agreed with the district court's first ruling on judicial review in which it concluded "a more comprehensive assessment of Wright's employment history and future earning capacity [was] necessary." The agency followed the court's remand instructions and undertook the reassessment of the evidence. The commissioner properly drew uponprior experience as well as general and specialized knowledge to make a finding of ten percent industrial disability. This determination of fact was clearly vested in him by Iowa Code Chapter 85 and was supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the district court.
See Iowa Code § 17A.14(5) ("The agency's experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge may be utilized in the evaluation of the evidence.").
Wright urges this court to "set aside the Ruling of the trial court and [reinstate] the original award of fifteen percent." This, of course, we have no authority to do. The original award of fifteen percent was reversed by the district court whose decision became the law of the case when this court affirmed it and further review was not granted by our supreme court. The agency, not this court, has authority to make factual determinations essential to the adjudication of industrial disability claims.