Opinion
CV417-195
10-24-2023
TAVON R. WRIGHT, Plaintiff, v. KEVIN FIKES Defendant.
ORDER
CHRISTOPHER L. RAY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The Court entered a default judgment in favor of pro se plaintiff Tavon R. Wright against defendant Kevin Fikes in the amount of $40,251.00. Doc. 27. Wright seeks a “writ of execution to garnish the wages of Defendant Kevin E. Fikes until all of the $40,251 dollar judgment has been relieved.” Doc. 30. He states that Fikes “works for GA Port Authority of Savannah as a port officer.” Id. at 1.
As this Court has explained before, doc. 29 at 1-2, a money judgment is enforced in a federal court by means of a writ of execution, unless the court directs otherwise. Fed.R.Civ.P. 69(a)(1). This process is governed by Rule 69(a)(1), which provides, in relevant part, that “[t]he procedure on execution-and in proceedings supplementary to and in aid of judgment or execution-must accord with the procedure of the state where the court is located, but a federal statute governs to the extent it applies.” Id. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 64 provides that a judgment-creditor has access to “every remedy . . . available . . . under the law of [Georgia] . . . for seizing . . . property to secure satisfaction of the . . . judgment.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 64(a). This specifically includes garnishment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 64(b).
Accordingly, Georgia law applies in executing this Court's judgment and in garnishment proceedings, to the extent it does not conflict with federal law. Cf. Zelaya/Capital Int'l Judgment, LLC v. Zelaya, 769 F.3d 1296 (11th Cir. 2014) (applying Florida garnishment law to case originating in Florida district court). Georgia law sets out a process by which a plaintiff with a money judgment may institute garnishment proceedings. See O.C.G.A. § 18-4-1, et seq. It requires a formal affidavit, see O.C.G.A. § 18-4-3, and mandates specific information that must be included on a summons of garnishment, see O.C.G.A. § 18-4-7. Wright has not formally complied with the affidavit requirement, and although he provides some of the necessary information, he does not provide all of it. See doc. 30. Last time, the Court afforded Plaintiff an opportunity to cure the defects in his filing by conducting post-judgment discovery to discover the information necessary to proceed. See doc. 29. This time, such an opportunity would be futile.
Plaintiff identifies Fikes' employer as the “GA Port Authority of Savannah.” See doc. 30 at 1. This Court has explicitly found that “Georgia Ports Authority is entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution.” Misener Marine Const., Inc. v. Norfolk Dredging Co., 2008 WL 2278132, at *8 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 28, 2008). The Eleventh Amendment protects states and “arms of the state” from being sued in federal court. Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir.2003) (citing Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977)). The Eleventh Circuit has determined that garnishment actions against Georgia state agencies are barred by this immunity. Cassady v. Hall, 892 F.3d 1150, 1153 (11th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he motion [for garnishment] falls within the Eleventh Amendment's embrace.”). Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to grant Plaintiff's motion for garnishment against the Georgia Ports Authority. Id. at 1155. As the Eleventh Circuit instructed in Cassady, if Plaintiff “is entitled to a lien of garnishment, [he] must file an action in a Georgia court.” Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 18-4-26).
Because this Court lacks jurisdiction to grant it, Plaintiff's Motion for Writ of Garnishment is DENIED. Doc. 30.
SO ORDERED.