Opinion
CIVIL 3:22-CV-2079
04-09-2024
ADOLPH WRIGHT, Plaintiff v. ELITE REVENUE SOLUTIONS, LLC, et al., Defendants.
Mariani, Judge.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Martin C. Carlson, United States Magistrate Judge
I. Factual Background
This case comes before us for a legally mandated screening review of the plaintiff's second amended complaint. (Doc. 16). In this, his third effort at filing a pro se, in forma pauperis complaint, tthe plaintiff has filed a prolix but largely incomprehensible complaint against a private company and its employees, Luzerne County, as well as various county agencies and officials. (Id.) While the precise meaning of the complaint is unclear despite its unwieldly length, it seems that the plaintiff seeks to use this federal forum to challenge rulings made in a state litigation relating to a court-ordered tax sale of a farm, something that the plaintiff simply cannot do. Upon consideration of this second amended complaint, for the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that this case be dismissed.
II. Discussion
A. Screening of Pro Se Complaints-Standard of Review
This court has an ongoing statutory obligation to conduct a preliminary review of pro se complaints brought by plaintiffs given leave to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Specifically, we are obliged to review the complaint to determine whether any claims are frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. This statutory text mirrors the language of Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that a complaint should be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
With respect to this benchmark standard for the legal sufficiency of a complaint, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has aptly noted the evolving standards governing pleading practice in federal court, stating that:
Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court's opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), continuing with our opinion in Phillips [v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008)], and culminating recently with the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, -U.S.-, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009), pleading standards have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).
In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, Inc., 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court “need not credit a complaint's bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss.” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally, a court need not “assume that a . . . plaintiff can prove facts that the . . . plaintiff has not alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), in order to state a valid cause of action, a plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of actions will not do.” Id., at 555. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id.
In keeping with the principles of Twombly, the Supreme Court has underscored that a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon which relief can be granted when ruling on a motion to dismiss. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court held that, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court should “begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id., at 679.
According to the Supreme Court, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id., at 678. Rather, in conducting a review of the adequacy of a complaint, the Supreme Court has advised trial courts that they must:
[B]egin by identifying pleadings that because they are no more than conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.Id., at 679.
Thus, following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions; it must recite factual allegations sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated:
[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts.Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.
As the Court of Appeals has observed:
The Supreme Court in Twombly set forth the “plausibility” standard for overcoming a motion to dismiss and refined this approach in Iqbal. The plausibility standard requires the complaint to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. A complaint satisfies the plausibility standard when the factual pleadings “allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). This standard requires showing “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. A complaint which pleads facts “merely consistent with” a defendant's liability, [ ] “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement of relief.' ”Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 1861 (2012).
In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a three-step analysis:
First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id., at 1950. Finally, “where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.”Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950).
In considering a motion to dismiss, the court generally relies on the complaint, attached exhibits, and matters of public record. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007). The court may also consider “undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the [attached] documents.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Moreover, “documents whose contents are alleged in the complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleading, may be considered.” Pryor v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002); see also U.S. Express Lines, Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 382, 388 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that “[a]lthough a district court may not consider matters extraneous to the pleadings, a document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint may be considered without converting the motion to dismiss in one for summary judgment”). However, the court may not rely on other parts of the record in determining a motion to dismiss, or when determining whether a proposed amended complaint is futile because it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994).
In addition to these pleading rules, a civil complaint must comply with the requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure which defines what a complaint should say and provides that:
(a) A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional support; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
Thus, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions. Rather, a pro se plaintiff's complaint must recite factual allegations which are sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation, set forth in a “short and plain” statement of a cause of action. It is against these benchmarks that we evaluate Wright's second amended complaint.
B. The Complaint Should be Dismissed.
In our view, this complaint is fatally flawed in the following fundamental respects.
1. The Complaint Violates Rule 8
At the outset, dismissal of this second amended complaint is warranted because the complaint plainly still fails to comply with Rule 8's basic injunction that, “[a] pleading that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” It is well-settled that: A[t]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint contain 'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), and that each averment be 'concise, and direct, Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(e)(1).” Scibelli v. Lebanon County, 219 F.Appx 221, 222 (3d Cir. 2007). Thus, when a complaint is “illegible or incomprehensible”, id., or when a complaint “is not only of an unwieldy length, but it is also largely unintelligible”, Stephanatos v. Cohen, 236 F.Appx 785, 787 (3d Cir. 2007), an order dismissing a complaint under Rule 8 is clearly appropriate. See, e.g., Mincy v. Klem, 303 F.Appx 106 (3d Cir. 2008); Rhett v. New Jersey State Superior Court, 260 F.Appx 513 (3d Cir. 2008); Stephanatos, 236 F.Appx at 787; Scibelli, 219 F.Appx at 222; Bennett-Nelson v. La. Bd. of Regents, 431 F.3d 448, 450 n. 1 (5th Cir. 2005).
Dismissal under Rule 8 is also proper when a complaint Aleft the defendants having to guess what of the many things discussed constituted [a cause of action],” Binsack v. Lackawanna County Prison, 438 F. Appx 158 (3d Cir. 2011), or when the complaint is so “rambling and unclear” as to defy response. Tillio v. Spiess, 441 F.Appx 109 (3d Cir. 2011). Similarly, dismissal is appropriate in Athose cases in which the complaint is so confused, ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.” Id. at 110 (quoting Simmons v. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 86 (2d Cir. 1995)) (quotations omitted); see also Tillio v. Northland Grp. Inc., 456 Fed.Appx. 78, 79 (3d Cir. 2012). Further, a complaint may be dismissed under Rule 8 when the pleading is simply illegible and cannot be understood. See, e.g., Radin v. Jersey City Medical Center, 375 F. Appx 205 (3d Cir. 2010); Moss v. United States, 329 Fed.Appx. 335 (3d Cir. 2009) (dismissing illegible complaint); Earnest v. Ling, 140 F. Appx 431 (3d Cir. 2005) (dismissing complaint where “complaint fails to clearly identify which parties [the plaintiff] seeks to sue”); Oneal v. U.S. Fed. Prob., CIV.A. 05-5509 (MLC), 2006 WL 758301 (D.N.J. Mar. 22, 2006) (dismissing complaint consisting of approximately 50 pages of mostly-illegible handwriting); Gearhart v. City of Philadelphia Police, CIV.A.06-0130, 2006 WL 446071 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 21, 2006) (dismissing illegible complaint).
Rule 8 also calls for the dismissal of complaints which contain no intelligible prayer of relief. In this regard, it is well-settled that:
[I]n order to satisfy the strictures of Rule 8, a complaint must also contain a coherent prayer for relief, demanding relief from a defendant that lies within the power of the defendant to provide. See Klein v. Pike Cnty. Comm'rs, CIV.A. 11-278, 2011 WL 6097734 (M.D.Pa. Dec.6, 2011) (failure to articulate a prayer for relief compels dismissal); Snyder v. Snyder, 4:12-CV-105, 2012 WL 512003 (M.D.Pa. Jan.24, 2012) report and recommendation adopted, 4:12-CV-105, 2012 WL 511993 (M.D.Pa. Feb.15, 2012) (same).Robertson v. Samuels, No. 3:CV-14-097, 2014 WL 793107, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 26, 2014).
These principles apply here and compel the dismissal of this complaint in its current form since the complaint, while voluminous, leaves “defendants having to guess what of the many things discussed constituted [a cause of action].” Binsack v. Lackawanna County Prison, 438 F. Appx 158 (3d Cir. 2011). Therefore Rule 8 compels dismissal of the complaint in its entirety.
2. The Plaintiff May Not Use this Forum to Collaterally Attack State Court Proceedings.
Further, while the precise meaning of this complaint is unclear, it seems that this matter arises out of state court proceedings relating to the tax sale of a property. Thus, the plaintiff is proceeding to federal court, advancing claims which necessarily invite us to review, re-examine, and reject state court rulings in this prior state case.
This we cannot do. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has spoken to this issue and has announced a rule, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which compels federal district courts to decline invitations to conduct what amounts to appellate review of state trial court decisions. As described by the Third Circuit:
That doctrine takes its name from the two Supreme Court cases that gave rise to the doctrine. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983). The doctrine is derived from 28 U.S.C. § 1257 which states that “[f]inal judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a state in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court....”. See also Desi's Pizza, Inc. v. City of Wilkes Barre, 321 F.3d 411, 419 (3d Cir.2003). “Since Congress has never conferred a similar power of review on the United States District Courts, the Supreme Court has inferred that Congress did not intend to empower District Courts to review state court decisions.” Desi's Pizza, 321 F.3d at 419.Gary v. Braddock Cemetery, 517 F.3d 195, 200 (3d Cir. 2008).
Because federal district courts are not empowered by law to sit as reviewing courts, reexamining state court decisions, “[t]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives a federal district court of jurisdiction in some circumstances to review a state court adjudication.” Turner v. Crawford Square Apartments III, LLP., 449 F.3d 542, 547 (3d Cir. 2006). Cases construing this jurisdictional limit on the power of federal courts have quite appropriately:
[E]mphasized the narrow scope of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, holding that it “is confined to cases of the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” [Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp.], 544 U.S. at 284, 125 S.Ct. at 1521-22; see also Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, -, 126 S.Ct. 1198, 1201, 163 L.Ed.2d 1059 (2006).Id.
However, even within these narrowly drawn confines, it has been consistently recognized that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents federal judges from considering lawsuits brought by state court losers complaining of injuries caused by state court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments, particularly where those lawsuits necessarily require us to re-examine state rulings in cases involving property sales. See, e.g., Cuevas v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 643 Fed.Appx. 124, 126 (3d Cir. 2016); Moncrief v. Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp., 275 F.Appx 149 (3d Cir. 2008) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes re-litigation of state mortgage foreclosure in federal court); Ayres-Fountain v. Eastern Savings Bank, 153 F.Appx 91 (3d Cir. 2005) (same); In re Knapper, 407 F.3d 5773 (3d Cir. 2005) (same); Downey v. Perrault, No. 09-1018, 2009 WL 3030051 (D.N.J. Sept. 15, 2009) (same); Easley v. New Century Mortgage Corp., No. 08-4283 (E.D. Pa. July 28, 2009) (same); Laychock v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, No. 07-4478, 2008 WL 2890962 (E.D. Pa. July 23, 2008) (same).
In sum, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, “to the extent that [plaintiff] complain[s] of injuries caused by the state court . . . judgment and invite[s] the Court to review it and reject it, subject matter jurisdiction [i]s lacking” and the complaint should be dismissed. Cuevas v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 643 Fed.Appx. 124, 126 (3d Cir. 2016).
3. The Actions of the State Courts Cannot be Legally Attributed to the County and Its Officials.
Further, the unspoken premise underlying these claims against Luzerne County appears to be the fact that the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County presided over this tax sale litigation. Wright errs if he believes that this litigation in state court in Luzerne County somehow creates civil liability for the county. Quite the contrary:
These state court agencies, . . ., are defined by statute as arms of the state courts, and are institutions of state government. See, e.g., Walters v. Washington County, No. 06-1355, 2009 WL 7936639 (W.D.Pa. March 23, 2009); Van Tassel v. Lawrence County Domestics Relations Section, No. 09-266, 2009 WL 3052411 (W.D.Pa. Sept.22, 2009). Therefore, individual counties cannot be held liable for the actions of state court judges, who are part of the unified state court system.
Since the courts are institutions of state government, this complaint further runs afoul of basic constitutional rules limiting lawsuits against state agencies and officials. As a matter of constitutional law, the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution provides that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the ... States ....“, U.S. Const. Amend XI. By its terms, the Eleventh Amendment strictly limits the power of federal courts to entertain cases brought by citizens against the state and state agencies. Moreover, a suit brought against an individual acting in his or her official capacity constitutes a suit against the state and, therefore, also is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989).
Pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment, states, state agencies and state officials who are sued in their official capacity are generally immune from lawsuits in federal courts brought against them by citizens. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996). The constitutional protections afforded to the states and the state court system under the Eleventh Amendment also expressly apply to the state agencies that are integral parts of Pennsylvania's unitary court system. These court officers and agencies enjoy immunity from lawsuit under the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Walters v. Washington County, No. 06-1355, 2009 WL 7936639 (W.D.Pa. March 23, 2009); Van Tassel v. Lawrence County Domestics Relations Section, No. 09-266, 2009 WL 3052411 (W.D.Pa. Sept.22, 2009). Absent an express waiver of the immunity established by the Eleventh Amendment, all of these agencies, and their employees who are sued in their official capacities, are absolutely immune from lawsuits in federal court.Rose v. York Cty., No. 1:13-CV-2056, 2013 WL 4456220, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 1, 2013), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:13-CV-2056, 2013 WL 4434748 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 16, 2013).
Simply put, one cannot sue a county in federal court for civil rights violations arising out of the conduct of litigation in the county court of common pleas, since the courts are a state agency, and not part of county government. Furthermore, the courts themselves are not subject to suit as an institutional defendant in federal court since the Eleventh Amendment forbids claims against state agencies.
4. Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Immunity Apply Here.
Further, any state judicial and quasi-judicial actors referred to in this pleading are entitled to immunity from liability for their roles in this litigation. As the Third Circuit explained when it rejected a similar attempt to impose individual liability upon judicial and quasi-judicial actors in state cases:
With regard to the defendant judges, judicial immunity extends to judicial officers, even if their actions were “in error, w[ere] done maliciously, or w[ere] in excess of [their] authority,” unless the officers acted in clear absence of all jurisdiction. Capogrosso v. Sup. Ct. of N.J., 588 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir.2009) (per curiam) (citations, quotations omitted). The complained-of acts were clearly performed by these defendants in their roles as judges, and the alleged procedural errors identified by Conklin do not abrogate judicial immunity. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359, 362, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978).Conklin v. Anthou, 495 Fed.Appx. 257, 263 (3d Cir. 2012). This immunity also extends to quasi-judicial actors who play a role in state proceedings. As the Third Circuit noted:
Our finding of immunity also extends to [the] Court Administrator ... and Sheriff. [The Court Administator] is attacked solely for actions taken in his role as Court Administrator. Therefore, he is entitled to the
protection of quasi-judicial immunity. See Gallas, 211 F.3d at 772-73; Kincaid v. Vail, 969 F.2d 594, 601 (7th Cir. 1992). [The sheriff], meanwhile, is attacked exclusively for his role in carrying out the sale of [the foreclosed property] because the sale was at the direction of a “facially valid court order,” he is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity from suit as well. Roland v. Phillips, 19 F.3d 552, 556 (11th Cir.1994) (emphasis added).Id. at 264.
Therefore, these defendants are immune from any form of civil liability and any claims lodged against them for their roles in this tax sale litigation should be dismissed.
5. The Plaintiff May Not Bring Federal Civil Rights Claims Against Private Actors.
Finally, this complaint names a private company and several of its employees as defendants. While the precise tenor of the claims against counsel is uncertain, to the extent that the plaintiff is endeavoring to bring civil rights claims against these private parties for their role in this litigation, those claims fail for a single, simple reason. Such claims require a showing of state action, and it is well-settled that participants in this type of litigation are not considered state actors. Conklin at 265. Therefore, these claims against private parties also fail as a matter of law and should be dismissed.
Thus, this screening merits analysis calls for dismissal of this action in its current form on multiple grounds. We are mindful of the fact that in civil rights cases pro se plaintiffs often should be afforded an opportunity to amend a complaint before the complaint is dismissed in its entirety, see Fletcher-Hardee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, 482 F.3d 247, 253 (3d Cir. 2007), unless granting further leave to amend is not necessary because amendment would be futile or result in undue delay. Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004). In this case, however, Wright has been given opportunities to amend his complaint, but to no avail. Rather, the flaws in this pleading are so persistent and profound that they cannot be corrected through any more artful form of pleading. Therefore, it is recommended that the complaint be dismissed with prejudice.
III. Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the plaintiff's second amended complaint, (Doc. 16), be DISMISSED.
The Parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.