Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-3403-11T3
04-12-2013
HELEN WOZNIAK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PAMELA THOMAS, Defendant-Respondent.
Ira Karasick, attorney for appellant. Respondent has not filed a brief.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Grall and Accurso.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Special Civil Part, Essex County, Docket No. LT-040684-11.
Ira Karasick, attorney for appellant.
Respondent has not filed a brief. PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Helen Wozniak appeals from the dismissal of her summary dispossess action for non-payment of rent based on an oral lease. Plaintiff was trying to evict defendant, her ex-daughter-in-law, from a single family home in which defendant had resided with her ex-husband, plaintiff's son, and their children. After brief testimony from defendant that she and her ex-husband "put money into the house," the judge dismissed the complaint without prejudice "for lack of jurisdiction and the complexity of issues." We conclude that the judge should have conducted a preliminary hearing to ascertain whether defendant was claiming an ownership interest in the property and the basis for any such claim. If after conducting that inquiry the court were to determine that the matter involved a disputed title or complex equitable issues requiring discovery, then the action should have been transferred to the Law Division pursuant to R. 1:13-4. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for such a hearing.
Because trial of the matter was truncated, the facts of the record are sketchy. Defendant was formerly married to plaintiff's son. Defendant testified that father and son built the house together. Defendant lived there with her ex-husband and children for eleven years. She admitted that they paid rent to plaintiff, "periodically, never on a consistent basis, just to help offset [expenses]." She further claimed that "[w]e were always led to believe that it was our home and we paid [ ] money." She testified that after her ex-husband moved out in December 2008, she remained in the house with the couple's children. After their separation, her husband agreed to pay $2000 a month in unallocated support which she used to pay plaintiff. Defendant testified that she stopped paying plaintiff when her ex-husband stopped paying his support. She argued that she owed no rent to plaintiff because she did not "have a lease or anything that says that I owe the landlord any money, it's a family home."
For her part, plaintiff acknowledged that there was no written lease, but attempted to introduce checks demonstrating that the couple paid rent of $2500 per month pursuant to an oral agreement. She claimed that defendant owed $10,000 in unpaid rent for the last four months of 2011. She admitted that her son and defendant put money into the house, stating "[t]hey wanted extra - everything extra." Plaintiff testified that it was because of their contribution that she charged them only $2000 per month, which was only enough to pay the annual taxes of $24,000. She claimed that for four of the eleven years they lived there "they didn't pay at all."
Plaintiff's counsel attempted to offer a transcript of an agreement made in the Family Part that defendant would receive $2000 per month in unallocated support that she would use to pay rent to plaintiff. Counsel also argued that defendant claimed no interest in the house in the couple's divorce, and that plaintiff should be allowed to probe any inconsistent claim on the record.
The judge reviewed the transcript of the Family Part proceeding and determined that it appeared as if defendant's obligation to pay plaintiff was contingent upon plaintiff's son paying his support. The court concluded that because defendant had contributed to construction of the house, coupled with the complexities of the Family Part matter, the case should not proceed as a summary action for possession but instead proceed as a "DC case."
A reference to a civil action in the Special Civil Part harkening back to the docket of the County District Courts was abolished in 1983 with the creation of the Special Civil Part.
On appeal, plaintiff contends that the judge's dismissal of the complaint left plaintiff with no avenue of relief, that the facts presented were not too complex for a summary dispossess action, and that the court erred in dismissing the complaint.
The summary dispossess statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:18-51 to -61, was designed to provide landlords with a quick remedy for possession. Carr v. Johnson, 211 N.J. Super. 341, 347 (App. Div. 1986). Because of the summary nature of the proceeding and absence of discovery "[t]he Legislature did not intend for the Special Civil Part (as successor to the County District Court) to determine disputed land titles and complex equitable issues in the context of a landlord-tenant dispossess action." Ibid. Accordingly, N.J.S.A. 2A:18-60 provides for the transfer of a summary dispossess action to the Law Division in the discretion of the court when "it deems [the matter] of sufficient importance."
Suggestions for the criteria for transfer were first offered in Morrocco v. Felton, 112 N.J. Super. 226, 235-36 (Law Div. 1970), and adopted by this court in Carr, supra, 211 N.J. Super. at 349. Included among the factors still relevant to current Special Civil Part practice, is the complexity of the issues presented and the need for discovery or other pretrial procedures not available in a summary dispossess action. Twp. of Bloomfield v. Rosanna's Figure Salon, Inc., 253 N.J. Super. 551, 562 (App. Div. 1992).
In general, a motion for transfer should be granted whenever the procedural limitations of a summary action (other than the unavailability of a jury trial) would significantly prejudice substantial interests either of the litigants or of the judicial system itself, and, because of the particular facts and circumstances of a specific case, those prejudicial effects would outweigh the prejudice that would result from any delay caused by the transfer.We have held that judges should act sua sponte to transfer appropriate cases, notwithstanding the parties' failure to make a motion for transfer pursuant to R. 6:4-1(g) and N.J.S.A. 2A:18-60. Carr, supra, 211 N.J. Super. at 349.
[Id. at 563.]
This may have been an appropriate case for transfer to the Law Division had defendant been able to establish a colorable claim to an ownership interest in the house. If, however, defendant had no real fee claim, and the only issue was the amount of rent due, then the matter would seem to be readily resolvable in the landlord/tenant action, even given the oral nature of the lease. See Franklin Tower One, L.L.C. v. N.M., 304 N.J. Super. 586, 592 (App. Div. 1997) (noting that residential tenants may be removed only for good cause whether the lease be oral or written), aff'd, 157 N.J. 602 (1999). We cannot say which course was appropriate because the judge terminated the proceedings too quickly, before ascertaining the real nature of defendant's defense to the claim of her failure to pay rent.
In order to determine whether the procedural limitations of a landlord/tenant action would significantly prejudice the rights of defendant, and whether that prejudice outweighed the prejudice to plaintiff resulting from any delay caused by transfer to the Law Division, the court needed more facts from the parties. Cf. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp. v. Hunt, 364 N.J. Super. 587, 595 (Law Div. 2003) (finding preliminary hearing necessary to determine the good faith of defendant's allegation that plaintiff lacked right to possession). Defendant had been living in the house for three years after she and plaintiff's son had separated. She admitted to paying some amount of rent during that period. Her divorce had become final during that time. Plaintiff asserted that defendant had claimed no interest in the house in the divorce. A preliminary inquiry into all those matters would have allowed the court to ascertain whether defendant had any colorable claim to an ownership interest in the property, and allowed it to weigh the parties' respective interests in determining whether transfer to the Law Division was necessary. Determining that the landlord/tenant court is without jurisdiction to hear a matter without this preliminary inquiry makes impossible the weighing Carr requires, and deprives plaintiffs of the quick remedy the statute promises.
In no event should the case have been dismissed in lieu of transfer. The purpose of R. 1:13-4 is to insure that cases are transferred to the proper court when a court has determined that the case has been filed in the wrong division. Belgacem v. Veneziano, 218 N.J. Super. 6, 9 (App. Div. 1986). "No action is to be dismissed merely because it has been brought in or transferred to the wrong division." O'Neill v. Vreeland, 6 N.J. 158, 169 (1951).
We disagree with plaintiff that the dismissal without prejudice left her with no avenue of relief because it "equated to a dispositive decision on the issue of whether the parties had a landlord-tenant relationship." A judgment entered in a summary eviction proceeding in the Special Civil Part has no preclusive effect in subsequent litigation. Twp. Of Bloomfield, supra, 253 N.J. Super. at 563. This, of course, was not a judgment but a dismissal without prejudice, which adjudicates nothing. Malhame v. Borough of Demarest, 174 N.J. Super. 28, 30-31 (App. Div. 1980).
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Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a preliminary hearing to ascertain whether defendant is claiming an ownership interest in the property and the basis for any such claim. If after conducting that inquiry, the court determines that defendant has such a colorable claim, or the matter involves complex equitable issues requiring discovery, then the action should be transferred to the appropriate Division pursuant to R. 1:13-4.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION