Opinion
No. C 00-1536 MJJ (PR)
November 26, 2002
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Petitioner filed this pro se habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in which he claimed that he was being illegally detained in federal prison because the Parole Commission had failed to grant him certain time credits. At the time he filed the petition, he was incarcerated in the Federal Correctional Institute in Dublin, California, and he has since been released. In response to the court's Order to Show Cause, respondent contends that the petition should be dismissed as moot because petitioner's sentence has expired. Petitioner has filed a traverse.
In 1984, petitioner was convicted in federal court of various drug charges and sentenced to five years in prison and two years on special parole. He was released for good time in April 1987, about sixteen months prior to the full term date. Shortly after his release, petitioner engaged in more criminal activity for which he was convicted and sentenced in state court. After release from state custody in January 1995, he was taken into federal custody to complete the sixteen months left on the full term of his 5-year federal sentence. He was released from federal custody in December 1995, with credit for good time, and began his two-year special parole term. On July 13, 1997, while on federal parole, petitioner was taken into state custody on a state parole violation. He remained in state custody until July 23, 1998, when he was arrested by the Federal Parole Commission for violating his federal parole. Federal authorities determined that petitioner would have to serve the two years of his special parole term, and the expiration date for petitioner's sentence was set for July 22, 2000. In October 1998, petitioner was released on parole, but because petitioner violated parole again, the Parole Commission issued an arrest warrant in January 1999. In April 1999, petitioner was taken into state custody for a state parole violation. When he was released from state custody on July 8, 1999, petitioner was arrested under the federal Parole Commission's arrest warrant and into federal arrested on this warrant. After determining that petitioner should be given credit for the approximately four months he spent in state custody between April and July 1999, petitioner was released from federal custody on July 3, 2000. The full term of his federal sentence has since expired.
The Federal Parole Commission had issued an arrest warrant in August 1997, prior to petitioner's completion of his two-year federal parole term.
In sum, there were two periods of time during which petitioner was placed in state custody on a state parole violation: between April and July 1999, and between July 1997 and July 1998. Petitioner was given credit on his federal sentence for the period between April and July 1999, and he argues that under Parole Commission guidelines he should have also been credited for the period July 1997 and July 1998.
Respondent argues that the petition is moot because petitioner has received the redress he seeks in this petition — he has been released from custody and his sentence has expired. The "case or controversy" provision in Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution requires that throughout the litigation, the complainant "must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision." Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990). In this petition, petitioner does not challenge the validity of his conviction, he only challenges the execution of his sentence — specifically that because the Parole Commission did not grant him additional time credits, his release from custody was improperly delayed. Where, as here, a petitioner does not challenged the validity of his conviction, but rather only seeks an earlier release date, the petition becomes moot when petitioner is released from custody. Fendler v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 846 F.2d 550, 555 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding that release of petitioner on parole mooted his petition seeking earlier release date on the grounds contending that Parole Commission had improperly delayed his release date); Brady v. United States Parole Comm., 600 F.2d 234, 236 (9th Cir. 1979) (same); see also Picron-Peron v. Rison, 930 F.2d 773, 775-76 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding petition seeking release from confinement by I.N.S. mooted by petitioner's release from custody). In this case, as in Fendler and Brady, the only redress petitioner seeks is release from custody, which has already occurred.
Where a habeas petition challenges the validity of his conviction and seeks its expungement, the petition is not mooted by the petitioner's release from custody because of the continuing collateral detriment of petitioner's having a conviction on his record. See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998). By contrast, this petition does not seek the expungement of petitioner's conviction, only an earlier release date. In any event, even if the continuing collateral consequences doctrine applied to petitioner's time-credits claims, which do not challenge his conviction, there are no asserted or apparent continuing collateral consequences from his delayed release date.
In his traverse, petitioner argues that the petition is not moot because the full term of his sentence did not expire on the date he was released from custody. According to petitioner, he was still subject to parole supervision until the full term of his sentence expired on October 19, 2000. The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument in Fendler, finding that continued parole supervision does not prevent a petition seeking release from custody from becoming moot once the petitioner is released.Fendler, 846 F.2d at 555. In any case, here the full term of petitioner's sentence has since expired and he is no longer subject to parole supervision. Petitioner also argues that his petition falls under the "voluntary cessation" and "capable of repetition yet evading review" exceptions to the mootness doctrine. For either of these exceptions to apply, there has to be a possibility that the wrong can recur. See Picron-Peron, 930 F.2d at 776; Fendler, 846 F.2d at 555; Brady, 600 F.2d at 236. Petitioner does not demonstrate "a probability that he will again be subjected to the parole system." Fendler, 846 F.2d at 555 (finding exceptions to mootness doctrine do not apply). More specifically, in this case the alleged wrong is that the Parole Commission improperly delayed his release date and the expiration of the full term of his sentence. There is no possibility that his release date or the expiration of this sentence can be delayed again because petitioner has already been released from custody, his sentence has expired, and he is no longer under parole supervision. See Brady, 600 F.2d at 236 (finding exceptions to mootness do not apply based on continued parole supervision beyond release date).
In light of petitioner's release from custody and the expiration of his sentence, his petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be DISMISSED as moot. In light of this dismissal, all pending motions are terminated.
The clerk shall close the file.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
0 Jury Verdict. This action came before the Court for a trial by jury. The issues have been tried and the jury has rendered its verdict.
(X) Decision by Court. This action came to trial or hearing before the Court. The issued have been tried or heard and a decision has been rendered.
IT IS SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED
The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is DENIED.