Opinion
Civil Action 22-CV-3757
10-20-2022
ROBERT WOOLFORD, Plaintiff, v. DETECTIVE THOMAS BARTOL, et al. Defendants.
ORDER
MICHAEL M. BAYLSON MICHAEL M. BAYLSON, J.
AND NOW, this 20th day of October, 2022, upon consideration of Robert Woolford's Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 1) and pro se Complaint (ECF No. 2), it is ORDERED that:
1. Leave to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
2. The Complaint is DEEMED filed.
3. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to amend the caption to add the “Commonwealth Attorney's Office of the County of Philadelphia” as a Defendant.
4. The Amended Complaint is DISMISSED IN PART WITH PREJUDICE and DISMISSED IN PART WITHOUT PREJUDICE for the reasons stated in the Court's Memorandum as follows:
a. The claims against Defendants the Philadelphia Police Department, the Philadelphia District Attorney's Office, the Assistant Commonwealth Attorney, the Commonwealth Attorney for Philadelphia County, and John Does 1-3 are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
b. The claims against Detective Thomas Bartol and the City of Philadelphia are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.5. Woolford may file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order in the event he can allege additional facts to state a plausible claim against the City of Philadelphia or Detective Thomas Bartol. Any amended complaint must identify all defendants in the caption of the amended complaint in addition to identifying them in the body of the amended complaint and shall state the basis for Woolford's claims against each defendant. The amended complaint shall be a complete document that does not rely on the initial Complaint or other papers filed in this case to state a claim. When drafting his amended complaint, Woolford should be mindful of the Court's reasons for dismissing his claims as explained in the Court's Memorandum. Any amended complaint should not reassert claims that have been dismissed with prejudice. Upon the filing of an amended complaint, the Clerk shall not make service until so ORDERED by the Court.
6. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to send Woolford a blank copy of this Court's current standard form to be used by a self-represented litigant filing a civil action bearing the above-captioned civil action number. Woolford may use this form to file his amended complaint if he chooses to do so.
This form is available on the Court's website at http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents2/forms/forms-pro-se.
7. If Woolford does not wish to amend his Complaint and instead intends to stand on his Complaint as originally pled, he may file a notice with the Court within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order stating that intent, at which time the Court will issue a final order dismissing the case. Any such notice should be titled “Notice to Stand on Complaint,” and shall include the civil action number for this case. See Weber v. McGrogan, 939 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2019) (“If the plaintiff does not desire to amend, he may file an appropriate notice with the district court asserting his intent to stand on the complaint, at which time an order to dismiss the action would be appropriate.” (quoting Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951 n.1 (3d Cir. 1976))); In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 703-04 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding “that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed with prejudice the otherwise viable claims . . . following plaintiffs' decision not to replead those claims” when the district court “expressly warned plaintiffs that failure to replead the remaining claims . . . would result in the dismissal of those claims”).
8. If Woolford fails to file any response to this Order, the Court will conclude that Woolford intends to stand on his Complaint and will issue a final order dismissing this case. See Weber, 939 F.3d at 239-40 (explaining that a plaintiff's intent to stand on his complaint may be inferred from inaction after issuance of an order directing him to take action to cure a defective complaint).
The six-factor test announced in Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984), is inapplicable to dismissal orders based on a plaintiff's intention to stand on her complaint. See Weber, 939 F.3d at 241 & n.11 (treating the “stand on the complaint” doctrine as distinct from dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to comply with a court order, which require assessment of the Poulis factors); see also Elansari v. Altria, 799 Fed.Appx. 107, 108 n.1 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam). Indeed, an analysis under Poulis is not required when a plaintiff willfully abandons the case or makes adjudication impossible, as would be the case when a plaintiff opts not to amend her complaint, leaving the case without an operative pleading. See Dickens v. Danberg, 700 Fed.Appx. 116, 118 (3d Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (“Where a plaintiff's conduct clearly indicates that he willfully intends to abandon the case, or where the plaintiff's behavior is so contumacious as to make adjudication of the case impossible, a balancing of the Poulis factors is not necessary.”); Baker v. Accounts Receivables Mgmt., Inc., 292 F.R.D. 171, 175 (D.N.J. 2013) (“[T]he Court need not engage in an analysis of the six Poulis factors in cases where a party willfully abandons her case or otherwise makes adjudication of the matter impossible.” (citing cases)).