Opinion
7:21-CV-216-M
03-24-2022
WILLIAM D. WOOLENS, Plaintiff, v. CHARLENE D. RUCKLE/CLIBORNE, Defendant.
ORDER AND MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
ROBERTS B. JONES UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This matter is before the court on Plaintiffs' application to proceed in forma pauperis [DE-1] and for frivolity review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Plaintiff has demonstrated appropriate evidence of inability to pay the required court costs, and the application to proceed in forma pauperis is allowed. However, it is recommended that the complaint be dismissed for failure to state a claim and lack of jurisdiction.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court shall dismiss the complaint if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks money damages from a defendant immune from such recovery. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i-iii); see Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1994) (explaining Congress enacted predecessor statute 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) “to prevent abuse of the judicial system by parties who bear none of the ordinary financial disincentives to filing meritless claims”). A case is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); McLean v. United States, 566 F.3d 391, 399 (4th Cir. 2009) (“Examples of frivolous claims include those whose factual allegations are ‘so nutty,' ‘delusional,' or ‘wholly fanciful' as to be simply ‘unbelievable.'”). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law when it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. A claim lacks an arguable basis in fact when it describes “fantastic or delusional scenarios.” Id. at 327-28.
In determining whether a complaint is frivolous, “a court is not bound, as it usually is when making a determination based solely on the pleadings, to accept without question the truth of the Plaintiff's allegations.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992). Rather, the court may find a complaint factually frivolous “when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them.” Id. “The word ‘frivolous' is inherently elastic and not susceptible to categorical definition .... The term's capaciousness directs lower courts to conduct a flexible analysis, in light of the totality of the circumstances, of all factors bearing upon the frivolity of a claim.” Nagy v. Fed Med Ctr. Butner, 376 F.3d 252, 256-57 (4th Cir. 2004) (some internal quotation marks omitted). In making its frivolity determination, the court may “apply common sense.” Nasim v. Warden., Md House o/Correction, 64 F.3d 951, 954 (4th Cir. 1995).
In order to state a claim on which relief may be granted, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, the plaintiff must allege more than labels and conclusions. Id.
In the present case, Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, and pleadings drafted by a pro se litigant are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by an attorney. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). This court is charged with liberally construing a pleading filed by a pro se litigant to allow for the development of a potentially meritorious claim. See id; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Noble v. Barnett, 24 F.3d 582, 587 n.6 (4th Cir. 1994). However, the principles requiring generous construction of pro se complaints are not without limits; the district courts are not required “to conjure up questions never squarely presented to them.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 777 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
D. ANALYSIS
A. Background
Plaintiff alleges that the defendant, Charlene D. Ruckle/Clibome, “committed local, state and federal paternity and social security fraud” in two states: first, in West Virginia by submitting a birth certificate showing Plaintiff as the father of her child without DNA testing on August 5, 2002, and obtaining a fraudulent temporary order for child support; and second, in North Carolina by obtaining an illegal child support obligation against Plaintiff in New Hanover County from January 1, 2011 to August 31, 2011, reopening a closed child support case for Defendant's and her ex-husband's daughter, and involving a collection agency to obtain illegal garnishments from November 2011 to the present. Compl. [DE-1-1] at 2-3. Plaintiff asks for Defendant to be prosecuted for her crimes and for repayment from the illegal garnishments with interest from November 2011 to the present. Id. at 3. Plaintiff also states he is initiating a RICO lawsuit, id, and he indicated on the Civil Cover Sheet he was suing under the False Claim Act for “illegal child support obligation, ” and that his case is transferred from West Virginia. [DE-1-3].
Attached to Plaintiff's complaint is (1) a copy of a Complaint to Establish Paternity, Child Support, and Reimbursement Support filed March 26, 2003 against Plaintiff in the Family Court of Monongalia County, West Virginia, (2) a copy of an Affidavit signed by Defendant swearing to the truth of the facts in the child support Complaint, (3) a copy of a Disclaimer signed by Defendant related to legal representation in the child support proceeding, (4) a copy of an Acknowledgement of Automatic Assignment of Support Rights and of Cooperation Requirements signed by Defendant related to the child support proceeding, (5) a copy of a birth certificate for Alias Woolens listing Defendant as the mother and listing no father, (6) a copy of a child support arrearage computation for Plaintiff and Defendant for the period from September 1, 2002 to March 18, 2020, (7) a copy of a July 7, 2020 letter to Plaintiff regarding his child support case that was closed on April 12, 2006, (8) a copy of a notice to Plaintiff from the U.S. Department of the Treasury that a $1, 200 payment to Plaintiff was applied to child support debt in New Hanover County, (9) a copy of a page from a judgment denying a motion to modify a child support obligation in New Hanover County and noting a monthly obligation of $752.00 and an arrearage of $24, 572.97, (10) a copy of a notice from the Social Security Administration to Defendant dated July 28, 2021 regarding monthly withholding of $436.00 for child support, (11) a copy of a letter to Plaintiff dated July 13, 2015 from the State of West Virginia, Bureau for Child Support Enforcement stating Plaintiff owed no child support arrearage as of April 30, 2004 and his case was closed in 2004, (12) a copy of a November 9, 2011 notice of child support garnishment to Plaintiff's employer, and (13) a copy of a Notice of Registration of Foreign Support Order filed in New Hanover District Court by Clibome against Woolens for $9, 017.10 of support in arrears as of August 31, 2011 and $386.53 for ongoing monthly support obligation. [DE-1-2].
B. Discussion
Plaintiff first requests Defendant be criminally prosecuted for local, state, and federal crimes. Compl. [DE-1-1] at 3. Criminal prosecutions are initiated by prosecutors, not by federal courts. See Jones v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. CV ELH-19-196, 2019 WL 6918490, at *9 (D. Md. Dec. 19, 2019) (concluding that “because ‘a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another,' Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619, 93 S.Ct. 1146, 35 L.Ed.2d 536 (1973), ‘[a] private person may not initiate a criminal action in the federal courts.'”) (citing Ras-Selah: 7 Tafari: El v. Glasser and Glasser PLC, 434 Fed.Appx. 236, 236 (4th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); Conn. Action Now, Inc. v. Roberts Plating Co., 457 F.2d 81, 86-87 (2d Cir. 1972) (“It is a truism... that in our federal system crimes are always prosecuted by the Federal Govemment[.]”)). Accordingly, Plaintiff's criminal prosecution claim should be dismissed.
Plaintiff next seeks repayment of garnishments enforced against him as a result of allegedly fraudulent child support obligations. Compl. [DE-1 -1 ] at 3. Plaintiff couches his claim as a “RICO lawsuit” and later, in his Civil Cover Sheet, as one under the False Claims Act. Compl. [DE-1-1] at 3; [DE-1-3]. However, the essence of Plaintiff's complaint is that he disputes the validity of the child support orders Defendant obtained against him in West Virginia and North Carolina and, thus, his claim is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, “lower federal courts are precluded from exercising appellate jurisdiction over final state-court judgments.” Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 463 (2006) (per curiam); see Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). Jurisdiction to review such decisions lies with superior state courts and, ultimately, the United States Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting [federal] court review and rejection of those judgments.” Thana v. Bd. of License Comm 'rs for Charles Cnty., Md, 827 F.3d 314, 319 (4th Cir. 2016) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). The doctrine prevents federal courts from considering “issues actually presented to and decided by a state court, but also . . . constitutional claims that are inextricably intertwined with questions ruled upon by a state court, as when success on the federal claim depends upon a determination that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it.” Plyer v. Moore, 129 F.3d 728, 731 (4th Cir. 1997) (quotation marks and citations omitted). “[I]f the state-court loser seeks redress in the federal district court for the injury caused by the state-court decision, his federal claim is, by definition, ‘inextricably intertwined' with the state-court decision, and is therefore outside of the jurisdiction of the federal district court.” Davani v. Va. Dep't of Transp., 434 F.3d 712, 719 (4th Cir. 2006).
Plaintiff's request for repayment from “illegal garnishments” is “inextricably intertwined” with the state court child support orders, and thus Plaintiff must bring his challenge through the state courts. See Mendives v. Bexar Cnty., No. 5:21-CV-00356-JKP-RBF, 2021 WL 4708079, at *4 (W.D. Tex. June 23, 2021) (finding claims, including a claim under the False Claims Act that plaintiff's ex-wife and her attorney made certain false claims in their application for child support, were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because they “invite district court review and rejection of the state child support [garnishment and custody] judgment. . . .”) (citation omitted), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Mendives on behalf of R.C.M. v. Bexar Cnty., No. SA-21-CV-0356-JKP, 2021 WL 4705175 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 8, 2021); McAllister v. North Carolina, No. 5:10-CV-79-D, 2011 WL 883166, at *4 (E.D. N.C. Mar. 11, 2011) (concluding that plaintiff dissatisfied with a state court child support proceeding may appeal within the state court appellate system and, thereafter, to the United States Supreme Court). While the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a narrow exception to federal subject-matter jurisdiction, Vicks v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, 676 Fed.Appx. 167, 168 (4th Cir. 2017) (per curiam), it nevertheless precludes a federal district court from reviewing final judgments of state courts, even when a plaintiff has attempted to re-fashion his federal complaint to avoid this jurisdictional bar, Moore v. Idealease of Wilmington, 465 F.Supp.2d 484, 490 (E.D. N.C. 2006) (“[A] plaintiff cannot escape the reach of Rooker-Feldman by merely arguing a different legal theory not raised in state court.”) (citing Davani v. Va. Dep't of Transp., 434 F.3d 712, 719 (4th Cir. 2006)). Plaintiff's characterization of his claims as arising under RICO or the False Claims Act does not confer jurisdiction on this court to review the state court child support or garnishment orders. Because this court is without jurisdiction to review the judicial actions of the Monongalia County Family Court and the New Hanover County District Court, Plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed.
Alternatively, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729, et seq.
The False Claims Act contemplates two types of actions. First, under § 3730(a), “ [i]f the Attorney General finds that a person has violated or is violating section 3729, the Attorney General may bring a civil action under this section against the person.” Second, under § 3730(b), “[a] person may bring an action for a violation of section 3729 for the person and for the United States Government.”Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457, 477 (2007). Because a private claim is also brought on behalf of the United States, a plaintiff who is proceeding pro se, may not assert such a claim and must be represented by counsel. See Hamilton v. N. VA Dist. Off., No. 1:20-CV-644-RDA-MSN, 2021 WL 3417962, at *3 (E.D. Va. Aug. 4, 2021) (“a private right of action does not exist for pro se plaintiffs under the False Claims Act.”) (citing U.S. ex rel. Brooks v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 237 Fed.Appx. 802, 803 (4th Cir. 2007)), aff'dsub nom. Hamilton v. N. Va. Dist. Off., No. 21-1952, 2021 WL 5412257 (4th Cir. Nov. 19, 2021). Accordingly, in addition to being barred by Rooker-Feldman, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under the False Claims Act.
Finally, Plaintiff also invokes the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). To state a civil RICO claim under § 1962(c), a plaintiff must allege (1) conduct, (2) an enterprise, and (3) a pattern (4) of racketeering activity (5) that causes injury to the plaintiff. Sedima v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985). “The statute of limitations on private civil RICO claims is four years, beginning on the date the plaintiff discovered, or should have discovered, the injury.” CVLR Performance Horses, Inc. v. Wynne, 792 F.3d 469, 476 (4th Cir. 2015); Carias v. Harrison, No. 5:13-CT-3264-FL, 2017 WL 1155749, at *10 (E.D. N.C. Mar. 27, 2017), aff'd, 705 Fed.Appx. 181 (4th Cir. 2017). The court may raise a statute of limitations defense sua sponte when a complaint is filed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. See Eriline Co. S.A. v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 648, 655 (4th Cir. 2006) (citing Nasim, 64 F.3d at 953-54). Plaintiff's claims are based on acts he alleged occurred more than a decade ago. First, Plaintiff alleges Defendant obtained a fraudulent child support order in West Virginia in August 2002 and obtained a fraudulent child support order in North Carolina in August 2011. Compl. [DE-1-1] at 2. The documents attached to Plaintiff's complaint contain correspondence between Plaintiff and the West Virginia Bureau for Child Support Enforcement from July 2015 regarding his child support case with Monongalia County, [DE-1-2] at 15, and a garnishment for child support issued to Plaintiff's employer in November 2011 by New Hanover County, [DE-1-2] at 16. These documents indicate that Plaintiff had discovered, or should have discovered, the alleged injury more than four years prior to the filing of this case. Accordingly, in addition to being barred by Rooker-Feldman, Plaintiff's RICO claim is time-barred.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the motion to proceed in forma pauperis is allowed, and it is recommended that the complaint be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and, alternatively, for failure to state a claim.
IT IS DIRECTED that a copy of this Memorandum and Recommendation be served on Plaintiff. You shall have until April 7, 2022, to file written objections to the Memorandum and Recommendation. The presiding district judge must conduct his or her own review (that is, make a de novo determination) of those portions of the Memorandum and Recommendation to which objection is properly made and may accept, reject, or modify the determinations in the Memorandum and Recommendation; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. See, e.g, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3); Local Civ. R. 1.1 (permitting modification of deadlines specified in local rules), 72.4(b), E.D. N.C.
If you do not file written objections to the Memorandum and Recommendation by the foregoing deadline, you will be giving up the right to review of the Memorandum and Recommendation by the presiding district judge as described above, and the presiding district judge may enter an order or judgment based on the Memorandum and Recommendation without such review. In addition, your failure to file written objections by the foregoing deadline will bar you from appealing to the Court of Appeals from an order or judgment of the presiding district judge based on the Memorandum and Recommendation. See Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 846-47 (4th Cir. 1985).