Opinion
CIV. 1:19-CV-2048
09-30-2021
TANEL WOODWARD, Plaintiff, v. ADAM SABO, et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Martin C. Carlson United States Magistrate Judge
I. Statement of Facts and of The Case
This case, which comes before us for consideration of a motion to dismiss, (Doc. 21), invites us to consider the legal sufficiency of the case filed by the plaintiff, Tanel Woodward. Woodward brought this lawsuit against Defendant Adam Sabo, a police officer for the City of Harrisburg, as well as the Harrisburg Bureau of Police, the City of Harrisburg itself, and Thomas Carter, the Bureau Police Commissioner. Woodward's complaint alleges excessive force, unlawful detention, unlawful seizure, false arrest, a cover-up of the use of excessive force pursuant to common practice and procedure by the police department, false imprisonment, an illegal traffic stop, and infliction of willful or negligent mental anguish. (Doc. 19, at 2).
Woodward alleges that on December 1, 2017, while he was driving through a high crime area in the City of Harrisburg, several suspicious looking vehicles blocked his vehicle's path. (Doc. 19, at 4). Woodward claims that he feared for his safety when an individual-Defendant Sabo-emerged from one of the vehicles blocking him in and brandished a gun. (Id.) He then put his car in reverse and attempted to maneuver his way out of the area. (Id.) As he did so, Defendant Sabo fired his weapon toward Woodward's vehicle, striking him. (Id., at 4-5). Woodward claims that he was not aware that any of the vehicles were police vehicles at the time. (Id., at 5). One bullet struck him in his right index finger and the other struck him in his left shoulder. (Id.)
Woodward then proceeded to his mother's house, who drove him to Penn State Hershey Medical Center, where he was treated for the gunshot wounds. (Id.) The bullet from his shoulder was removed. (Id.) While there receiving treatment, officers from the City of Harrisburg Bureau of Police arrived and questioned him about the incident and why he left the blocked-in area. (Id.) Woodward responded that because there were no sirens and the vehicles were unmarked, he was not aware that they were police vehicles. (Id.) The officers charged Woodward with aggravated assault by physical menace against a police officer, escape, fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer, recklessly endangering another person, and related traffic offenses. (Doc. 21, ¶ 4; Commonwealth v. Woodward, CP-22-CR-0001419-2018). Woodward was handcuffed to the hospital bed and was later transported to Dauphin County Prison. (Doc. 19, at 5). At the time of the filing of the amended complaint (Doc. 19), which is now the operative pleading in this case, Woodward had not yet gone to trial on these pending charges.
In the time that has elapsed since the filing of the amended complaint, Woodward pled guilty to the charges of escape, fleeing or eluding, recklessly endangering another person, and operating a vehicle with a suspended or revoked license. See Commonwealth v. Woodward, CP-22-CR-0001419-2018.
Defendants Carter and City of Harrisburg filed a motion to dismiss (Doc. 21). The motion has been fully briefed (Docs. 23, 28, 29) and is therefore ripe for resolution. After consideration, we agree with Defendants Carter and City of Harrisburg that Woodward's complaint, as currently pleaded, fails to state a claim against them. Thus, we will recommend that the defendants' motion be granted.
We note that Woodward initially filed this lawsuit prose, but recently counsel has entered an appearance on his behalf. Woodward's counsel sought, and obtained, an extension of time in which to respond to a separate motion to dismiss filed by defendant Sabo. Notably, counsel did not seek any additional time in which to address this motion to dismiss. Therefore, we deem this motion to be ripe for resolution.
II. Discussion
A. Motion to Dismiss - Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. It is proper for the court to dismiss a complaint in accordance with Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure only if the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). With respect to this benchmark standard for the legal sufficiency of a complaint, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has aptly noted the evolving standards governing pleading practice in federal court, stating that:
Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court's opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), continuing with our opinion in Phillips [v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008)], and culminating recently with the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, BU.S.B, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009), pleading standards have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).
In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, Inc., 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court “need not credit a complaint's bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss.” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally, a court need not “assume that a . . . plaintiff can prove facts that the . . . plaintiff has not alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), in order to state a valid cause of action, a plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of actions will not do.” Id., at 555. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id.
In keeping with the principles of Twombly, the Supreme Court has underscored that a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon which relief can be granted when ruling on a motion to dismiss. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court held that, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court should “begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id., at 679. According to the Supreme Court, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id., at 678. Rather, in conducting a review of the adequacy of a complaint, the Supreme Court has advised trial courts that they must:
[B]egin by identifying pleadings that because they are no more than conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.Id., at 679.
Thus, following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions; it must recite factual allegations sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated:
[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts.Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.
Further, as the Court of Appeals has observed:
The Supreme Court in Twombly set forth the “plausibility” standard for overcoming a motion to dismiss and refined this approach in Iqbal. The plausibility standard requires the complaint to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. A complaint satisfies the plausibility standard when the factual pleadings “allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). This standard requires showing “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. A complaint which pleads facts “merely consistent with” a defendant's liability, [ ] “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement of relief.' ”Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. Denied, 132 S.Ct. 1861 (2012).
In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a three-step analysis:
First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id., at 1950. Finally, “where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.”Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950).
In considering a motion to dismiss, the court generally relies on the complaint, attached exhibits, and matters of public record. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007). The court may also consider “undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the [attached] documents.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Moreover, “documents whose contents are alleged in the complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleading, may be considered.” Pryor v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002); see also U.S. Express Lines, Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 382, 388 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that “[a]lthough a district court may not consider matters extraneous to the pleadings, a document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint may be considered without converting the motion to dismiss in one for summary judgment”). However, the court may not rely on other parts of the record in determining a motion to dismiss, or when determining whether a proposed amended complaint is futile because it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994).
B. The Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Should Be Granted.
As we have explained, Woodward asserts claims against these supervisory and institutional defendants for excessive force, unlawful detention, unlawful seizure, false arrest, a cover-up of the use of excessive force, false imprisonment, an illegal traffic stop, and infliction of willful or negligent mental anguish. Most of these specific claims set forth allegations against Defendant Sabo, which we will not be addressing, as there is a separate pending motion to dismiss on his behalf. (Doc. 33). Therefore, we will only be discussing and addressing claims against Defendants City of Harrisburg and Carter.
(1) The Claims Against the City of Harrisburg Should be Dismissed.
The City of Harrisburg has moved to dismiss the claims against it, arguing that Woodward failed to allege an actionable § 1983 municipal claim against it. We agree that Woodward's § 1983 municipal claim fails as a matter of law, and thus we will recommend that these claims be dismissed.
To the extent that Woodward is attempting to separately sue the City of Harrisburg's Bureau of Police as an individual entity, we note that the police department is not a proper institutional defendant in this action since police departments serve only as an administrative arm of a municipality, and it is a municipality through which any liability must flow to the police department. Indeed, it has been repeatedly held that a police department is not a “person” for purposes of Section 1983 and therefore is not a proper defendant in a Section 1983 civil rights action. Blackwell v. Middletown Borough Police Dep't, 1:12-CV-825, 2012 WL 6012568 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 16, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, 1:12-CV-825, 2012 WL 6002689 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2012) (citing Golya v. Golya, 2007 WL 2301085, *9B30, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58093, *29B30 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (explaining that courts within the Third Circuit have concluded that a police department is merely a sub-unit of the local government and is not amenable to suit under 1983)); Wivell v. Liberty Township Police Dep't, 2007 WL 2155540, *2B6, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54306, *5B6 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (explaining that police department not subject to suit in a § 1983 action); Mitros v. Cooke, 170 F.Supp.2d 504, 507 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (city police department is a sub-unit of the city government that is merely a vehicle through which the city fulfills its policing functions, and is not a separate entity for purposes of suit). Thus, any claims against the Bureau of Police should be dismissed.
It is difficult to discern, from the face of the amended complaint, what behavior Woodward attributes to this defendant. Woodward notes that the City is a municipality in Pennsylvania and states that “Defendants Carter and Sabo were employees of the City of Harrisburg's Bureau of Police and were acting and operating in their official capacities as authorized agents of the City of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.” (Doc. 19). Woodward also provides a list of tactics that he claims were the practice or custom of the City of Harrisburg Bureau of Police and alleges that the officers routinely engage in a practice of excessive force.
Plaintiffs seeking to hold institutional defendants liable for alleged civil rights violations must meet an exacting burden of pleading and proof. It is well-settled that local governmental entities may not be held liable under section 1983 for the acts of others under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); see also Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 946 F.2d 1017, 1027 (3d Cir. 1991). Instead, such an agency may only be held liable “when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
Thus, to sustain a claim against this institutional defendant, a plaintiff must “identify a . . . ‘policy' or ‘custom' that caused the plaintiff's injury.” Bd. of County Comm'rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997). This custom must be “so widespread as to have the force of law.” Id., at 404; see also Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 971 (3d Cir. 1996) (a policy is an official proclamation or edict of a municipality, while a custom is a practice that is “so permanent and well settled as to virtually constitute law”) (quoting Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990) (citations omitted)). The plaintiff must further “allege that a ‘policy or custom' of [the defendants] was the ‘moving force' behind the [constitutional] violation.” Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 107 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Brown, 520 U.S. at 404). A municipality can be held liable on the basis of failure to train when “that failure amounts to ‘deliberate indifference . . . [of the constitutional] rights of persons. . . .' ” Woloszyn v. County of Lawrence, 396 F.3d 314, 324 (3d Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). There must also be a causal nexus, in that the “ ‘identified deficiency in [the] training program must be closely related to the ultimate [constitutional] injury.' ” Id., at 325 (citations omitted). Therefore, analysis of a claim under Monell requires separate analysis of two distinct issues: “(1) whether plaintiff's harm was caused by a constitutional violation, and (2) if so whether the [municipality] is responsible for that violation.” Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Texas, 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992).
As we view the complaint, Woodward seeks redress against the City of Harrisburg for its alleged institutional failures, including the tactics used by its police officers. (Doc. 19, at 6-7). However, Woodward fails to allege the minimum that is required of him to state a Monell institutional liability claim.. Aside from the conclusory allegation in his complaint that the listed tactics were the practice or custom of the City's police officers, Woodward has provided nothing to support his claims. He has not indicated what makes this behavior a custom or practice by city officers or a direct causal link between the City's actions and a deprivation of his federal rights. In fact, while he seemingly presents the list as general tactics employed by the police department, much of the list appears to be his allegations relating to this specific incident. This is not sufficient to demonstrate a course of conduct that has become a custom because it is “so permanent and well settled” that is operates as law. Beck, 89 F.3d at 971. Furthermore, Woodward has neither alleged a violation of his constitutional rights by the City of Harrisburg nor has he alleged a causal link between that violation between the City's policy and the constitutional violation. Therefore, we conclude that the plaintiff's claims against the City of Harrisburg, as currently pleaded, should be dismissed.
For example, the following appears in Woodward's list of tactics that are “used with such frequency and regularity that they are the equivalent of the official policy of the City of Harrisburg, Bureau of Police”:
e. Manhandling the Plaintiff after he was shot and had just received medical treatment for what were subsequently identified as permanently disabling [injuries]. (Doc. 19, at 6-7).
(2) The Claims Against Defendant Carter Should be Dismissed.
Defendant Carter argues that Woodward's claims against him fail because Woodward did not plausibly plead any personal involvement by Defendant Carter. We agree. On this score, it is well established that:
A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs; liability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 537 n.3, 68 L.Ed.2d 420, 101 S.Ct. 1908 (1981); Hampton v. Holmesburg Prison Officials, 546 F.2d 1077, 1082 (3d Cir. 1976). Personal involvement can be shown through allegations or personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence. Allegations of participation or actual knowledge and acquiescence, however, must be made with appropriate particularity. Compare Boykins v. Ambridge Area School District, 621 F.2d 75, 80 (3d Cir. 1980) (civil rights
complaint adequate where it states time, place, persons responsible); Hall v. Pennsylvania State Police, 570 F.2d 86, 89 (3d Cir. 1978) (same).Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
Here, Woodward has not pleaded any personal involvement on Defendant Carter's part in the events which led to his arrest. In fact, he provides virtually no explanation of Carter's alleged role in this matter; he does little more than name Carter in the caption of the case. Carter is mentioned a handful of times in the complaint, but only in the context of identifying him as a party being sued and explaining some of his job duties. No. part of the complaint alleges any actions taken by Defendant Carter at all. Thus, the complaint fails to comply with basic pleading requirements by failing to provide a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief and that each averment be concise and direct. Scibelli v. Lebanon Cnty., 219 Fed.Appx. 221, 222 (3d Cir. 2007). Simply put, the absence of well-pleaded facts makes it virtually impossible to ascertain the legal and actual significance of Woodward's allegations. In such instances, dismissal is warranted. Therefore, we conclude that the amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against Defendant Carter and all claims against him should be dismissed.
We note that in his opposition brief, Woodward asserts that “Commissioner Thomas Carter, who was the Police Chief at the time of the incident, authorized the officers in question to make the traffic stop and has pertinent information regarding this incident.” (Doc. 28, at 2). Even if this were sufficient to state a claim against Defendant Carter, it is well settled that because a motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint by examining the face of that complaint, a plaintiff cannot amend a complaint through the filing of a brief, or through arguments set forth in a brief opposing a dispositive motion. Indeed, “[i]t is axiomatic that the complaint may not be amended by the briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss.” Pennsylvania ex rel. Zimmerman v. Pepsico, Inc., 836 F.2d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1988) (quoting Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1107 (7th Cir. 1984)); cf. Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 202 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[W]e do not consider after-the fact allegations in determining the sufficiency of [a] complaint under Rules 9(b) and 12(b)(6)”).
(3) Woodward Cannot State a Claim for Indemnification.
Finally, in his complaint, Woodward attempts to state a claim for indemnification. In Pennsylvania, indemnification is available “where there is an express contract to indemnify” or “where the party seeking to indemnify is vicariously or secondarily liable for the indemnitor's acts.” Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. Philip Morris, 228/ F.3d 429, 448 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted). The general indemnification doctrine has no application here since Woodward is neither vicariously or secondarily liable to any of the defendants nor is there an express contract between the parties for indemnification. Accordingly, Woodward has not sufficiently pleaded a claim for indemnification and this claim should also be dismissed.
III. Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT the defendants' motion to dismiss (Doc. 21) be GRANTED.
The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.