Opinion
CV134005565S
07-16-2018
Jermaine WOODS (Inmate #205299) v. WARDEN
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Kwak, J.
I
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The petitioner, Jermaine Woods, initiated this matter by way of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed on July 16, 2013. In the underlying criminal case, the petitioner was charged with murder for the fatal shooting of Jamal Hall on November 5, 1994. The matter was tried before a jury in December 1996, but resulted in a mistrial when the jury was unable to reach a verdict. A second trial was held in January 1997, and a jury convicted the petitioner of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a(a). The petitioner was subsequently sentenced to fifty years incarceration. Attorney Jayne Kennedy represented the petitioner at both trials. The petitioner’s conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. State v. Woods, 250 Conn. 807, 740 A.2d 371 (1999).
The petitioner then filed his first petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel at the second trial in that counsel failed to adequately prepare a diminished mental capacity defense. Attorney Joseph Visone represented the petitioner. The habeas court, Rittenband, J., granted the petitioner’s petition and ordered a new trial. The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the habeas court. Woods v. Commissioner of Correction, 85 Conn.App. 544, 545, 857 A.2d 986, cert. denied, 272 Conn. 903, 863 A.2d 696 (2004). At his new trial, the petitioner elected to be tried by a three-judge panel. He was represented by Attorney Errol Skyers. Following the trial in June 2006, the petitioner was convicted of murder and sentenced to fifty years incarceration. The petitioner’s conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. State v. Woods, 297 Conn. 569, 4 A.3d 236 (2010).
The petitioner filed his second habeas petition on November 4, 2008, alleging various claims for ineffective assistance of trial counsel at his third criminal trial, including a claim that "[t]rial counsel failed to timely notify and adequately prepare the petitioner’s expert witness, Dr. John Felber, the psychiatrist who testified at the petitioner’s prior successful habeas trial; who would testify at the criminal trial about the defendant’s diminished mental capacity which precipitated the defendant’s mistake of fact concerning a mis-perceived threat from the people who were surrounding the petitioner at the time the petitioner fired his gun." Attorney Visone also represented the petitioner at this habeas proceeding. The habeas court, Santos, J., denied the petition. The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the habeas court. Woods v. Commissioner, 142 Conn.App. 907, 64 A.3d 1290, 309 Conn. 915, 70 A.3d 39 (2013).
The petitioner initiated the present petition, his third habeas corpus petition, on July 16, 2013, alleging that his sentence is illegal due to (1) unconsidered evidence of his diminished capacity and mitigating circumstances; and (2) an equal protection violation. The respondent filed a return on January 5, 2018, alleging special defenses of procedural default, res judicata, collateral estoppel, successive petition and failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted as to count one, and special defenses of procedural default and failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted as to count two. The petitioner filed a reply to the respondent’s return on February 5, 2018.
On March 9, 2018, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition pursuant to Practice Book § 23-29 on the grounds that the claims alleged in the petition are precluded by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, procedurally defaulted in that they were not raised at the trial or appellate levels and fail to state claims upon which habeas corpus relief can be granted. The petitioner filed an objection to the respondent’s motion to dismiss on March 21, 2010. For the reasons articulated more fully below, the respondent’s motion is granted as to both counts and judgment shall enter dismissing the petition.
II
DISCUSSION
"A motion to dismiss ... properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court ..." Filippi v. Sullivan, 273 Conn. 1, 8, 866 A.2d 599 (2005). "In ruling upon whether a complaint survives a motion to dismiss, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader ..." (Internal citations and quotation marks omitted.) Young v. Commissioner of Correction, 104 Conn.App. 188, 193, 932 A.2d 467 (2007), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 907, 942 A.2d 416 (2008). "[A pleading] must be read in its entirety in such a way as to give effect to the pleading with reference to the general theory upon which it proceeded, and do substantial justice between the parties. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gil v. Gil, 94 Conn.App. 306, 313, 892 A.2d 318 (2006)." Taylor v. Commissioner of Correction, 94 Conn.App. 772, 785, 895 A.2d 246 (2006), rev’d in part on other grounds, 284 Conn. 433, 936 A.2d 611 (2007).
A
Count One
1
Diminished Capacity
In the pro se petition, the petitioner alleges in count one that his conviction is illegal because evidence of his diminished capacity was not properly presented during trial. The respondent’s motion to dismiss seeks dismissal of this claim, inter alia, pursuant to the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel.
"[T]he doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, [provides that] a former judgment on a claim, if rendered on the merits, is an absolute bar to a subsequent action [between the same parties] on the same claim ... To determine whether two claims are the same for purposes of res judicata, we compare the pleadings and judgment in the first action with the complaint in the subsequent action ... The judicial [doctrine] of res judicata ... [is] based on the public policy that a party should not be able to relitigate a matter which it already has had an opportunity to litigate ... [W]here a party has fully and fairly litigated his claims, he may be barred from future actions on matters not raised in the prior proceeding." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Henderson v. Commissioner of Correction, 129 Conn.App. 188, 199-200, 19 A.3d 705, cert. denied, 303 Conn. 901, 31 A.3d 1177 (2011).
"The common-law doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, embodies a judicial policy in favor of judicial economy, the stability of former judgments and finality ... Collateral estoppel ... is that aspect of res judicata which prohibits the relitigation of an issue when that issue was actually litigated and necessarily determined in a prior action between the same parties upon a different claim ... For an issue to be subject to collateral estoppel, it must have been fully and fairly litigated in the first action. It also must have been actually decided and the decision must have been necessary to the judgment ...
"An issue is actually litigated if it is properly raised in the pleadings or otherwise, submitted for determination, and in fact determined ... An issue is necessarily determined if, in the absence of a determination of the issue, the judgment could not have been validly rendered ... [C]ollateral estoppel [is] based on the public policy that a party should not be able to relitigate a matter which it already has had an opportunity to litigate ... Stability in judgments grants to parties and others the certainty in the management of their affairs which results when a controversy is finally laid to rest ... [A]lthough most defenses cannot be considered on a motion to dismiss, a trial court can properly entertain a ... motion to dismiss that raises collateral estoppel grounds." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Parker v. Commissioner of Correction, 169 Conn.App. 300, 313-14, 149 A.3d 174, cert. denied, 324 Conn. 903, 151 A.3d 1289 (2016).
Upon review of the record, it is clear that the petitioner’s issues regarding a diminished capacity defense were presented at the petitioner’s third criminal trial and second habeas trial. The habeas court in the petitioner’s second habeas proceeding, Santos, J., acknowledged that Dr. Felber’s testimony regarding the petitioner’s diminished capacity differed in the third criminal trial from the second habeas trial, but ultimately denied the petitioner’s claims. The petitioner also references witnesses Rosita Saucier, a guidance counselor with the Waterbury Adult Education, Attorney Gregory St. John and Attorney Louis Avitable, but all three witnesses have also testified previously on the petitioner’s behalf. Furthermore, the petitions in both the petitioner’s second habeas proceeding and the present habeas proceeding seek the same relief. Therefore, the court finds that the petitioner’s claim has been adjudicated and cannot be re-litigated. As a result, the petitioner’s claim regarding a diminished capacity defense is barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel.
2
Mitigating Circumstances
The petitioner further alleges in count one of his petition that his conviction is illegal because the sentencing court did not consider evidence of several listed mitigating circumstances prior to the imposition of his sentence. Specifically, the petitioner alleges that he was nineteen when the incident occurred, that he had no history of violence prior to or after the incident occurred, that the weapon used was only discharged once, that there were over one hundred people in the area when the incident occurred, and that there is no evidence in the petitioner’s case that the petitioner and victim knew each other. The respondent’s motion to dismiss seeks dismissal of this claim, inter alia, on the grounds that it fails to state a claim upon which habeas corpus relief can be granted.
In support of his claim, the petitioner indicates in his reply that his age of nineteen at the time of the crime is relevant because of newly discovered research indicating that the brain’s frontal-lobe is not fully developed until the age of twenty-five. It appears to the court that the petitioner is claiming that he is entitled to an individualized sentencing hearing extended to juveniles serving mandatory life sentences pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012) and our Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Riley, 315 Conn. 637, 110 A.3d 1205 (2015), cert. denied, 136 S.Ct. 1361, 194 L.Ed.2d 376 (2016).
Our Appellate Court in Haughey v. Commissioner of Correction, 173 Conn.App. 559, 568, 164 A.3d 849, cert. denied, 327 Conn. 906, 170 A.3d 1 (2017), recently declined to apply the Miller/Riley considerations to a petitioner over the age of eighteen, concluding that "[e]xpanding the application of [those precedents] to offenders eighteen years of age or older simply does not comport with existing eighth amendment jurisprudence pertaining to juvenile sentencing." General Statutes § 54-91g(a)(1), which requires that a sentencing court take into consideration "the defendant’s age at the time of the offense, the hallmark features of adolescence, and any scientific and psychological evidence showing the differences between a child’s brain development and an adult’s brain development[,]" only applies to cases involving children "as defined in section 46b-120." General Statutes § 46b-120(1) in relevant part defines "child" as "any person under eighteen years of age who has not been legally emancipated ..."
According to the pro se petition, the petitioner was nineteen years old at the time he committed his offenses. Consequently, pursuant to relevant case law and General Statutes § § 46b-120(1) and 54-91g(a)(1), the petitioner was not a juvenile when he committed the offense and a sentencing court was not required to consider the information the petitioner presently alleges he was entitled to have considered by that court. The petitioner’s sentence cannot be illegal on the ground asserted in his habeas corpus petition. The court concludes, based upon the foregoing, there is no habeas corpus relief that can be granted and dismisses this portion of the claim.
The respondent’s motion to dismiss also seeks dismissal of this claim on procedural default grounds. "In essence, the procedural default doctrine holds that a claimant may not raise, in a collateral proceeding, claims that he could have made at trial or on direct appeal in the original proceeding and that if the state, in response, alleges that a claimant should be procedurally defaulted from now making the claim, the claimant bears the burden of demonstrating good cause for having failed to raise the claim directly, and he must show that he suffered actual prejudice as a result of this excusable failure." Hinds v. Commissioner of Correction, 151 Conn.App. 837, 852, 97 A.3d 986 (2014), aff’d on other grounds, 321 Conn. 56, 136 A.3d 596 (2016).
"The appropriate standard for reviewability of habeas claims that were not properly raised at trial ... or on direct appeal ... because of a procedural default is the cause and prejudice standard. Under this standard, the petitioner must demonstrate good cause for his failure to raise a claim at trial or on direct appeal and actual prejudice resulting from the impropriety claimed in the habeas petition ... [T]he cause and prejudice test is designed to prevent full review of issues in habeas corpus proceedings that counsel did not raise at trial or on appeal for reasons of tactics, inadvertence or ignorance ... Therefore, attorney error short of ineffective assistance of counsel does not adequately excuse compliance with our rules of [trial and] appellate procedure." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Brunetti v. Commissioner of Correction, 134 Conn.App. 160, 168, 37 A.3d 811, cert. denied, 305 Conn. 903, 44 A.3d 180 (2012).
In Anderson v. Commissioner of Correction, 114 Conn.App. 778, 788, 971 A.2d 766, cert. denied, 293 Conn. 915, 979 A.2d 488 (2009), the Appellate Court noted the following: "Practice Book § 23-31(c) explicitly requires a petitioner to assert facts and any cause and prejudice that would permit review of an issue despite a claim of procedural default ... Although that provision states that ‘the reply shall not restate claims raised in the petition,’ it does not relieve the petitioner of his obligation with respect to the contents of a reply ... ‘[T]he existence of cause for a procedural default must ordinarily turn on whether the [petitioner] can show that some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel’s efforts to comply with the [s]tate’s procedural rule ... [For example] a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available to counsel ... or ... some interference by officials ... would constitute cause under this standard ... A court will not reach the merits of the habeas claim when the petitioner fails to make the required showing.’ ... Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, [ 285 Conn. 556, 568, 941 A.2d 248 (2008) ]."
Just as in Anderson, here the petitioner’s reply relating to his claim involving the additional mitigating factors fails to allege any facts or assert any cause and resulting prejudice to permit review of his claims. His reply merely reasserts facts alleged in his petition which is not permissible, nor sufficient, to overcome the respondent’s affirmative defense of procedural default. The court finds, therefore, that the petitioner has failed to allege legally cognizable cause and prejudice to rebut his procedural default, and he is thus barred from having the claims raised in his petition decided on the merits in the habeas corpus forum. These claims must also be dismissed.
B
Count Two
In the second count of his petition, the petitioner claims that his rights under the equal protection clause have been violated due to the state’s decision to try the petitioner for his crimes after his first habeas petition was granted. Specifically, the petitioner alleges that a federal investigation uncovered that the Waterbury Chief State’s Attorney, John Connelly, provided favorable treatment to clients of his friend, Attorney Martin Minella. The petitioner further alleges that he could not afford to hire Attorney Minella, and if he had, Attorney Connelly would have disposed of his case instead of trying the case for a third time. The petitioner claims that his equal rights were violated because he was not the beneficiary of Attorney Connelly’s alleged illegal activity. The respondent’s motion to dismiss seeks dismissal of this claim, inter alia, pursuant to the doctrine of procedural default.
The petitioner did not raise his equal protection claim before the trial court or on appeal. Therefore, pursuant to the case law discussed herein, the petitioner now bears the burden of satisfying the cause and prejudice standard. The petitioner’s reply as to this claim merely recites the facts alleged in his petition, with the addition of a copy of a newspaper article in which Attorney Connelly indicates that he is unwilling to let the petitioner plead guilty to manslaughter. The petitioner has failed to allege legally cognizable cause and prejudice to rebut his procedural default. This claim could, and should, have been raised at trial or on direct appeal before being raised in a habeas corpus petition. At its core, the doctrine of procedural default concerns claims being raised in the first instance in the appropriate forum. The petitioner here has failed to raise his claim in the proper forum and is barred by his procedural default from having the claim raised in his petition decided on the merits in the habeas corpus forum.
CONCLUSION
Judgment shall enter dismissing both counts of the petitioner’s habeas petition.