Woods v. Cafiero

Full title: HAROLD R.A. WOODS, Plaintiff, v. WILLIAM A. CAFIERO, MELAMED TURCK…

Court: United States District Court, N.D. New York

Date published: Feb 7, 2005

1:04-CV-0695, (LEK) (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2005)

Opinion

1:04-CV-0695, (LEK).

February 7, 2005

Stephen Bergstein, Esq., Thornton, Bergstein Ullrich, LLP, Chester NY, Attorneys for Plaintiff.

Mark C. Rushfield, Esq., Shaw Perelson, LLP, Highland NY, Attorneys for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM — DECISION and ORDER

LAWRENCE KAHN, District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Harold R.A. Woods commenced the instant action against Defendants claiming that his employment with Defendants was terminated on account of his age or speech. Presently before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12 seeking dismissal on the grounds that: (1) the Defendant Rondout Valley Central School District Board of Education ("School District") is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity; and (2) there is no individual liability under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq.

II. FACTS

As is relevant hereto, Plaintiff contends that Defendants' terminated his employment as a substitute teacher on account of his age or in retaliation for his having engaged in certain protected speech.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion to dismiss pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted," must be denied "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim [that] would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). A complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears that no construction of the facts would permit the plaintiff to prevail. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 10 (1980); Bass v. Jackson, 790 F.2d 260, 262 (2d Cir. 1986).

IV. DISCUSSION

a. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Defendants claim that, in New York, a school district is an arm of the state entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court. In support, Defendants claim that school districts satisfy the six factor test set forth in McGinty v. New York, 251 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2001). Defendants also cite to various decisions from the District Court for the Southern District of New York, one of which was affirmed by the Second Circuit in an unpublished decision. Scaglione v. Mamaroneck Union Free Sch. Dist., 47 Fed. Appx. 17 (2d Cir. 2002). In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the Supreme Court's decision in Mount Healthy Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280-81 (1977), the Second Circuit's decision in Fay v. South Colonie Sch. Dist., 802 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1986), and an analysis of the McGinty factors compels a finding that the School District is not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.

In Scaglione v. Mamaroneck Union Free Sch. Dist., 47 Fed. Appx. 17 (2d Cir. 2002), the Second Circuit held that the defendant school district was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. In that unpublished opinion, the Second Circuit provided little discussion of the issue and did not address its previous decision in Fay, finding that a school district is not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. This seeming anomaly between Scaglione and Fay need not give the Court pause because, pursuant to Second Circuit rules, Scaglione "MAY NOT BE CITED AS PRECEDENTIAL AUTHORITY TO THIS OR ANY OTHER COURT." Scaglione, 47 Fed. Appx. at 19; U.S. Ct. of App. 2d Cir. R. 0.23 ("Since these [summary orders] do not constitute formal opinions of the court and are unreported or not uniformly available to all parties, they shall not be cited or otherwise used in unrelated cases before this or any other court."). Thus, the Second Circuit's decision in Scaglione has no authority (binding or persuasive) in this case.

That leaves us with Fay, in which the Second Circuit noted that a school district is not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity because there was no evidence that: (1) payment of monetary damages would come from the state treasury; (2) school districts are the alter ego for the state; and (3) "being a steward of state education policy does not make the school district an alter ego of the state." 802 F.2d at 27. Fay has been overruled in part, see Taylor v. Vermont Dep't of Ed., 313 F.3d 768 (2d Cir. 2002), but not on the issue of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Defendants have not pointed to, and the Court has been unable to locate, any cases overruling Fay on the Eleventh Amendment issue. In fact, the principles of Fay were reaffirmed by Rosa R. v. Connelly, 889 F.2d 435 (2d Cir. 1989), wherein the Second Circuit held that, under Connecticut law, local boards of education are not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. This Court is bound by the decision in Fay and, accordingly, finds that the Defendant School District is not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.

This conclusion is supported by application of the six factor test articulated in McGinty and review of the New York State Education Law. The six factors used in determining whether an entity is an arm of the state are: (1) how the entity is identified in its documents of origin; (2) how the governing members of the entity are appointed; (3) how the entity is funded; (4) whether the entity's function is traditionally one of local or state government; (5) whether the state has a veto power over the entity's actions; and (6) whether the entity's financial obligations are binding on the state. McGinty, 251 F.3d at 95-96. "If these factors point in one direction, the inquiry is complete. If not, a court must ask whether a suit against the entity in federal court would threaten the integrity of the state and expose its treasury to risk." Id. 1. How The Entity Is Identified In Its Documents Or Origin

Pursuant to N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 1701 and 1804, "[t]he Board of Education . . . is hereby created a body corporate."¹ Article X, § 5 of the New York State Constitution essentially contemplates school districts as public corporations. N.Y. CONST. art. X, § 5 ("No public corporation (other than a county, city, town, village, school district. . . .)." By lumping school districts with other public corporations, such as counties, cities, towns, and villages, it becomes clear that school districts should be viewed in the same light as these other entities. Of course, counties, cities, towns and villages do not enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity. The same result should apply to school districts.

1 This quotation is from § 1701, which applies to union free school districts. Section 1804, however, provides that "[e]xcept as provided in this article, all the provisions of this chapter or of any other general law relating to or affecting union free school districts shall apply to central districts. . . ."

The Second Circuit has noted that delineating an entity as a "public corporation" "is of little help in determining whether an entity is an arm of the state." McGinty, 251 F.3d at 96. Thus, New York case law should be reviewed for clarification. Id. The New York courts have held that, akin to municipalities, school districts in New York are subdivisions of the state. See Bd. of Educ. of Roosevelt Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Bd. of Trustees of the State Univ. of New York, 282 A.D.2d 166, 172 (3d Dep't 2001). In Jeter v. Ellenville Central Sch. Dist., 41 N.Y.2d 283, 287 (1977), the New York Court of Appeal referred to the New York City Board of Education as a "unit of municipal government."

Defendants cite to Lanza v. Wagner, 11 N.Y.2d 317, 326 (1962) for the proposition that school boards are agencies of the state. In Lanza, the New York Court of Appeals stated that:

Although members of a Board of Education in a city perform tasks generally regarded as connected with local government, they are officers of an independent corporation separate and distinct from the city, created by the State for the purpose of carrying out a purely State function and are not city officers within the compass of the Constitution's home rule provisions. . . . "If there be one public policy well-established in this State", this court declared in Matter of Divisich v. Marshall ( 281 N.Y. 170, 173, supra.;), "it is that public education shall be beyond control by municipalities and politics. The Board of Education of the City of New York is not a department of the city government, it is an independent corporate body."

Id. This Court is of the opinion that this statement supports a finding that school boards are not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Distilled to its essence (and particularly when read together with Jeter,), Lanza is saying that: (1) school board members perform tasks associated with local government; but (2) school boards are an "independent corporation" separate and apart from a particular municipality. What this means, in effect, is that, like municipalities, school boards are their own entities. As in Mount Healthy, 429 U.S. at 280, "a local school board like [plaintiff] is more like a county or city than it is like an arm of the State." Municipalities, as subdivisions of the state, do not enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity and neither do local school boards, which also are subdivisions of the state.

Indeed, the Commissioner of the New York State Department of Education is "authorized and empowered to lay out central school districts for the establishment of central schools." N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 1801(1). However, while the Commissioner does have this authority, such powers are ineffective "until it has been organized by the qualified voters of the district." Id. at § 1801(4); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 1802 (requiring petition of qualified voters to establish a new central school district). Thus, the ultimate authority for creating a school district lies at the local level.

Considering that school districts are treated by state law as being akin to municipalities and that the ultimate authority to establish a school district lies at the local level, the Court finds that this first factor weighs against application of Eleventh Amendment immunity.

2. How The Governing Members Of The Entity Are Appointed

Pursuant to § 1804 of the Education Law, "[e]ach such central school district shall be managed by a board of education." The members of the board of education are locally elected. Id. Thus, this factor also weighs against affording the School District Eleventh Amendment immunity.

3. How The Entity Is Funded

Although school districts receive aid from the state, they are funded locally. For example, school districts have the duty to raise by tax moneys required to pay teachers' salaries. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 1709(20). The budgets of central school districts are determined on a local basis. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 1804(4) ("The board of education . . . shall hold a budget hearing . . . and shall prepare and present to the voters at such budget hearing a proposed school district budget."). Just because school districts may receive financial assistance from the state does not automatically transform them into an arm of the state. Fay, 802 F.2d at 27; Rosa R., 889 F.2d at 437 ("Although local boards receive much of their funding from the state, '[i]nferior government bodies do not share in Eleventh Amendment immunity simply because they receive state funds.'") (quoting Fay, 802 F.2d at 27). The Court finds that this factor weighs against Eleventh Amendment immunity.

4. Whether The Entity's Function Is Traditionally One Of Local Or State Government

The fourth factor does not decidedly point one way or another, but does point against finding immunity. Arguably, Lanza stands for the proposition that education is a state function. Lanza, 11 N.Y.2d at 326 ("[M]embers of a Board of Education . . . are officers of an independent corporation separate and distinct from the city, created by the State for the purpose of carrying out a purely State function. . . ."). Indeed, the obligation to provide a public education is imposed upon the state pursuant to the New York State Constitution. N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1.

Looking back through history, however, it appears that education traditionally was a local function. See Reform Educ. Fin. Inequities Today v. Cuomo, 86 N.Y.2d 279, 284 (1995);² Paynter ex rel. Stone v. State of New York, 290 A.D.2d 95, 99 (4^th Dep't 2001) ("By 1894, there were 11,778 local school districts . . . each of which was required by State law to provide a free education "to all persons over five and under twenty-one years of age residing in the district.") (quoting L. 1881, ch. 528, § 3); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State of New York, 86 N.Y.2d 307, 320 (1995) (noting state interest in preserving and promoting local control of education). As discussed in Reform Educational Financing Inequities Today, Article XI, § 1 of the New York Constitution was adopted to ensure that responsibility for the provisions of public education was placed on the state; not elsewhere. Thus, the Court finds that, traditionally, education was not a state function and this factor, too, points against Eleventh Amendment immunity.

2 The Reform Educational Financing Inequities Today Court gave the following historical analysis of the purpose of art. XI, § 1 of the New York Constitution:

"[T]he evident purpose of [the Education Article] was to deprive the legislature of discretion in relation to the establishment and maintenance of common schools, and to impose on that body the absolute duty to provide a general system of common schools" (3 Lincoln, Constitutional History of New York, at 554). Thus, the primary aim of the legislation was to constitutionalize the established system of common schools rather than to alter its substance (see, e.g., Report of Common Education and Funds Pertaining Thereto, 2 Documents of NY Constitutional Convention of 1894, Doc No. 62, at 3; Judd v. Board of Educ., 278 NY 200, 210). That system consisted of 11,778 local school districts with varying amounts of property wealth which offered significantly disparate educational opportunities (Fortieth Ann. Report of State Superintendent of Public Instruction, 6 NY Assembly Documents of 1894, Doc No. 42, at 76-83, 88-95).

Reform Educ. Fin. Inequities Today, 86 N.Y.2d at 284.

5. Whether The State Has A Veto Power Over The Entity's Actions

This fifth factor is somewhat mixed, but, on balance, weighs against Eleventh Amendment immunity. It is clear that the Commissioner has some review powers of the decisions of local boards of education. For example, the Commissioner can remove board members, superintendents, or other school officers for cause. See N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 306, 1706. Similarly, the Commissioner can withhold funds from school districts under certain circumstances. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 306. The Commissioner is charged with general supervision over schools. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 305(2). The Commissioner also reviews petitions by "[a]ny party conceiving himself aggrieved." N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 310.

The Commissioner's power, however, is constrained and does not extend over all decisions. Local school boards exercise substantial discretion in the day-to-day management of the school districts without input or veto power by the Commissioner. Upon review of the Education Law, it appears that the school district, and the school district alone, has the authority and the duty to (1) adopt their own by-laws; (2) establish their own rules and regulations concerning order and discipline in the schools; (3) prescribe the course of study by which students are graded and classified; (4) prescribe the textbooks to be used; (5) purchase or lease sites for school-related purposes; (6) take charge and possession of the schoolhouses, sites, lots, furniture, books, apparatus, and all school property within its district; (7) contract with and employ teachers; (8) determine the number of teachers so employed; (8) remove board members for misconduct; (9) raise by tax moneys required to pay teachers' salaries; etc. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 1709. These, and other, provisions of the New York Education Law makes it clear that substantial authority over local central school districts is vested at the local level; not the state level. See Rosa R., 889 F.2d at 437 ("Although the state board of education is charged with general supervision and control of the educational interests of the state, being a steward of state education policy does not make the school district an alter ego of the state. This is true . . . where actual implementation of the goals and maintenance of the public schools are the responsibilities of local boards whose members are chosen by municipal election.") (internal quotations and citations omitted). To the extent the Commissioner has review authority, N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 310, the Court believes there to be a fundamental difference between having the power of review upon petition and having a veto power. The Court has been unable to locate any authority whereby the Commissioner can, on his or her own, review decisions by school districts and reject them. Rather, the Commissioner only has authority when matters are properly presented to him or her.

In short, this factor does not decidedly point towards the inapplicability of the Eleventh Amendment, but that it does weigh against such immunity.

6. Whether The Entity's Financial Obligations Are Binding On The State

This sixth factor is, perhaps, the most important. McGinty, 251 F.3d at 100. "The relevant question with respect to this sixth factor is 'whether a judgment against the [School District] would have the practical effect of requiring payment from New York.'" McGinty, 251 F.3d at 99 (quoting Mancuso v. New York State Thruway Auth., 86 F.3d 289, 296 (2d Cir. 1996)). The sixth factor strongly weighs against finding Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Pursuant to the Education Law, local school boards "shall have power, and it shall be its duty" to "pay any judgments levied against the school district and in the event there are no moneys otherwise available, . . . levy a tax upon the taxable property of the district to pay the same." N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 1709(26). In further support of the conclusion that the state is not liable for the actions of school boards, Article X, § 5 of the New York State Constitution expressly provides that "[n]either the state nor any political subdivision thereof shall at any time be liable for the payment of any obligations issued by such a public corporation." Defendants have presented the Court with no authority for the proposition that the State of New York bears any responsibility for judgments against the School District.

In conclusion, the Court finds that application of these factors point in one direction — that the School District is not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. To the extent that application of these factors is not conclusive, for the reasons previously articulated, it is clear that "a suit against the [school district] in federal court would [not] threaten the integrity of the state and expose its treasury to risk," and, therefore, is not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.McGinty, 251 F.3d at 96.

b. Individual Liability Under the ADEA

Defendants also move to dismiss the ADEA claim as to the individual Defendants on the ground that there is no individual liability under the ADEA. This Court finds that the decisions of other courts that have held that there is no individual liability under the ADEA are correctly decided. Parker v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 97 F. Supp.2d 437, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Bottge v. Suburban Propane, 77 F. Supp.2d 310, 313 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (Kahn, J.); Donavan v. Eastern Milk Producers Co-op. Ass'n, Inc., 971 F. Supp. 674, 679 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (Pooler, J.); see also Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1313 (2d Cir. 1995), abrogated on other grounds, Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998). Accordingly, any ADEA claims against the individual defendants must be dismissed.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows:

(1) Defendants' motion to dismiss the claims against the School District on the grounds of Eleventh Amendment immunity is DENIED; and

(2) Defendants' motion to dismiss the ADEA claims against the individual defendants is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.